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Oregon Health & Science University seemed stuck in the backwaters of 
the nation’s academic health centers when Dr. Peter Kohler became its 
president in 1988. Its hospital hemorrhaged money, served rusty water from 
its faucets, and sometimes forced women in its cramped maternity ward 
to deliver babies in hallways. Legislators proposed bills to close it. State 
support for the university was on the decline as was maintenance on its 
aging buildings. Roofs leaked, walls cracked, and researchers struggled in 
dark, ill-equipped labs.
So Kohler and his young administrative team came up with a radical 
plan to help OHSU take control of its fate as a semi-independent public 
corporation. And they sold the plan to the legislature and state leaders.  
Free from constraints of the state and its university system, the health 
center’s creative and entrepreneurial power exploded. Over the next two 
decades, OHSU more than doubled its research, clinical and classroom 
space; tripled its employees; quadrupled its research grants; and expanded 
its operating budget five-fold, reaching the top echelon of the nation’s 
medical research universities.
This remarkable story offers a case study and possible model for other 
public universities and academic health centers now facing the same social 
and economic forces that drove OHSU to transform. 
William Graves has worked more than three decades as a daily 
newspaper journalist, including 23 years at The Oregonian in 
Portland. He is co-author of a book on education reform,  
Poisoned Apple, a graduate of the University of Puget Sound and 
Western Washington University, and a former Nieman Fellow at 
Harvard University. He and his wife, Karin, have three adult children 
and live in Beaverton, Ore.
“I know of no other academic health center or major public research 
university that ever made a change as radical as OHSU made in 1995:  
It left the state and the state system of higher education to operate 
largely on its own as a private corporation with a public mission. 
The architect of this change was Dr. Peter Kohler along with his leadership 
team, whose story unfolds in this excellent book, a worthwhile read for 
anyone with connections to academia or government.”
— Phil Knight, Chairman Emeritus, Nike Inc.
© Mark Graves
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Author’s Note
Peter Kohler, the former president of Oregon Health & Science Univer-
sity, contacted me in the winter of 2014 to see if I might be interested in
helping him and the five members of his former administrative team write
a book. I had spent twenty-three years covering education and health care
for The Oregonian in Portland, knew of Kohler, and had on a few oc-
casions reported on OHSU when he was its president. He and his team
wanted to tell the story of how they battled to free Oregon’s sole aca-
demic health center from the bureaucratic trappings of the state and its
university system by converting it into an independent and entrepreneur-
ial public benefit corporation and of the remarkable transformation that
followed. Kohler also wanted to show that OHSU’s transformation could
serve as a model for other public universities and academic health centers
struggling with declining state support and revenue.
He and his team initially set out to write this story themselves as a kind of
collective memoir. When I joined them, it became clear I would need to write
this remarkable story with them as the key players and primary sources. They
contributed money to the OHSU Foundation, which in turn provided me a
salary while I researched hundreds of documents and newspaper stories and
interviewed scores of current and former OHSU employees and state leaders
involved in its transformation. Without this funding, I would have been un-
able to write the story of these people and their institution.
I have approached this project as a journalist, striving to find various
and opposing views on the issues and to be as accurate as I can. I do,
however, tell this story from the perspective of Kohler and his team. I re-
lied on multiple interviews with all of them, worked closely with Kohler
throughout, and I try to tell the story they wanted to tell. At no time did
any of them interfere. All of them reviewed the manuscript, in some cases
multiple times, all with the view of ensuring the story was accurate.
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Introduction
A Singular Path to Change
On July 1, 1995, Oregon Health & Science University broke from the
state’s higher education system and plunged into the health care market-
place as an independent public corporation. While other public bodies in
Oregon and elsewhere had mixed government and corporate qualities, no
academic health center or major public research university had ever made
such a radical change—to break from the state and its university system
and chart its fate alone as a private corporation with a public mission.
OHSU’s transformation—and the way its administrative team carried
it out—offers a vivid case study in institutional change and leadership. It
is an instructive story for the growing number of public academic health
centers and universities facing the same disruptive forces that drove
OHSU to convert to a public corporation. And beyond public institutions,
it provides insights for any large organization willing to go through the
cultural and structural changes necessary to truly transform into a high-
performing operation.
LEADING CHANGE
As in all stories of organizational change, OHSU’s transformation is a
story about people. Dr. Peter Kohler—a trim, tall, forty-nine-year-old en-
docrinologist—arrived at OHSU in 1988 for his first attempt at running
one of about 125 academic health centers across the nation at that time.
Like many of the researchers and faculty whom he would draw to OHSU,
he was a rising star, most recently as dean of the medical school at the Uni-
versity of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio. He had a strong
track record of handling administrative duties at other academic health
centers, and he had a solid research background, including a prominent
role during his eight years at the National Institutes of Health.
“He was exactly the kind of president we needed,” says Dr. Markus
Grompe, genetic researcher and professor in the departments of Pediatrics
and Molecular and Medical Genetics at OHSU. “He was someone who
wanted research and had actually done it. He was a Howard Hughes [Med-
ical Institute] investigator, which is the elite. He had a really good balance
of knowing the research world and knowing the business world.”1
Kohler’s soft Virginian accent and genial, unassuming manner made
him an instant hit among Oregon leaders. And he deftly picked the right
people for the right jobs, assembling a young leadership team that devel-
oped a unique camaraderie over the years in their galvanizing struggle to
win autonomy for OHSU. Lesley Hallick, a molecular biology professor
and researcher, joined Kohler as vice president of academic affairs, the
leader who would convince a skeptical faculty it should support con-
version to a public corporation. Lois Davis, former chief of staff for
Congressman Ron Wyden (Democrat from Oregon), led the charge in the
legislature as the health center’s chief lobbyist. Timothy Goldfarb, direc-
tor of hospitals and clinics, showed how OHSU’s clinical services could be
a powerful economic engine for the health center if freed from state re-
strictions and allowed to compete as a business. James B. Walker, the uni-
versity’s vice president of finance and administration, had deep experience
running the hospital business in the face of state bureaucratic rules. He
built a compelling financial argument for making OHSU a public corpora-
tion even as he worried through sleepless nights whether it could ever re-
ally happen. The state assigned Janet Billups to OHSU as a young assistant
attorney general, but she soon became the university’s lawyer, charged
with the monumental job of combing Oregon’s statutes and nearly single-
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handedly writing Senate Bill 2, which would define OHSU’s powers and
obligations as a public corporation.
It wasn’t long after Kohler arrived at OHSU that he and his leadership
team concluded transformational change offered the best, and possibly the
only, path to a stable future. State funding had been declining for decades.
The university’s other major source of money, its small teaching hospital,
served largely indigent patients: it was a money loser that legislators more
than once proposed closing. It was widely viewed as a hospital of last re-
sort, even by OHSU employees, who went elsewhere for care. Rusty water
poured from its taps. Its maternity ward put as many as four mothers to a
room and was so limited in space that OHSU had to send some of its preg-
nant patients to other hospitals or into the hallway to deliver their babies.
Scuffed, worn, and cramped classrooms, research labs, and offices across
the campus needed repairs and remodeling.
After Kohler’s team led OHSU’s conversion into a public corporation,
state regulatory barriers fell like the Berlin Wall, releasing pent-up en-
trepreneurial talent that produced explosive growth. The expansion lifted
the university into the top research echelon of American academic health
centers. It quickly upgraded and expanded its hospital, which has become
the preferred choice for Oregonians and one of the top ten hospitals in the
nation for handling the most complex medical cases. Most of OHSU’s new
laboratories, clinics, surgery centers, and research institutes emerged after
it became a public corporation. It is impossible to say precisely how much
of the university’s dramatic growth can be attributed to its becoming a
public corporation, but research, business, and education leaders both in-
side and outside the university agree that the change played a major role.
Steve Stadum, a lawyer and former chief operating officer for OHSU’s
Knight Cancer Institute, argues the university could not have grown so
much if it had remained a state agency and part of the state university sys-
tem. “We would have never had a board,” he says. “We would have never
been able to issue debt, and we would not have ever been able to take risks,
be entrepreneurial and opportunistic.”2
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Current President Joseph Robertson says OHSU would be half its
size today if it had not become a public corporation,3 which he says was
“a foundational change” instrumental in its success. “OHSU is a much
larger yet leaner, more entrepreneurial institution,” he writes, “with wide-
spread excellence: nationally ranked education programs and world-class
research and patient-care programs.”4
Dr. Eric Orwoll, who directs OHSU’s clinical research program, says
“everything changed over a very short period of time” after the university
became a public corporation. Research expanded rapidly on campus, says
Orwoll, a world expert on bone biology and osteoporosis in men. “There
were new collaborations, new people, new opportunities for me as a
young faculty member,” he says. “It was a really fortuitous time to be here.”
Orwoll arrived at OHSU in 1977 before the conversion and initially
worked in “small, old, dark” laboratories in the old Veterans Admin-
istration Hospital on campus. Now he works on the top floor of the
fourteen-story Hatfield Research Center, which opened in 1998. The lab-
oratories are modern, well-equipped, “state of the art,” he says, not only
in the Hatfield Center, but also in the rebuilt VA Hospital and in OHSU’s
remodeled labs and towering new research buildings.5
RISE OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS
OHSU’s identity as an academic health center underscores the significance
of its transformation. The challenges of transforming any organization
rise with complexity, and there are few enterprises more complex than
academic health centers, which employ and enroll high concentrations
of society’s most intelligent people. Neither students nor faculty can re-
treat into the groves of academe because they are daily immersed in the
practical demands and drama of helping people who are injured, sick,
and sometimes dying, says Dr. Steven Wartman, president of the Asso-
ciation of Academic Health Centers (AAHC). University medical centers
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“are unique hybrids of business and academics. That, paradoxically, makes
them the hardest institutions in the world to manage.”6
Medical education, research, and health care programs coalesced into
academic health centers in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s as federal research
support and state funding increased. The federal government also offered
states financial incentives to enlarge their medical schools because health
leaders warned of a looming doctor shortage. Academic health centers re-
fined their professional and accreditation standards, writes Dr. Roger Bulger,
former president of the AAHC, and soon the university hospital rose as the
“clinical court of last resort for the most complex medical problems.”7
More recently, academic health centers have evolved into what might
better be described as systems or networks, says Wartman. They encom-
pass a growing geographic range of health and educational facilities with
a host of services, he says, and each “can be viewed as an organization
without boundaries.”8 Though they share the same three central mis-
sions—education, health care, and research—they differ widely in size,
structure, and areas of focus and expertise. About two-thirds are part
of a comprehensive undergraduate university, such as the University of
Washington Medical Center; 19 percent are part of a university system;
and 21 percent are freestanding health science universities like OHSU.9
About a third are public, though the gap between public and private acad-
emic medical centers has narrowed, says Wartman.
“The economic realities and political realities have made the public act
more like the private,” he says. “They had to become more entrepreneurial.”10
Although academic health centers play a critical national role in train-
ing most health professionals, save lives in the most complex medical
cases, provide health care for the poor, and conduct advanced medical re-
search, their collective force on the American health care landscape is not
clearly documented. While the AAHC does not provide a current number
of academic health centers, a recent publication estimates it to be about
140.11 These centers command a significant share of the $3.1 trillion an-
nual health care spending in the United States, but neither the AAHC nor
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the Association of American Medical Colleges can say precisely what that
portion is. A 2014 report on the nation’s academic health centers says the
more than “110” academic health centers earned more than $175 billion a
year from patient services and $14 billion in National Institutes of Health
research funding. The report estimated that US academic health centers
collectively employ about 1.2 million people.12
In addition, reports by the AAHC say the medical centers collectively
enroll more than 325,000 health profession and graduate students and
spend $19 billion on research and more than $6 billion on uncompensated
patient care each year.13
“They are (major) economic engines in the communities in which
they are embedded,” says Wartman. “Many serve as safety nets as well.”14
DECLINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION
By the time Kohler arrived at OHSU in 1988, the academic health center
boom of the 1950s through the 1970s had subsided, giving way to rising
health education costs and waning state support. The hospital strug-
gled financially in a market that was becoming increasingly competitive
as the health insurance industry moved away from fee-for-service to
managed care. The latter model limits customer choices in doctors and
hospitals and pays providers on a flat per patient basis, all to control
costs. OHSU, like all academic health centers, had a disadvantage in the
managed care market because of the higher costs of its more complex
services. What’s more, Oregon voters in 1990 passed a property tax lim-
itation measure that almost guaranteed OHSU its state revenue would
plummet rather than rise.
When he was hired, Kohler had been told to expect state funding to
soon climb to about 30 percent of the health center’s budget. But instead,
it remained flat, and the tax limit pushed it lower. This dramatic decrease
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in state funding, more than any other force, drove Kohler to seek more
independence for OHSU. The university needed to fix buildings, upgrade
its clinics, and expand its research capacity if it was to draw paying pa-
tients and first-rate faculty. So Kohler had to either succumb to the decline
and bury his dream of making OHSU a great academic health center or
find another way. When the medical center transformed to a public cor-
poration and split from the state and its higher education system, it was
collecting about a fifth of its operating budget from Oregon’s general fund,
down from two-fifths twenty years earlier. The decline in state support
continued over the following two decades, during which OHSU’s budget
grew fivefold to $2.5 billion a year, less than 2 percent of which came from
the state.
Today, public universities across the country face similar irreversible
declines in state support. In early 2016, the University of California at
Berkeley launched a “strategic planning process” aimed at helping it adjust
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to what Chancellor Nicholas Dirks called the “new normal” of decreasing
state support. The prestigious public research university once depended
on the state for half of its support, but that had plunged to only 13 percent
of its $2.6 billion budget. With state limits on tuition increases and rapidly
rising pension and health care costs, the university was operating with an
annual deficit of about 6 percent or $150 million.15
At about the same time, public universities in Illinois were faced with
layoffs and other drastic measures because a legislative budget fight had
blocked their state money for seven months. Eastern Illinois University
prepared to lay off 198 civil service workers and possibly close early.16
Chicago State University had exhausted its reserves, could not meet its
next month’s payroll, and declared financial exigency, which, among other
cuts, would allow it to fire tenured professors.17 The City College of
New York—a system of twenty-four colleges, including eleven four-year
schools, serving 274,000 students—had a 17 percent drop in state funding
over the eight preceding years, while tuition climbed by $300 per year
in a system that was tuition-free in 1976.18 In Louisiana, faced with a
$900 million deficit in its state budget, the state higher education system
braced for at least $70 million in cuts on top of $684 million in cuts since
2008.19 Former US Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings had just
taken office as the new president of the University of North Carolina sys-
tem and was greeted by faculty and student protests after years of budget
cuts, pay freezes, and fears the system was losing its national stature.20 In
Kansas, Governor Sam Brownback ordered a $17 million cut in spending
on the state’s public colleges over the next four months to close a revenue
gap.21 Dirks concluded the American public university was under siege.
“What we are engaged in here is a fundamental defense of the concept of
the public university,” he says, “a concept that we must reinvent in order
to preserve.”22
Despite modest increases in state support for public institutions
four, five, and six years after the Great Recession, most observers do
not expect those increases to be permanent nor to reverse a long-
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term trend of decline. State funding for higher education, including
community colleges, collectively climbed 5.7 percent nationwide in the
2013–14 year to $86.3 billion, but still fell below annual levels for
2008 through 2011. Between the Great Recession and fiscal year 2014,
state support dropped 19 percent nationwide in per student spending,
from $8,081 per student to $6,552 (in constant-adjusted 2014 dollars).
Changes varied widely among states. Funding shot up 50 percent in Illi-
nois, 38 percent in North Dakota and 6 percent in Alaska during this pe-
riod. But it dropped in every other state. Allocations plunged 41 percent
in Louisiana, 39 percent in Alabama, and 37 percent in Pennsylvania,
and fell by a more modest 5 percent in Wyoming, New York, Montana,
and Nebraska.23
Over the long run, state funding can be expected to continue to de-
cline, says Thomas G. Mortenson, a higher education policy analyst. Based
on trends since 1980, Mortenson figures, “average state support for higher
education will reach zero by 2059.”24
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Public universities have turned to tuition to make up for lost state
support. Over the two decades between 1995 and 2015, on average tuition
and fees more than doubled from $4,399 to $9,410 in 2015 dollars.25 Tu-
ition and fees have climbed so high they threaten to squeeze out middle-
class students, let alone those more economically disadvantaged. Federal
student financial aid through loans and grants, which totaled about
$134 billion in the 2013–14 school year, has helped replace lost state
revenues, but university leaders believe that, too, is finite.26 The federal
government may start requiring states to demonstrate a certain level of
support before it will provide financial aid to their students, says Portland
State University President Wim Wiewel. He says he does not see how
public universities can sustain their quality without more state support.
“We’ll continue to raise class sizes because we are going to continue
to increase the number of non-tenured track faculty,” he said. “We will do
whatever it takes to make a cheap education possible. And clearly there are
pressures to make that happen. Because we have reached a limit to what
we can do through tuition. We can’t keep raising tuition without seriously
reducing the number of students we get, and then you get into a down-
ward spiral.”27
Universities have other sources of money, including research grants,
investment earnings, dormitory and dining hall fees, event ticket sales,
and parking receipts. Yet while their collective income from all sources
continues to outpace inflation, it is not enough. Public universities in
recent years have frozen salaries, cut staff, allowed class sizes to grow,
deferred maintenance on their buildings, and reduced programs, slipping
into a vicious cycle of decline.
“Even while their tuition charges are soaring, revenue-starved public
campuses are in a long-term state of decline that shows no sign of re-
versing,” writes James Garland, former president of Miami University in
Ohio, an alarm echoed by many other authors.28
As a result of this trend, universities have had to cut into the heart of
their enterprise—the quality of their faculty. They are replacing full-time
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professors with lower-cost lecturers, instructors, and part-time adjuncts.
The proportion of full-time faculty in all public and private universities
has plunged from 78 percent in 1970 to 51 percent in 2013,29 and not all of
those full-time professors are tenured or on tenure tracks. About 70 per-
cent of US higher education’s professors are contingent—adjuncts and
non-tenure track lecturers and instructors.30 Universities also are skimp-
ing on deferred maintenance to balance their budgets, creating growing
backlogs of buildings in need of repair. The deferred maintenance price
tag for Arizona’s three public universities, for example, stood at over a
half a billion dollars in the 2014–15 school year. The state gave the uni-
versities $3 million for maintenance that year after seven years of no
money at all.31 A 2015 survey of Schools of Agriculture at ninety-one
universities found a total $8.4 billion in deferred maintenance that re-
duced the asset value of more than 15,000 buildings by nearly a third,
according to a report by Sightlines, a firm that helps universities manage
their facilities, and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universi-
ties.32 The New York Times described how declining state support played
out at City College of New York, where on its “handsome Gothic campus,
leaking ceilings have turned hallways into obstacle courses of buckets.
The bathrooms sometimes run out of toilet paper. The lectures are be-
coming uncomfortably overcrowded, and course selections are dwindling,
because of steep budget cuts.”33
PUBLIC DEFUNDING OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS
The trend of eroding state funding for public higher education in general
is no less significant for academic health centers. Over the quarter century
between 1987 and 2012, the declines in state support are stark and nearly
universal. The portion of total revenue coming from the state dropped
from 68 percent to 20 percent at the University of Arkansas for Medical
Sciences in Little Rock, from 65 percent to 35 percent at Georgia Health
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Sciences University, from 64 percent to 39 percent at the University of
Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, from 46 percent to 29 percent at the
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and from 32 per-
cent to 17 percent at the University of California at San Francisco.34
Academic health centers cannot count on much money from tuition
since they enroll relatively few students, but they are slightly better posi-
tioned than other public universities to deal with declining state revenue:
they can generate income through their hospital and clinical services. Those
services also bring some indirect government support. The federal govern-
ment pays for Medicare patients, and the federal and state governments
share the costs of Medicaid patients. In addition, Medicare recognizes the
benefits to society of training doctors by giving academic health centers
$3 billion a year. Medicare also gives teaching hospitals about $6.5 million a
year to compensate for the added costs of caring for more severe cases.35 But
depending on clinical revenues and Medicaid and Medicare payments has
limits. At OHSU, for example, Medicare and Medicaid account for 55 per-
cent of the payer mix and so about half or less of its patient revenue.36
The realities of declining government support have brought other academic
health centers to the same place OHSU was two decades ago, when it faced a
growing deferred maintenance backlog, staff cuts, legislative threats to close
its hospital, and declining quality.
INSTITUTION, HEAL THYSELF: THE OHSU MODEL
At OHSU, Kohler’s solution to declining state support was to win the uni-
versity enough autonomy to take charge of its fate. By becoming a public
corporation, OHSU was freed of state regulations that hampered its abil-
ity to grow and compete in the health care marketplace. Once on its own
as a public corporation, it could borrow its own money on Wall Street to
improve its research and clinical facilities, attract top-quality researchers
and faculty, and reposition itself on an upward trajectory. Not all academic
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health centers and public universities need to become public corporations,
but they need to find more independence and more ways to sustain them-
selves with less government help, say many experts. John Woodward,
a health finance specialist who helped OHSU during its transition, says
other public universities and academic health centers need to prepare for
that day when state tax money dries up.
OHSU “is the model,” he says. “You have to be able to stand on your
own.”37
Other higher education leaders are reaching the same conclusion. For
example, James Garland, the former Miami University president, says the
traditional business model of public universities, with its heavy reliance
on state subsidies and tuition, is failing. He proposes a different business
model that resembles the OHSU public corporation. He argues that instead
of giving money directly to their public universities, states should give it to
students in the form of scholarships. This would create market incentives
among universities to compete for students and their money by offering
better education at better prices. To compete effectively, Garland says, the
universities should be freed from state systems and bureaucracies to become
“semiautonomous, publicly owned but independently governed, tax exempt
corporations.” Each university would have its own governing board and the
power to set tuition and salaries, award contracts, accept gifts, and make
changes in admission and graduation standards.38
Most academic health centers and universities are fervently seeking op-
tions to stay solvent, even as they draw more heavily on hospital and clinical
revenue, tuition, alumni contributions, philanthropy, endowments, and in-
vestments to cover their bottom lines. Because Oregon was among the first
states to see state funding on an inexorable descent, it was the first to re-
lease an entire academic health center from its state university system. Other
venerated public institutions over the last two decades have shown an in-
terest in seeking more autonomy, but their legislatures and political barriers
have limited their success. State funding had slipped to 14 percent of the to-
tal budget for the University of Virginia and 22 percent at Virginia’s College
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of William & Mary when, in 2005, both won some independence from the
state system in exchange for meeting certain performance goals. In recent
years, the University of Oregon, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Med-
ical University of South Carolina, University of California at San Francisco,
and others have sought to win legislative approval to part with their state
systems and become independent universities.
Many of these efforts failed because of political blowback. Richard
Lariviere, for example, was fired as president of the University of Oregon
(UO) in 2011 after he defied the State Board of Higher Education in a
hard-charging push to pry UO away from the Oregon University System
and create its own board. In the same year, Chancellor Carolyn A. “Biddy”
Martin tried to broker a deal with Governor Scott Walker to sever Madi-
son, the flagship, from the University of Wisconsin system. After facing
nearly a year of political turmoil and protests over that plan, Martin
moved on to lead Amherst College in Massachusetts, and Madison re-
mained in the university system.
In contrast, Kohler and his team were fortunate to encounter a fa-
vorable political climate in Oregon, which contributed to their success in
winning support for OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation. Repub-
licans, who controlled both houses of the Oregon Legislature, had long
preached that government should operate like a business, and now here
was a government enterprise proposing to do exactly that. State leaders
and voters were in the mood for big changes. The legislature had just
passed a sweeping public school reform plan, and voters had approved
the property tax limit that made it harder for the state to pay for its
universities. OHSU’s proposed change had the support of newly-elected
Democratic Governor John Kitzhaber, an emergency room physician
who trained at its medical school. And state leaders knew the university’s
hospital was struggling to make money and could become a serious
economic drain on the state if something didn’t change. Still, the uni-
versity had proposed a radical move. Not everyone was ready to turn
the state’s only academic health center loose. Some university leaders
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still saw OHSU, for all of its problems, as the “crown jewel” of Oregon’s
higher education system.
This case study of OHSU’s transformation provides insights into lead-
ing and managing change that should interest leaders who want to take
their institutions on the bold and risky path to independence. It shows
how Kohler’s team won the support of Mark Hatfield, Oregon’s senior
US senator; governors Neil Goldschmidt, Barbara Roberts, and John
Kitzhaber; rural and urban, Republican and Democratic legislators; fac-
ulty, staff, unions, students; and the State Board of Higher Education and
university system chancellors Thomas Bartlett and Joe Cox. Kohler’s team
also engaged, and in many cases enlisted, many other powerful people in
their five-year campaign to transform OHSU, such as state Senate Pres-
ident Gordon Smith and state Senator Eugene Timms (Republican from
Burns), cochair of the legislature’s Joint Ways and Means Committee;
business leaders Fred Buckman, president and CEO of PacifiCorp; John
Gray, chair of GrayCo Inc.; Jerry Meyer, chair and CEO of Tektronix;
Mark Dodson, a Portland attorney and president of Northwest Natural
Gas; and Mike Thorne, former legislator and executive director of the
Port of Portland.
Legislators are accustomed to seeing state agency leaders come to them
with requests for money. But Kohler didn’t do that, says Thorne, the former
Senate leader who eventually served on OHSU’s board. Instead, the OHSU
president came to them with a solution. Once leaders saw where Kohler was
headed, Thorne says, “the reasons became obvious.”
Given the political paralysis that has gripped so much of government
in recent decades, the OHSU story offers a refreshing reminder, says
Thorne, that “if people get focused and are willing to commit themselves,
you can solve things.”39
The bill to transform OHSU into a public corporation won all but
three votes in the Senate and unanimous support in the House.
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NEW HORIZONS
Today, OHSU towers over Portland in a dense complex of medical, class-
room, and research buildings on Marquam Hill, commonly called Pill Hill.
Old buildings like the sprawling, sand-colored brick medical school mix
with new curved, gleaming glass-and-steel towers over 116 acres full of
researchers and clinics. From its high perch, the academic health center
has a view north over downtown Portland and beyond to the Columbia
River and Mount St. Helens. The view opens east to the Willamette River
winding into the city and the distant snow-capped Mount Hood and Cas-
cade Mountain Range.
Graphic by Mark Graves.
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Despite its lofty location, the medical complex had for nearly a cen-
tury looked inward and settled for provincial goals, leaving it relatively
obscure and unnoticed among the nation’s research universities and aca-
demic health centers. After becoming an independent public corporation
in 1995, however, it raised its sights and profile, expanded dramatically,
and became a player on the national stage. Today it looks outward with a
national vision more aligned with its commanding view.
Over the last two decades, OHSU’s research and operating budgets
and its philanthropy dollars grew fourfold, and it doubled the number of
people it employs, patients it serves, and degrees it awards. The medical
center upgraded its old buildings, overhauled the medical school curricu-
lum, and nearly doubled its square feet of building space, from 3.8 million
to 7.1 million. It expanded beyond Pill Hill to the Willamette River water-
front below and added buildings on its 300-acre West Campus near Hills-
boro, a city 20 miles west of Portland. There OHSU operates its Oregon
National Primate Research Center, Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute,
Neurological Sciences Institute, Institute for Environmental Health and
the Department of Biomedical Engineering’s Center for Spoken Language
Understanding. The university also runs rural health clinics and education
and research centers across the state. The once sleepy campus on Pill Hill
now pulses around the clock with its thousands of researchers, faculty, and
medical students engaged in its primary missions—research, teaching, and
health care.
In becoming a public corporation, OHSU was unleashed. It broke
from its past and state authority to pursue its independent vision, a break
that dramatically changed its culture and trajectory—a break that trans-
formed it.
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Chapter One
Setting the Stage
In the fall of 1983, an Oregon Health Sciences University1 recruiter invited
Jim Walker, chief financial officer for the University of New Mexico Hos-
pital, to apply for the same position at the academic health center’s hospital.
Dr. Donald Kassebaum, vice president for OHSU’s hospital services and di-
rector of the University Hospital, was having trouble finding someone for
the job. No one wanted to take charge of finances for a hospital that was re-
peatedly slipping into the red, desperately in need of upgrades and led by a
poorly organized team of administrators. What’s more, the job was on the
frontlines of an ongoing conflict between Kassebaum and the university’s
president, Dr. Leonard Laster—hardly an appealing place to be.
Walker—a good-humored man with wavy light hair, a mustache, and
a ready smile—was only thirty-five, one of the youngest medical center
CFOs in the nation, and he liked handling finances for the University of
New Mexico Hospital. Though used for teaching by the university, the
hospital actually was owned by the county, had its own board of direc-
tors, and enjoyed complete autonomy from the university. “I was happy
as a lark,” Walker recalled. He talked to the OHSU recruiter for about fif-
teen minutes.
“I really wouldn’t be interested,” he said.
The recruiter called again the next day.
“I’m happy here,” Walker said. “I love Albuquerque.”
But the recruiter kept calling. Walker had long wanted to visit the Pa-
cific Northwest and here was a chance for a free trip.
“I’d love to come,” he said. “But I’m not interested in the job. I could
come only if the director understands I’m not interested in the job.”
Within an hour, the recruiter called again and said the hospital would
pay for his visit, knowing he was not interested in the job. He told his boss,
the hospital’s chief executive officer, that he was going to make the trip to
get his first glimpse of the Pacific Northwest.
“That place is a mess,” his boss warned him, of OHSU. “That is not a
place you want to go.”
Walker visited the medical center and met with Kassebaum and Dave
Witter, chief operational officer for the hospital. He immediately saw why
OHSU was having trouble getting a finance officer. In addition to bad re-
lations with the university, the hospital was in a difficult financial bind
because of an awkward governance structure that forced it to run every-
thing except patient billing by the State Board of Higher Education.
But Kassebaum and Witter described to Walker efforts under way at
OHSU to expand its research capacity. Walker knew the only way a pub-
lic university could grow in size and excellence was to attract physicians at
the top in their specialties. High-performing physicians liked being close
to research and were drawn to major research universities where they
could keep abreast of the newest ideas. They in turn attracted paying pa-
tients. OHSU’s commitment to more research piqued Walker’s interest.
He returned to campus for a second visit and met the people who would
report to him.
“I was impressed with them,” he said. “That night, my wife and I
talked about it. She said, ‘This is up to you. Portland would be good for us
and the kids.’”
The next morning he went to work, still undecided, still mulling it
over.
“I thought the University of New Mexico didn’t have the potential to
really improve a great deal,” he concluded. “But Oregon just might.”
He called OHSU and accepted the job. Before reporting to work in
February of 1984, Walker and his wife took a two-week trip to Florida
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to visit Walker’s parents. Timothy Goldfarb, an administrator who had
joined the hospital a few weeks earlier, repeatedly tried to call Walker on
his trip and even left messages with his parents. But Walker told himself
he was on vacation and Goldfarb could just wait until he got to OHSU.
On his first day of work, Walker met in the morning with Kasse-
baum, who emphasized that Walker reported only to him and was to take
no guidance from President Laster. That afternoon, he met with Laster
who told him he was surprised to see Walker.
“I didn’t even know they were hiring a chief financial officer over
there,” the president said.
Laster made it clear to Walker that he was to report only to him and
was not to take his directions from Kassebaum. Then Walker went to see
Goldfarb and asked why the hospital administrator was trying to contact
him on his Florida vacation.
“I was going to tell you not to come,” Goldfarb said. “This place is so
dysfunctional. I didn’t want someone else making that mistake.”
Walker’s head was spinning.
“By the end of the first day,” he said, “I realized I had made a big mis-
take in taking this job.”2
On that first day, Walker had stumbled upon two factors at OHSU that
would become important in its transformation to an independent public cor-
poration, a change in which he would play a major role. First, he got a vivid
glimpse of the institution’s many problems—ranging from internal power
struggles and bureaucratic obstacles to financial fragility—that would help
President Kohler later make his case for the need to change. Second, he met
President Laster, who, despite strained relations with many members of the
faculty and administration, had a vision for taking OHSU to a level of ex-
cellence. Laster’s changes created friction with staff, but they improved the
university and put it on a more ambitious trajectory. That set the stage for
Kohler, whose vision for the institution fell right in line with his predecessor’s.
Laster’s administration also brought in people like Walker. While Les-
ley Hallick, the molecular biologist, was already at OHSU when Laster
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arrived, Lois Davis, the journalist and lobbyist, and Tim Goldfarb, the hos-
pital administrator, arrived during Laster’s tenure. Janet Billups was hired a
month after Laster left in November of 1987. Though Kohler didn’t hire any
of them, he spotted talents in Walker, Hallick, Davis, Goldfarb, and Billups
and pulled them together into a powerful leadership team.
Walker soon learned that the acrimony between the president and
the hospital director was only one of a growing number of challenges
threatening the financial health and future of the institution. Problems
had been brewing for years, and many of them were shared by medical
institutions across the country. The costs of medical schools and other
health professional education had been climbing for decades. With state
funding in sharp decline, that problem was coming to a head at OHSU.
Many, if not all, states had found it difficult to sustain a tax base to pay
for public and higher education, and an era of free medical school tuition
for students in affluent states such as California and Texas was already wan-
ing in the 1960s. Even as state support shrank, health professional education
needed to expand. The populous Baby Boomers were starting to put stress
on the health system. During the 1960s and 1970s, health leaders warned
of a looming doctor shortage for the country, so the federal government
offered states financial incentives to enlarge their medical schools.3 The in-
ducements helped launch, but not sustain, the expansion.
Also during this period, medical, nursing, dental, and pharmacy
schools—often with the inclusion of a teaching hospital—were being con-
solidated into academic medical complexes across the country. These new
entities, academic health centers, were being created as Medicare and
Medicaid became major sources of health care support for the elderly and
poor and potentially larger money streams for these institutions. In ad-
dition, Medicare provided teaching hospitals extra money to help pay for
their physician residency programs.4 Academic medical centers expanded
their clinical activities to serve not only an increase in patients but also to
raise more revenue as state support for faculty pay declined. More cen-
ters bought city and county public hospitals, often already partially staffed
4 TRANSFORMED
by their faculties, to train their students. But that also meant the respon-
sibility of providing care for poor and indigent patients shifted to these
state-owned institutions.
Research became an important enterprise for academic health centers
and expanded dramatically during this era, too. The annual budget of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) exploded following World War II. In
1947, it had an annual budget of less than $5 million. When Dr. James
A. Shannon became director in 1955, the budget had swelled to $65 mil-
lion, but Shannon had an even bigger vision for the agency. He believed
only government could finance research at the higher levels it needed to
reach. He emphasized fundamental research over applied and develop-
mental work as he established new institutes, including the institutes of
Child Health and Human Development, which would employ Kohler; of
Environmental Health Sciences; and of General Medical Sciences. By the
time Shannon left in 1968, the NIH budget had grown to $1.3 billion and
its staff had doubled to 13,300 people.5
Vannevar Bush, who had been head of the US Office of Scientific
Research and Development and chair of the National Defense Research
Committee during World War II, also used his influence after the war
to press the government into financing more research. He initiated the
Manhattan Project during the war, and in a report to President Truman
in 1945, he called for an expansion of government funding for science and
the creation of a national research foundation. His proposal was enacted
in 1950 by Congress as the National Science Foundation.6
Rather than create separate research institutes, as was done in France
and Germany, the United States turned to academic health centers for
its primary medical research sites. The creation of the National Science
Foundation, the blossoming of the NIH, and increases in research funding
resulted in major expansions of academic health centers, particularly in
the basic sciences. With expansion came growing pains. Academic health
centers relied on the three-legged stool of teaching, patient care, and re-
search. Research grants, however, came with overhead costs and could
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not be sustained without additional support. Academic health centers also
were expected to provide indigent care. By the 1980s, they were seeing
their state support sink as their costs for serving the indigent and sup-
plementing research rose. They collected tuition, but with relatively few
students, that accounted for no more than 2 percent to 3 percent of a med-
ical center’s budget. So academic health centers increasingly depended on
their hospitals and clinics for the revenue they needed to sustain their ex-
panding responsibilities.
THE FIRST PRESIDENT
All of these economic forces were hitting Oregon in 1974 when the State
Board of Higher Education approved consolidation of the University of
Oregon’s medical, dental, and nursing schools along with the medical
school’s hospital and clinical services into an independent state academic
health center. While the new health center operated independently of the
University of Oregon, it was initially called the University of Oregon Health
Sciences Center. The center would have its own president and remain part
of the Oregon State System of Higher Education. The board hired Dr. Lewis
William “Bill” Bluemle Jr., president of State University of New York’s Up-
state Medical Center in Syracuse, to be the Oregon medical center’s first
president. Bluemle was a tall, distinguished, and innovative nephrologist
with a charming demeanor and sharp mind. He used an electric motor from
his phonograph to develop a blood pump for the first clinically applicable
artificial kidney program at the University of Pennsylvania.
Three weeks after he arrived in Oregon, he was hit with a crisis:
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals withdrew University
Hospital’s accreditation for failing to address shortcomings identified
three or four years earlier. Part of the problem, Bluemle learned, was in
the hospital leadership. The accrediting board felt slighted during its visit
to the hospital.
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“Some of our people just didn’t show up for meetings when the team
came on its site visit,” Bluemle said years later.7
Kassebaum, who was hired by Bluemle to lead the hospital, said the
accreditation commission concluded the hospital was badly managed. The
commission said, “It’s unsafe,” he recalled. “It doesn’t meet environmental
safety standards. The doctors have no discipline. There’s no medical staff
organization. They don’t complete their medical records. You’ve got 3,500
incomplete medical records.”8
Without accreditation, the hospital could not qualify for reimburse-
ment from Medicare and Medicaid, which means “we would go out of
business,” Bluemle said. He scrambled to launch some initiatives and
promised improvements that won back temporary accreditation. The cri-
sis revealed a lack of energy and commitment on campus, he said.
Now, I noticed the first several weekends that I was in my new job
that our parking lot was kind of empty from Friday noon on for
the rest of the weekend. I had never seen that at the institutions
I’d worked at back East. I’m talking about faculty parking lots. And
of course the patient parking lots as well because the faculty were
taking care of the patients. And that bothered me. That didn’t have
anything directly to do with accreditation, but it had to do with
commitment, and I thought that was a sign that they were a little
too laid back, and maybe life was too easy, and maybe they needed
a little stimulation to perk up.9
Mary Ann Lockwood, who handled public relations for Bluemle, said
in a 1998 interview that the new president was bright and “very, very
nice,” but he had an aloof Eastern manner and distaste for small talk that
made him “a bit of a fish out of water” in Oregon.
“He was not good at dealing with Oregon’s legislators, and they felt he
was patronizing,” Lockwood said.10
Bluemle hired a pathologist named Dr. Robert Stone as dean of the
medical school. Stone, former dean of the University of New Mexico
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School of Medicine, had recently served two years as director of the
NIH under President Richard Nixon. He was fired, according to author
Richard Rettig, for failing to give strong direction to NIH and for promot-
ing medical research instead of the office of the US Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare.11 Lockwood said hiring Stone was “a disastrous
mistake.” Stone had a long, cheeky face, wavy brown hair, and penetrating
eyes. He was effective and tough. But he developed a reputation for also
being mechanical and impersonal and at odds with many of the school’s
leaders, including Bluemle. Hallick however, said she liked Stone and his
support for expanding the university’s research capacity.
Dr. Richard Jones, then the young chairman of the biochemistry de-
partment, recalled the first time he met Stone.
“The first thing he did when I sat down across from him was take out
his watch and put it on the table in front of him,” said Jones. “I kind of had
this feeling, ‘Boy, I’m working against the clock.’”12 Lockwood said Stone
didn’t really like Oregon and thought it was “small potatoes.”13
Bluemle also found Oregon too parochial, Kassebaum said, and left
after less than three years to become president of the private Thomas Jef-
ferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
“He didn’t like the legislature,” Kassebaum recalled. “He didn’t like the
mindset. He thought that the faculty was weak and the chairs were weak,
and he was right. They were inbred. In those days, they just kept appoint-
ing from within.”14
After Bluemle left, Jones, the biochemistry department chair, was ap-
pointed interim president for the fourteen months it took the state higher
education board to find a permanent one. In 1978, shortly after getting
that promotion, Jones fired Stone.
As interim president, Jones decided to move forward with Bluemle’s
unfinished business rather than launch new initiatives. One incomplete
task was building a new Shriners Hospital for Children on campus. Many
of the physicians serving as chiefs of staff at the old Shriners Hospital in
East Portland worked out of a clinic near Legacy Emanuel Medical Cen-
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ter in North Portland. Those physicians were urging the Shriners to build
near Emanuel. City leaders, including then Portland Mayor Neil Gold-
schmidt also wanted the Shriners hospital near Emanuel, arguing it would
create too many traffic and parking headaches on Pill Hill.
The university, of course, saw the hospital as a great asset for its medical
school students and clinical services. And the Shriners wanted to put it near
the university and researchers. Jones worked out a ninety-nine-year lease
agreement with the service organization to build the hospital on the north
lower slope of Pill Hill, near Gaines and SW Sam Jackson Park roads. But
the city would not issue building permits. The Shriners finally told the city
they would build a new hospital in Los Angeles if they were not allowed to
build on the hill. Within weeks, the Shriners had their permits.15
LASTER ARRIVES
Leonard Laster, a handsome, confident gastroenterologist from the East
Coast, became OHSU’s second president in 1978. He was a brilliant physi-
cian and researcher, born and raised in New York City and admitted to
Harvard College in 1944 at age fourteen. He graduated from medical school
in 1950 at twenty-one. As a young doctor, he joined the Public Health Ser-
vice and became a researcher at the NIH when the agency was in its infancy.
He stayed twenty-three years during NIH’s golden age, as it ushered in the
modern era of medicine and later produced nine Nobel laureates.
That period, he said, “was an extraordinarily exciting time” when the
institutes of health demonstrated “the benefits to people that come from jux-
taposing research, basic research and clinical care. It was a demonstration
of how medical care for its own sake, not for profit, the way it is today,
could produce some of the most caring and expert care imaginable. It was
Camelot.”16 His experience at NIH instilled strong values in him for research
and excellence, and a commitment to quality, to exceptional care over mar-
ketplace competitiveness, that would shape his leadership in Oregon.
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After leaving the NIH, Laster spent several years working for the sci-
ence adviser to President Richard Nixon, where he was shocked by what
he heard from political appointees in budget meetings. At one meeting,
they discussed cutting a medical program in half. Laster argued against the
idea. An economist turned and looked him in the eye.
“Len,” he said. “You must realize that the only cost-effective outcome
is death.”
“You must be joking,” said Laster.
“No, if you think about it, that’s the case.”
That, Laster said, was when he realized a stark gulf in values separated
the world of health care and economic politics.17
He moved on to become dean of the medical school at State Uni-
versity of New York Downstate Medical Center, where he soon became
frustrated by low state funding and an inability to attract top researchers.
He knew he would face the same challenges when he was recruited to the
University of Oregon Health Sciences Center in 1978, but at least there he
would be president and in a position to do something about it. He didn’t
know much about Oregon, but he had a fond memory of Portland and the
medical university campus, which he once visited to take his board exams
in gastroenterology.
“I think it was the one sunny day that Oregon had in the last 50 years,”
he said in a playful dig on Oregon’s abundant overcast skies and rain, “but
I remember standing on the steps of Baird Hall, looking out over the city,
river, and mountains and thinking, ‘How do people get so lucky to work
here?’”
Laster’s nine-year term at the helm of the university was marked by
both conflict and significant growth, especially in research. He was engulfed
in controversy even before he arrived thanks to his predecessor. The uni-
versity provided Bluemle and his wife a house, called the Miller House, near
the medical school and perched on Old Orchard Road in Portland Heights,
atop the Southwest Hills overlooking downtown Portland. Harold Miller—a
prominent Portland owner of a men’s clothing store and contributor to the
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Medical Research Foundation—donated the house. But the Bluemles didn’t
want to live in it. They instead rented an attractive gray clapboard home
with multiple rooms and bathrooms nearby on Portland Heights owned by
the Malarkeys, another prominent Portland family. Some members of the
public were offended, seeing the move as ungrateful and wasteful. After
the Bluemles left, university leaders decided to sell the Miller house and
use the money to buy the Malarkey home, and they promised Laster and
his wife that they could live there. But the university had to get approval
from the legislature to make the deal. Legislators turned down the request,
even though the university already had the money, because many felt college
presidents were getting too many perks, said Jones, interim president at the
time. The university president’s salary, $108,360 a year plus $7,600 for ex-
penses, was the highest in the state, including the salaries of the governor
and university system chancellor.18
The Lasters had sold their house and were vacationing on Cape Cod,
their furniture and goods packed in trucks heading west, when they
learned there was no house for them in Portland.
“We scrambled and we scrambled and we scrambled to find some-
place because they were ready to come,” said Lockwood, the public rela-
tions director.
Finally, Lockwood found another house to rent in Portland Heights.
Still, some residents criticized the university for being extravagant in sell-
ing the generous gift of the Miller House and attempting to buy the
Malarkey House.19 It was a cold reception for the Lasters—literally.
Shortly after they arrived, a storm knocked out their power and heat and
one of their three children came down with the flu. Still more criticism
came when the university bought beds for the Lasters’ children and re-
placed a broken washing machine in their rental with one purchased by
the physical plant on campus. There were charges of waste and excess.
“The media spin was that patients were being deprived of clean laundry
so that the president would not be inconvenienced,” according to notes in
the university archives.20 The Lasters later moved into another home on
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Montgomery Drive in Portland Heights, which was eventually donated to
the university and became Kohler’s residence during his tenure.
Laster faced other immediate challenges when he arrived on Pill Hill.
In his view, Oregon’s only academic health center suffered from a bad
self-image. The university offered its best jobs in medicine and surgery
to promising doctors elsewhere in the country and were turned down,
forcing them to select from within. Bluemle’s decision to leave after three
years was like being dumped by a parent, Laster said. James McGill, a
sixth-generation Oregonian hired by Laster in 1980 as chief administra-
tive and financial officer, said Laster saw the Oregon academic health
center as “in the backwater nationally.”21 One veteran staffer took Laster
aside and told him, “You know, nobody comes here.” When he arrived at
the university, it faced “an uncertain future at best and a plodding one at
worst,” and had become mired in mediocrity, Laster later wrote. “A dispir-
ited institution had lost self confidence and had settled into the central
region of the bell-shaped curve.”22
Laster also found the private sector in Oregon, including the private
hospitals, had no respect for government institutions. The enmity be-
tween the university and the local hospitals “was palpable,” he said. Once,
Laster asked the CEO of a large Oregon company for help rejuvenating
the health university and was immediately rebuffed.
“You’re a state institution,” the executive said. “I wouldn’t go near
state government with a 10 foot pole. You get dirty just thinking about it.”
Laster wrote down that prospect as “doubtful.”23
He also soon discovered that OHSU didn’t find much more respect
within state government and was “not the favored child” in the state
higher education system.
“It was partly because we didn’t have a varsity football team,” he said,
“partly because there was an attitude that really never went away that we
were training fat cats, high-income high rollers, and these were not the
dirt-under-the-fingernails farmers that are the real people of Oregon.”24
Similarly, the legislature thought the medical center was too expen-
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sive and always asking for too much. During his tenure, Laster said, bills
surfaced repeatedly to close OHSU’s hospital or the entire academic health
center, though none passed. 25 In addition, Laster found himself viewed
unfavorably as an outsider simply because he came from the East Coast.
During encounters with the Oregon university community, he said, he
got a message between the lines that said: “You’re an outsider; you don’t
understand the ethos of this medical school, and you’re trying to impose
something on it because you’re bringing in an outsider’s view.” 26
HATFIELD GETS INVOLVED
Early in his term, Laster inherited another conflict carried forward from
the interim Jones administration. The medical center was in a battle
with Portland leaders, again including Mayor Goldschmidt and Legacy
Emanuel Medical Center, over where to build a new Veterans Affairs
Hospital to replace the one on Pill Hill. US Senator Mark Hatfield (Re-
publican from Oregon), the state’s senior senator, was helping the project
with federal money. The university had developed a symbiotic relation-
ship with the VA Hospital and wanted to see it stay on the hill. But the
leadership in Portland wanted the VA Hospital, as with the Shriners hos-
pital, to be near Emanuel in North Portland as part of an urban renewal
project. Laster, with Hatfield’s help, persisted, and the new VA Hospital
went up on the hill.
Hatfield began cultivating a working relationship with Laster after the
senator had an epiphany upon learning Oregon legislators were thinking
about closing the medical school.27 Hatfield had drifted away from OHSU
after a long history with the institution. As a representative in the Oregon
Legislature, he helped find state funds to allow the dental school for the
University of Oregon in 1956 to move out of its forty-year-old building in
Northeast Portland into a $2.2 million ten-floor building on Pill Hill. As a
state senator on the Senate Health Committee in 1955, Hatfield carried the
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bill to the Senate floor that would create a teaching hospital for what was
then the University of Oregon Medical School. The bill for the proposed
hospital, which would later become University Hospital where Walker
worked, drew stiff opposition from the Oregon Medical Association. The
association’s representatives charged it was a step toward socialized medi-
cine and would create competition with existing hospitals.
Dr. David W. Baird, dean of the medical school, described by many as
politically savvy, advised Hatfield as they battled to pass the hospital bill.
“David Baird became my tutor basically on how to handle these charges,”
Hatfield recalled.28 Baird, who took command as dean in 1943, had led a
major expansion of the University of Oregon Medical School. Under his
leadership, the school constructed a home for a basic science department
and administrative offices in 1949, a building that today bears his name.
In 1952, the school built a four-story east wing to Emma Jones Hall, the
former nursing dormitory that today serves as home to the OHSU Depart-
ment of Family Medicine. The medical school’s full-time faculty also grew
dramatically under Baird’s leadership.
Hatfield and Baird became friends, which helped foster Hatfield’s af-
fection for the medical school. Later, while governor, Hatfield ended up
in University Hospital with what he called “fatigue attacks.” Baird came to
see him there. Another time during one of his campaigns, Hatfield was hit
with vertigo while staying at the Sheraton Hotel near Lloyd Center in east
Portland. His wife, Antoinette, called Baird, who came to the hotel to at-
tend on Hatfield.29
With renewed interest in OHSU after seeing state legislators try to
put it out of business, Hatfield started working with Laster and steering
federal funds to projects on Pill Hill.30 And nobody was in a better position
to control the flow of US money than Hatfield, chair of the Senate Appro-
priations Committee.
“Hatfield’s infusion of capital during the 1980s kept OHSU from
falling into such a deep hole it would have been impossible to ever re-
cover,” Walker said.31
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THE SOUNDING BOARD
Laster drew fire yet again in 1981 when the institution changed its
name from the University of Oregon Health Sciences Center to Oregon
Health Sciences University. He tackled the issue in his characteristic style,
said McGill, by working the problem intensely through conversations
with many people before reaching a conclusion.32 The change was neces-
sary. The medical center had broken from the University of Oregon as an
independent institution in 1974, and it needed to establish its own iden-
tity. But it seemed no matter what he did, Laster offended someone. From
time to time, he would call on Lesley Hallick, then a molecular biology
professor, as a sounding board. She was young, tall, with deep-set inquir-
ing eyes and a disarming smile.
“He would call me in and just chat when he was having a fight with
someone,” said Hallick. “I was a nobody, you know. I wasn’t a chair of a
department. I was really safe. And people liked me. . . . But he agonized. I
felt badly for him. He would take on one chair as a friend, and he would
burn through him. Then he would take on another chair as a friend. But
he always had more enemies than he had friends at any given time.”33
Hallick arrived at OHSU in 1977 after a brief career steeped in acade-
mics and molecular biology research. She grew up in Orange, California,
the daughter of a World War II fighter pilot, and earned her bachelor’s in
biochemistry at Pomona College in Claremont, becoming the first person
in her family to earn a college degree. She applied for graduate school and
was accepted by Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Rockefeller University in New York City, and the University of
Wisconsin. She chose the University of Wisconsin because her boyfriend
and future husband was going there.
“As a result [of that decision], I have an absolutely wonderful daugh-
ter and two terrific grandchildren, so I don’t regret it for a minute,” Hallick
said years later.34
After earning her doctorate in molecular biology, she took a post-
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doctoral fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley, where she
worked with Harry Rubin in virology and John Hurst in chemistry, study-
ing the structures of virus DNA and RNA. She was also able to work on
a collaborative project in the laboratory of J. Michael Bishop and Harold
Varmus, two inspiring researchers at the University of California at San
Francisco who went on to win the 1989 Nobel Prize in physiology. Var-
mus eventually left UCSF to head the NIH. Hallick taught and launched
research that would lead her later to explore virology, simian AIDS retro-
viruses, and DNA tumor viruses during her twelve years as a faculty
member in microbiology at OHSU. By the time she arrived at Berkeley,
she was married with a daughter. She and her husband divorced shortly
after their move to the Bay Area.
Laster often called on Hallick to head committees and campus ini-
tiatives because she had an appealing mix of energy, sagacity, and charm
that gave her extraordinary interpersonal and diplomatic skills. As a single
mother, professor, and researcher at OHSU, she still managed to earn cre-
dentials for preparing income tax returns and tax consulting, work she did
nights and weekends. She kept her license for thirty years. She liked num-
bers, and she liked being around people, especially after spending so many
hours isolated in a lab.35
Hallick seemed to have limitless energy for handling multiple jobs at
once. At Laster’s request, she explained molecular biology to a civic group
on Pill Hill called the Marquam Hill Society. When the higher education
system was slammed with a class action suit, charging discrimination in
salary against women, Hallick was singled out as an example. While she
was earning $18,000 a year, her male counterpart in biochemistry was
earning $21,000. But Hallick did not become a plaintiff, because she didn’t
feel like she was being discriminated against. She could see that no one, in-
cluding her boss, knew what other departments were paying their faculty.
Still, because she had become viewed by Laster as a reasonable person, he
asked her to chair an affirmative action committee to address issues of eq-
uity and discrimination at OHSU.
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“Mr. President, I don’t understand what this committee could do that
would be helpful,” she said. “It is just going to make everyone mad. It is
going to make you mad.”36
But Laster insisted. So after her sabbatical in the San Francisco Bay
area in 1983–84, Hallick took on that mission and recruited an affirmative
action officer, established a more open search process to fill professional
openings, and created a system that allowed administrators to compare
salaries.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Hallick got along well with Laster and just about everybody else. But she
soon recognized that for all of his brilliance, Laster seemed to have a blind
spot when it came to politics and diplomacy with his faculty, legislators, and
even the State Board of Higher Education that hired him. He begrudgingly
attended board meetings, after being reprimanded for simply skipping them,
and behaved as though he had no interest in the board business.37
Laster also rubbed faculty leaders the wrong way, probably in part
because he pushed them so hard. Dr. Joseph Bloom, chairman of the
OHSU Department of Psychiatry under Laster and later dean of the med-
ical school, called Laster a bull in a china shop. “He went a certain distance
and kind of wore out his welcome,” said Bloom.38
Laster could be a compassionate man, but he alienated the faculty,
“barked at everybody,” and refused to answer his mail—ever, Lockwood
said. Dr. John Benson, the university faculty’s first full-time gastroenterol-
ogist and later dean of the medical school, knew Laster when both worked
in Boston. Laster worked well with the community and foundation, he
said, but he was not well respected by the faculty.39
Dr. Frederick Fraunfelder, who arrived about the same time as Laster
to chair the Department of Ophthalmology, found the president so diffi-
cult that he agreed to lead a campaign to oust him. He said he collected
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signatures from twenty-four of the twenty-five department chairs asking
the State Board of Higher Education to replace Laster. Dr. George Porter,
chair of the Department of Medicine, flew to Washington, DC, and asked
Senator Hatfield to support the chairs’ call for dumping Laster, Fraun-
felder said. But Hatfield shared Laster’s vision for OHSU and wanted to
see it realized.
“He said, ‘No, you are not going to get rid of this man,’” recalled
Fraunfelder.40
Even so, Fraunfelder thinks his petition reached the state board,
though he did not present it himself. Not surprisingly, four years into his
presidency, Laster received a less than glowing job evaluation from then
Chancellor Roy Lieuallen. He had been accused by faculty and other ad-
ministrators, the performance review said, of being too abrasive, aloof and
intimidating. The chancellor said, “we agree that he must be responsive to
them [his critics] and modify his administrative behavior.”41
The State Board of Higher Education decided to ease friction by as-
signing James McGill a new title of vice president, with responsibilities to
deal with the faculty and internal management. He essentially took over
chief executive officer functions, and let Laster concentrate on external re-
sponsibilities such as raising funds and working with legislators and the
Oregon congressional delegation.42
“We turned Leonard loose at what he was good at; fund-raising is his
strong suit,” said James Peterson, president of the state board.43
With the change, deans and clinical chairs could go to McGill instead
of Laster to negotiate salaries, purchases, or new initiatives. When Hallick
was ready to propose her affirmative action committee’s action plan, she
went to McGill rather than Laster. The president accepted the state
board’s intervention. “I’m very demanding,” he said in a story in The Ore-
gonian, the Portland-based statewide newspaper. “I’m not going to settle
for second best.”44
McGill said he warned Laster the new division of leadership respon-
sibilities may work for a while, but it could not persist. “You don’t, over a
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long period of time, have the CEO of an institution divorced or two arms’
length from some of the key day-to-day operation of an institution,” he
said. The arrangement worked pretty well, he said, for about four years
before his relationship with Laster “began to fray.”45
The president continued to stir conflict both in and outside the aca-
demic health center. A year after the board warned Laster to “modify his
administrative behavior,” Walker arrived to find him still immersed in
conflict with Kassebaum. Years later, Kassebaum said he had initially sup-
ported Laster, shared his vision for OHSU, even backed his being selected
as president, and got along with him well for about three years before
their personalities began to clash.46
THE MAN WHO LOVES HOSPITALS
Laster’s personnel conflicts were apparent to Timothy Goldfarb when he
found his way to OHSU through Kassebaum in early 1984. At that time in
the summer of 1983, Goldfarb, a young man with dark eyebrows and mus-
tache, and his wife, Laura, were both looking for work in the health field.
They had been around one another since they met as adolescents at a church
camp in the mountains of Arizona, and they wanted to keep it that way. But
after they completed college and married, she found work as a midwife in
Phoenix while he landed a job as senior associate administrator of the new
hospital at the University of Arizona’s medical center in Tucson. Neither
could find work in the other’s city. They eventually grew tired of being sepa-
rated and decided one weekend in the summer of 1983 to quit their jobs and
find a place where they could both work. OHSU offered such a place. Gold-
farb knew OHSU was having internal organizational and financial problems
when Kassebaum offered to make him associate director of the University
Hospital. But it was a job that would keep him close to Laura, who could
work as a midwife at a federally subsidized health clinic in Woodburn, a
small city thirty miles south of Portland.
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Though he expected problems, Goldfarb was shocked by the dysfunc-
tion and disrepair at OHSU, especially in contrast to the new, smooth-
functioning hospital he left behind in Arizona. As would be the case with
Walker a few weeks later, Kassebaum emphasized he was Goldfarb’s su-
pervisor while Laster told the new hire to report only to him. Then
Goldfarb was shown to his tiny office on the ninth floor of the hospital.
His desk filled the room, so much so that to get to his chair, Goldfarb had
to step over the desk.
“They just didn’t understand how bad things were or how good things
might be,” he said.47
He was barred from talking to other hospital or university admin-
istrators without Laster or Kassebaum in the room. The two executives
each worried that administrators might conspire in factions to get rid of
them, Goldfarb said. And there were factions. Fraunfelder, the Depart-
ment of Ophthalmology chair; Porter, the Department of Medicine chair;
and other faculty claimed the cafeteria in the old county hospital as a meet-
ing place, Goldfarb said.
“They would go to that cafeteria and kibitz about ways to get rid of
Laster,” he said. “I kept trying to close the cafeteria to save money . . . They
resisted mightily. I never did close the cafeteria.”48
He and Walker met clandestinely off campus to discuss ways to im-
prove the hospital. “It was exciting; it was kind of dangerous,” Goldfarb
said.49
Despite the university’s problems, Goldfarb said, he loved being in the
hospital because he grew up in a hospital. Shortly after Goldfarb was born
in Jerome, Arizona, in 1949, his father came down with polio, was un-
able to move his arms and legs and was put into an iron lung to help him
breathe. His father spent sixteen years in the iron lung, mostly in hospitals
in Cottonwood, which is near Jerome, and in Prescott and Phoenix, be-
fore he died of pneumonia, and those hospitals are where Goldfarb spent
much of his youth. Since earning his master’s in health services adminis-
tration in 1978, Goldfarb has lived much of his adult life in hospitals too.
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When the thirty-four-year-old administrator arrived at OHSU, he set his
sights on making its hospital a good place to spend his days.50
AN IMPULSIVE HIRE
Lois Davis also joined OHSU during Laster’s tenure, though she had no
plans to do so when she visited him in October of 1986. She had worked
since 1979—first as a press secretary and then four years as chief of
staff—for US Representative Ron Wyden, a Democrat from Oregon. She
and her husband, Jim, were ready to leave Washington, DC, with their
daughter and return to Oregon, where Jim grew up and where both had
family. So Davis headed out to Portland to explore employment possibili-
ties. Her first stop was to meet Laster for an informational interview.
She talked with him for about twenty minutes. Then he said, “I have
some people I want you to talk to.” About 15 minutes later, Davis found
herself facing a half-circle of five OHSU administrators, including Dave
Witter, then serving as interim chief executive officer for the hospital.
“So tell me why you want this job?” asked Witter.
“What job?” replied Davis. “I didn’t know I was interviewing for a
job.”
The interviewers burst into laughter.
“That’s so Len Laster,” said Witter.
Laster was looking for a lobbyist for the upcoming 1987 legislative
session who could also direct special projects and be a liaison to the faculty
and chancellor’s office. Davis told the interview committee she could han-
dle government relations but knew nothing about working with faculty,
particularly at a medical school. After the interview, she went to Wyden’s
office in downtown Portland. Minutes later, Laster called her and offered
her the job. OHSU had been only her first stop on a networking tour, she
told him, and she was not sure this was even the kind of job she wanted.
Laster said he would give her twenty-four hours.
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When he called the next day, Davis said she needed more time. Laster
gave her a week. During that week, Davis flew back to DC and learned
Laster had been urging Wyden to encourage her to take the job. She
agreed to give the job a six-month trial. Laster left eight months later;
Davis stayed for twenty-three years.51
The young woman with short brown hair and wide smile was a grad-
uate of the University of Oregon journalism school, had worked as a
reporter for the Springfield News in Oregon and attended law school for
a time before joining Wyden’s office. Like Walker, she soon discovered
OHSU had rocky relations with the legislature and with the chancellor’s
office and state higher education system. “We are always a thorn in their
side,” one university official told her.52 While most of the state system was
focused on its academic mission, OHSU also had to address its research
and health care missions.
“None of the Oregon State System of Higher Education personnel
were particularly familiar with academic medical centers,” Davis wrote,
years later. “They did not understand what it took for OHSU to run its
clinical enterprise. And they had seven other universities that inevitably
resented the ‘special’ treatment that OHSU sought.”53
The state system made some concessions to OHSU, but not enough
to allow the university to perform at its best. Davis also saw the shaky
relationship between the two play out in the legislature. She didn’t get
much guidance for her new lobbying job. She said she was essentially told,
“Here’s a map of Oregon. Salem is 50 miles south. Go get us some money.”
But she did get one very specific assignment. “I was told to watch the
chancellor’s staff like a hawk.” Witter told her that given the option of
more money for the state university system or for University Hospital, the
chancellor’s office would sell OHSU down the river every time. And Davis
saw that play out during her first years on the job. She recalled:
When the system’s budget was under consideration, I could almost
guarantee legislative staff members would come to me to tell me
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that the chancellor’s office was dealing away the hospital’s money
in the back rooms. I’m sure these situations were not the result
of ill will: It is not hard to understand why the chancellor’s staff
would prefer to get funds that could be applied generally across all
of the Oregon State System of Higher Education institutions. But
the net result was to leave the hospital financially vulnerable—a
reality that did not win any friends on Pill Hill for the higher edu-
cation system. 54
It also did not take Davis long to learn what legislators thought of
Laster. The president asked her one day to set up a meeting for him with
a state senator, and Davis assumed that would be routine. She conveyed
Laster’s wish to the senator’s office and stopped by the next day to find out
when they could meet. A staff member said the senator refused to meet
with Laster.
“He said to tell you he will be happy to meet with you anytime,” she
told Davis, “but he will not meet with Laster.”55
LASTER’S VISION
At least part of the reason people found Laster difficult to work with was
that he set such high standards for the university and for himself. McGill
said Laster was “driven.” He worked almost every waking hour, even over
weekends, and put extreme pressure on himself. And he expected the
same of his employees, which put him at odds with “some who were will-
ing to settle for less than first rate, for top quality,” McGill said.56
In his speeches to the public and to the university, Laster railed
against mediocrity and repeatedly emphasized the importance of excel-
lence and quality.
“I know that excellence is becoming trite,” he said in a speech to the
Rotary Club of Portland, “but I believe the basic problem in this country
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today, in our businesses, in our governments and in our every societal ac-
tivity is a falling away from standards of excellence.”57
In another speech to the City Club of Portland, he hardly talked about
OHSU at all, choosing instead to focus on the concept of excellence and
how it should be valued in great minds as highly as it is in great sports and
entertainment figures.
“Too often, in our national life, we have settled for second best, for
mediocrity, and have taught that lesson to our children,” he said. “Above
almost all other human endeavors, the goal of medicine and the other
healing arts must be excellence and dare not be mediocrity.”58
He again chose to dwell on the importance of seeking “not on how
near we could come to average, but rather on how near we could come
to the best” in a 1986 speech. “Quality is, indeed, breeding quality,” he
said. “Achievement is breeding even greater achievement; and excitement
is breeding more excitement.”59
Laster’s push for excellence “served the institution well,” McGill
said.60 He did manage to forge good relations with some key people and
pushed forward with a vision for a more vibrant institution, a vision
rooted in those golden years at NIH. He wanted to build some measure of
the future of medicine at his institution.
“I thought, ‘let’s build something that is really of genuine excellence
here that will excite the people within; draw more excellence from the
outside, as the NIH did,’” he said. “‘Let’s start a Renaissance and get us
known around the country as a center of excellence.’”61
He turned to molecular medicine, an emerging discipline, as a place to
focus and decided the way to move into that field was to build a research
institute. New architecture could also boost the university’s self-image, said
Laster, who thought the campus had been “uglied up by that big, massive
medical school building [Mackenzie Hall].” But to build a research institute,
Laster needed money, and he wasn’t getting any from the legislature.
Even the Medical Research Foundation was at odds with the medical
school. The nonprofit foundation was created by Edwin E. Osgood, one of
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the university’s early researchers, and a group of other physicians and busi-
nessmen to raise money to stimulate and support medical research, not just
at OHSU but around the state. It would, for example, give young researchers
money to build a track record so they could compete for NIH funding. It also
served as a fiscal agent to administer grants coming to the faculty.
In the early 1960s, Dr. Don Pickering, a pediatric endocrinologist and
researcher, and Dr. Edward S. West, chair of the biochemistry depart-
ment, received millions of dollars from the NIH to establish the nation’s
first federally-supported primate center on donated land in Hillsboro,
west of Portland. The center would be owned and operated by the Medical
Research Foundation largely independent of the medical school save that
the school’s dean, David Baird, was appointed its principal investigator.
Pickering became director of the primate center and wanted to be princi-
pal investigator, too. He also spent NIH money on a mainframe computer,
which the NIH had not authorized. His actions irritated Baird, who even-
tually accepted Pickering’s resignation, though Pickering continued to
work for the foundation. The foundation’s board refused to let the Sec-
retary of State’s office audit the nonprofit, creating other consequences,
recalled Richard Jones, the interim OHSU president and longtime mem-
ber of the foundation’s board.62
“The Legislature decided, ‘Well, in that case, we can’t have the Med-
ical Research Foundation as the fiscal agent for grants coming from the
federal government and supporting research at the medical school, be-
cause that is a state school,’” recalled Jones.63
So the medical school set up a research support office to be fiscal agent
for its grants and donations, and the primate center operated indepen-
dently, through grants administered by the Medical Research Foundation.
“It was civil hatred between [the research board] and the medical
school,” Laster said. The president turned to other sources for money.64
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THE VOLLUM INSTITUTE
While serving on the board of directors for an Oregon company called
Tektronix, Laster met Jim Castles, a lawyer for Tektronix founder Howard
Vollum and a member of the MJ Murdock Charitable Trust in Oregon.
Tektronix made oscilloscopes and other electronic measuring equipment.
Laster told Castles he was trying to raise money to build a research institute.
Castles talked to the Murdock Trust, which then kicked in $500,000 for the
institute. Castles also introduced Laster to Vollum, who had a dim view of
the medical school and hospital because a pediatrician close to his family
had a falling out with its former dean. Even so, Laster and Vollum became
friends, and Vollum soon stepped up with a contribution.
“Jean [Vollum’s wife] and I are going to start out by giving you $5 mil-
lion to start an institute,” said Howard Vollum as he handed Laster an
actual check for $5 million.
“Not many people have that happen to them,” the president said.
Later, Vollum upped his contribution to $30 million with only one
request to Laster: “Bring seven-foot jumpers to the campus.”65
Hatfield then found Laster another $25 million in federal support. But
the senator said he didn’t want Laster to construct just another building;
he wanted him to create a new architecture, a new physicality, for the
campus. Laster hired architect Pietro Belluschi, former dean of architec-
ture at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Belluschi came to Portland.
One day, as he and Laster walked across the OHSU campus, the president
recalled, he pointed to the medical school building and said, “I wish you
would have been there when they built this monstrosity.”
Belluschi responded, “Before you go further, one of my good friends
designed that building. It is actually a school of architecture called Bru-
talism,” a style popular among universities in the 1960s and 1970s, which
expressed strength, functionality, and interior people-flows.
“Well,” replied Laster, “We have one of the classic examples of Bru-
talism in the world.”66
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Belluschi and Laster actually must have been talking about the medical
school’s eight-story Basic Science Building, now known as the Richard
T. Jones Hall for Basic Medical Sciences, which opened in 1971, a short
ways west of the main medical school building, Mackenzie Hall. The
Basic Sciences Building—designed by Campbell Yost Partners, an architec-
tural firm known for its exposed concrete styles—has Brutalism features,
including its angular, heavy cement exterior and windows framed and di-
vided by thick bands of steel. Mackenzie Hall was built long before the era
of Brutalism, but Laster also didn’t care for its design—a squat, three-story,
flat-roofed, sandy-brick rectangle, flanked on each side by a square wing
with a shallow pitched roof.
As construction got underway on the new research institute, Laster
again encountered a groundswell of opposition. Critics on campus called
the project a waste of money.67 He was facing “a faculty revolt,” Laster said.
“That was a very, very difficult time—and a shock, because I thought I was
doing something that would get people starry-eyed.”68
The faculty had been starved of state funds during the economic re-
cession in the early 1980s and felt the Vollum philanthropy should repair
some of that, said Benson, the former medical school dean.69 Some fac-
ulty members also objected to establishing the Vollum Institute outside
the medical school as a freestanding research operation, said Bloom, act-
ing chair of the Psychiatry Department during the debate.70
Opponents to the Vollum project sent delegations to Washington,
DC, to urge Hatfield to redirect the money to other projects. Kasse-
baum describes a day when all of the vice presidents and deans lined up in
Laster’s office to meet with Hatfield.
Hatfield said, “You’re giving Laster too much trouble, and you’re
letting your faculties quibble with him, and so forth, and you ei-
ther straighten up or get out of here, or I will give all my money to
the University of Washington.” So he blackmailed us.71
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After that meeting, Kassebaum said, deans and vice presidents began
leaving OHSU, including him. Some faculty members and administrators,
however, supported Laster’s efforts to build the research institute that
would bear Vollum’s name. Dr. Howard Lewis, former chair of medicine
and in his eighties at the time, visited Laster in his office.
“Len, one, I’m sorry you didn’t come while I was still chairman,”
Laster recalled him saying. “Two, what you’re doing is critical for this
place. And three, you’re going to run into the worst opposition imagin-
able. People don’t take change comfortably here. Don’t let them run you
down or run you out.”72
Other faculty members said the project gave them hope at a time
when they were considering leaving, Laster said. The president told Hat-
field the senator didn’t need this conflict and could walk out. He also
offered to give the money back to Vollum. But Hatfield and Vollum stuck
by Laster.
“Finish this,” said Hatfield, “because we have to plan the next one.”73
Laster observed that the conflict over building Vollum reflected how
the OHSU community resisted change and settled for operating with less.
People had learned to adapt to an unhappy situation. They never
really got enough of a budget. Their physical resources hadn’t been
replenished in I don’t know how many years. Their existence was
hand-to-mouth, juggling, grants, and it was tough to make it in
that environment. But those that had made it had an equilibrium
going, and here was an outsider coming in and upsetting things,
and that’s scary.74
Faculty and administrators also worried, Laster said, that if he suc-
ceeded in bringing in someone good to run the research institute, that
person would be “the favored child,” and they would be forgotten as
“also-rans.” And Laster did succeed. He heard about Edward Herbert, a
top-notch molecular biologist at the University of Oregon who had al-
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ready accepted a position to work for Harvard University in one of its
molecular biology research centers at Massachusetts General Hospital.
Laster went to see him and made an offer.
“Ed, here is a blank canvas, a new building, an endowment of $30 mil-
lion, and the freedom to do anything that your creativity will allow,”
Laster told him.
Herbert turned down Harvard and came to OHSU in 1983 as found-
ing director of the Vollum Institute. And that, said Laster, was the begin-
ning of the turnaround. While Laster gave the university a dream, he said,
“Hatfield and Vollum gave it life, and Ed Herbert gave it a soul.” Herbert,
Laster said, “was a seven-foot jumper.”75
Herbert was outgoing, helpful to clinicians and basic scientists, and an
effective recruiter. He persuaded Dr. Earl Zimmerman, a clinical neurolo-
gist and laboratory scientist, to leave Columbia University Medical School
to become chairman of Neurology at the OHSU medical school. OHSU
also lured Dr. Donald Trunkey from San Francisco to chair its surgery
department. Trunkey wanted to be near other neuroscientists as he con-
ducted research on trauma and head injuries.76
Success led to more success, momentum began to grow, and the
money began to flow. Hatfield was bringing in federal money for new
construction on Laster’s drawing board: a nursing school building, a li-
brary, and a bridge connecting the University Hospital complex to the
VA Hospital. Construction of the eight-story building for the Vollum In-
stitute for Advanced Biomedical Research was completed in 1987, just
before Laster left to become president of the University of Massachusetts.
Herbert died tragically of pancreatic cancer early that year before the in-
stitute he had helped create could move into its new building. About
two-thirds of the narrow, pink granite building—wedged between the
Medical Research Building and Richard T. Jones Hall for Basic Medical
Sciences—bows gracefully like a bay window, offering a softer, rounder
design in contrast to the angular Brutalism of its neighbor. With its pri-
vate support and endowment, the institute operates independently on the
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campus, though it is intrinsically connected with OHSU faculty and re-
searchers. Richard Goodman, a biochemist and molecular biologist and
Kohler’s first important recruitment, served as its director from 1990 to
2016 and lured many nationally prominent scientists. Among them are
Eric Gouaux, who developed new ways to characterize the structure and
function of nerve synapses and decode the signals nerve cells use to com-
municate, and Gail Mandel, who showed how glia and neurons cause Rett
Syndrome, an autism-spectrum disorder that strikes young girls. The in-
stitute’s researchers remain dedicated to the study of the molecular basis
of nervous system and brain function, studies that may someday cure
brain-related diseases such as multiple sclerosis, autism, drug addiction,
and stroke.
A LAWYER ARRIVES
Janet Billups arrived at OHSU about the time the Vollum building was
completed. She took a job with the Oregon Attorney General’s Office in
December of 1987 as the department’s lawyer for the health center and for
nearby Portland State University. She would be a critical player in giving
OHSU a legal path for its transformation into a public corporation.
Billups was a fourth-generation native Oregonian with ancestors who
came to the state on the Oregon Trail. She attended a small Seventh-
day Adventist college in Walla Walla, Washington, and completed law
school at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland.77 She passed the Oregon
bar exam in 1980, worked as a law clerk and later as a trial lawyer for
Multnomah County, which includes Portland, under one of the state’s leg-
endary trial lawyers, John Leahy.78
That experience would prove valuable for Billups when she took up
the challenge of drafting Senate Bill 2, the legislative and legal framework
for OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation. She had been working for
the county eight years when Leahy retired. She decided that was a good
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time to move on and joined the state Department of Justice as an assistant
attorney general. She again was forced into a quick study as she learned
the legal terrain of the academic world at Portland State University and
of the unique mix of academe and clinical medicine at OHSU. As a practi-
cal matter, she spent most of her time at OHSU. The medical center “was
very inviting” and “provided the space for me,” said Billups, who remains
a lawyer for OHSU.79
MONEY PROBLEMS
During those years, OHSU had plenty of other problems beyond its strug-
gles between its president and his faculty and administrators. It lacked
modern facilities and a critical mass of outstanding doctors who could
serve both as faculty and health care providers to draw paying patients and
make the hospital profitable. An academic health center needs a profitable
hospital to expand. Despite the investment in research driven by Vollum
and Hatfield, OHSU’s research capacity was small compared to other aca-
demic health centers across the country, and that made it harder for it to
attract top physicians.
Jim Walker found the university’s plants and equipment “abysmal,”
putting it at a severe disadvantage in the capital-intensive health care in-
dustry. Outpatient clinics and services were all in buildings constructed
between the 1920s and early 1950s. Many of the hospital wings were
putting four patients to a room at a time when the industry standard had
become private one-bed rooms or semi-private two-bed rooms. The cam-
pus had a great view from its hilltop location, but finding a place to park
was exasperating. Walker concluded the clinical faculty had some areas of
strengths, but it was nowhere as strong as faculties of top-tier academic
health centers across the country.80
Private and not-for-profit hospitals run by the Sisters of Providence
and Legacy Health System in the Portland area had state-of-the-art facili-
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ties and equipment, drawing more paying customers and leaving Univer-
sity Hospital as the primary indigent hospital for the metro area and state.
A third of its revenue in 1984 came from uninsured and low-income Med-
icaid patients, which was three times the proportion of the other metro
hospitals and twice the state average.
University Hospital also had limited access to capital, explained
Walker. First, it had little or no disposable income to service debt for
improving its facilities. Secondly, it had to make its request for capital
funding to the legislature as part of the package of construction requests
filed by the entire eight-campus university system. The Oregon State Sys-
tem of Higher Education set priorities on capital projects and was not apt
to put the University Hospital high on that list.
The chancellor’s office, which oversaw the state university system,
viewed the hospital as a liability, given its history of financial crises over
the years. To grant the hospital more debt would take away from the
system’s other seven institutions, and the chancellor’s office was not con-
fident the hospital would be able to pay its obligations. During the early
and middle 1980s, the University Hospital, the primary economic engine
of the academic health center, was failing and in constant financial stress.
The hospital lost $3.2 million between 1980 and 1984. Patient days, a pri-
mary indicator of inpatient volumes, had fallen 17 percent from 1983 to
1986. The hospital occupancy rate was generally in the 71-to-77 percent
range during the 1980s and dipped as low as 66 percent in 1985.81 Rather
than an economic engine, the hospital was becoming a financial drain. Ad-
ministrators were scattered across the OHSU campus, making it difficult
for them to communicate, and the hospital administrative culture did not
encourage communication. What’s more, hospital leaders were not en-
gaged in any strategic planning on how to dig out of this financial hole.82
University Hospital, like all state agencies, also had to contend with a
cumbersome biennial budgeting process because the legislature met only
every two years. So as part of OHSU’s two-year budget request, the hospi-
tal had to try to predict how many and what type of patients would show
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up at its doors two years into the future. It frequently missed the mark and
had to appeal to the Legislative Emergency Board for more money. Legis-
lators grew weary of the university’s constant plea of penury and regularly
called university clinical leaders to task for their inability to manage their
budget properly.83
Mike Thorne, then a state senator from Pendleton and chair of the
Ways and Means Committee and member of the emergency board, re-
called that the University Hospital seemed to be overwhelmed with in-
digent care, and Laster offered no solution other than requests for more
state money.
“I don’t think he had an interest in changing that model,” Thorne said.
“Pill Hill was a big drain. You would go up there, and it was depressing. It
was kind of old and antiquated in so many ways, and it didn’t have much
of a reputation. It was sort of a place where you sent all of the indigents
for hospital care. It was always out of money.”84
What’s more, competing nonprofit metro hospitals such as Legacy
Emanuel Medical Center and Providence St. Vincent Medical Center re-
sented state aid to the university’s hospital and lobbied against it. Legisla-
tors became so irritated with University Hospital in 1985 that they were
again talking about closing it. A group of Democratic and Republican rep-
resentatives sponsored House Bill 2596, which called for creating a “task
force to study closing Oregon Health Science University Hospital and to
provide indigent care and clinical experience through other hospitals.”85
The bill, which ultimately did not pass, could have taken down the entire
academic health center, Billups said.86
The strained relationship between the hospital and the university
administration came to a head in early 1986, and Laster and Kasse-
baum agreed on a mutual parting.87 Dave Witter replaced Kassebaum as
interim CEO of the hospital. McGill had been meeting regularly with the
hospital administrators to improve relations, and they pulled together, fi-
nally, as a real team to plan ways to improve the hospital’s performance.
Hospital operations slowly improved. Administrators successfully re-
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placed and improved the billing and patient registration systems, enabling
the hospital to cut the billing staff by sixty positions while improving bill
collections. Goldfarb played a key role in retaining good clinical faculty
while recruiting more. Patient volumes started rising after years of de-
cline, and the hospital started operating in the black by the late 1980s. It
wasn’t earning enough cash to strengthen the School of Medicine or to
improve facilities—but it was making money.88
McGill resigned in early 1987 to become vice president in charge of
finance and other administrative functions at the University of Missouri
four-campus system, where he stayed a decade before doing similar work
for twelve more years at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.
After his departure, Laster asked Walker to join his office as interim
vice president of finance and administration. Walker declined, saying he
had little academic experience and was more comfortable with the hos-
pital. The next day, Laster called Walker and told him he didn’t get to
choose. Walker would be joining the Laster team. But not for long, as
Laster was about to move on.89
A CAMPUS PLAN
By the time he left OHSU in 1987 to take his new job at the University of
Massachusetts Medical Center, Laster had developed a long-term building
plan for the campus and gotten several other projects underway. He and
Hatfield, for example, worked on his dream to build a new library with
modern computer technology. Hatfield would get federal money for the
library, but construction of what would be called the Biomedical Informa-
tion Communication Center bogged down in haggling over nearby land
that residents were trying to sell at exorbitant prices. Kohler would later
decide to build the library near the hospital on land OHSU already owned,
allowing construction to proceed. The “library of the 21st Century,” which
allows distance learning and teleconferencing between rural doctors and
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OHSU specialists, opened in 1991 and remains one of the most sophis-
ticated electronic medical libraries in the world. Laster also had laid out
plans for a School of Nursing building, but it was Carol Lindeman, dean
of the nursing school, who led the effort to turn that idea into a completed
building in 1992 with Hatfield’s help in securing federal support. The Cen-
ter for Research on Occupational and Environmental Toxicology, one of
the first facilities in the world to combine molecular and cell biology to
study adverse effects of chemicals on the human body, also had its roots in
the Laster era. So did the 660-foot-long Veterans Affairs Medical Center
bridge, a project that Laster put on the drawing board and that Dr. John
Kendall, former dean of the medical school, ushered through to construc-
tion. Both the toxicology center and bridge were completed in 1992.
Laster, however, was against moving the state’s Office of Rural Health
to OHSU. Davis recalls the day when Laster revealed his opposition to
Senator Eugene Timms, a Republican from the eastern Oregon town of
Burns, who would become a major supporter of OHSU’s conversion to a
public corporation. The large lawmaker got to his feet and extended a big
hand as Davis and Laster entered his Salem office, Davis recalled.
“Hi Doc,” he boomed. “Hi Lois. Have a seat.”
The smaller, nattily-dressed Laster took his chair, and said bluntly,
“Lois says I’m crazy not to take you up on your offer to move rural health
to OHSU.”
Timms reared back, looking startled. Davis was surprised, too. She
had made an impassioned case to her new boss for moving the state’s Of-
fice of Rural Health to OHSU. It would give the university a better toehold
statewide and draw more interest from rural legislators such as Timms,
broadening OHSU’s base of political support. Timms glanced at Davis
briefly and then turned back to Laster and leaned forward in his chair.
“You are crazy,” he said.90
On August 15, 1987, Laster announced he was moving on and gave
local reporters a tour through the new Vollum building. He told them dol-
lars and square feet are not what matters.
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“It’s the people,” he said. “Little by little, you get activities going on
here so when a young person wants to work in a field, the adviser says,
‘Hey, you’d better go to Portland because that’s where some of the best
work is being done.’”
An account in The Oregonian describes Laster taking reporters
through a research lab where “a few scientists clad in jeans worked in
bright, white light” while rock music blared. They walked to a rounded,
fourth-floor window that had a commanding view of Portland. Laster
leaned on the bar extending across the window and took a long look, as if
for the last time. “There’s nothing like it,” he said.91
Laster had dragged OHSU out of its slumber, pushed it deeper into
neural and molecular biology research, pressed it to reach for excellence,
and set the stage for its next president. As he said a year earlier in one of
his speeches:
“We have set our sights not on the dry dust below us, but rather on
the brilliant stars above us.”92
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Chapter Two
A Transformation Plan
Oregon Health Sciences University, like the nation’s other 124 academic
health centers, had become an extraordinarily complex organization by
the time Peter Kohler arrived in 1988. It operated on a $254 million an-
nual budget, and employed more than 5,800 workers engaged in multiple
missions of conducting research, treating patients, and training doctors,
dentists, nurses, and other health workers—about 2,000 trainees in all.1 It
operated two hospitals and was affiliated with three others. It ran clin-
ics, research labs, and classrooms. It collected revenue from its health
services, the state, the National Institutes of Health, donors, and other
government research grants. It employed a high concentration of bright,
highly-educated workers with big personalities and big ambitions capable
of transplanting hearts, repairing brains, and probing the frontiers of mol-
ecular biology. It enrolled the brightest students of their generation. It
functioned both in the lofty world of academe and on the ground, treating
sick and injured people in the competitive health care marketplace.
In all that they do, academic health centers walk a tightrope, writes
Gregory R. Wegner, as editor of the Higher Education Roundtable’s Pol-
icy Perspectives. They must maintain a clear commitment to their aca-
demic missions, he says, while remaining vigilant about changes in the
health care market that can quickly send them into red ink.
“Quite possibly there is no other example of a billion dollar enterprise
that has so many layers, so many overlapping lines of authority as com-
monly appear in an AHC,” he writes.2
The challenge of making OHSU’s moving parts all work together ap-
pealed to Kohler, as did its broader mission of improving public health.
And he was well prepared to lead the medical center. He had a solid work
history in management, research, and patient care, and he also had an un-
usual grounding in the liberal arts that set him apart from most physicians
and researchers and gave him a unique perspective on the value of a well-
rounded education.
Dr. Bert W. O’Malley—a longtime close friend of Kohler and an endocri-
nologist who worked with him at Duke University, the National Institutes
of Health and Baylor College of Medicine in Houston—describes Kohler as
widely well-liked, even-keeled, unassuming, ethical, and humorous.
“He has a quiet strength about him,” said O’Malley, chair of the De-
partment of Molecular and Cellular Biology at Baylor, “combined with a
substantial intellect that leads to good decision-making.”3
Kohler was born July 18, 1928, in Brooklyn, New York, and grew up
with one younger brother. His mother, who had a master’s degree in lit-
erature from Columbia University, worked as an executive assistant to
high-powered bosses, including William S. Paley, the chief executive for
the Columbia Broadcasting System. While the family was in New York
during the summer of Kohler’s birth, they ordinarily lived in southwest-
ern Virginia, where Kohler’s father was an English professor at Virginia
Tech in Blacksburg. During two summers when he was a young boy,
Kohler’s family returned to live in New York City, where his father wrote
plot lines for soap operas. With nurturing, highly-educated, and stimulat-
ing parents, Kohler grew up confident and disciplined.
He went off to Charlottesville to study at the University of Virginia.
He followed his parents’ examples by majoring in English, even though his
father had advised him against it. His father thought his talents were bet-
ter suited to other endeavors, said Kohler. And the fact was, Kohler said,
“I hated to write.”4
Later in school, he came around to his father’s view, leaned toward
medicine and loaded up on chemistry and biology classes, even while com-
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pleting his bachelor’s degree in English literature. He was inspired by a
grandfather who loved being a physician, and he liked the idea of devoting
his life to work that could help people and make a difference.
“I thought I would like family medicine,” he said. “I could see myself
being a family physician. The idea of being a physician appealed to me.”5
He joined the Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity and played varsity center
and linebacker for the University of Virginia football team. He lettered, he
said, though he watched most of the games from the bench. Years later,
Joe Cox, chancellor of the Oregon State System of Higher Education, told
Kohler that they both had been on the same playing field at the same time
during a game between the University of Maryland and the University of
Virginia: Cox was on Maryland’s sousaphone line. “Our line was heavier
than yours,” he joked to Kohler.6
After graduating, Kohler was admitted to the medical school at Duke
University in 1959. His younger brother would follow him there to be-
come a rheumatologist. The Duke medical school, founded in 1944, was
young enough when Kohler arrived to still have many of the original
faculty. One professor, Dr. Eugene Stead, intimidated students with his
brilliance but impressed them with his teaching. He took an interest in
Kohler. On one occasion, Stead told Kohler he was exploring the effects
of anticoagulation on blood flow, and he wondered whether hemophiliacs
have less plaque buildup in their arteries. He invited Kohler to assist him
in this venture, but was vague on how. So Kohler dug into some books in
the library and found a photo of the aorta of a hemophiliac. The aorta was
riddled with plaque, a clear answer to Stead’s question. About two weeks
later, Stead asked whether he had found anything. He showed the photo
to the professor. Stead was impressed, and that would pay off later.
During his freshman year, Kohler stayed in a dormitory for medical
students across the street from the nursing students’ dorm. The two
dorms shared a cafeteria, which led to romance between future doctors,
nearly all men in those days, and nurses, nearly all women. One evening,
Kohler and another medical student went on a double blind date with two
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nurses. Kohler became more interested in his friend’s date than his own.
Her name was Judy Baker, the daughter of a Pennsylvania physician, and
after they met, Kohler dated her for nearly 100 consecutive nights. On the
day after Christmas that year, in Kohler’s freshman year and less than four
months after their first blind date, he and Baker married in Judy’s home-
town of Athens, Pennsylvania. After a “very small wedding,” they drove
twelve hours back to Duke the next day.7
They were both in school for the next eighteen months. During that
time Judy developed Graves’ disease, which produces an overactive thy-
roid gland and causes the immune system to attack glands in the neck. The
dean of the Duke medical school successfully operated on Judy at the end
of her senior year, fixing the problem.
The Kohlers worried Judy might have trouble conceiving because of
the surgery and disease, but by December, 1962, she was expecting their
first child. Kohler finished school early, and he and Judy moved to Sayre,
a town near Athens in northeastern Pennsylvania, where Kohler worked
as a pre-intern in the Guthrie Clinic and Robert Packer Hospital. Judy’s
father, Dr. Dan Baker, an orthopedic surgeon, also worked there, though
not directly with his son-in-law. The Kohlers’ first child, Brooke, arrived
on January 9, 1963, as one of the first babies born in the hospital’s new ob-
stetrical suite.
Later that year, the Kohlers moved back to Durham for his internship
at Duke. There, Kohler met O’Malley, with whom he still communicates
regularly by email or phone. The Kohlers’ second child, Stephen, was born
the following spring, on March 10, 1964. After his internship, Kohler
took a one-year endocrinology fellowship with the thyroid specialist at
Duke, and then faced military duty. At that time, all American medical
school graduates were drafted. Kohler was picked for the Air Force, and
dreaded the possibility he could be sent to the remote Thule Air Base on
Greenland. But there was one way around that kind of assignment: he
could compete with other medical students for one of the few available
slots at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. “The NIH
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at that time had its choice of the best and brightest medical school gradu-
ates in the US,” Kohler said.8
He called on Professor Stead, who had a stellar national reputation,
to write him a recommendation. Stead also was famous for understating
everything, so Kohler didn’t expect high praise. But he did say to the
professor, “If you just won’t say anything bad about me, I will take my
chances.” Stead must have honored his request: Kohler was selected as a
clinical associate.
“We were part of a very collegial group of extremely bright people,
many of whom went on to become leaders in academic medicine,” he said.
Among those colleagues was his friend, O’Malley.9
Kohler was already gaining insights from the schools he attended and
worked in that would help guide his leadership at OHSU. While at the
University of Virginia, the English department invited William Faulkner
to be an artist in residence. Kohler noticed that just bringing the literary
giant on campus for a spell seemed to raise the national profile and ambi-
tions of the whole school. He would remember that in his efforts to build
OHSU’s national reputation by luring top researchers. And while at Duke
and later at NIH, he noticed the medical school went aggressively after
NIH research grants and quickly built up its research capacity. That en-
abled it to attract top researchers, who in turn won more grants, raising
the medical center’s reputation more, creating an upward cycle of quality
and reputation.
“Watching what they did there has always made me feel we can do
some similar things here,” he would say later as president of OHSU.10
Oregon’s academic health center on Pill Hill had shown little interest
in NIH grants when Kohler was working for the institutes, and it didn’t
register on the national radar screen. Dr. John W. Kendall, an endocrinol-
ogist who joined the Oregon medical school in 1960 and served as dean
from 1983 through 1992, won NIH grants as a researcher. But he could
see that Oregon was largely missing out on the rapid expansion of the
NIH during the 1950s and 1960s. Though the University of Washington
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medical school opened more than a half century after Oregon’s in 1946, it
saw explosive growth with the onset of NIH money during that period as
did other younger medical centers at San Diego and Stanford University.
While those schools grew, the Oregon medical center drifted, Kendall
said, because its older, staid faculty was not interested in NIH money.
I remember sitting at this lunch table—this would have been in the
50s or 60s—and one of the chairs of a basic science department
said, “I don’t want any of my faculty to have an NIH grant.”
I looked at him and said, “Well, why?”
“They come and go,” he said. “The state money is solid. So I won’t
encourage my faculty to get an NIH grant at all.”
Well, hell, the money was pouring into Seattle and San Diego and
others around the country while we were bumping along, and this
fellow was the most respected research-oriented faculty member
on campus, and he was the adviser to the dean on research.11
Kohler would eventually bring the Duke model to OHSU. Like Laster,
whom he knew at the NIH, Kohler was struck by what the NIH produced
when it invested in top researchers and turned them loose to dig into
pure science. Like Laster, he would envision bringing NIH-like efforts to
produce pockets of excellence at OHSU that would, in turn, lift up the as-
pirations of the entire university, just as Faulkner did for the University
of Virginia. He would understand, as Laster did, that if he was going to
attract top researchers, he would have to build first-rate research labs and
facilities. And to do that, he would have to expand the medical center’s
hospital facilities and clinical capacity to help support the research.
While Kohler had planned to stay at NIH in Bethesda only for the two
years of his military obligation as a clinical associate, he was invited to stay
on as part of the senior staff. He did so for six more years and became head
of endocrine service for his unit, which focused on child health and can-
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cer. During his years at NIH, he and his wife had two more children. Todd
was born on August 4, 1966, followed by Adam on October 3, 1968.
Kohler not only led his unit, he also worked in the laboratory, explor-
ing cell culture and a variety of things that could affect cells—particularly
pituitary cells. He isolated a strain of cancer cells that continue to be
replicated and used by scientists all over the world, producing an annual
royalty for Kohler of about $1,000 that continues to this day. While run-
ning his NIH lab, Kohler also completed his training by working as a
resident at Georgetown University.
O’Malley took a job at the private Baylor College of Medicine in
Houston, and Kohler soon followed in 1973 to head the endocrinology
division. Despite his increasing share of management duties, Kohler re-
ceived a prestigious Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator award
to support his research. He developed a reputation for his skill in juggling
research, teaching, and management. Baylor also gave Kohler insights to
the powers that a private medical center, free of state regulations and bu-
reaucracy, has in competing for research money and patients.
Four years later Kohler left Baylor and O’Malley to move deeper
into management as chair of medicine at the University of Arkansas
for Medical Sciences in Little Rock. During his nine years in Arkansas,
Kohler continued to research and teach, but he also studied how large
complex organizations work and bring out the best in their profes-
sional staffs. He served his final year as interim dean of the medical
school. He finally set research aside when he took a job as Dean of
Medical School at the University of Texas medical center in San An-
tonio. After more than twenty years in research and the classroom, he
was ready to move fully into administration.
“I thought I could be more helpful as an administrator than as a scien-
tist,” he said. “I thought my science was pretty good, but I couldn’t put it
in the category of great.”12
He liked the idea of trying to solve problems for an entire organization,
of getting everybody moving in the same direction. He put in 60-to-70-hour
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work weeks in San Antonio, but still found time to read, fish, go deer hunt-
ing—usually taking one of his sons with him—and exercise.13
By this time, Kohler had a good appreciation for how tough academic
health centers are to manage. In addition to their complexity and mixed
missions, they are filled with a rare concentration of extraordinarily bright
and accomplished faculty, scientists, and students.
“The more talented they are, the more like prima donnas they can be,”
Kohler said. “The most ungovernable organizations in the country are our
academic health centers.”14
OHSU CALLS
Kohler had been at San Antonio about two years when Dr. Lynn Lori-
aux dropped by for a visit. Loriaux had worked with him at NIH, took
Kohler’s job as head of clinical services when he left and was still there.
A week after visiting Kohler, Loriaux visited OHSU to give some talks.
At the time, the Oregon State Board of Higher Education had organized a
search committee to find a president to replace Laster. A member of the
search committee asked Loriaux if he knew of any good candidates. Lori-
aux suggested Kohler, whom he suspected was restless at San Antonio.15
By then, Kohler’s name already had reached the search committee,
recalled Mark Dodson, a Portland lawyer who at the time was chair of
both the State Board of Higher Education and the board’s search commit-
tee. Dodson, who had been on the board about four years, said he took
a hands-on interest in finding OHSU’s next leader because he had seen
searches for seven university presidents and two chancellors, and “I had
seen a lot of them go south.”16
Dodson grew up and completed high school in Beaverton, a suburb
west of Portland, was admitted to Harvard University as an undergraduate
and then attended a Baptist seminary for a year. But the seminary “didn’t
take,” he said, and Dodson became the first male in three generations in
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his family to choose not to become a Baptist minister. Instead, he went
to work researching street people in Berkeley, California, while he earned
a law degree at the University of California, Berkeley. He moved back to
Oregon in 1973 to practice law in Portland, where he and his wife raised
two children.
Dodson was determined to find the right leader for OHSU. “It was an
institution that could go in either direction very dramatically,” he said, and
either slide into the backwaters or rise as a national leader in the world of
academic health care. The board had hired a national search firm that was
good at finding candidates for public universities, but Dodson concluded
it didn’t have a good grasp on what was required in somebody leading an
academic health center. So he met with an OHSU campus search com-
mittee charged with giving the state board insights and feedback on the
candidates, co-chaired by Lesley Hallick, the molecular biologist who ad-
vised Laster. Dodson asked the group to give him ten names. He wrote
down each nomination on a blackboard.
“Dr. Peter Kohler,” said one committee member. Dodson recalls that
the nomination came from Dr. J.S. “Dutch” Reinschmidt, who directed
OHSU’s regional programs. The group gave Dodson ten names, and he
made it a goal to walk the OHSU campus with each of them—and he did.
“That is probably the cheapest, best audit of an institution’s potential
you are ever going to get, to have those ten people walk the campus and
tell you where they see this institution ten or 20 years from now,” he said.
“They had different visions, but they all saw great potential there.”17
Dodson’s “audit” helped him see the academic health center was not
wholly formed, with an undeveloped research arm, no real brand, and
some impressive individuals but not yet a coherent, impressive research,
clinical, and faculty team. “They needed leadership,” he said.
He asked Kohler to apply for the president’s job, but Kohler hesitated.
He was wary of taking another position so soon for fear he’d get a repu-
tation for frequently jumping jobs. Dr. William Conner—member of the
faculty search committee, professor of medicine and head of endocrinol-
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ogy, metabolism, and clinical nutrition at OHSU—called Kohler and also
urged him to apply. That pushed Kohler over the edge.
He quickly rose to the top of the list of eighty-four candidates, and of
the ten Dodson had collected on his blackboard, and flew to Portland for
interviews as one of two finalists. A third anonymous finalist had dropped
out. The other was Dr. William N. Kelley, a friend of Kohler’s who also
had worked at NIH, as a biomedical researcher specializing in biochemi-
cal genetics. At the time he applied for the OHSU presidency, Kelley was
chair of the internal medicine department at the University of Michigan
School of Medicine.
Hallick was chosen to escort Kohler around campus for interviews
with a variety of board members and administrators. The easy-going
physician with silver hair and fair, freckled skin, impressed her.
I liked him because he was so honest and so apparently straightfor-
ward. I trotted him around, and took him from group A to group
B. I had lots of chances to talk with him.
“Why do you want to do this?” I asked him.
“Well, I watched the person doing that at my place,” he said, “and I
can do that job.”
What he was implying was that he could do it better.18
Both Walker and Goldfarb at this time were shopping for jobs, but
Dodson, who admired the pair both for their work and good humor, told
them to back off. “I said, ‘You guys aren’t going anywhere until we get
a new CEO.’” Walker, who held the vice president of finance post that
Laster had insisted he take, also met with Kohler during his campus visit.
“He was a gentleman,” Walker said. “That is how he comes across—a gen-
tleman from Virginia. . . . He also came across as very competent.” Walker
said he would later learn that the gentleman from Virginia also “can be
tough as nails behind the façade.”19
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When Dodson again met with the faculty search group to review
their finalists, someone said “Kohler may be a little soft.” Then another
member, whom Dodson thinks was Reinschmidt, countered: Kohler
played as linebacker for the University of Virginia football team. “He is
not too soft,” he said.
Dodson had settled on Kohler as his first choice and was already wor-
ried “we were going to lose him,” he recalled. One evening on Kohler’s
first visit to Portland, Dodson arranged for him to meet with Senator
Mike Thorne, the conservative Democrat and rancher from Pendleton
who chaired the legislature’s Joint Ways and Means Committee—the
state’s purse strings. Thorne and his wife were having dinner at Portland’s
upscale Benson Hotel. Dodson knew Kohler was staying there and would
soon be back from dinner elsewhere, so Dodson pulled Thorne into the
lobby to wait with him to ambush Kohler.
Kohler arrived and the leaders met. Dodson expected Kohler would
be impressed by Thorne’s legislative power and interest in rural health,
and he believed Thorne would find Kohler refreshing. And he was right.
Kohler talked about his interest in establishing rural Area Health Educa-
tion Centers in Oregon as he already had done in Texas. Thorne, who had
already been leading discussions about creating the rural health centers in
Oregon, loved the plan. “I said, ‘You know, I can commit to you now: I’ll
do everything I can to get that funded,’” he recalled. “He [Kohler] was such
a breath of fresh air.”20
Kohler made two trips to OHSU, but was uneasy with the finalist
interview process. He had concluded the state board search committee
preferred Kelley.21 So Kohler withdrew his candidacy. The board,
though divided, did first offer the job to Kelley, but he demanded
too much in pay and benefits and declined to negotiate. Hallick was
relieved. Both candidates “had great visions,” she said, “but [Kelley]
would have left a lot of blood on the floor. It was just his style. He
would just slash and burn, which he did go on to do, absolutely. That
was an accurate read.”22
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Dodson turned to Senator Mark Hatfield, whom he knew well, for
advice. Hatfield sent him to talk to Dr. Samuel Thier, president of the
national Institute of Medicine in Washington, DC, who knew the top
candidates. Dodson said he talked to Thier on at least four occasions at
Hatfield’s suggestion.23
Dodson concluded Kelley was “too ambitious, too aggressive.” He
urged the board to go after Kohler. He told the board that Kohler was per-
fect because “he would take us one step ahead, one step ahead, and one
step ahead, and 10 years later we would turn around and look at how
far we’d come,” he said. “If we had brought in somebody who didn’t have
Pete’s organizational skills or his demeanor, we could bankrupt the insti-
tution.” Kohler understood that bringing in too much research too quickly
could drown the university in the overhead costs needed to support it. “He
gets this; he gets us,” Dodson said. 24
Convinced Kohler was the right man for the job, Dodson set out to
persuade him to reconsider. “I never underestimate the value of the dra-
matic gesture,” he said. He arranged for himself and George Richardson, a
state board member and lobbyist for Northwest Natural Gas Co., to fly to
San Antonio, Texas, to implore Kohler to reconsider.25
“If I had to get down on bended knee, I was willing to do that,” Dod-
son said.26
But it didn’t take that much drama to convince Kohler to take the job.
“It was a move up,” he said. “It was a major responsibility. . . . I thought
it was a geographically advantaged organization (being in Oregon with its
vast wilderness, mountains and ocean.) It is a place you can recruit to. I was
sure if things were organized constructively, it would really blossom.”27
The state board on Monday, April 4, voted to hire Kohler as OHSU’s
new president. He was given a state salary of $112,680 per year plus an
expense allowance of $7,980 and the use of a state-owned house. The
OHSU Foundation kicked in another $40,000 to supplement his salary.
Still, Kohler would be making less than the $187,750 he was earning at
San Antonio.28
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A special edition of the OHSU newsletter Campusgram devoted its
cover to the story. The account described Kohler, then 49, as a nationally-
known endocrinologist and noted he and Judy had four children, Brooke
Kohler-Culp, 25; Stephen, 24; Todd, 21; and Adam, 19. OHSU’s Dr. John
Benson, who was at the time president of the American Board of Internal
Medicine, which included Kohler, declared in the article, “Peter Kohler
has rapidly emerged as a leader in American medical education and will
serve the citizens and health sciences in Oregon ably and forcefully. A
respected clinical investigator and standard-bearer in endocrinology, a
congenial former chairman of a large department of internal medicine and
now dean of a quality medical school, Dr. Kohler is well prepared to head
the university.”29
In an Oregonian article, Kohler’s professional colleagues from his work
at San Antonio, the NIH and elsewhere, only had praise for the new
president: “he’s a calm, reasonable man,” “an excellent listener,” “a true
gentleman,” “a prince of a person,” “a person everyone likes to work with,”
“exhibits incredible judgment as a physician,” “tall, handsome and always
smiling,” “wry and dry sense of humor,” “able to laugh at human folly,” “a
real down-to-earth guy,” “wonderful family man,” and “very calm individ-
ual, very fair, studious, a real person.”30
Kohler had researched OHSU before applying for president and knew
some of the problems he would be facing. The university had, he recalled,
“a very high quality, small faculty and very outdated and poor laboratory
space” though the Vollum Institute had just been completed. He knew
about building deficiencies, the tussles Laster had had with faculty and
the hospital, the hospital’s financial challenges, and the friction between
OHSU and the legislature and the State Board of Higher Education.
New university presidents typically say they want to spend their first
year getting the lay of the land, learning from staff, state leaders, and the
public, before setting an agenda. But even before he was hired, Kohler
seemed to know exactly what he wanted to do. On March 17, 1988, he
outlined his ambitious agenda for the academic medical center in a pre-
A Transformation Plan 55
sentation to the State Board of Higher Education. He said he would not
take the job without the board’s support of his goals.31 He said he would
seek to:
• Streamline the administrative organization for the university, delegat-
ing major responsibilities to vice presidents and the executive council.
The administration would rely on consensus building with faculty and
constituent groups.
• Upgrade University Hospital to become a premier tertiary care facility.
• Develop Area Health Education Centers (AHECs) to improve health
care services in Oregon’s less populated regions.
• Upgrade Doernbecher Children’s Hospital as a separate facility serving
the entire state.
• Expand and coordinate research programs at the Vollum Institute for
Advanced Biomedical Research and the Center for Research on Oc-
cupational and Environmental Toxicology and develop new research
centers.
• Establish a major focus on genetic and gene therapy research.
• Strengthen instruction and make AHECs part of the teaching pro-
gram.
• Seek state level funding for 30 percent of budget.
• Develop new revenue from federal and private sources.
• Improve and expand facilities, including parking.
• Improve minority faculty, staff, and student recruitment.
• Make OHSU one of the top 20 academic health centers in the nation
in terms of NIH research awards.
Dodson welcomed Kohler’s agenda. “That is exactly what I wanted to
hear,” he said.”32
The State Board of Higher Education voted to support Kohler’s
agenda, which in many ways carried on President Laster’s vision to ex-
pand research and facilities and to create focused areas of excellence such
as gene therapy research. However, Kohler departed from Laster in fun-
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damental ways, with his emphasis on consensus building with faculty
and staff, with expanding OHSU operations into rural areas, and with
a statewide mission for Doernbecher Children’s Hospital. Unlike Laster,
who wanted to keep OHSU’s focus on the Hill, Kohler wanted to create
a statewide campus. Kohler had concluded that to become better, OHSU
would have to get bigger in every way.
“I wanted OHSU to be among the top academic health centers in the
country,” he said. “It was not going to happen staying small.”33
COMPLACENCY AND DIVISION
Kohler took command of an academic health center in July of 1988 that
was still compromised by mediocre ambition, internal division, and poor
relations with the state higher education system and legislature. It had
only begun to raise its sights. It lacked the organization that a smooth-
running university with so many missions requires.
“When I left, it was still not a coherent organization,” said Laster.
“One guy got $5 million, I think, from [a foundation] and set up a labo-
ratory without any of us ever knowing it. . . . In those days it was pretty
loose and free-wheeling.”34
Dr. Donald Trunkey, the trauma and general surgeon hired by Laster as
chair of the Department of Surgery, arrived in 1986, just two years before
Kohler, to find the University Hospital was diverting half of its surgery cases
to other hospitals. The hospital was short on operating rooms, surgeons,
and computerized tomography (CT) scan capacity, he recalled.
“Nobody was doing general surgery,” he said. “It was just a bunch of
fiefdoms, just out of control. Three of the fiefdoms—plastic, cardiac, and
neurosurgery—were on probation from the Residency Review Commit-
tee. . . . I mean, there just was no commitment.”35
At the time Kohler arrived, the medical school was 101 years old, and
the entire academic medical center operated on $254 million a year. It was
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drawing about $40 million in federal research funds. The university em-
ployed more than 3,500 full-time workers, including 800 professors, and
more than 1,600 part-time workers, 470 of them faculty members. That
made it Portland’s third-largest and Oregon’s seventh-largest employer.
OHSU enrolled 2,066 students, 359 of whom were studying to be doctors,
250 to be dentists, 578 to be nurses, and the rest in other health degrees
and fellowship programs. It was among fifty-two of the nation’s 125 aca-
demic health centers that operated independently of a larger university.
The academic health center had a mediocre national reputation, but it
also had its bright spots. For example, one of its earliest researchers, Dr. Ed-
win E. Osgood—who joined the medical school as student and teacher in
1918—advanced understanding of bone marrow, abnormal blood cell pro-
duction, and leukemia, research areas in which OHSU continues to excel. In
1958, Dr. Albert Starr launched an open-heart surgery program at the then
University of Oregon Medical School and shortly after worked with Lowell
Edwards, an electrical engineer, to produce the world’s first successful heart
valve replacement.36 By the time Kohler arrived at OHSU, its surgeons had
conducted nearly 100 heart transplants.37 Dr. Kenneth Carl Swan, an oph-
thalmologist who became the first full-time paid head of a department at the
university in 1944, built the Department of Ophthalmology into one of the
nation’s best. Swan opened the nation’s first children’s eye clinic, invented
the first synthetic tears, developed the Ames Recording Ophthalmoscope,
and his department designed the first microscope for ocular surgery. When
Kohler arrived, the Vollum Institute had just completed its new building
and was in its second year and already gaining national attention for its mol-
ecular research of the brain and nervous system.
These successes were not the norm, however. OHSU’s research capac-
ity was limited and unexceptional. And its clinical services were struggling
with old buildings, insufficient equipment and space, and a large proportion
of indigent patients. Most of the buildings had not been updated in decades.
The medical center had postponed maintenance for years, racking up more
than $350 million in deferred maintenance that needed to be addressed.
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“There is a phenomenon I’ve seen many times,” Kohler said. “When
you live with something substandard long enough, you get to thinking it
is normal. It takes someone with fresh eyes to say, ‘This is not normal; it
needs to be much better.’”38
While the labor and delivery unit offered one of the starkest examples
of substandard facilities, the whole campus “was in bad shape overall,”
Kohler said. On an upper floor of Baird Hall, he said, one of the univer-
sity’s first research areas, the Osgood Laboratory (named for and used by
Osgood himself), was dark with old benches and racks. It “looked like it
needed to be preserved under glass as a way science was done in the last
century,” Kohler said. Osgood’s lab reminded him of Edgar Allan Poe’s
room preserved at the University of Virginia, he added.39
The hospital roof leaked, and on one occasion, sewage leaked into
the Baird Hall conference room. Even the window air conditioner in
Kohler’s Baird Hall office didn’t work. With OHSU so low on the list of
the state board and legislature’s building priorities, Kohler soon learned
that getting help fixing the campus would not come easy. Shortly after
he arrived, he traveled to Eugene to meet Representative Carl Hosticka,
a Democrat, in his office at the University of Oregon, where he was
a professor. Kohler wanted to talk to Hosticka about OHSU’s deferred
maintenance needs.
“There were two giant holes in the wall of Hosticka’s office,” Kohler
said. “You could see the slats under the drywall. I think I was talking to the
wrong person.”40
When Kohler was hired, the medical center was getting about 23 per-
cent of its budget from the state. Board members had assured him they
would do all that they could to push that up to 30 percent. That would
help, but Kohler would have to find other ways to start sprucing up his
worn campus. He also had much more to learn. Janet Billups, in her first
year as the attorney general’s representative for OHSU, began meeting
regularly with him. In one of their first meetings in his office, he asked
about how contracts were written and approved.
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“He thought he needed to read and approve every contract at OHSU,”
she said.41
An administrator at one of the health centers Kohler had worked
for had become embroiled in a controversy over mismanagement of con-
tracts, and Kohler was determined not to have that happen to him. As a
practical matter, Billups told him, he needed to delegate that authority to
others, such as a contract officer, or read more than 800 contracts himself.
His concern about the contracts reflected his desire to gain a commanding
understanding of the institution, Billups said.
“He was clearly really very thorough in understanding this place, un-
derstanding how it runs, understanding its business,” she said.42
After Kohler arrived, acting president Dave Witter took Walker’s job
as vice president of finance and administration, though he would soon
leave, and Walker returned to the job he was originally hired for—chief
finance officer of University Hospital. Tim Goldfarb remained permanent
CEO of the hospital and clinics. Davis was still handling government rela-
tions. Kohler met regularly with Walker, Goldfarb, Davis, and Billups, but
Hallick was still grinding away in the classroom and research laboratory.
By the end of 1988, Kohler and his young leadership team, all in their
thirties and early forties, had defined their agenda for the 1989 Legislature,
which would convene in January. They would seek a better biennial budget,
administration of the Office of Rural Health, and a state network of five
Area Health Education Centers (AHECs). Kohler began traveling with
Davis to Salem to meet legislators individually, including Senator Eugene
Timms, the Republican from Burns who would become his key supporter
in his quest to make the university a public corporation. Kohler also testified
before committees on matters of concern to the medical center, and reached
out to Senator Hatfield to nourish the senator’s good relationship with the
university. He knew that even if the state did increase its support for OHSU,
he would need Hatfield’s help in getting federal money to turn OHSU into
a research powerhouse. State capital did not flow easily to OHSU. Each uni-
versity in the state higher education system took its turn getting state bond
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authority for construction. But health care clinical and research buildings
cost far more than standard classroom buildings so OHSU’s projects often
fell to the bottom of the list or were downsized.
Kohler’s team set out to educate legislators on the unique demands
on a university that, unlike the other seven campuses, included a major
health care operation. Legislators had little affection for the higher educa-
tion system and even less for OHSU, Davis wrote.
Legislators understood the value of public higher education, but
they did not understand how its budget worked or why it cost
so much to operate. The budget-setting Ways and Means Com-
mittee was used to looking at traditional state agency budgets,
which were pretty straightforward. Higher education’s budgets
were more complicated, featuring everything from state funds to
tuition and fees, federal financial aid and federal and private re-
search dollars. Some of the funds were unrestricted, but others
were restricted to particular uses. Personnel categories looked
nothing like those at state agencies. To frustrated Ways and
Means committee members, it looked like higher education’s rep-
resentatives were trying to hide the ball; surely they could present
the budget in a fashion more consistent with other state agencies
if they chose to.43
As Mike Thorne, the Pendleton Democrat who chaired the commit-
tee, said: it seemed like Pill Hill was just a big drain.44
Kohler’s team decided to take a different tack and change the narra-
tive—at least as it related to OHSU. The team would not depend solely
on the chancellor’s office to carry its message to Salem. It would estab-
lish its own working relationship with legislators and their staffs and
would explain to them how the academic health care world worked. It
also would improve the accuracy and clarity of the financial informa-
tion it provided, and it would provide as much information as legislators
needed when they needed it. If OHSU took on a program or task, it
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would do exactly what it promised. Finally, it would keep legislators in
the loop. There would be no surprises.45
OHSU’S RURAL EXPANSION
Kohler also began laying the groundwork for expanding the university’s
reach beyond Portland into Oregon’s vast rural regions. He believed Ore-
gon’s sole academic health center needed to serve the entire state. That
meant understanding the needs of rural residents by working with them
and their health providers. Having grown up in rural Virginia, Kohler also
had an affinity and affection for people and their needs across Oregon’s
countryside. So he strongly supported moving the state’s Office of Rural
Health to OHSU. When Davis told him that Senator Timms wanted to
make that move, Kohler readily agreed. “When can I meet the senator?”
he asked.46
Kohler appointed Dr. J.S. “Dutch” Reinschmidt to lead OHSU in its
expansion to the state’s rural reaches. Reinschmidt had joined the Univer-
sity of Oregon Medical School in 1970 as director of its Regional Medical
Program and later of its continuing education program. Choosing him to
lead OHSU’s rural efforts was a “key decision,” Hallick said.
Dutch was beloved. He was a surgeon . . . so he had credentials
from both rural and medical arenas. He had run our Continuing
Medical Education office, and that meant he stumped the state all
the time, little tiny communities, to see what kind of education
the doctors wanted and needed. He never stepped on toes. . . . And
so he immediately had credibility across the state, especially rural
parts of the state. . . . Dutch was a great choice. But he wasn’t the
kind of choice you’d expect a brand new president necessarily to
make. You know, you usually bring in your own person to launch
a major new program.47
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Reinschmidt, who, like Kohler, majored in English along with chem-
istry as an undergraduate and had a fondness for Shakespeare, grew up in
Florida and marched with the US Army across Europe during World War
II before entering college.48 After completing medical school at Vanderbilt
University in Nashville, Tennessee, he spent several years in family practice
in a small agricultural community called Tekoa in Washington State, near
the Idaho border. There he developed an appreciation for the challenge rural
physicians faced in keeping up with modern medical developments.
He worked briefly in Pullman, Washington, and then Eugene, Ore-
gon, before he was hired by University of Oregon Medical School to be
director of the federally-funded Regional Medical Program, which dis-
seminated the latest knowledge about heart disease, cancer, stroke, and
other diseases to rural doctors. The medical school was providing short
“circuit rider” courses in rural areas, but Reinschmidt soon concluded “we
really needed to broaden ourselves and, as the university developed, to
recognize that we had a fundamental responsibility to the entire state.”49
With help from the Oregon Medical Association, he expanded the
program, enlisting university faculty in organizing weekend and week-
long courses all over the state. The rural courses evolved into annual
education conferences in Bend, Ashland, and at Salishan Lodge on the
central coast that would draw hundreds of rural physicians, not only from
Oregon, but also other states—all supported by tuition charged to the par-
ticipating physicians.
When Kohler arrived, Reinschmidt had already been pushing OHSU
to look at the federal AHECs, and Laster had pushed back. The AHEC
program was developed by Congress in 1971 to recruit and train a health
professions workforce committed to underserved populations, mostly in
rural America. With a blend of state and federal support, the program
helps bring the resources of academic medical centers like OHSU to serve
local community health needs. AHECs expose and recruit high school stu-
dents in underserved areas into the health professions, provide education
to rural physicians and future health professionals, and develop strategies
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to respond to rural health care needs. OHSU medical students are rotated
through AHECs, where they are mentored by local physicians and help re-
lieve the health care shortage.50
As acting president before Kohler arrived, Dave Witter had been
approached by Senator Thorne, the conservative Democrat and wheat
farmer from Pendleton, to see what more OHSU could do to support rural
physicians, because they were losing them. Rural doctors were leaving
because they worked in old facilities, lacked modern equipment, handled
heavy patient loads, and had a high proportion of indigent and uninsured
patients. A lack of doctors was part of the reason some rural hospitals
were closing or struggling financially.51 Three physicians from Wallowa
County had asked Thorne for his help, so he organized a conference in the
spring of 1988, just before Kohler arrived, on rural health needs. The con-
ference in Joseph, a small town in Northeast Oregon, drew Reinschmidt,
the deans of the medical and nursing schools, nurses, rural physicians,
hospital directors, members of the Academy of Family Physicians, and the
Oregon Medical Association: more than sixty people in all. The group set-
tled on a plan that included establishing five AHECs across the state.52
Kohler embraced the plan. He had helped establish AHECs in the Rio
Grande Valley south of San Antonio. One, near Brownsville, has evolved
into an academic medical institute. Thorne and those at the Joseph con-
ference wanted to see AHECs in Oregon.
Some rural practitioners and hospital administrators worried that the
real goal of the AHEC program might be to provide OHSU with a base
from which to set up competitive clinical operations in their areas. Some
rural leaders also were wary of OHSU and questioned whether it could
credibly and objectively manage the operations of the Office of Rural
Health. Since OHSU had relationships with rural doctors and hospitals
that referred patients to it, wasn’t there a possibility it would favor those
over others who were not so connected?
But other rural physicians and legislators, especially Thorne and
Timms, defended the rural health education plan. Practitioners in the
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eastern Oregon district that Timms represented complained the Office
of Rural Health was poorly managed by the State Department of Human
Resources, and Timms wanted it out of that agency. OHSU assured leg-
islators it would establish firewalls to ensure the office remained at arm’s
length from its clinical business so that it was not favoring one rural area
over another for revenue purposes.53
Kohler joined Reinschmidt in travels from town to town across the
state to assure legislators, local leaders, health care providers, and the pub-
lic that OHSU was only looking for ways to help improve local health care.
They spoke to Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, chambers of commerce and local
newspapers, pressing his message: “I want to know how OHSU can help
you.” They told rural communities about OHSU’s desire to manage and
support the Office of Rural Health and launch an AHEC program. People
liked Kohler’s friendly, unpretentious style, and they listened.
One of Kohler’s first trips was in early fall of 1989 to Pendleton, home
of Senator Thorne. From the time he met the senator at the Benson Ho-
tel, Kohler had been cultivating a good relationship with Thorne. Kohler
flew into Pendleton, a small city on the banks of the Columbia River in
north central Oregon, in a twin-engine state plane to speak to the local
Rotary Club. He was greeted at the airport by the Main Street Cowboys,
a goodwill civic group that welcomes visitors and promotes Pendleton
and its famous rodeo and festival, the annual weeklong Pendleton Round-
up, which had just ended in late September. The group dressed Kohler in
chaps and a cowboy hat and put him in the back of a Round-up float that
was playing “Yellow Rose of Texas.”54
He rode on the float to the Rotary Club meeting, where he talked
about OHSU’s desire to bring health services and education to rural Ore-
gon in much the same way the Oregon State University Extension Service
provided classes and services to rural farmers.
“It was a good way to break the ice,” Kohler said of the visit. “Rural
Oregonians have tended to be suspicious of people in Portland.”55
Kohler had other adventures during the winter and early spring of
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1989, in visits every two or three weeks throughout Oregon’s eastern and
southern hinterlands and coast where he got a firsthand view of the state’s
enormous landscape. Most of the time he talked about OHSU’s hopes of
expanding services to rural Oregon, but he also made trips to support
fundraisers for local hospitals, which were struggling to stay out of debt.
Weather threatened and complicated several trips. On one dark win-
ter night, he was flying to a hospital benefit in Enterprise in northeast
Oregon, and it was snowing as his small plane approached the airport. He
found it a little unsettling that the airport had no building or tower. The
pilot would fly over and flick his lights three times, a signal to whoever
was on the ground to turn on the runway lights. The system worked, and
Kohler made the visit.
He was going to make a trip by plane to Lakeview, a small town in
southeast Oregon, but the state pilot concluded the weather was too dan-
gerous for a trip over the rugged Cascade Range that divided east and west
Oregon. But then Kohler got word from a physicians group in Lakeview
that Dr. Robert Bomengen—physician, OHSU graduate, and pilot—would
fly him over. Kohler made it to the meeting, but the flight back with a
commercial pilot had an edge.
“We could hear ice forming on the wing,” Kohler said.
Rural residents appreciated his efforts to meet with them, and his
travels paid off.56 The legislature in the spring of 1989 supported moving
the rural health office to OHSU and setting aside a state match for federal
money to create AHECs in Oregon. OHSU now had the framework to
build the 98,000-square-mile statewide campus Kohler envisioned.
OHSU’s goodwill also had established a supportive statewide political
foundation that would become critical in Kohler’s quest to make OHSU a
public corporation. But Kohler didn’t embrace expansion into rural Ore-
gon for political reasons, Dodson said, but because “it was something he
had a passion for.”57 The AHEC program continues to operate today in a
national network of 235 centers, including the five in Oregon, connected
with 120 medical schools in nearly every state.
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FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
During the spring of 1989, Kohler got a taste of the financial challenges he
was up against in keeping OHSU afloat. The hospital was bleeding out. It
was $1 million or more in the red. As so many times in the past, OHSU
would have to appeal to the state for a bailout. Kohler, Walker, and Gold-
farb went to Salem to meet with then-Governor Neil Goldschmidt, the
former Portland mayor, who was in the third year of his first and only
term. They met in the governor’s conference room, with Walker and
Goldfarb at one end of the table, the governor at the other, and Kohler in
between. Goldschmidt told the administrators he would help, but he did
not want to see them coming for money again. He would not hold the
new president responsible for the hospital’s financial predicament, he said.
He stood, walked behind Kohler, put his hands on Kohler’s shoulders and
looked over at Walker and Goldfarb.
“This is my guy,” he said. “If there are problems, you two guys are
gone. The heads that roll will be Tim Goldfarb’s and Jim Walker’s.”58
Near the end of 1989, Kohler needed to find someone to replace Dr.
Robert Koler, researcher and former chair of the genetics department,
who had been serving as vice president for academic affairs since Laster
left and was now about to retire. During the university’s national search
for a candidate, Kohler urged Lesley Hallick to apply. Though she was one
of the first people he had met at OHSU as she ushered him about campus
for his job interviews, he had seen little of her in his first year. She re-
turned to the classroom and laboratory as a tenured associate professor in
molecular microbiology and immunology. But she must have made an im-
pression on the president. In addition, Koler, the outgoing vice president,
had worked with Hallick on several issues and committees and praised her
strong academic credentials to Kohler. Hallick was shocked when she was
actually offered the job, however, because Koler had told her not to get
her hopes up.
“You know, I don’t think this is a shoo-in for you,” he told her.
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“I assume I’m a shoo-out,” she replied. “I’m not going any-
where . . . I’m fine with that. I have a job. I love my job. That’s just fine.”59
But Hallick had her reasons for wanting to be vice president for aca-
demic affairs, a post later renamed provost in keeping with most other
academic health centers.
I didn’t really believe the university was a university yet, and it
needed to become one. . . . We were sort of fiefdoms, and we
needed to integrate and become a grown-up university. We had
no infrastructure and none was ever funded. . . . There were just
a lot of things about the way [OHSU] worked that weren’t very
effective in terms of everything from the registrar’s office, to stu-
dent life support or research. It seemed like there were things that
could get fixed. I viewed it as a short-term thing. I didn’t want to
do administration. It sounded really boring. I just figured I would
maybe clean some things up and make it better for the university
and then go back to my lab and teaching.60
With Hallick on board, Kohler had his core inner circle in place. And
it wasn’t long before he, Hallick, Walker, Davis, Goldfarb, and Billups
were talking about the need for more independence for OHSU. While
the legislature gave OHSU the rural expansion authority it was after, it
didn’t give it any more money. It allocated $58 million in state support to
OHSU for 1989–90, roughly the same as the previous year. But OHSU’s
operations, with increased clinical and research revenue, had grown by
about $37 million. So state revenue would cover only about 22 percent of
the OHSU budget, less than the 30 percent board members told Kohler
he could count on. That reality, the hospital’s recent financial crisis, and
the pressing need to fix buildings and expand OHSU’s research capacity all
pushed Kohler’s team to start talking about the need for another gover-
nance model that would give the institution more control over its fate.
Another force fueling that discussion was the rapid spread of man-
aged health care, which penetrated Portland deeper than most parts of the
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country. In the traditional fee-for-service approach to health care, insur-
ance companies pay doctors according to their services such as stitching a
cut, replacing a hip, or knocking down an infection. Under managed care
plans, health insurance companies reduce costs by organizing networks of
physicians, specialists, and hospitals equipped to give patients whatever
care they need for a fixed monthly lump payment on a capitation or per
patient basis. These capitation plans, which became popular again under
the federal Affordable Care Act signed into law in 2010, try to build incen-
tives for doctors to provide more preventive care and no more services or
tests than necessary.
Medicaid, the state- and federally-funded health insurance program
for people on low incomes, also uses a managed care approach in many
states, including Oregon. The state provides monthly payments to in-
surance companies that organize managed care networks. Kohler knew
OHSU was serving a disproportionately large share of Medicaid patients,
as well as low-income non-Medicaid patients who paid nothing. The
managed care trend would force the health center to make radical changes
in its business model if it were to compete for primary care patients. It
would have to become part of private managed care groups, including
some that managed Medicaid. The hospital and outpatient clinics would
have to work more efficiently together as a system to keep costs down.
Most of the health care money under managed care would flow through
the primary care clinics and practitioners, Hallick said.61
Walker and Goldfarb told Kohler something had to give. OHSU’s
businesses, its hospital and clinics, couldn’t operate in business-like ways
in a state bureaucracy under the pressure of managed care. They couldn’t
survive. They needed to be free of state regulations so they could buy,
build, and provide services at a quick, competitive pace. They needed to
be independent.
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A REBELLIOUS STREAK
The interest of Kohler and his team in more independence for OHSU
tapped into a rebellious streak in the medical school that runs back to its
origins. The private Willamette University in Salem, founded in 1842 as
the first university in the Western United States, opened Oregon’s first
formal medical education program in 1867. Eleven years later it moved
to Portland, which had more and better medical clinics to serve the city’s
19,000 residents. Initially, the medical program, called the Willamette
Medical Department, operated in a few rooms above a livery stable on
SW Park Avenue and Jefferson Street, near where the Portland Art Mu-
seum now sprawls. In 1886, the program moved into a Victorian building
at NW Fourteenth Avenue and Couch Street in the core of the city. The
building featured a 150-seat auditorium, a twenty-table dissecting room,
and a refrigerator large enough to store thirty cadavers.62
But along with moving, the school reorganized the faculty and ap-
pointed a new chair of obstetrics, changes that upset four physicians
teaching at the school—Simeon E. Josephi, Kenneth A.J. Mackenzie, H.C.
Wilson, and George M. Welles. The four rebelled. They joined four other
Portland physicians and won a charter in June 1887 under the Board of
Regents of the University of Oregon to open a new state medical school
in Portland.63 Classes opened that fall in two rooms of a former two-
story grocery store at NW Twenty-Third Avenue and Marshall Street,
the site where Legacy Good Samaritan Medical Center continues to oper-
ate today. Students used a block and tackle to pull up cadavers through a
trapdoor to the top floor for research and instruction.64 The school, with
eight faculty, offered a two-year course of study, and its first class, a group
of seven students who had completed their first year at Willamette, grad-
uated in 1888. The new medical school was not very selective in whom
it accepted for admission. Students had to demonstrate a knowledge of
arithmetic, geography, and “common English,” with a grasp of writing,
spelling, and grammar. The school’s gross income for 1888 was $2,329.
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The following year, the school moved its building one block to Lovejoy
Street and replaced it in 1893 with a well-equipped medical college build-
ing. The medical school established by four rebellious physicians as part
of the University of Oregon would evolve into Oregon Health & Science
University.65
Josephi—distinctive with his wire glasses, white hair, and long white
goatee—was elected dean of the new medical school. The other three dis-
senters served on its faculty. By 1909, the school had arranged for its
students to learn in Multnomah County Hospital at First Avenue and SW
Hooker Street, about four blocks from OHSU’s South Waterfront campus
today. Eight years after the dissenters started the UO Medical School, the
Willamette Medical Department moved back to Salem. By 1912, the UO
Medical School had established itself as a solid academic program with a
full-time laboratory staff, support from the state legislature, and a pub-
lic mission to serve the indigent through its affiliations with a teaching
hospital and an outpatient clinic called the People’s Institute and Free Dis-
pensary in downtown Portland. Mackenzie replaced Josephi as dean, and
in 1913, the Willamette Medical Department merged with the UO Med-
ical School as the state’s sole medical education program.66
Mackenzie, who had curly dark hair and a bushy mustache, was
among the first of a long line of leaders longing to see the medical school
expand and excel. He wanted to see it moved to a quiet, pastoral setting
more conducive to learning and reflection, away from the noise and grit
of the city. He moonlighted as chief surgeon of the Oregon–Washington
Railway and Navigation Company and persuaded the company in 1914 to
donate twenty acres of land on Marquam Hill, inaccessible to its trains, for
a new medical school campus. An old wagon road was the only way to get
to the hilltop, about 1.5 miles from downtown Portland. Critics called the
new campus “Mackenzie’s Folly,” charging it was too remote to be prac-
tical. But the next year, the legislature appropriated $50,000 for a new
medical building on the site, and the three-story Mackenzie Hall was com-
pleted in 1919. The medical school opened on the hill with ten full-time
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faculty serving fifty students, including some women and many returning
war veterans. A janitor kept the key to a closet-sized room where it ini-
tially stored its medical textbooks.67
Rather than become forgotten and isolated, the medical school be-
came a beacon for other health-related enterprises and rapidly expanded
over Pill Hill. Four years after it opened, Multnomah County built a new
hospital on the hill so that it could contract with the medical school to
serve its patients. In 1926, Doernbecher Memorial Hospital for Children
rose on the hill, financed primarily by a donation from a charitable trust
managed by the heirs of Frank Silas Doernbecher, a prominent Portland
businessman who established Portland’s leading furniture factory. He had
stipulated in his will that the $200,000 be given “to some charity for the
benefit of the people of Oregon.” The medical school took over opera-
tions of Doernbecher, the first full-service children’s hospital in the Pacific
Northwest, two years after it was built.
In 1931, the school built a clinic building for outpatient services. The
University of Oregon opened a nursing school on the hill the next year.
In 1938, the medical school added a library and auditorium building, a
three-story laboratory wing to Mackenzie Hall and an eighty-bed Univer-
sity State Tuberculosis Hospital, later converted to the Campus Services
Building. The private North Pacific Dental College in Portland became
part of the University of Oregon in 1945 and moved into a new build-
ing on the OHSU campus eleven years later. Baird Hall rose in 1949 as
a building for administrative offices and basic sciences departments, in-
cluding Osgood’s research lab. A Child Development and Rehabilitation
Center was built on the campus in 1954. Multnomah County decided to
get out of the inpatient care business and sold its hospital in 1973 for $1
to the state, which then turned its operations over to the medical school.
The school then merged its hospital, the county hospital, and the univer-
sity’s outpatient clinics into University Hospital.
The medical school in 1974 pursued more independence in a move it
had been contemplating for years, with support from the State Board of
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Higher Education. It broke from the University of Oregon to become an
independent institution within the state university system. It merged its
dental, nursing, and medical schools into the University of Oregon Health
Sciences Center to create the state’s only academic medical center, and the
state board hired Dr. Lewis William Bluemle Jr. to run it.68
Now, sixteen years later, Kohler and his team were looking at another
split, this time from the state bureaucracy and higher education system.
Any doubts Kohler’s team had about the need to make that break vanished
when Oregon voters approved Measure 5 in November, 1990.
MEASURE 5
The Oregon Department of Revenue divides the history of property taxa-
tion in Oregon between before and after Measure 5. The landmark prop-
erty tax limitation legislation dramatically shifted the way the state funded
public and higher education. Before Measure 5, Oregon had a pure levy-
based property tax system. Each taxing district—whether for water, recre-
ation, community colleges, schools, or other services—calculated its own
tax levy based on its budget needs. The levy for each taxing district, say,
Portland Public Schools, was then divided by the total real market value in
the district to arrive at a district tax rate. The tax rate times the real market
value equaled the amount of money that Portland schools or any other tax
district could collect. Most levies were limited to an annual growth rate of
6 percent, and any increase greater than that required voter approval.
This system created great inequities in public school funding. Taxpay-
ers living in districts like Portland with high property values could raise
far more money for their schools with a given tax rate than could prop-
erty owners in rural areas such as Burns with low property values. The
result was Portland school district was so awash in money that it could
afford, for example, to provide musical instruments for all interested stu-
dents, run its own repair shop to fix those instruments, and bring in local
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performing artists to teach children how to use them. Some rural districts,
by contrast, struggled to keep their schools opened for a full school year.
That all changed under Measure 5, which went into effect during the
1991–92 fiscal year. The measure limited tax rates to $5 per $1,000 of real
market value for school taxes and to $10 per $1,000 real market value for
general government taxes. This applied only to money raised for operat-
ing costs. Schools and other government agencies could still ask voters for
approval to levy taxes to pay for maintenance and construction bond sales.
With the Measure 5 limits, most school districts could not raise
enough money to sustain their budgets. The measure required the state
to make up the sizable difference. In doing so, the state equalized spend-
ing, meaning rich districts like Portland got less while poor rural districts
got more. The State of Oregon assumed the major burden of supporting
public schools, which now get half their money from the state, 35 percent
from local property taxes, and 15 percent from the federal government.
Without a sales tax, the state relies on an income tax for 89 percent of the
revenue it uses to support all state services, including prisons, social ser-
vices, and higher education. Measure 5 forced the state to use a big share
of that income tax money to also support public schools, which meant less
money was available for the other agencies, including state universities.69
Governor Barbara Roberts, elected on the same day Measure 5 passed, or-
dered state agencies, including the universities, to cut their state funding
requests by 25 percent.
It was now clear to Kohler and his team that they were going to have
to find another source of money if the university was to survive, let alone
grow and prosper. The state was giving too little and expecting too much
of the medical center, said Hallick.
“So when Measure 5 hit, and it was obvious it was just going to get
worse, and very quickly, we were already in the conversations [about in-
dependence] and very quickly went to, ‘OK, what are the extremes here
and what is in between?’” she said. “That’s when we started talking to var-
ious business leaders.”70
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Neither Kohler nor members of his leadership team recall precisely
when or how the term “public corporation” surfaced as they explored
ways to deal with declining state revenue. The notion of breaking away
or becoming more independent of the state goes back to the academic
health center’s origins. Bluemle left the Oregon medical center knowing it
needed “a new paradigm for financing,” he said years later. The new para-
digm, he said:
had to be a change the legislature would support, a radical change,
which would make the institution more dependent upon itself to
survive. That’s the only way you can build the incentive to do—or
encourage people to do—the hard work, to generate the resources
to make it first class. You can’t do it any other way. And I guess
that’s one reason that [the private Thomas Jefferson University in
Philadelphia] appealed to me, because it had to rely on itself to
generate its resources. . . . But you had to change, you had to de-
pend more on yourself, you had to give up your old biases. You
had to scramble, you had to become competitive, and you had to
rely on yourself to win. And that would have taken a lot longer
than three years [that he headed OHSU].71
Donald Kassebaum also recalled exploring with Bluemle and a mem-
ber of his staff, John D’Aprix, the public corporation option:
We were going to do it for the hospital. We went to the Port of
Portland. We studied the model of the public authority, and we
proposed it to the Oregon State System of Higher Education and to
the Oregon Legislature. . . . they simply gave us a lot of freedoms
and said, “We really don’t want to talk about that now.”72
Bluemle’s successor, Leonard Laster, said he and his staff also talked
about taking OHSU more private, but didn’t see that as a realistic option.
“Things that we talked about as just ridiculous ideas, like making the hos-
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pital private, have come to pass,” he said. “It couldn’t have been done in
my time—I really would have been run out of town.”73
Memories differ, but several people point to Brian Booth, attorney
and a founder of the Tonkon Torp LLP law firm in Portland, and member
of the OHSU Foundation board, as one of the first to talk about re-
structuring the academic health center in a way that would give it more
independence and control over its fate.
In the months before Kohler joined the university, Booth talked to
Billups and interim President David Witter about whether OHSU—or at
least its clinical operations—would be better off as a hospital district.74
Conversations about how a different structure could benefit OHSU and
the state continued to percolate after Kohler arrived. A number of uni-
versities around the country were divesting—or discussing divest-
ing—themselves of their hospitals, and there were questions about
whether this would make sense for OHSU. Most of those early conver-
sations occurred at the Oregon State System of Higher Education level,
among close associates of the university, or, in some cases, with legislators
or legislative staff who had some knowledge of the health care field. Al-
though none of these discussions led anywhere, they did keep the need for
change alive in people’s minds—including that of Kohler.
The term “public corporation” appears as a broad, generic label in
Oregon statutes and court cases to apply to a wide range of public insti-
tutions. Early court decisions, such as McClain v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oregon in 1928, refer to state universities such as the University
of Oregon as “public corporations.” A more descriptive term for what
Kohler’s team was seeking would be an independent public university.
But Kohler had not been president long before the idea of a public
corporation surfaced. Wendy Robinson, assistant Oregon attorney gen-
eral, wrote an analysis in 1989 that reached Kohler’s office. Robinson
outlines the qualities and powers of a “public corporation.”75 She notes a
public corporation is: created by government in a public process, gets at
least some support with public money, has a board of directors, is subject
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to public records laws, is exempt from public contracting rules, and carries
out public functions that would otherwise be performed by the state.
Kohler and his team also considered spinning the hospital off as an in-
dependent operation divorced from OHSU, but Kohler had reservations.
The hospital would have its own board and director independent of the
university and would be in control over how much of its revenue would
flow to support the university and its medical school. Kohler wanted to
retain that control. His effort to move OHSU to the top echelon of the
nation’s academic health centers would be limited if he were to lose com-
mand of the hospital, a potential major moneymaker if operated well.
But he and his team were willing to take a hard look at every option,
whether creating some kind of hospital district, becoming part of the state
health department, going completely private, or becoming a public corpo-
ration. They quietly began running those ideas by leaders in the medical
center and by legislators such as Thorne and Timms, civic leaders, and
others who had a stake or interest in OHSU. Kohler talked to Dodson
about making OHSU a public corporation when Dodson still chaired the
State Board of Higher Education. Dodson still subscribed to the old sys-
tem—you go to the legislature to get money. He pushed back.
“Look, you’ve been right about everything up to this point,” he told
Kohler, “but I really have got to ask you, ‘Do you know what you are doing
here? Is this really the right thing? Because you know, you are going to cut
yourself off from a lot of state funding.’”76
Pursuing any of the various options Kohler and his team were
considering would take time, and they had more immediate challenges
commanding their attention. Measure 5 put a tremendous strain on the
state budget, and in such times, higher education usually took hard hits
because legislators knew that unlike most state agencies, universities
could raise money by charging students tuition. And among higher ed-
ucation institutions, OHSU was likely to suffer even more because it
also could earn money through its hospital and clinical services. Early in
1991, Roberts, in her proposed budget to the legislature, appropriated
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$665 million to the state’s eight universities for 1991–93, $28 million
less than they had been getting.77
At the same time, OHSU was launching major initiatives. It was es-
tablishing AHECs around the state. Its new medical ethics center, created
to ensure patients receive compassionate and ethical care, had just opened
the previous year. The medical school had received a foundation grant
to overhaul its curriculum. And the university complex was in the midst
of a building boom, including many projects Laster had planned with
Hatfield’s support. An article in the Sunday Oregonian on August 5, 1991,
noted buildings were multiplying on Marquam Hill “like bacteria in a petri
dish.”
On the east edge of campus, the concrete frame of the [privately-
funded] $23 million Casey Eye Institute is rising on a brow of the
hill overlooking Portland. Higher on the hill, beyond the hospi-
tal, a towering crane pivots over the reinforcement rods sprouting
from the foundation of the new $20.4 million Biomedical Infor-
mation Communications Center. . . . To the south, the university
just broke ground for a $14 million nursing school building.78
Hatfield over the previous decade had funneled $91 million into con-
struction at OHSU, including federal money for the already completed
$42 million Vollum Institute for Advanced Biomedical Research and a
$10 million renovation of the hospital’s south wing.79 And as Laster had
envisioned, the new space was enabling the university to attract re-
searchers. The Vollum Institute, under Richard Goodman’s leadership,
had quickly filled its four floors with eighteen bright young scientists,
many of who would reach national prominence, since it opened three
years earlier. One of them, Michael Forte, a geneticist from Case Western
Reserve University in Cleveland, turned down two other jobs to come
to Portland and probe fruit flies and secrets of the brain at the molecular
level. A team led by Olivier Civelli had already found a way to reproduce
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a substance that nerve cells make to communicate with one another. The
university also had recruited Dr. Neil Swanson, a skin cancer expert, from
the University of Michigan and Dr. Melvin Ball, an expert in brain dis-
eases from the University of Western Ontario.80
CREATING THE FREEDOM TO COMPETE
Even as the university expanded its research capacity, Kohler knew that
to sustain OHSU’s growth in quality and size in the face of declining state
support, the university would need to compete more aggressively for pay-
ing patients. In late 1991, he assembled a task force of business leaders,
legislators, and representatives from OHSU, the university system, gover-
nor’s office and community to study and recommend a course of action.
The committee, which included Brian Booth, the lawyer, studied the pros
and cons of four possible paths: stick with the status quo, merge with the
Oregon Health Division, become fully private, or transform into a public
corporation.81
The group considered how each of these courses would affect OHSU’s
faculty, staff, patients, taxpayers, the state higher education system, state
government, and the academic health center’s commitment to research,
education, and patient care. It did so in the context of four key issues:
• The two-year cycles of budget reductions and uncertainties complicate
long-term planning.
• Overall state support had dropped from 42 percent of OHSU’s operat-
ing budget in 1975–76 to 17.5 percent in 1991–92.
• While OHSU had made some significant expansions with the help of
federal grants and private donations such as Vollum’s for the Vollum
Institute, the academic health center still needed to address deferred main-
tenance on its existing buildings and to expand its clinical and research
capacity. Its attempts to get help in capital investment from the state for
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these needs were regularly delayed and often deferred indefinitely.
• The state management system creates delays and inefficiencies that
work against the health care needs of an academic health center.82
The group quickly rejected maintaining the status quo as unworkable.
The health center could not count on increased revenue from the federal
or state governments. So to cover increasing costs, let alone grow, it
would have to raise more money from its health services. State regulations
constrained its ability to compete, raised its administrative costs and pre-
vented it from responding swiftly to capital development needs. And there
were political barriers. The state higher education system was focused on
academics, not health care. Legislators sometimes criticized the university
medical center for competing with private hospitals, though nearly all in
the Portland area were nonprofits.83
The committee also rejected the idea of merging with the Oregon
Health Division. That would essentially amount to replacing one bu-
reaucracy with another. The division was more aligned with other state
agencies than with a business enterprise like clinical care. While the di-
vision did overlap with OHSU in some areas of health care, the two
operations were different enough that merging would probably lead to
more, not fewer, problems.84
The medical school did not have a large enough private endowment
to make full privatization practical. It could spin off the hospital as a pri-
vate operation, but Kohler didn’t want to give up that control or invite
the conflict that would naturally arise from splitting the hospital and uni-
versity. What’s more, university and state leaders likely would oppose full
privatization, making it politically nonviable.85
So transforming to a public corporation quickly emerged as the best
choice. It would keep the academic health center whole and give it the
freedom and flexibility to trim administrative costs and engage in private
business practices while retaining its public mission, access to some state
support, and public accountability. While exempt from state agency sta-
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tus, the health center would still be bound by laws that affect all public
bodies such as civil rights, affirmative action, anti-discrimination, the
Public Records Act, the Open Meetings Law, the Public Employees Rights
Law, the Municipal Audit Law, and the Ethics in Government Act. Its as-
sets would still belong to the people of Oregon. It would not be a privately
held business, but remain a unit of government. It would have its own
governing board, bonding authority, and responsibility for its own budget
and spending. But it would still have the protection of state tort liability
limits and retain immunity from federal antitrust laws.
The public corporation option seemed in many ways to offer the best
of the public and private worlds, but the committee cautioned that there
could be drawbacks, too. Plunging so heavily into the marketplace was fi-
nancially risky, and funding could be fragile. The university likely would
feel pressure to raise tuition. Further, making the transformation would
require major legislation, and it was unclear whether it would draw suffi-
cient community and political support.86
Though this was a radical move for such a large, complex orga-
nization, one never tried by any other academic health center, it had
precedents both in Oregon and elsewhere in the country.
The Port of Portland, the Oregon State Accident and Insurance Fund
Corporation (Oregon’s workers’ compensation program), and TriMet, a
transit authority spread over three counties in the Portland metropolitan
area, all had both corporate and public features.87
Rutgers University in New Jersey and many Pennsylvania universi-
ties—including Pennsylvania State University, Temple University, and the
University of Pittsburgh—essentially operate as public corporations. But
these all started as private institutions that gained a public corporation sta-
tus as their state ties and financial support and public missions grew.88
The Pennsylvania Legislature, for example, approved the Temple
University-Commonwealth Act in 1965, converting the university, cre-
ated in 1874 as a “corporation,” to an “instrumentality of the Common-
wealth to serve as a state-related university in the higher education sys-
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tem.”89 The university would have its own board and control over its
financial affairs while receiving the benefits of state support and bonding
authority. But some of its powers, such as setting tuition, were turned
over to the state.
Earlier, in 1929, the New Jersey Legislature replaced Rutgers Univer-
sity’s private governing board with a New Jersey State Board of Regents
appointed by the governor. By 1955, Rutgers was getting half of its money
from the state. In 1956, the New Jersey Superior Court upheld a challenge
to a governance overhaul that gave Rutgers two governing boards, a Board
of Governors and a Board of Trustees, with duties divided roughly along its
public and private missions. The court refers to the university in its deci-
sion as a “corporation,” and notes it “shall be and continue to be given a high
degree of self government and that the government and the conduct of the
Corporation and the University shall be free of partisanship.”90
Kohler’s task force recommended OHSU become a public corpora-
tion. On April 3, 1992, Kohler sent an eleven-page memo to Thomas A.
Bartlett, the new chancellor of the Oregon State System of Higher Edu-
cation, outlining “suggested actions” for enabling OHSU to operate more
effectively, either as a “component” of the state higher education system
or, “alternatively, as a public corporation.”91
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Chapter Three
Selling the Plan
George Pernsteiner, associate vice chancellor of the Oregon University
System, held up a small jar of water before the Oregon Legislative Emer-
gency Board on January 8, 1993, and gave it a little shake. Flecks of rust
fell through the water like flakes in a snow globe, clouding it red. The
water, Pernsteiner explained to the board, came from the water pipes of
the Multnomah Pavilion, also known as the north hospital, the former
Multnomah County Hospital built in 1923. Among other clinical and
hospital services, the old building housed on its fourth floor the Oregon
Health Sciences University Labor and Delivery Department. Rusty wa-
ter, Pernsteiner said, was just one symptom of bigger problems OHSU
was having with providing medical services in an increasingly competi-
tive and unstable market.
He was appealing on behalf of OHSU to a dozen members of the
emergency board, chaired by Senator John Kitzhaber, a Democrat and
physician who graduated from OHSU and would soon be elected gov-
ernor. The room included Jim Walker, the hospital financial chief, and
Tim Goldfarb, the hospital director who gave OHSU lobbyist Lois Davis
the vial of rusty water for Pernsteiner’s presentation. President Peter
Kohler was at a medical meeting out of state. The university wanted to
use $18 million in gifts, bonds, and cash from hospital earnings for the
first phase of a $25 million project and $7 million in bonds for the sec-
ond phase. The project would make repairs and add five stories to the
nine-story C-Wing of the newer University Hospital, also called the south
hospital. Two of those floors would be devoted to modern labor and de-
livery, mother and baby care, and neonatal services.1
OHSU had set aside money to launch the expansion project seven
years earlier. But it needed state permission to proceed. In 1987, it asked
for that authority from the State Board of Higher Education. But the board
did not forward its request to the 1987 Legislature, which needed to ap-
prove its request to sell state bonds. The board again failed to refer it to
the legislature in 1989. After more delays, OHSU finally won approval to
sell state bonds to build the new wing, but it still had to get permission
from the emergency board for the specific plan and dollar amount for the
new labor and delivery wing.
As Kohler and his leadership team set out to make their case for con-
verting OHSU into a public corporation, the worn, outdated maternity
ward became Exhibit A. It provided a vivid image of OHSU’s state of
disrepair and of how the state bureaucracy mired the medical center in
regulations and delays that made it nearly impossible for it to upgrade its
facilities so it could compete for patients.
The existing outdated birthing wing had only one bathroom and
shower and five delivery rooms for the entire fourth floor in the north
hospital. It lacked space for family member visits and packed at least two,
and as many as four, women per room. It had the capacity to deliver 1,800
babies a year, yet 2,800 babies were arriving, forcing some women to de-
liver their babies in the hallway when all delivery rooms were full. Even
then, the hospital was forced to divert one-third of its pregnant mothers,
most of whom were indigent, to other hospitals to deliver their babies.
Laura Goldfarb, wife of the hospital director, gave birth to twin daugh-
ters in the old maternity ward on August 4, 1987. The twins were delivered
by cesarean section, and the room was suffocating, said Tim Goldfarb.
“I was so nervous, and I was standing on a table and chair to take pic-
tures of the twins being born,” he recalled. “I was pouring sweat. It was so
hot in her room. There was no air conditioning, no ventilation. It was like
being in a battle zone.”2
88 TRANSFORMED
Mothers needing ultrasound or other imaging services would have to
go outside to the nearby and newer University Hospital, the south hos-
pital, built in 1956. One day, Kohler was showing a woman from the
office of Governor Neil Goldschmidt around campus. They happened to
be standing outside in an area between the two hospitals when suddenly
they heard someone shout “gangway.” It was a hospital worker pushing a
mother on a gurney up a steep ramp from south hospital to north hospital
above. He had to get a running start to make it up the hill.3
As lobbyist for the academic health center, Lois Davis felt compelled
to deliver her son, Matt, in the university’s primitive labor and delivery
wing in September of 1988.
“How could I go to Salem and tell everybody what an amazing place
this was and why it should be supported if I wasn’t even prepared to have
my baby there?” she said.4
But she also had been the one who got Pernsteiner his rusty water
sample.
“We actually had people come and take a tour and see where the pipes
were rusting,” she said. “Really, as a pregnant woman, I was afraid to drink
the water at the university because it was so bad. That was before the days
of bottled water so it was difficult.”
She asked Goldfarb to promise her she would not have to deliver in
the hallway and that she would have a full-fledged anesthesiologist rather
than an intern or resident in training. She had delivered her daughter by
cesarean years earlier in a teaching hospital in Washington, DC, and the
anesthesiologist, a resident, put the epidural into her bloodstream instead
of her lower spine, a potentially devastating mistake.
At OHSU, she was admitted into a room with peeling paint, a hole in
the wall, and another pregnant mother. The women shared a bathroom
down the hall. Davis delivered again by cesarean, and this time the anes-
thesiologist, a doctor on fellowship, performed well, as did everyone else.
She had wonderful care in grim surroundings, Davis said.5
A few years later, Susan Stanley, a Portland freelance journalist, spent
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three weeks in the OHSU Labor and Delivery Department, and wrote a
book called Maternity Ward: Behind the Scenes at a Big City Hospital. She de-
scribed it like this:
Put plainly, the best that can be said is that L&D [Labor and Deliv-
ery] looks like some turn-of-the-century charity hospital. “Spare”
would be about the kindest description. The five delivery rooms,
with the exception of the room called “Special Delivery,” are en-
tirely too small, scarcely accommodating the delivery bed and chair
or two for the family and friends who so often nowadays are part
of the show. Tuck a couple of residents, a nurse or two, a medical
student, and perhaps a student nurse into one of those rooms, and
it’s a mob scene—untidy, confusing, and very possibly unsafe.
All too often, the PAR—the post-anesthesia recovery room—and
the prep room down the hall are redefined as delivery rooms.
Sometimes, normal vaginal deliveries take place in one of the two
operating rooms, simply because the other rooms are filled. (For
that matter, in a pinch, the hallway has had to serve, a screen
dragged over for a modicum of privacy if there’s time.)6
After Pernsteiner’s dramatic presentation with the vial of rusty water,
the emergency board approved OHSU’s project with an estimated comple-
tion date of July 1994. But there were more delays. The City of Portland
in January of 1994 denied OHSU building permits for the project until
it paved remote dirt parking lots. In a letter to Commissioner Charlie
Hales, Kohler pleaded for a break. To pave the lots, he said, the university
would have to raise fees for employees, who had not received a cost of
living increase in two years. If the project did not get underway by Janu-
ary 31, he said, the contract bids would expire, and the university would
have to spend more money to rebid. The bids did expire before the city fi-
nally issued permits, and the Attorney General’s Office said OHSU should
start over. So the university bid the project again in February of 1994 and
selected a contractor, but the Department of Administrative Services and
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the Department of Justice took issue over the award process OHSU fol-
lowed, though it had been approved by the university system. The dispute
was settled in June. The contract was finally awarded, and the hospital
expansion project was completed in the fall of 1995—nine years after it be-
gan. The delays had cost OHSU millions of dollars a year in lost business.
Kohler called it a horror story and one of his favorite examples of
what would change if OHSU were allowed to become a public corpora-
tion.7 The story made it clear to state leaders why the university could not
compete in a rapidly changing health care market as part of a state agency,
Pernsteiner said years later. Legislators worried OHSU was going to go
broke and take down the whole eight-campus Oregon University System,
he said.
“For a lot of financial reasons, state [leaders] worried they could get
stuck with the bill,” he said.8
In retrospect, Goldfarb said, it was probably a bad business practice
to so dramatically display in public the bad water coming from the taps
of a hospital desperate for more paying patients. But he and the others on
Kohler’s leadership team were young, bold, and still a little green.
“We were all kids,” said Goldfarb, who was thirty-three at the time.9
In the summer of 1992, six months before the emergency board meet-
ing, Kohler’s team was poised to launch a major push for converting
OHSU to a public corporation in the 1993 Legislature. The task force
that studied restructuring options had just recommended the university
take that path. It was time to take action. Kohler and his leadership
team—Goldfarb, Davis, Jim Walker, provost Lesley Hallick, and attorney
Janet Billups—were taking stock of what they were up against and trying
to define more clearly what becoming a public corporation would mean.
As they did so, the daunting scope of what they were taking on settled
in. Some academic health centers facing economic problems during this
period had spun off their hospitals as private, nonprofit operations to
give them a fighting chance to compete. But no state had turned loose
an entire public academic health center—the hospitals, clinics, schools of
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medicine, nursing, and dentistry, and research enterprises—to operate in-
dependently. There was no precedent. For all its problems, OHSU had
become a massive enterprise in Oregon as the state’s only academic health
center and the fifth-largest employer in the Portland metro area with
6,600 workers and rural health services across the state. Among others,
Herb Aschkenasy, chair of the State Board of Higher Education, called
OHSU the “crown jewel” of Oregon’s university system, and Kohler and
his team were asking Aschkenasy and the board to give it up. They also
had to convince the legislature and the governor to surrender control.
The university’s push to separate from the state bureaucracy and uni-
versity system was seen as an insult by the people who worked in those
systems, Walker said. “We were saying we can’t get our business done be-
cause we have to go through these state agencies.”10
What’s more, they were asking taxpayers to trust them without the
oversight of the state board or legislature. And they had to sell the plan
internally to OHSU faculty, unions, staff, and students. The faculty would
worry about the academic mission being compromised for the bottom
line. Students would worry about higher tuition. The unions would worry
about job security.
On an optimistic day, Walker said, he put the university’s odds of win-
ning approval to become a public corporation at about 50–50. More often,
he said, it looked like a long shot, maybe a 20 percent or 30 percent chance.
But he and the others all concluded they had little choice but to try.
“I was firmly convinced it was the right thing to do,” he said.11
Though the team could clearly see it faced an “uphill battle,” Davis
said, it also could see that giving the university more independence made
sense.
“We just didn’t acknowledge to ourselves that we wouldn’t be success-
ful,” she said. “We were going to make this happen.”12
Hallick said she hadn’t been out of the laboratory and classroom for
long and was “pretty naïve politically.” She recalled:
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I think what drove us all was not so much confidence that we
could make it happen, but a belief that if we didn’t the institution
wouldn’t survive. We really thought it was critical that we had to
get some operating freedom so that we could be more efficient.
. . . We were going to have to compete in the business world with
other health systems and provide uncompensated care at the same
time that the state with Measure 5 was trying to pull out all of the
state money in the hospital and in the education mission for that
matter. We just didn’t think it was doable. So some of it was just
backs-together desperation that we had to do it. . . . We had to fig-
ure out a way to make it happen.13
DRAFTING A PUBLIC CORPORATION
The leadership group talked for months about how it should sell the pub-
lic corporation model to the state board, legislators, the OHSU workforce,
and others. But then it turned inward, Hallick said, to focus on writing
what it thought the public corporation should be. Once they had a good
grasp of the change they were proposing, they could more convincingly
sell it to others. By the summer of 1992, Janet Billups was deeply im-
mersed in writing what would become Senate Bill 2.
She had been working since Kohler’s arrival at OHSU as a represen-
tative of the Attorney General’s Office. But in March of 1992, Kohler
hired her to be OHSU’s lawyer and to help him draft legislation to make
the university a public corporation, even though the task force had not
yet recommended that course. Letting OHSU hire its own attorney was
frowned upon by the Department of Justice. In fact, two months earlier,
Donald Arnold, administrator for the Department of Justice’s General
Counsel Division, sent out an interoffice memo saying he wanted to know
about any state agencies contemplating reorganization.14
He wanted to know about OHSU’s proposed reorganization early so
he could stop it, Billups said. That created a conflict for her because while
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she was still working for the Department of Justice, her client and soon-
to-be employer was OHSU.
“I was in such an awkward, difficult situation,” Billups said, “I knew I
had to leave. I wanted to leave and come to OHSU.”15
Fortunately, the interim attorney general at the time, Charles S.
Crookham, a judge, had been like a mentor to Billups and granted her per-
mission to leave the Department of Justice to serve OHSU as in-house
counsel. But he told her not to hire any outside attorneys. Typically, an
attorney entrusted to design the legal architecture for restructuring a ma-
jor public institution would have assembled a team of lawyers. But Billups
was on her own to write OHSU’s public corporation law. She had no staff;
no partners. She did, however, turn to Douglas Goe, a bond attorney at
the Ater Wynne firm in Portland, to help her craft the law’s borrowing
authority provisions. One of OHSU’s chief objectives in becoming a public
corporation was to gain authority over its own debt financing, but Billups
lacked expertise in that area. Goe agreed to help her for free. Mark Dod-
son, who also worked at Ater Wynne, said he too did some work on the
bill, including one part that proposed allowing OHSU to keep secret all
but the final stage of its searches for new presidents.16
But Billups wrote most of the bill herself. She drew on her twelve years
of legal experience, crowded her dining room table with a heavily used copy
of Oregon’s Local Government Law Manual and a two-foot stack of the gray,
hardback volumes of the Oregon Revised Statutes and went to work. She
combed through the manual and every book of statutes, researching what
laws would need to be modified to make OHSU a public corporation. Key ap-
pellate cases surfaced as she read, and she found those cases and read those
too, and cases that related to them. She reshaped the university in the law as
a public body that would meet the academic and business needs identified by
Kohler’s leadership team. The team wanted to be sure the law would:
• Retain the university’s public character as it would remain the prop-
erty of the people of the State of Oregon.
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• Establish governance and leadership focused on the mission and suc-
cess of OHSU.
• Keep intact the integrated OHSU missions of health care, research,
and education.
Billups also scoured federal laws, primarily those relating to health
care financing, and looked in Oregon and elsewhere for organizations that
might be similar to the public corporation model OHSU was proposing.
She concluded the Port of Portland offered the best model. Other univer-
sities, such as Rutgers and the University of Pennsylvania, evolved over
decades from private to public institutions and did not provide good com-
parisons. The University of California system has its own authority as a
constitutional fourth branch of government, but taking that path would
require changing the Oregon constitution. Changing laws to make the
university a public corporation accomplished the same thing.
Billups wrote a solid bill that would only see small modifications
as it moved through the legislature. The law addressed the overall phi-
losophy of the public corporation, the powers of an OHSU board of
directors, how OHSU would coordinate with the Oregon State System
of Higher Education, OHSU’s powers for debt financing and stock own-
ership, its obligations to the state Public Employees Retirement System,
and its state protection from federal antitrust laws. While long and
complex, the bill provided clarity and detail about precisely what OHSU
was proposing to become.
The bill gave comprehensive powers to what would be OHSU’s board
of directors. Billups gave the board every logical power and authority she
could find in Oregon statutes for both public and private organizations.
She included a provision common in governance statutes that required
the law to be liberally construed so that the board’s authority would be
broadly interpreted. Her bill also drew on what the statutes said about ar-
ticles of incorporation and on bylaws from other universities, hospitals,
and scientific research institutes.
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The state’s governance role over OHSU would come through the
governor’s authority to appoint board members. The governor would be
able to remove board members, but that authority would be based on
“cause,” minimizing political interference into the institution’s research,
education, and health care operations. The State Board of Higher Educa-
tion included two student members, which had proved valuable, so the
OHSU board would also include a student member. No constituencies
were promised board seats; each board member would represent OHSU
as a whole.
The chief mission of Billups’ bill was to free OHSU from state bureau-
cratic entanglements. So Senate Bill 2 exempted OHSU from any statute
that applied only to state agencies or that required the exclusive use of
state-mandated centralized services. Under its own board and governance
structure, OHSU could enter the market with freedom to buy goods and
choose professional and trade services as it saw fit.
After completing a draft of the bill, Billups would meet with Kohler,
Walker, Goldfarb, Davis, and Hallick to thrash out each section. They met
every week for months. One week, they might focus on the powers of the
board. The next, they might review the low-bid contract law. The follow-
ing meeting might turn to the Public Employee Retirement System. They
debated concepts and big questions such as, “Should we retain a few state
services or cut the cord entirely?” They had even more discussions dur-
ing hallway encounters. Through it all, Billups gained deep respect for the
group. She said it was the most “cohesive, gifted, creative team of people”
she would ever work with.17 The bill may be her career legacy, Billups said,
but she was proudest of how well her colleagues learned its every detail:
By the time the bill was introduced, the team—none of them
lawyers—not only knew what the bill said, they also knew the legal
reasoning for why it was said. I once watched while Dr. Kohler
explained that the bill had to include condemnation authority in
order to help avoid the fatal flaw of violating the special legisla-
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tion prohibition. He then went on to describe that an alternative to
condemnation authority would be to grant OHSU taxing power,
and, oh, by the way, the special legislation prohibition is one rea-
son why the bill had to make clear that OHSU would be a statewide
resource without territorial boundaries. It was a proud moment.18
Kohler didn’t know so much about the bill, which Billups was still
writing, when he and the team prepared to make a push for it in the 1993
legislative session. The conventional wisdom was that it would take three
sessions of the legislature, which met every two years, to get a major ini-
tiative like the public corporation plan approved. Kohler began speaking
publicly about it. He described the public corporation proposal in a speech
to the Portland Rotary Club on July 14, 1992, drawing a short story inside
The Oregonian the next day.19 But there was little public discussion of the
proposal after that. That’s partly because just as Kohler and his team were
starting to make their first push for the 1993 Legislature, Governor Bar-
bara Roberts asked them to stop.
She opposed turning OHSU loose from the state higher education sys-
tem, and she didn’t want its campaign to become a public corporation
overshadowing her drive for tax reform. She didn’t want people to think
government wasn’t working, she recalled.
“We were trying to keep everything as stable as we could keep it,” she
said, “so people felt good that we were doing a good job so that they could
look at tax reform.”20
She had called the legislature into a one-day special session on July
1, 1992, with hopes lawmakers would support a tax reform package
that she wanted to present to voters on the November ballot. Her plan
included a 3.5 percent sales tax, which Oregon voters had rejected re-
peatedly in earlier proposals, along with cuts in personal income and
property taxes. The plan would raise $950 million in new taxes to help
offset revenue losses under Measure 5. The Oregon House crushed her
plan by voting 33–26 against it. But Roberts didn’t give up. She planned
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to craft a new, more modest tax package, which would also include a
sales tax, for the 1993 Legislature.
So Kohler and his team retreated.
“We turned inward,” said Hallick. “We didn’t stop working internally,
but we sort of slowed down the external pitching.”21 They talked quietly
and informally among the various constituents and leaders they would
need in their camp. Kohler, Davis, and others on the leadership team all
had individual conversations with legislators and other leaders in hallways
and offices.
“We were very straight with people,” Davis said. “We said, ‘The gov-
ernor has asked us to back off. We’re not pushing to do this right now,
but we do think it needs to be looked at because we are not convinced that
there will ultimately be any other solution.’”22
That’s why there are few public records of OHSU’s quest for public
corporation status during this time, notes Barbara Archer, a professor at
Concordia University in Portland who wrote her doctoral dissertation on
OHSU’s transformation and what she calls its “divorce” from the state and
university system. She writes:
The process chosen for the divorce was very quiet and diffuse. The
process allowed OHSU to effectively control and manage the over-
all process. Instead of bringing groups together and having large
discussions, behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy was the approach
used. . . . Much of the process was one-on-one or small group, in-
formal discussions.23
While the Kohler team continued to soft-pedal its plan, Roberts took
hers to the 1993 Legislature for a long seven-month battle. And she won.
The legislature narrowly agreed to put a 5-cent sales tax proposal on the
November ballot that would raise $1 billion a year. Like sales tax mea-
sures put before Oregon voters eight times before, this one went down
in flames by a 3-to-1 margin, leaving the state with a $1.2 billion budget
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shortfall. That would mean big cuts for all state agencies, including OHSU.
And that added urgency to the quest by Kohler’s team to give the univer-
sity freedom to compete for money on its own. As Hallick said, they “had
to do it.”
OREGON HEALTH PLAN
Another development adding to the team’s pressure for change was the
1993 Legislature’s eleventh-hour approval of a bill that would provide
$66 million, most coming from a 10 cents per pack cigarette tax increase,
to launch the Oregon Health Plan. The plan expanded those eligible for
Medicaid, a state and federal supported health program for low-income
residents, from households earning under 58 percent of the federal
poverty level to all under the poverty level. The change added about
120,000 more Oregonians. It also created a state high-risk insurance pool
for those whose pre-existing medical conditions shut them out of other
insurance plans.24 In addition, it required most employers to provide
medical coverage to full-time workers beginning in 1997. These features
would appear later in the Massachusetts health care plan developed by
Governor Mitt Romney and the Affordable Care Act steered through
Congress by President Barack Obama.
The Oregon Health Plan had emerged in the 1989 Legislature through
a series of bills, but only now was being funded. It would be implemented
on February 1, 1994. Kitzhaber, first elected to the legislature in 1978, led
the design and legislative passage of the health plan as Senate president.
The OHSU alumnus, who had worked as an emergency room physician
in southern Oregon, wanted to see good health care across the state and
became an eloquent spokesman for health care reform.
The most innovative, and controversial, feature of the plan was that
it created a priority list of the health services it would cover based on ef-
ficacy and cost, with the most effective and least expensive services at the
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top. State officials, after a series of public hearings and focus groups, pri-
oritized a list of 709 medical conditions.25
The cutoff line fell at 587. Medicaid money would cover those con-
ditions up to 587, but not above.26 The cutoff line would fluctuate from
year to year with the state budget. The plan put a priority, as would
Obamacare, on preventive care—physicals, prenatal services, mammo-
grams, immunizations. It covered dental care, doctor visits for diagnosis
of any condition, and follow-up medical treatment for most conditions,
including the costs of hospitalization. It covered surgical care for treatable
cancers, repair of deep and open wounds, appendectomies, treatment for
burns, and services that could prevent death, restore health, or improve
the quality of life. Also covered were prescription drugs, psychological
treatment for conditions ranging from depression to schizophrenia, treat-
ment for drug and alcohol abuse, gynecological care (including tubal lig-
ations and abortions), organ transplants and other non-cosmetic surgery,
physical and occupational therapy, and hospice care for the terminally ill.27
Among services above the 587 cutoff were treatment for infertility,
restorative breast surgery, medical treatment for diaper rash, stripping
of varicose veins, and health services that may have uncertain or lim-
ited value. Newborn care was covered; intensive neonatal treatment
for extremely premature babies was not. Drug therapy for HIV infec-
tion made the cut; but only comfort and hospice care—not aggressive
treatment—were included for those in the last stages of AIDS or can-
cer.28 A majority of Oregonians supported the plan, but critics, includ-
ing some congressional leaders, attacked it as health care “rationing.”
In a speech to the Association of Canadian Medical Colleges, Kohler
noted that health care has been “implicitly rationed for years.” Medic-
aid and private insurance plans ration by specifying what they will pay
for, Kohler said, but legislators did not appreciate or understand the
implicit rationing.
“[They] often took up the cause of a particularly sympathetic indi-
vidual needing a glamorous or at least newsworthy procedure such as an
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organ transplant,” he said. “At the same time these same legislators seemed
oblivious to the thousands of women who were not receiving prenatal
care or other preventative services.”29
The primary feature of the Oregon Health Plan, the expansion of
Medicaid, hit OHSU right between the eyes. Compared to other hos-
pitals, OHSU handled the highest proportion of Oregon’s Medicaid
patients, earning $40 million in the prior year for those services. But
it would be in danger of losing those patients and that revenue stream
if it didn’t develop more cost-efficient care for a much larger statewide
population of Medicaid patients. The health plan spawned a number
of new health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that would contract
with the state to manage Medicaid patients, including some of those
who had been going to OHSU. The new HMOs were reluctant to in-
clude OHSU in their networks. They saw the academic health center
as more expensive, partly because it provided so much indigent care,
Kohler said.30
OHSU needed to be included in the Medicaid HMO networks, and to
do that, it would have to contract with doctors and hospitals across Ore-
gon—all within a five month deadline established by the legislation signed
in August of 1993. Under state rules, it would have to issue a request for
proposals (RFPs) to the hundreds of providers, mostly primary care doc-
tors, with whom it would attempt to forge agreements. Putting out RFPs
in rural communities would be “nonsense because there would be only
one provider,” said Hallick.31 The university would never meet that dead-
line unless the state gave it an exemption from the onerous contracting
rules it had to follow as a state agency. State officials initially refused to ex-
empt it. OHSU administrators put in hundreds of hours to finally get the
exemption the medical center needed from Governor Barbara Roberts’ of-
fice. The academic health center couldn’t have asked for a better example
of how being part of a state agency hampered its ability to succeed. It cited
the example in a four-page treatise it would later use to make its case for
converting to a public corporation:
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The contracting issues had nothing to do with the development of
a quality health care program. It was exclusively a debate about how
state regulations directed at traditional government activities should
be applied to a unique public institution, which must operate in a
competitive industry. The delay put the University significantly be-
hind schedule, placing at risk the continuity of care of the thousands
of Medicaid patients historically treated by OHSU physicians.32
The burden of the new health plan, probably more than anything
else, helped make OHSU’s need for change clear to Governor Roberts.
Kohler and some members of his leadership team met with Roberts
and told her it would be nearly impossible to participate in the Oregon
Health Plan under the state contracting requirements, Hallick said. No
one on the team remembers when that meeting was, but it may have
been February 10, 1994, when Kohler’s calendar shows him meeting at
3:45 p.m. with Roberts and Gary Weeks, then director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, on the 1995–97 budget. The group
met again on February 23. In any case, Roberts came to understand that
“they were not only handicapped, in a sense discriminated against, com-
pared to the other medical operations in the area. I remember now
listening to that and thinking, ‘that is not right. They should not be
penalized for their structure when their intentions are good.’”33 She ex-
pressed that realization to Kohler in a rhetorical question:
“You really need this public corporation, don’t you?” she said.
She not only gave OHSU the waiver it needed to carry out the Oregon
Health Plan, but also agreed to include a note in her 1995–97 budget to the
legislature to propose a public corporation bill for the 1995 session. Legis-
lators and state leaders took budget notes seriously. That promise gave the
university a green light and a deadline for selling its plan. Walker said it was
more like a yellow light. Roberts was allowing OHSU to openly resume its
public corporation quest, but she wasn’t necessarily endorsing it, he said. In
her 1995–97 budget plan, however, Roberts did pledge support for making
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OHSU a public corporation, though not for giving more autonomy to the
entire university system.34
TAKING THE PLAN PUBLIC
With Roberts’ blessing, Kohler and his team in early 1994 geared up for
their campaign to make OHSU a public corporation. Kohler anticipated
some opposition. He explained in an email to the team that Kitzhaber, well
into his campaign for governor, was concerned the unions and other health
systems might fight the public corporation plan.35 The team quickly needed
to gain union leadership’s support, Kohler wrote, and to inform the major
Portland health organizations such as Kaiser Permanente and Providence
Health & Services about OHSU’s quest to become a public corporation.36
Other possible competition also was surfacing. As the state wrestled
with a budget squeezed by the property tax limits of Measure 5, other
higher education leaders were weighing in with plans of their own to pri-
vatize public universities. In January, Michael D. Mooney, president of
the private Lewis & Clark College in Portland, told The Oregonian’s edi-
torial board that Oregon should make all of its colleges and universities
private and focus on providing financial aid so more students could afford
to attend them. The colleges could tap their alumni for donations as
private colleges do and raise tuition for those who could pay. “Higher ed-
ucation can help itself,” he said.37
About a year earlier, Kohler and Myles Brand, president of the Uni-
versity of Oregon, explored whether there was enough private philan-
thropy in Oregon to support their institutions if they went private. They
concluded there was not. But in March of 1993, Brand was again talking to
the State Board of Higher Education about making UO more independent.
Representative Carolyn Oakley (Republican from Albany), who would
chair the Ways and Means subcommittee on education two years later,
asked the state board to describe the merits of turning the 16,700-student
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Eugene university over to a private board of directors that would run it as
a public corporation as OHSU was proposing. The change would be risky,
Brand reported, should be considered only as a last resort, and would de-
mand the university remain small, raise tuition, and take fewer Oregon
students in favor of higher-paying out-of-state students. Becoming more
independent could mean the university would lose students and research
and descend into ruin, Brand said. But with sufficient donors and tuition,
it could reduce state funding by half and allow the university to raise its
quality to “sterling” levels.38 In the following January of 1994, the Univer-
sity of Oregon produced a report which projected that if UO became a
public corporation, then it would see healthy annual increases in revenue
despite declines in state support, largely because of tuition increases.39
In April of 1994, Thomas A. Bartlett, chancellor of the State System of
Higher Education, announced he wanted to make the entire system a pub-
lic corporation because Measure 5 had produced a $92 million cut in state
money for the 1995–97 higher education budget.40 The state’s support of
higher education had dropped over four years from 30 percent of the total
university system budget to 25 percent. It soon would fall to 20 percent.
The system had cut $65 million from its 1993–95 appropriation, which
was initially $732 million, and eliminated scores of positions, programs,
even departments.41 Under a public corporation system, Oregon’s eight
universities could save $20 million in two years, Bartlett predicted. All of
the universities could be more businesslike and efficient with “greater au-
thority to manage day-to-day operations,” he said. His proposal “would
fundamentally change the administrative relationship between the public
institutions of higher education and state government.”42
The chancellor’s office, Davis said, “knew we were making headway
with Senate Bill 2, and [it] wanted to say, ‘No, we can take care of it. Just
make us all a public corporation, and it’ll take care of everything.’ It was
clearly an attempt to keep us within the system.”43
Like Roberts, Kitzhaber, who would succeed her as governor in Janu-
ary of 1995, did not support making the whole university system a public
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corporation. It made sense for OHSU to gain more autonomy, he said,
because the State Board of Higher Education wasn’t equipped to oversee
OHSU’s large clinical and research operations. But the state board did have
appropriate expertise and authority to oversee undergraduate education,
the primary business of the other universities.
Other legislators also had doubts about giving the other universities
more independence. Representative John Minnis (Republican from
Wood Village) said he was skeptical, noting it was already “unbelievably
difficult” to get the state board to respond to the legislature.44 But The Ore-
gonian editorial board came out the next day in support of the plan. “The
[university] system could end up offering the Legislature a continuing ed-
ucation on how all state government could run better,” the board said.45
CAMPAIGN GEARS UP
In January of 1994, Kohler began meeting with business leaders and created
the Public Corporation Advisory Committee, which would be chaired by
former Governor Neil Goldschmidt. He also began working on a document
that would outline in detail why OHSU should become a public corporation.
In the following months, he met repeatedly with legislators in Salem, and
he traveled to small towns across the state such as Ashland, Lincoln City,
Klamath Falls, Medford, Bend, Sunriver, Eugene, and La Grande to speak
to rural health meetings, legislators, newspaper editorial boards, chambers
of commerce, and radio interviewers. He talked with Senator Brady Adams
(Republican from Grants Pass), Representative Dick Springer (Democrat
from Portland), Representative Eugene Timms (Republican from Burns),
Senator Lenn Hannon (Republican from Ashland), US Senator Mark Hat-
field, Portland Mayor Vera Katz, and Janice Wilson, president of the State
Board of Higher Education. Kohler understood the value of meeting people
on their home turf and did so regularly, no matter whether the legislature
was in session, Davis said.
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“He’d go to Burns to meet Gene Timms,” she said, “go to Pendleton
to see Mike Thorne, because it said, ‘We respect you.’ It said, ‘We actually
are statewide. We aren’t just statewide during the legislative session when
we want your help.’”46
Kohler’s leadership team also was selling the public corporation.
Team members launched an “all-out” public campaign in 1994, said Hal-
lick, and met with “every legislator or potential legislator” to describe why
OHSU needed to become a public corporation.47
In February, Commissioner Earl Blumenauer, now an Oregon Con-
gressman, proposed a Portland City Council resolution to urge the gover-
nor, legislature and State Board of Higher Education to let OHSU spin off
as a public corporation on July 1, 1995. He said the resolution could “get
the ball rolling” on what he called the “OHSU spin-off.”48
Kohler’s team also started collecting ammunition for its upcoming
battle in the legislature. Steven Forrey, who worked for Walker, sent out
an email on January 24, 1994, to three dozen OHSU administrators and
employees seeking anecdotes about work slowed by the state bureaucracy
that would help make the case for converting to a public corporation. The
request was part “of the ongoing investigation into the value of function-
ing as a public corporation,” he wrote.
Jim Walker provided an example on March 18 in a memo to Forrey,
Davis, and Billups. He noted the Oregon State System of Higher Education
conducted an internal audit of $2,827 in credit card purchases by the
OHSU business office. The inquiry resulted in a six-page report, which
cost more than the $2,827 worth of transactions being audited.
Kohler raised the profile of the OHSU public corporation proposal
by making his pitch on May 25, 1994, to more than 1,000 business
people, politicians, and community leaders gathered for the Portland
Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce’s annual membership meeting
at the Portland Hilton. He said OHSU was “swimming against twin
tides”—a rapidly changing health care environment and budget cuts re-
sulting from Measure 5.
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“After almost three years of planning, we have begun to talk about the
idea of converting to a public corporation, either as part of an umbrella
corporation formed by the State System of Higher Education or indepen-
dently on our own,” he said. “We’re not talking about a private corpora-
tion, but a public one. . . . We would continue to fulfill our statewide pub-
lic mission of education, indigent patient care, research and outreach.”49
But, Kohler added, OHSU also runs a health care business.
Remember, OHSU receives 60 percent of its revenue from a busi-
ness enterprise which must operate in a business environment by
the same rules as the other players in the marketplace. It receives
another 26 percent of its revenues from gifts, grants and contracts,
the majority of which come from the federal government or other
out-of-state sources. Only 13.8 percent of its budget comes from
the state general fund, and that percentage will drop in the next bi-
ennium given Measure 5.50
In an article about Kohler’s speech the next day in The Oregonian, re-
porter Steve Woodward noted that “the idea of spinning off OHSU from
state control is a couple of years old, but Kohler took the opportunity to
push the idea afresh.”51
That evening, Kohler gave a tough speech to the OHSU medical staff
at a faculty dinner in which he appeared to be preparing them for work
in a corporation. He stated bluntly that they either must improve the
quality and production of their clinical services or move on. With state
money declining, the university had to adjust to the emerging managed
care market and compete, he said. “Clinical income,” he said “has become
the life-blood of OHSU.”
As health maintenance organizations expand, he said, OHSU was run-
ning a system of care that is “often a non-system” characterized by poor
coordination and internal communication. He ticked off other problems:
• Service was often not up to our customers’ expectations.
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• Accountable faculty care was often lacking—many patients were un-
able to identify the faculty member responsible for their care.
• Numbers of faculty were out of balance. OHSU needed either more
clinical activity or less faculty.
Kohler said researchers were going to have to support themselves with
grants; faculty must do the same with clinical income.
“We cannot support those faculty who do not contribute,” he said,
“and those who do not contribute should expect to leave OHSU. . . . Those
who cannot—or will not—support themselves by seeing patients or
through grants are in trouble.”52
DEMANDS OF LEADERSHIP
Kohler set high expectations for himself, too. He devoted a big chunk of
his time to selling the public corporation, but he also was swamped by the
demands of running a complex medical university. One way he managed
to do so much was by sleeping less than most people. He could work late
into the evening and still rise every day at about 4:00 a.m. He’d turn to
snacks for a morning boost. Carol Reinmiller, his secretary, said he had a
sweet tooth and was a “Diet Coke addict.” Each morning and afternoon,
he’d take a walk from his office down the old corridors of Baird Hall to
the cafeteria where he would get a cookie. He often ate lunch at his desk,
regularly choosing a tuna fish sandwich with chips and an apple. Though
he looked trim, his wife, Judy, was repeatedly telling him he needed to go
on a diet. He was also inclined, maybe too inclined, to say yes to everyone
who wanted to meet with him, Reinmiller said.
“His days would be just jammed with things he really should not have
been bothered with,” she said.53
He worked on building and writing projects, speeches, letters, meet-
ings with national health and political leaders. He met regularly with his
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deans, vice presidents, and other staff members about a variety of ini-
tiatives unfolding at OHSU, such as construction projects for the Mark
Hatfield Research Center and a new Doernbecher Children’s Hospital, a
merger with the Oregon Regional Primate Research Center, a medical
school curriculum overhaul, and a nursing school program expansion
through partnerships with other universities across the state.
He also had duties off campus. During the years leading up to the 1995
Legislature, he held leadership posts with numerous professional organi-
zations. He served, for example, as an endocrinology executive committee
member with the American Board of Internal Medicine, vice president
of the American Clinical and Climatological Association, board of direc-
tor member for the Association of Academic Health Centers, a council
member for the Endocrine Society, and chair of the board of scientific
counselors for the National Institute of Child Health and Human De-
velopment. He also served on numerous boards of directors, including
those for the Alzheimer’s Disease Center of Oregon, Health Bridge North-
west, Standard Insurance Company, HealthChoice Inc., the Mayor’s Busi-
ness Roundtable, and the Oregon Health Council, which he chaired 1993
through 1995.
He stayed involved with national health care issues and connected
regularly with Hatfield and the Oregon congressional delegation. He, for
example, extended his support to the national health plan that First Lady
Hillary Clinton was designing. “At a time when the National Health Se-
curity Plan will soon be released, your support is very important to me,”
Clinton wrote him.54
And when anything went sideways on campus, Kohler had to deal
with it. On January 25, 1994, for example, OHSU surgeons cracked open
the chest of Mark DeSylvia, a fifteen-year-old boy from Scappoose, a town
twenty miles northwest of Portland, to give him a new heart. The high
school freshmen, member of the swimming team, suffered from a form
of cardiomyopathy, a genetic condition that killed his mother and aunt.
But as DeSylvia lay on the operating table, doctors realized the heart came
Selling the Plan 109
from a donor with blood type A, and the boy had blood type B. The heart
was incompatible. Dr. Adnan Cobanoglu, head of the transplant team,
called off the operation. The team sewed up DySylvia’s chest and waited
for a new heart. None came. Ten days later, the boy died.55 Kohler an-
nounced the university would conduct an “independent outside review”
into the blood type mix-up. Procedures were changed. The boy’s fam-
ily filed a lawsuit, and two years later, settled with OHSU for $250,000.
Like other academic health centers, OHSU handled the region’s most
complicated medical procedures, often to address imminent life-threat-
ening conditions. And that meant it also sometimes faced heart-breaking
tragedies. It fell to Kohler to lead the university forward through those
dark patches.
OHSU’S IMPROVING HEALTH
Through regular meetings in 1993 and 1994, Kohler and members of
his leadership team honed their message in preparation for the 1995 leg-
islative session. As they pressed their case internally and externally for
making OHSU a public corporation, they portrayed the university as an
institution that was gaining health and momentum. But they argued it
could not sustain that momentum without more freedom to grow and
earn money. Kohler struck a delicate balance between showing OHSU on
the path to prosperity and in danger of decline, even collapse, if it could
not break free from the weight of state controls to compete in the man-
aged care market. And as noted by former Oregon Senate leader Mike
Thorne—by this time head of the Port of Portland, another public corpo-
ration—what impressed lawmakers was that Kohler was not begging for
money from a strapped state. Instead, he was offering a solution.
Kohler’s strategy, like that of Laster before him, was to build new re-
search laboratories and upgrade the hospitals and clinics so the university
could attract better researchers and faculty, which would in turn attract
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paying patients and increased revenue. Walker and Goldfarb embraced
that strategy, too.
Even before Kohler arrived, improvements were underway. Walker
and Goldfarb had begun coordinating and streamlining the disorganized
hospital management system. “The management was awful,” recalled
Walker. The patient billing system, for example, was overly complex and
antiquated. Walker and Goldfarb bought a new computer system around
1986 that reduced the number of workers needed to handle patient ac-
counts from 156 to 55. The new system saved money and allowed the
health center to more efficiently bill patients and track bad debt, which
could then be sent to collections, Walker said.56
As finances improved, Walker and Goldfarb began sinking whatever
money they could into attracting faculty and researchers with national
reputations. Shortly after Kohler arrived, the university got a big boost
with the completion of the Vollum Institute in 1987 and the Physicians
Pavilion in 1993.57 The first brought in some high-powered researchers;
the latter provided modern outpatient services. Both made the university
more attractive to faculty and patients.
In addition, several other facilities were completed during this period
that helped raise OHSU’s profile. The privately-supported Casey Eye In-
stitute and the Biomedical Information Communication Center, the elec-
tronic library conceived by Laster and Hatfield, opened in 1991. In the
following year, the Center for Research on Occupational and Environ-
mental Toxicology building opened and the 660-foot-long suspended,
enclosed pedestrian sky bridge, the longest in North America, both phys-
ically and symbolically tied University Hospital to the Veterans Affairs
Medical Center.
OHSU’s forward-thinking revised medical school curriculum was draw-
ing top students and national attention. “Dutch” Reinschmidt and John
Kendall, dean of the School of Medicine, had led an overhaul in the early
1990s of the old curriculum, which they had concluded was too packed, lec-
ture heavy, and inflexible. With grants from the Charles E. Culpeper and
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Robert Wood Johnson foundations, the faculty dramatically changed the way
it taught, putting more emphasis on problem solving, clinical practice, and
family medicine. The students also spent time working in rural hospitals as
part of their study rotations. Reinschmidt explained:
One of the major tenets at the time was to reduce lecture time
by 50 percent or more and replace that by self-directed learning
and group learning activities so that there was direct involvement
of the students in the educational process. So they see patients in
their first two weeks—very superficially, but they have exposure
to clinical situations so that they see the connection between what
they’re learning in the basic sciences and what’s happening to this
person’s heart and cardiovascular system, as an example.58
US News & World Report in March of 1994 ranked the nation’s 126
medical universities in two categories: research, which included sixty
schools such as Harvard and Stanford universities that received the most
NIH research money; and comprehensive, the sixty-six schools like OHSU
that were more oriented toward training primary care doctors. As evi-
dence of the impact of its curriculum changes, the magazine ranked OHSU
the top comprehensive medical school in the nation, giving it top ratings
in reputation and student selectivity.59
The university on Pill Hill also was becoming the hub of a statewide
campus: the State Office of Rural Health became part of OHSU, and Area
Health Education Centers opened across the state. The School of Nurs-
ing, operating in a new building, created a statewide integrated nursing
education system, an initiative led by Chancellor Bartlett and Carol Linde-
man, dean of the nursing school. The OHSU nursing programs were con-
nected with those at Eastern Oregon University in La Grande, Southern
Oregon University in Ashland and the Oregon Institute of Technology in
Klamath Falls. These rural expansions helped Kohler cement favor with
rural legislators.
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In the first five years of Kohler’s presidency, the university had dra-
matically increased its complexity, research capacity, staff, and reputa-
tion—all of which helped stabilize it financially. OHSU’s revenue had
climbed 75 percent, from $261 million to $458 million; its research
awards had increased 80 percent, from $41 million to $74 million.60 By
1993, both Walker and Goldfarb had been promoted. Goldfarb had risen
to chief executive officer of the hospital. Walker initially turned down
Kohler’s offer in 1992 to make him vice president of finance for the entire
university. But after Kohler told him he would have to hire someone else
who would become Walker’s boss, Walker took the job.
As university clinical and laboratory space improved, Goldfarb and
Walker concentrated on finding good people to fill it. They leveraged their
relationship with the Veterans Affairs Hospital to pool money and offer
attractive salaries to faculty and researchers whom the university and VA
could share. The hospital also started kicking in money so the dean of the
School of Medicine could offer salaries attractive enough to attract top fac-
ulty. They would, for example, recruit a top orthopedic surgeon, who in
turn attracted faulty who wanted to work with him.
“We wanted physicians who were cutting edge,” said Walker.61
In addition to recruiting Dr. Neil Swanson from the University of
Michigan and Dr. Melvin Ball from the University of Western Ontario,
OHSU also hired Dr. Lynn Loriaux, a gland expert and longtime friend of
Kohler’s from the NIH. As more experts joined the university and its repu-
tation grew, more paying patients started seeking out its care. New faculty
came with “fresh blood and eyes,” Goldfarb said. They brought new ambi-
tion, saw new possibilities and raised the university’s aspirations.
“It was just an unbelievable, young, aggressive, ambitious smart fac-
ulty that even got the old guys to believe,” Goldfarb said.62
The impact of this “fresh blood” was reflected in the hospital’s bottom
line. The hospital is the university’s economic engine, and for a long period,
it was sputtering at 65 percent capacity, meaning a third of its beds were
empty. Occasionally, it slipped into the red. By 1989, University Hospital
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had stabilized and was posting consistent net income with 85 percent occu-
pancy. Through the 90s, it sustained an average 80 percent capacity, enough
to allow it to cover all fixed costs and still make money.63 Between 1991 and
1994, the hospital achieved an average 5.6 percent net income, unheard of
in OHSU history.64 The effects of new buildings, better faculty, and more
patients produced an upward spiral toward financial health.
Walker and Goldfarb’s interest in seeing the university become a pub-
lic corporation sharpened when they saw how quickly and smoothly the
Physicians Pavilion went up in 1993 with private money. Brim Inc., which
managed small hospitals in twenty-two states, served as general part-
ner and developer for the 80,000-square-foot, four-story medical pavilion
built on top of an existing parking garage. Brim financed the construction,
conducted by Walsh Construction, and then OHSU leased the building
from Brim.
The building rose within two years, on time and within budget, even
as the project to build a labor and delivery unit on the existing Univer-
sity Hospital had not yet begun after more than six years of waiting for
the state’s okay. The pavilion project showed Walker and Goldfarb what
would be possible for OHSU if it were free of state regulations to build
like a private company, said John Woodward, who at the time was a pub-
lic debt banker with Paine Webber’s San Francisco Office.65
In late 1993, Walker and Goldfarb invited Woodward to look at
OHSU’s finances and public corporation model to see if the university
could obtain debt financing from Wall Street on its own. Woodward con-
cluded the university was undercapitalized with a significant backlog of
deferred maintenance. The relatively short-term debt on its capital pro-
jects could be refinanced and stretched out so that it was less of a burden,
he said. He agreed that the university would need to break away from the
state and borrow on its own faith and credit to get the capital it needed for
upgrades and expansion.
But could OHSU raise money on its own? This was a time of great fi-
nancial turbulence for academic health centers. Walker speculated at the
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time that as many as 45 of about 125 were in danger of failing financially
if they could not adjust to the health care environment that was mov-
ing headlong toward managed care. State legislatures had permitted other
academic health centers, such as the University of Arizona in Tucson and
the University of Colorado in Denver, to spin off their hospitals as pri-
vate, independent operations because they were seen as financial drains,
Woodward said.
“In almost every instance,” he said, “the reason it was done was the Leg-
islature was fearful of the liability that it could cost for the state to operate.”
But that was not the case with OHSU, he said. The Oregon academic
health center wasn’t digging out of a hole, but instead “clearly on the rise
as far as reputation.”66
While not easy, Woodward concluded it would be possible for the
university to get the terms it needed to make bond financing on Wall
Street economically viable. The university was stable financially, growing
and valued by state leaders and the populace. Woodward had heard it
called the “crown jewel” of the university system more than once. “People
were not going to walk away from this,” he said. Still, there were risks.
OHSU was essentially proposing to launch an unprecedented start-up, and
it had no credit history, Woodward said.67
The university also was going through an internal debate on how best
to position itself. With the rise of managed care and its emphasis on pri-
mary care, Goldfarb was pushing for a big shift to primary care. He argued
the university should open primary care clinics off the hill where they
would be more accessible and people would be more apt to use them, and
allow the university to compete in the managed care market. But Walker
could see the university was building a significant competitive advantage
over other health care providers in the region with its expanding array of
specialists and experts. OHSU was no longer only the service of last resort,
where you go when you were poor or without insurance. It was becoming
the first choice for paying patients looking for the doctors most familiar
with the latest research.
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“The only advantage you had in an academic health center, especially
an academic health center on a hill, was in the tertiary, specialty care,” he
said. “You have physicians who want to stay on the cutting edge. . . . That
is an economic advantage you are going to have . . . and that is the only
advantage you have.”68
OHSU did expand its primary care operations with some clinics in
Portland during this period, though not as much as Goldfarb wanted. But
it was that competitive advantage that Walker described, the medical cen-
ter’s subsequent dramatic expansion of specialists and a capacity to handle
the most complex cases, that allowed it to prosper.
By 1994, as Kohler and his team made its public push for the public
corporation, Walker and Goldfarb could show the university was finan-
cially solid and capable of securing its own capital in the market. But again,
the team had to strike a balance—show that while it was positioned to suc-
ceed in the capital market, it could do so only with authority to go to Wall
Street and borrow money on its own. That authority would come only if
it could be freed from state restrictions to operate as a public corporation.
Otherwise it would have to rely on the slow state bonding process that
had forced it to wait nine years to replace its outdated maternity ward. It
could not compete with other area hospital networks if it didn’t have the
authority and independence to move faster, to control its purchases and
streamline its operations, to expand its research laboratories and clinics.
Its recent gains and future prospects would fade like an old photograph.
SHORING UP SUPPORT
By late 1994, Kohler also was winning the support of key leaders at every
level of government. After Kitzhaber was elected governor in 1994, state
Senator Gordon Smith, a Republican from Pendleton, replaced him as
Senate president. Both would support the OHSU public corporation pro-
posal. So did Hatfield, who understood that OHSU was strapped by state
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regulations and a weak economy and needed more autonomy to breathe
and blossom. Kohler happened to be meeting with Smith in his Salem of-
fice in late 1994 when Hatfield called Smith to say he wanted to see Senate
Bill 2 introduced in the legislature.
But there was another surprise meeting that reminded Kohler and his
team not everyone was behind them. On December 6, 1994, Dave Frohn-
mayer, the former state attorney general who had become University of
Oregon president five months earlier, invited Kohler, Walker, and Hal-
lick to his room at the Hilton Hotel during a stay in downtown Portland.
He supported Chancellor Bartlett’s proposal to make the entire univer-
sity system a public corporation, which Bartlett’s successor, Chancellor Joe
Cox, was planning to push in the 1995 Legislature. Frohnmayer thought
the University of Oregon had made a mistake by letting the medical school
become independent, Davis said.
“He knew the status of the [Oregon University System] would be di-
minished by losing OHSU,” she said.69
He also thought Bartlett’s plan would prevent OHSU from breaking
free on its own. And he could see Kohler’s team was gaining momentum.
“Don’t do this,” he told Kohler and his team.
Hallick said she was shocked to hear him threaten to undermine the
effort if OHSU persisted. But Frohnmayer also understood the merits of
what OHSU was trying to do. Fifteen years later, shortly after he retired as
UO president, he would at the request of Chancellor George Pernsteiner
write a report recommending that Oregon convert its largest universi-
ties—the UO, Portland State and Oregon State—into public corporations
so they would have more freedom to raise money and revitalize the state’s
stifled higher education system.70
By late 1994, Billups had completed several drafts of Senate Bill 2,
Davis had prepared attractive documents on the importance of OHSU and
the case for making it a public corporation, and the Public Corporation
Advisory Committee was wrapping up its work. But there was still one
group OHSU had to get on board—the State Board of Higher Education.
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During a meeting on November 18, 1994, at what was then called
Western Oregon State College in Monmouth, the State Board of Higher
Education took up the public corporation proposals of OHSU and of the
chancellor’s office. Cox told the board that he and Kohler could not come
to an agreement on the two bills. He said he agreed OHSU needed more
freedom from state rules to compete in the health care market, but he ar-
gued against giving OHSU a clean break from the system. He said state
money for education needed to continue to flow through the state board,
and he was troubled by OHSU having its own governing board. He ques-
tioned how the two boards could set priorities and how both would try to
influence the legislature.
“Can there be two boards of higher education—one board of higher
education that is nonmedical and one board of higher education that is
medical?” he asked.
Kohler was at an American College of Physicians meeting in Philadel-
phia, so Hallick stepped in to make OHSU’s case for full autonomy. She
argued the university needed the independence to compete as the health
care market tilted toward managed care, but noted it would remain a
“unit of government totally accountable to the public good.” The wisdom
with which the university reorganized “will determine whether or not we
thrive or go into bankruptcy,” she said. “It’s as dramatic as that.”71
The board agreed to try to resolve the issues at its meeting in De-
cember. Before that meeting, Cox, Kohler, and Governor-elect Kitzhaber
met to find a solution. Kitzhaber agreed to support Kohler’s bill, Senate
Bill 2. He also agreed to allow the university system to float its proposal,
though he did not support it.72 Cox and Kohler acknowledged OHSU
would continue to have a relationship to the state system if it succeeded
in becoming a public corporation. OHSU would fully control the hospital
and clinical programs, but the university would remain connected to the
state system and share joint responsibility with the state board in changing
or closing academic programs.73 The state money for OHSU’s instruc-
tional programs would flow through the state board as a line item, and
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the amount would be fixed at the 1995–97 levels through 1997–99, after
which state support would be scaled down.74
The state board also added it wanted to retain final approval on
OHSU education programs and tuition and fees. It then voted unani-
mously to ask Kitzhaber to introduce both bills in the legislature.75
Cox subsequently spoke in favor of the OHSU bill. He said he and the
state board “reached the conclusion mutually, that one size was not going
to fit all; that the unique nature of Oregon Health Sciences University did
require that we go further in the direction of a true public corporation,
further than OSSHE [wants] to go with the other seven.”
SELLING THE PLAN INTERNALLY
As Kohler’s leadership team sold its public corporation proposal across
the state, members also carefully explained the plan to everyone at
OHSU—students, management, the unions, and faculty. Sometimes
Kohler or Hallick or Billups alone would talk to a group of faculty, staff,
or students on how the public corporation would benefit them and the
university; other times they would make presentations together. They
also talked with leaders of the unions—the Oregon Nurses Association
and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) Local 328. Kohler, Walker, Hallick, and Goldfarb had been
meeting regularly for years with officials of AFSCME Local 328, the union
representing OHSU workers, as a formal labor-management commit-
tee. The four union officials included Doug Hurd, president, and Diane
Lovell, field staff representative, both of whom would testify in favor of
Senate Bill 2. OHSU leaders had developed a good relationship with union
members so they were receptive, but cautious, when administrators pro-
posed the public corporation early in 1994. Kohler’s team promised that
the public corporation would give union members better job security. It
also would help to “get their salaries up to market,” Hallick told them.76
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And that argument hit home with the union, which had long strug-
gled to get better salaries from the state, recalled Lovell. The state classi-
fied workers by title and paid them accordingly, but many of the AFSCME
employees at OHSU had specialized training that was not reflected in their
state title. Radiology technicians, for example, might be classified simply
as technicians or medical workers and not get the pay they deserved for
their expertise. Discussions with AFSCME were cordial and productive,
and union officials showed a good grasp of the difficulties an academic
health center faced fitting into a state system.
But the union had concerns about how the public corporation model
would affect its contracts, bargaining, salaries, and job stability. Would
the university try to outsource jobs, break the union, or cut off access to
the Public Employees Retirement System? The AFSCME 12-to-15 mem-
ber executive committee studied the proposal with help from its national
office and concluded the move to a public corporation would be good for
its workers.
OHSU in Senate Bill 2 assured the union its workers could participate
in the Public Employees Retirement System and engage in collective bar-
gaining directly with OHSU rather than the state, which the union pre-
ferred. The union also shared OHSU’s concern that the university could
get dragged into the financial problems that were hitting other academic
health centers around the country. And the union trusted Kohler and his
team, Lovell said.77
Students also were relatively easy to bring on board in favor of the
public corporation, Hallick said. OHSU had only about 2,400 students,
all working on graduate or medical degrees, and graduate students are
typically too busy to become involved in issues such as restructuring the
university. “They are just focused on trying to survive their curricula,” she
said, “and it is a very intense thing so they are sort of oblivious to the
whole thing.”78
Students were represented by a council comprised of elected members
from all the schools. As provost, Hallick served as chief supporter and liai-
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son to students and their deans. Students were concerned that becoming
a public corporation would drive up tuition, though OHSU already had
gained authority to set tuition in 1991. Students also wanted to have two
representatives on the university board when OHSU became a public cor-
poration, just as there were two students on the State Board of Higher
Education, one of whom at the time was Ronda Trotman Reese, an OHSU
dental student. But Kohler and other leaders wanted to keep the board
small enough to be able to act swiftly in making critical financial decisions.
After hearing many proposals and going through many discussions, stu-
dents and the leadership team agreed the OHSU board would have one
student member. Trotman Reese became an advocate on behalf of stu-
dents for the public corporation, and she would testify effectively in the
legislature in support of the proposal.
The faculty was the most difficult group to get behind the public cor-
poration. Initially, the faculty was in an uproar, Hallick said.
“They were convinced that it would be the death knell of our edu-
cation mission,” she said, “that we would just turn and focus entirely on
business, and we wouldn’t care about the education mission or the public
mission.”79
Faculty at most universities, including OHSU, are notoriously inde-
pendent and resistant to change. David Korn, dean of the medical school
at Stanford University, once observed his faculty members were anar-
chists united only by a common parking problem.80 But faculties also are
bright and can appreciate reasoning and a good argument. So Hallick pre-
sented a strong, rational case for a public corporation to the faculty council
and Faculty Senate leaders. The Faculty Senate appointed a task force to
study the impact of the public corporation proposal on the university and
faculty. The task force concluded the university’s future “was rather bleak”
if it did not have more freedom to raise capital and invest in its clinics and
hospital, said Dr. Jerris Hedges, who chaired the faculty group. It also be-
lieved the Oregon State Board of Higher Education “did not demonstrate
a strong understanding of the unique nature of health sciences education,”
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he said.81 Provided the faculty could preserve its role in university gover-
nance and retain its health, retirement, and other benefits, the task force
concluded, it would support a move to the public corporation model.
On the eve of OHSU’s 1995 legislative battle for Senate Bill 2, Kohler
made the case for converting to a public corporation in his annual OHSU
Convocation. The October 7, 1994, presentation was titled “OHSU in the
21st Century: Changing the Way We Do Business Without Changing the
Business That We Do.” He began by describing the threats to the university.
We are in the midst of a period of dramatic, historical change.
State and federal revenues are declining. National health reform
has an unclear future. And the health care marketplace is being
turned on its head. Fee-for-service is on the decline, being re-
placed by capitated payment and contractual arrangements. Insur-
ance companies are no longer just payers—they’re also providers,
and they’re partnering with individual health systems to the po-
tential exclusion of others. Health systems are scrambling to lock
up primary care networks and to cut off referrals to competitive
systems or facilities. It’s an environment of take no prisoners and
may the best person—or in this case system—win. Faced with this
brave new world, the OHSU community has two choices: we can
go up or we can go down. What we cannot do is stand still.
The university already was making big changes, he said, with revi-
sions of the curricula for the dental, medical, and nursing schools, expan-
sion of its rural health programs, the Biomedical Information Commu-
nication Center’s growing electronic communication network, increas-
ing research, and the university’s move into the world of managed care
through agreements with Multnomah County, ODS Health (now Moda
Health), and providers all over the state to form networks and health
maintenance organizations. But state support was still falling, Kohler said,
and the university needed to be more innovative because its state agency
role “has worked against us in our effort to reinvent ourselves.” He talked
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about state delays in getting contracting exemptions for its Medicaid pa-
tients and for building a new maternal-child unit. He quoted Roger Bas-
sett, Oregon’s community college commissioner: “It is hard to be aggres-
sive with your foot in a bucket.”
OHSU needed to become a public corporation, he argued. He de-
scribed what that would mean, and how it would not change the uni-
versity’s core mission of care, research, and education. He noted the plan
Chancellor Bartlett had introduced to free the whole university system
from state regulations would not come close to giving OHSU the freedom
it needed.
Legislators would support the OHSU plan, Kohler said, because they
could see that with declining state revenue and a rapidly changing health
care marketplace, the university would fall into a downward spiral, de-
priving the state of direct services, faculty, and out-of-state revenues.
“We do not want to abandon our mission, we want to enhance it,” he
said. “The public corporation will also be the only way for us to do busi-
ness successfully in the future.”82
Kohler and his team had led the university through more than two
years of debate and discussion. They had won the internal support of deans,
administrators, faculty, unions, and students, and the external support of
the governor, key legislative leaders, the State Board of Higher Education,
and top business leaders. One of the final and decisive debates unfolded the
day before Kohler delivered his convocation speech, when the Faculty Sen-
ate took a vote on the public corporation proposal. The head of the nurse
midwifery program spoke. She didn’t like the idea of a public corporation,
she said, but without it, she didn’t think the university could survive to carry
out its education mission. The Senate approved the change.
Kohler and his team were ready to introduce Senate Bill 2 and make
their case to the legislature.
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Chapter Four
The Legislative Battle
On January 23, 1995, the eve of the opening of the Oregon biennial leg-
islative session, Oregon Health Sciences University’s Public Corporation
Advisory Committee released its final report at a news conference in
the state capitol in Salem. The committee, led by former Governor Neil
Goldschmidt and composed of seven prominent business leaders, recom-
mended OHSU be cut loose from the state system of higher education and
the state Department of Administrative Services to become a public cor-
poration—a public agency, not a state agency. The university could not
prosper under the existing structure, the panel concluded in its report, but
as a public corporation, it could compete, reduce its costs, and grow while
continuing to fulfill its public mission both in Portland and in rural areas.1
“OHSU has the potential to become one of the top-10 biomedical re-
search universities in the country, a national model for academic health
centers, and a powerful catalyst for developing Oregon’s biotechnology
industry,” the committee said. Under the existing structure, OHSU “is not
capable of turning that vision into reality.”2
The committee noted OHSU’s annual state appropriation had climbed
only slightly from about $52 million to $65 million between 1984 and
1994, yet its total revenues had climbed from $176 million to $463 mil-
lion. As a result, the institution’s share of support from the state had
dropped from 30 percent to less than 14 percent during that period.3 The
state could not afford to support OHSU if it failed in the marketplace, the
panel’s report said. The ability of OHSU to compete was hampered by “un-
necessary layers of approval, cumbersome administrative processes and
restricted procurement and personnel requirements” and laws prevent-
ing it from holding stock or entering partnerships that could enable it to
raise money. “OHSU must be free to run its business activities in a more
business-like manner,” the committee concluded.4
The advisory group considered whether OHSU would be better off as
a private nonprofit, but concluded that would undermine its public acade-
mic and research mission. The panel recommended that OHSU be exempt
from the state’s public records and open meetings laws for business nego-
tiations and records and for new president searches, and that the president
serve as a member of the OHSU governing board—all conditions re-
quested by neither President Kohler nor members of his leadership team.5
The firm endorsement from a panel that included a former governor
and well-respected top business leaders added to growing momentum in
support of OHSU’s public corporation proposal. As the legislative session
approached, Kohler had amassed an impressive array of backers, rang-
ing from faculty, staff, unions, and students to the governor and the State
Board of Higher Education. Governor Kitzhaber said OHSU could serve
as a laboratory to test whether the public corporation structure would
work. Joseph Cox, in an Oregonian article anticipating the release of the
advisory committee report, said he was behind OHSU’s plan. “I came to
be persuaded that [OHSU] had to be sprung even further from the nest
than the other [universities],” he said.6 Another key legislator, Senator
Tom Hartung (Republican from Portland), chair of the Senate Education
Committee, also expressed his support. “This fits right into our philoso-
phy of making government smaller, more efficient and more productive,”
he said.7 Further, the Portland City Council on January 11 unanimously
passed a resolution in support of OHSU’s quest to operate as an indepen-
dent, public institution.8
Most legislators and state leaders also supported OHSU’s public cor-
poration proposal. The medical university showed both a clear need to
make the change and the capacity to earn money and survive on its own.
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And most leaders could see the urgency of its plan. The skeptics were
mostly liberal Democrats. They worried “the further OHSU got away
from the state, the less likely it was to continue its mission for the poor
and its other very public missions,” said Davis.9 They feared it would focus
primarily on the bottom line.
Republicans, who controlled both the House and Senate, were
largely enthusiastic about the public corporation plan. Like Hartung,
they saw it as the embodiment of what they had been pushing for across
all government programs: a more businesslike approach to providing
services. And they trusted Kohler. He had built political support by
delivering on his promise to bring more health care to rural Oregon,
which was dominated by Republican legislators. Since OHSU took over
the Office of Rural Health and launched its five Area Health Education
Centers (AHECs), rural areas had gained sixty-one physicians, seventy-
seven nurse practitioners, and seventeen physician assistants; provided
clinical services to fifteen towns; and arranged for twenty-nine family
medicine residents to complete at least twenty weeks of clinical rota-
tions in rural AHEC practice sites.10
THE PERFECT CHAMPION
OHSU had the perfect champion in one rural Republican—Senator Eu-
gene Timms, who was born and raised in Burns. He graduated from Burns
Union High in 1950, earned a bachelor’s degree in business at Willamette
University and married his lifelong friend, Edna Evans, in 1953. He served
a stint in the military before returning to Burns and his family’s business,
Alpine Creamery. Timms was civically active and served in the state Sen-
ate twenty-two years. He proved an ideal advocate for OHSU with his
avuncular, friendly style: a legislator well liked by his community and by
both Republicans and Democrats. He worried about the chronic shortage
of health providers in rural Oregon and saw OHSU as an ally in addressing
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the problem. He worked with Kohler almost from the day the president
arrived to establish AHECs and other medical services in rural Oregon.
Timms probably did more than any other single leader in Oregon to
help OHSU gain authority to operate as a public corporation, which he
viewed as “an exciting opportunity for this Legislature and the people of
Oregon.” Kohler needed someone with Timms’ clout to usher the univer-
sity’s public corporation bill, Senate Bill 2 (SB 2) through the legislature.
Most bills die in committees without even a hearing. As cochair of the
Joint Ways and Means Committee, Timms had the power to insure SB 2
got on the Senate Education Committee’s agenda. He made the proposal
personal by telling the committee “Oregon Health Sciences University is
as much a Burns university as it is a Portland University.”11
As the legislature went into session, Kohler and his team continued
to solicit support from other quarters of the state. Early in the year, Port-
land Mayor Vera Katz sent a letter to Hartung and the Senate Committee
on Education, urging it to support OHSU’s public corporation proposal.
She noted the university was the metro area’s largest employer, bringing
in more than $150 million a year to Oregon from out-of-state sources.
“Members of Portland’s City Council are convinced that with the chang-
ing realities nationally for health care systems and academic learning
centers,” she wrote, “becoming a public corporation is a critical move if
OHSU is to remain successful and competitive.”12
A short time later, two weeks after the 1995 legislative session opened
in January, Kohler’s team staged a second news conference in Salem.
Kohler, Governor Kitzhaber, Timms, Goldschmidt, and eight other leg-
islative leaders announced they would be introducing bills to make OHSU
a public corporation. Timms would sponsor and introduce SB 2, which
was joined by twenty-seven cosponsors. Governor Kitzhaber would in-
troduce a nearly identical bill, House Bill 275, to show his support for the
proposal and to provide a separate vehicle for it should anything go wrong
in the Senate.
As the news conference began, Kitzhaber rose to go to the podium,
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leaned over to Kohler and whispered, “By the way, I am going to an-
nounce we will keep our budget flat through the 1997–99 biennium.”13
This came as a surprise to Kohler. He knew OHSU had agreed to ac-
cept the 15 percent cut the governor had proposed for the entire higher
education system for 1995–97. But he had somehow missed that the state
higher education board had agreed to a four-year freeze on state revenue
at its December meeting. In the moment, there was nothing he could say,
so Kohler just nodded slightly as the governor stepped to the podium.14
The two public corporations bills were formally introduced on Feb-
ruary 2.
Though Kohler’s team had gained wide support, not everyone sup-
ported OHSU’s quest. David Frohnmayer, president of the University of
Oregon, made it clear at the meeting in his hotel that he was against the
plan. Attorney General Ted Kulongoski opposed the public corporation
structure, and some Democratic legislators argued OHSU would lose its
commitment to its public mission if it were no longer a state agency.
So Kohler’s leadership team was taking no chances. In addition to
the business advisory committee’s report and a news conference show-
casing the support of the governor and other key legislators, the team
led efforts to compose an executive summary of the bill, a section-by-
section analysis, a list of questions and answers, a two-page fact sheet,
a four-page white paper, a highlights document with a list of key sup-
porters on the back, and a booklet describing OHSU called One of a Kind
in Oregon. One four-page treatise described how OHSU under a new
governance structure would both save money and remain accountable
to the public. It argued that a public corporation was “a better way to
do business,” “a smarter way to serve Oregonians,” and would “unleash
OHSU to succeed.”15
“Making OHSU a public corporation would not change its missions,
just how it achieves them,” it said. “It would unleash enormous potential
the university has to compete in the marketplace and to expand its repu-
tation as one of the nation’s premier academic medical centers.”16
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Kohler’s team met regularly to discuss details of their public cor-
poration plan and strategies for selling it. Kohler’s calendar shows
scheduled public corporation meetings, usually on Tuesdays, thirteen
times during the first half of 1995, but team members said they met far
more often with each other and with legislators and other leaders. By
this time, Walker and Davis had offices in Kohler’s presidential suite in
the northwest corner of Baird Hall. Their offices fringed a lobby area
where secretaries were clustered in a warren of desks. Billups and Hal-
lick had offices in a suite about ninety feet down the hall. Goldfarb’s
office was in the hospital, but he often spent time with the rest of the
team in Baird Hall. So it was easy for some or all of the team mem-
bers to strike up informal meetings about issues pressing on the public
corporation. Sometimes they met in Kohler’s office, other times in the
conference room. Often bursts of laughter would roll out from wher-
ever they were meeting.
“We liked each other; we respected each other,” said Davis. “We took
our work very seriously. We did not take ourselves very seriously. . . . One
of the ways we dealt with this high stress situation was that we could laugh
about it.”17
Meetings often lasted an hour, sometimes two, and the topic of the
moment would dictate who dominated, Billups said.18 Once the legislature
got underway, the team often was scattered so they would meet in confer-
ence calls. Walker said he must have attended 100 to 200 meetings on the
public corporation. “It is a blur,” he said.19
Team members met with legislators and staff to solidify votes from
members who had already said they were supportive—and to secure votes
from those who were on the fence or in the “no” column. Davis went
nearly every day to Salem, putting in sixty-hour weeks while she and her
husband, who was also lobbying in Salem, raised two small children and
juggled ways to get them to and from daycare. Hallick and Kohler regu-
larly rose at 4:00 a.m. to tackle their multitude of duties. Sometimes Davis
was up at 4:00 a.m., too.
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Kohler traveled to the capitol about once a week, and Davis and some
other lobbyists working for the team made up to 100 trips by the time
the session ended in June. Kohler made at least twenty-six trips to Salem
during the session and met personally with at least nineteen legislators,
including all five members of the Senate Committee on Education, at least
nine members on the Joint Committee on Ways and Means education
subcommittee, and the cochairs of the full Ways and Means Committee.
He and his team members were prepared to talk about any feature
down to the smallest technical detail about the public corporation plan,
but they repeatedly blundered in coordinating their carpooling. Those
traveling to Salem on any given day had agreed to meet at the Howard
Johnson’s motel at the I-405 exit off Interstate 5 on the south side of Port-
land. Somebody invariably would fail to show up for the rendezvous at the
appointed time, which would vary slightly from day to day.
“So at least once a week,” recalled Billups, “some collection of us sat
stressed out in a motel parking lot [in the days before cell phones] won-
dering about our colleague’s whereabouts and whether we would make it
to Salem on time.”20
Walker recalled that on one winter Monday morning, possibly before
the session began, he and Kohler were to meet at the motel and drive
to Salem to meet with Timms and some other legislators. They woke
to four inches of snow, which paralyzed Portland because it is not well-
equipped to plow. Hardly anyone was driving, but Walker, who lived in
Lake Oswego, a suburban city south of Portland, and Kohler each pulled
on high boots and got in their cars. Walker strapped chains on his tires,
and Kohler had snow tires. They rendezvoused at the motel and drove to
Salem. With only about an inch of snow in Salem, a few legislators, in-
cluding Timms, had showed at the capitol.
“They were in unbelief, shocked that Pete and I had made it,” Walker
said. “It made a big impression on them.”21
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FIRST HEARING
Senate Bill 2 made its legislative debut at 8:00 a.m. on February 23 in a
public hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on Education. Kohler,
Hallick, Walker, and Billups all for the first time formally made their case
before legislators for converting OHSU into a public corporation. They
had cleared their first hurdle by getting the bill on the agenda. Now they
had to persuade the committee to support it and send it to the Ways and
Means Committee. That committee would put the bill on the calendar of
its education subcommittee. The subcommittee could kill it or refer it to
the full committee with a recommendation for passage. If the full commit-
tee supported it, the bill would then go to the Senate floor for a vote. If the
Senate supported it, the bill would go to the House for a vote that would
bring either final passage or defeat.
Timms put his clout behind the bill by introducing it to the five-mem-
ber Committee on Education. He sat at a small table for people testifying
to the lawmakers. The panel members sat behind the hearing room’s arc-
ing, blonde-wood desk, which was raised like a judge’s bench so that they
all looked down at Timms. The senator said OHSU had reached the limit
of what it could accomplish as a state agency and was offering a way to
make government more efficient by rethinking the way it provided ser-
vices. Freed from state strictures, OHSU could become one of the top
biomedical universities in the nation, he said.22
Kohler then took a seat at the table to testify. He described the prob-
lem OHSU faced with increased competition in a marketplace shifting to
managed care. “Those who cannot be responsive and efficient, and those
unwilling to embrace change, will simply not survive,” he said.23
OHSU was poised not only to survive but also to thrive if it could be
freed from the state bureaucracy and gain more flexibility, he said. Ore-
gon’s only academic health center had become one of Portland’s largest
employers, with a staff of nearly 7,000 people. It brought in $150 million
a year from out-of-state sources and had tripled its research dollars over
136 TRANSFORMED
the previous eight years, even as its state support had fallen to less than
14 percent of its budget. OHSU was rated as one of the most efficient aca-
demic medical centers in the nation, he said.24
“We have downsized central administration by almost 50 percent by
combining hospital and university administration in a way that is unique
in the country,” he said. “We are visited almost weekly by other institu-
tions trying to understand our lack of time-consuming turf battles.”25
He explained that without more state support or more freedom,
OHSU could not sustain its services and role as an economic catalyst. The
university was “in essence an important business enterprise supporting its
education activities.” State regulations and procedures were designed for
traditional government, not the biomedical research and patient care that
dominated the university’s work. The public corporation model offered
the best solution for keeping the university healthy while allowing it to
fulfill its public missions of providing indigent care and education. Kohler
described how a public corporation would work and how it would save
the university money and allow it to flourish. He concluded:
OHSU can be one of the country’s top biomedical research univer-
sities and a model for academic health centers. It can continue to
improve health care services in rural Oregon and serve as a cata-
lyst for economic growth statewide. It can achieve all this without
additional state support, but not without the tools provided by the
public corporation proposal.26
Hallick testified next. She identified herself as the provost, an acad-
emic title sometimes referred to as vice president for academic affairs.
“There are other names used, but I won’t mention them here,” she joked.
She emphasized that the university’s academic mission would remain “in
the public corporation our first and primary mission.” She described the
university’s schools and programs and noted “we have been under siege
for a few years here” because of a decline in state support, which is “the
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underpinning of many of the educational programs.” Despite that de-
cline, the university had not eliminated a single educational program.
Instead, she said, the university had cut and consolidated its administra-
tion, creating “the leanest administration of any academic health center in
the country.” Data from two years earlier showed OHSU’s administration
leanest next to Mississippi. “They have not undergone this last round of
cuts nor the next one,” she said. “So we are reasonably confident that we
are the leanest, and that isn’t all good.”27
Walker took his turn before the Senate committee. He described uni-
versity finances, the threats of managed health care, and OHSU’s difficulty
forming a statewide health maintenance organization with Multnomah
County because of cumbersome state contract regulations. He said OHSU
carried about $110 million in debt, was strong enough to access the pri-
vate debt market and wanted the option of issuing bonds through the
state.28 He implied a threat loomed over OHSU by describing how acad-
emic health centers can slip into a downward spiral when their buildings
and equipment age, and they start having difficulty attracting patients and
sustaining research.
“The business erodes, the research erodes,” he said. “The patient care
isn’t very good, they don’t have the research dollars coming into the state,
and they have very little research going on. . . . It all interrelates.”29
OHSU, on the other hand, was getting financially stronger, Walker said,
because Kohler had put money into maintenance and good faculty and
adopted a strategic plan that brought all of the university schools and depart-
ments together under a consolidated administration and common vision.
“You have to get the business side healthy,” he said. “You have to start
investing in faculty and be able to make the unit run as a whole . . . If you
don’t have the quality faculty, patients aren’t going to come up to our in-
stitution.”30
He warned declining state revenue threatened OHSU’s ability to make
those investments. As the Public Corporation Advisory Committee had
reported, OHSU could not compensate for less state support and sustain
138 TRANSFORMED
its financial health in an increasingly competitive market without more
freedom to reduce its costs, raise its own capital, and expand so that it
could attract more high-quality faculty and doctors, who would in turn
draw more paying patients.
DEFINING CHANGE
Next Billups, who identified herself as OHSU’s Legal Policy Advisor, took
a seat at the table and calmly and confidently walked the committee
through the ninety-two-section bill, section by section. She made it clear
to committee members and the audience that OHSU’s proposal was what
it claimed to be, nothing more and nothing less. There was no subtext,
no secret plan. If people had questions, the OHSU team would answer
them. If they had concerns, the team would do its best to address them.
Senator Ken Baker (Republican from Clackamas), raised one concern as
Billups described section 2 of the bill as “intended to define or at least ex-
plain what kind of creature we are creating here.”
Baker asked, “Have we anywhere else in Oregon statutes defining
what we mean by independent public corporation?”
“No, and that’s a bit of a problem,” said Billups, “and that’s one reason
it is difficult to . . .”
“So, wouldn’t it be good,” said Baker, “if we are going to do this like we
did on SB 271 [the chancellor’s public corporation proposal for the whole
university system] to have a definition to use sort of as a template?”31
Baker had a point. Public corporation was not explicitly defined in the
bill, and it needed to be. By the next meeting five days later, Billups had a
definition:
A public corporation is an entity that is created by the state to
carry out public missions and services. In order to carry out these
public missions and services, the public corporation participates
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in activities or provides services that are also provided by private
enterprise. A public corporation is granted increased operating
flexibility in order to best insure its success while retaining prin-
ciples of public accountability and fundamental public policy. The
Board of Directors of the public corporation is appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the senate but is otherwise delegated
the authority to set policy and manage the operations of the public
corporation.32
During the first hearing, Billups took the committee through other
features of SB 2, describing the composition of the board and its powers,
state statutes that would still apply to the university and those from which
it would be exempt, and how OHSU would pay for state services it used.
The state personnel system would remain in place until OHSU developed
its own, which would preserve collective bargaining rights and employee
access to the Public Employees Retirement System.33
Senator Cliff Trow, a Democrat, history professor, and administrator
at Oregon State University in Corvallis, asked if severing OHSU from
the rest of the state university system would disrupt cooperative research
among faculty of the state institutions, a concern that came up in Gold-
schmidt’s advisory committee. Kohler went to the table and said OHSU
would remain involved with the state university system’s academic pro-
grams, noting that cooperation among researchers depended more on
their initiative and the strength of their research programs than on ad-
ministrative efforts to foster collaboration.
The committee did not raise many other concerns in the first meet-
ing, but Hartung scheduled the next meeting five days later to start at
7:00 a.m. so the panel would have time to probe the proposal more deeply.
One striking feature of these meetings was how much OHSU’s image had
changed in the eyes of lawmakers. No longer were lawmakers looking at
the university as a mismanaged drain on the system. Instead, they spoke
about it with respect.
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“It is just amazing to me the public perception on what you are doing
up there, and doing very well,” said Hartung in his committee’s second
meeting on the bill. “In this process, we do not want to denigrate that or
downgrade it. I wish we could have the same public perception on educa-
tion K-12.”34
On the other hand, word began reaching Kohler’s team during this
time that some legislators saw OHSU denigrating state government and
its employees with its arguments about being stalled and held back by state
bureaucrats. The team scrambled to meet with legislators one-on-one to
clarify that they were not criticizing state government, but making the
point that 60 percent of their money came from a competitive business
enterprise with other health care providers, not other state agencies.
Kohler also looked for chances to sell the public corporation else-
where. During the first half of 1995, as the legislature pored over SB 2,
Kohler managed to give at least nine speeches to various groups. He
spoke on “The role of OHSU for the New Health Care Environment”
to the Clackamas County Medical Society and on “The Changing Face
of Medical Education in the Decade of the 90s” to a medical group in
Seattle. He spoke to the Portland City Council, to a Kiwanis group in
Portland, to the American Lung Association, and to the Jewish Federa-
tion of Portland.
On February 10, he agreed to pinch hit for University of Oregon Pres-
ident Dave Frohnmayer, who had a conflict, as speaker at the weekly
meeting of the City Club of Portland, an influential group of civic and
business leaders and citizens. The talk was broadcast on Oregon Public
Radio. Kohler talked about the importance of higher education on the
economy and the workforce challenges of the changing world of health
care. As in most of his talks, he took a few minutes at the end of his pre-
sentation to mention OHSU’s quest to become a public corporation.
“There is a lot of talk about reinventing government,” he said. “There
aren’t many effective examples yet. OHSU will be one of the first; and, we
believe, one of the most successful.”35
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Kohler was to speak on April 19 on “What happens to Teaching in
Managed Care” to a black tie dinner in Oklahoma City, two days before
the Ways and Means Committee would take up its final vote on SB 2. But
his speech was canceled after Timothy McVeigh earlier that day bombed
the downtown federal building.36
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM PLAN
As OHSU pushed for more independence, so did the Oregon State System
of Higher Education with Senate Bill 271, also called the Higher Education
Administrative Efficiency Act for the 21st Century. The legislation, in-
troduced by Chancellor Thomas Bartlett, and then carried forward by his
successor, Joseph Cox, proposed making the entire eight-campus univer-
sity system a public corporation. It reflected a national unrest in higher
education. Public universities, academic health centers, and university
systems in other parts of the country also were casting about for more au-
tonomy. Higher education leaders in Florida were proposing to privatize
some university operations, and leaders in Virginia were seeking more au-
tonomy for some of their colleges.37 The University of Wisconsin and the
University of Maryland had recently won legislative approval to spin off
their hospitals as a “public authority or public corporation” with their own
boards and operating flexibility. Governor Christine Todd Whitman was
proposing to eliminate the New Jersey Department of Higher Education.38
Academics were writing about these winds of change in articles such as
one by Fred Evans, a professor at Eastern Washington University, titled
“The Coming Privatization of Higher Education.” State higher education
leaders also were reading David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s best-selling
book Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming
the Public Sector.39
But unlike SB 2, the state board’s plan had been getting a cool recep-
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tion from politicians, campus leaders, and editorial boards from the day
Bartlett floated it. Many were uneasy with the magnitude of the proposal.
The term “public corporation” was part of the problem, Cox said. “It con-
founded our friends and confused our critics,” he said.40
He and other university system administrators emphasized the plan
was not radical and not privatization. They modified the proposed bill
in September for the upcoming 1995 legislative session. Their new bill
would convert the state system into “a semi-independent state agency.”
But legislators still worried about giving up too much authority over
higher education. Representative Tony Van Vliet, a Republican and for-
mer Oregon State University professor who left the legislature in 1994,
expressed the view of many state leaders. With their lump-sum state
budgets and authority to set tuition, he said, the state’s universities had
enough independence.
“They want all the perks that go with a public agency, such as access
to funds, but the advantages of the private sector,” he said. “It doesn’t give
much accountability either way. They can’t be neither fish nor fowl.”41
While SB 2 stayed on track in the 1995 Legislature, the Higher Educa-
tion Administrative Efficiency Act for the 21st Century foundered. When
Cox heard a rumor that the Efficiency Act already was dead, he invited
about a dozen legislative leaders to a breakfast, described by reporter Kit
Lively, in The Chronicle of Higher Education:
It was an intentionally frugal affair, with boxes of Danish pastry
and juice served in a cramped basement room of the State Capitol.
After everyone was settled at a Formica-topped table, Mr. Cox
closed the door and asked what was going on. Brady Adams, the
Senate Majority Leader and an old friend, said he was sorry, but
the bill did not have the support it needed to survive. The chancel-
lor froze.
Suddenly, the Senate’s new president, a businessman named Gor-
don Smith, said he wasn’t quite ready to call the coroner. He liked
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the [university] system’s idea. If legislators could promise only
limited funds to higher education, he said in a later interview, it
was in their interest to encourage efficiency 42
While Smith’s support kept the bill breathing, legislators still had
concerns. They worried that the higher education system’s plan to save
$7 million by ending payments for services such as purchasing and per-
sonnel would be a blow to state agencies. They also didn’t like the
119-page bill’s complexity, which required modification in more than 240
statutes, many to change the name of the university system to the Ore-
gon Public University System or OPUS. University officials produced a
slimmed-down version of the bill in late January that scrapped the name
change and phased out service payments over more than two years.
Still, key leaders had doubts. Representative Carolyn Oakley (Republi-
can from Albany), chair of the Ways and Means education subcommittee,
worried about its impact on the state budget, and Kitzhaber couldn’t support
it because, as one of his advisers said, its request for “total exemption from a
large body of statutes goes too far.” Oakley proposed a watered-down com-
promise that would give the state’s universities more control over purchas-
ing, contracting, personnel, and printing. On the day before the legislature
adjourned, it passed the twelve-page Efficiency Act.43
MORE HEARINGS
OHSU’s SB 2, by contrast, received sustained and serious consideration by
legislators in the Senate Committee on Education, which met again on
February 28 and March 2, a total of eight hours, before sending it to the
Joint Ways and Means Committee. The Ways and Means education sub-
committee then dug into the bill on April 5, 12, 13, and 17; and the full
Ways and Means Committee took up the bill just once, on April 21.
Governor Kitzhaber, other state leaders, educators, business and pri-
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vate hospital leaders, union representatives, students, even other legis-
lators spoke in favor of the bill. No one spoke against it. At the Senate
Education Committee’s February 28 meeting, Kitzhaber testified that con-
verting OHSU to a public corporation was compelling for two reasons: it
would not be able to thrive without the change, and it would be more ef-
ficient and cost-effective with it, which was what the public wanted to see
in government.
“I’ve heard nothing either inside or outside the legislature that sug-
gests this is a bad idea,” he said.44
He said the conversion would not undermine the state university sys-
tem, but allow OHSU to carry out its multiple missions of education,
research, and care to the indigent. Then he again surprised Kohler and his
team. He said as a public corporation, OHSU could fulfill its mission with-
out more state money.
“The intent is over the next several years to try to move the state
funding component on down to zero where the school at one point will
be self-sufficient,” he said.45
Kohler and his team were stunned. That idea had never been part of the
plan. Kohler’s team had argued its goal was to give OHSU the flexibility to
be more successful at competing for private revenue to supplement—not re-
place—its public funding.46 Section 13 of SB 2 explicitly stated the university
was to submit a funding request to the state Department of Administrative
Services by September 1 of each even-numbered year. Administrative ser-
vices was then to submit a request on behalf of OHSU “to the Legislative
Assembly as part of the governor’s biennial budget.”47
Kohler, Davis, and Billups huddled in the back of the hearing room and
discussed how to respond. They did not want to let the governor’s statement
stand on the record. On the other hand, they did not want to alienate one of
their key supporters by directly challenging him in front of the committee.
In the end, they decided to soft-pedal it. When a committee member asked
Kohler if the university could completely divest itself of state appropriations
over time, the president responded that would be possible only if the state or
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another entity were to provide OHSU with a $2 billion endowment to fund
general operations. Otherwise, he said, the university would survive, but it
would have to reduce the scope of services the state subsidizes such as edu-
cation and health care for indigent patients.48
After the committee adjourned, Kohler, Davis, and Billups talked to
individual committee members and staff to clarify that the medical uni-
versity had never proposed becoming fully self-sufficient. The OHSU
administrators explained they had, in fact, considered a fully private model
and rejected it, as did their advisory committee, primarily because it could
jeopardize their public mission, but also because they didn’t believe it
would work. Even as its hospital and clinical revenues increased, OHSU
would be hard-pressed to support its research and its medical school and
other educational programs without state revenue. Private donors would
not give money to the university to sustain its operations; they wanted to
support new buildings or research initiatives.49
In retrospect, it was a major mistake not to more directly, if politely,
challenge Kitzhaber on the record, Davis said. As the years passed, the
governor’s statement was used by OHSU critics to fuel the myth that the
university had promised to move away from state funding over time.
Kitzhaber insists that Kohler had clearly stated OHSU “would not be a
burden on the general fund anymore.”50 By that, Kohler said, he meant
the university could live with flat funding for the next biennium, but
he did not ever suggest the health center could operate with no state
money. The university still relied on the state to help it cover its public
missions of educating doctors, dentists, and nurses and providing health
care to the poor.
Other leaders had come to believe that OHSU could operate with less
state money. As a result, Kohler and his team wrangled for years with
Ways and Means members and staff in the early to mid-2000s for state
money and never got enough.51 Today, with less than 2 percent of its
operating budget coming from the state, OHSU has nearly become self-
sufficient.
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GRILLED BY LAWMAKERS
During the legislative committee hearings on SB 2, lawmakers did not
question whether OHSU should become a public corporation, but rather
what features and powers it should have once it made the shift. They
questioned whether it would pose unfair competitive advantages as a pub-
lic corporation or become too disconnected from other state universities.
They wrestled with whether OHSU deserved exemptions from the pub-
lic records and open meetings laws, how much bonding power it should
have, how much authority the legislature should retain, who should be on
its board, how the conversion would affect minority hiring and enroll-
ment, and whether OHSU should have full control over its land.
The discourse was civil and, occasionally, humorous. For example,
as Billups took the Senate Education Committee through the bill in its
second session, she came to section 62, which creates the office of Demon-
strator of Anatomy. “It is a person who has a certain amount of authority
over the use of the remains of a deceased person,” she explained.
“Is that the best term to use, ‘Demonstrator of Anatomy?’” asked Sen-
ator Hartung, as the hearing room burst into laughter.
“Well, it’s certainly an entertaining term,” said Billups. “I don’t know
its historical background, but it’s been . . .”
“Is that the term that is currently used?” asked Hartung.
“Yes it is,” Billups said. “We didn’t change the name.”
The name emerged in medical schools of the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. At the University of Paris, for example, medical students
would gather around a human cadaver with two anatomists. One would
read from an anatomical writing about a part of the body while the
other showed, or “demonstrated,” where the part was. Hence, the second
anatomist was called the “Demonstrator of Anatomy.” Today, the OHSU
Demonstrator of Anatomy, a member of the faculty, handles body do-
nations. Funeral homes provide the Demonstrator unclaimed indigent
bodies for the medical school. The state also sometimes makes the bodies
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of children who die under its guardianship available to the Demonstrator
of Anatomy.
Hartung and other Senate Education Committee members questioned
what other Oregon hospitals, particularly those in the Portland area,
thought about OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation and whether
the change would give the University Hospital an unfair competitive ad-
vantage. Timms told the committee he had the same questions and met
with six representatives of “the bigger hospitals” in the Portland area.
“Nobody had any complaints,” he said. “They were not afraid we were
creating something that would have a competitive advantage; if anything,
they thought they could work together better.”52
Ed Patterson, a representative of the Oregon Association of Hospitals,
said that the group’s board voted unanimously to support SB 2 after hear-
ing a presentation from Goldfarb and Billups. Some members had a major
concern about whether OHSU would be competing with them on a “level
playing field,” Patterson said, but those concerns were offset by the advan-
tage of having access to a high-quality academic health center capable of
providing specialty care.
“They also view the university as a resource not only for the patients
that they see, but a resource for all patients in the state,” he said.53
Committee member Senator Marylin Shannon, a socially conserva-
tive Republican from a small town near Salem, still questioned whether
OHSU might have an unfair advantage because of its state support.
OHSU doctors, she said, “can charge less than any other tertiary physi-
cian in Portland or the surrounding area because they are [part of] a
public corporation and they are subsidized with tax monies.” She cited
an example of a Portland ophthalmologist who claimed OHSU’s Casey
Eye Institute could undercut him with much lower charges. Kohler
replied Casey got less state money than it needed just to cover its teach-
ing costs. In addition, he said, it provided a disproportionate share of
indigent care that more than offset the small amount of money it was
getting from the state.
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“So I guess when I hear questions about the playing field being even or
not even, I would say it’s not even,” he said. “We’re still on the downside
rather than the upside with regard to these kinds of competitive bids.”54
Some legislators again questioned whether OHSU would become too
disconnected from the state’s other seven universities if it were cut loose.
Trow (Democrat from Corvallis), the historian, expressed concern
that if OHSU had its own board as a public corporation, it would lose
touch with the State Board of Higher Education. The two boards should
have some interconnection, he said.
“Having some direct participation of the Chancellor in what’s going
on in your operation is important, not that the Chancellor should run
it by any stretch,” he said. Kohler replied that Hallick would continue to
meet with the Academic Council for the state university system and that
he would do the same with the Council of Presidents. Trow wanted it in
the bill.
“It is in there,” said Hallick. She pointed to Section 12 of SB 2, which
stated OHSU would submit any proposals to change, add, merge, or close
any academic degree or certificate programs or other academic policies to
the state board for approval.55
Senator Hartung raised the same concern with Goldschmidt when he
came before the committee to testify.
“We want to keep a handle on [OHSU],” Hartung said, “like when one
of your kids are ready to break away and want to leave home. You know
you must do it, but also you want to keep up a meaningful connection.”
Goldschmidt replied that faculty members would stay connected with
colleagues at other universities as long as their work is supported. They
don’t make those connections, he said, “because our state system of higher
education commands us to do it; it isn’t because the Legislature somehow
commands us to do it.” He also noted that if OHSU became a public cor-
poration, the legislature would still have authority over it by controlling
the money flowing to the university, and the state board would have one
or two of its members on the OHSU board.
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“Our choices here are to grow or die,” Goldschmidt said, “because the
economics are brutal, and I don’t mean your economics. I mean the health
care economics.”56
He also explained why the Public Corporation Advisory Committee
that he chaired recommended amending SB 2 so OHSU would be exempt
from some features of the state public records and meetings law. One ex-
emption would allow the university to keep its search process for a new
president secret. Hiring a new president for OHSU as a public corporation
would be akin to hiring a “chief executive officer to manage a multi-mil-
lion dollar corporation,” he said. Fred Buckman—president and CEO of
PacifiCorp, an electrical utility, and a member of Goldschmidt’s commit-
tee—joined Kohler at the table to explain that recruiting for senior levels
in a competitive corporation usually meant going after people already em-
ployed.
“They may very well wish to explore [the job] without the whole
world knowing about it until they have at least made some commitment
that this is an attractive next step,” he said. “The open meetings law is one
that makes it very difficult for you to explore and attract the very best peo-
ple at the top of an organization that is in a competitive environment the
way I see Oregon Health Sciences University.”57
The Goldschmidt committee also recommended the university be ex-
empt from the public records law in disclosing “sensitive business records”
and business dealings with potential partners. Goldschmidt told the com-
mittee, “I will not be surprised, and in fact would be shocked, if the newspa-
per publishers haven’t already showed up to tell you why it’s a bad idea.”58
Later during the same committee meeting, Gail Ryder, lobbyist for
the Oregon Newpaper Publishers Association, did show up to challenge
the proposed exemptions, arguing they could do damage to Oregon’s pub-
lic records and meetings laws.
“We believe that the business of government should be done in the
public with proper notice and proper records,” she said. OHSU should not
be exempt from that, she said, just because it becomes semi-public.
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On the business exemption, she noted, “Oregon law already con-
ditionally exempts the trade secrets of businesses in Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) 192, which states an exemption for trade secrets” that may
include “any formula, plan, pattern, process, tool, mechanism, compound,
procedure, production data or compilation of information.” The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act is even broader, she said.
“These two provisions provide more than enough protection of the
records of businesses potentially entering into partnerships with Oregon
Health Sciences University,” she said. “What is meant by sensitive business
records beyond what is already provided in the statutes?”
As for presidential searches, she continued, the law already allowed
public agencies to deliberate on candidates for top posts in executive ses-
sions, which in Oregon are closed to the public but open to journalists
who agree not to report on what occurs. The law puts reporters in an
awkward position of having to sit on potential news, but it also allows
them to keep government bodies honest. While there is little public in-
terest in unsuccessful candidates, Ryder said, the public is interested in
finalists and the process leading to a selection of president and has a right
to know about it.
“The interest of the public in selection of a chief executive officer for
a public agency does not change just because the status of that entity has
become semi-independent,” she said.59
The proposed amendments came up again in the Senate Education
Committee’s third meeting on March 3. Mark Dodson, Portland attorney
and state board chair when Kohler was hired, noted the amendments
would keep the search for a new president secret, but “the successful can-
didate would be hired in public.” He said the amendment to keep sensitive
business information secret would protect OHSU in business dealings
with private companies that would be reluctant to do business under “the
chilling effect” of the public records law. The committee then voted to
adopt both amendments. SB 2 would add to exemptions under Oregon’s
public records and meetings laws:60
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• Sensitive business records or financial or commercial information of
the Oregon Health Sciences University that is not customarily pro-
vided to business competitors.
• Records of the Oregon Health Sciences University regarding candi-
dates for the position of university president.
The bill also adds to those meetings from which reporters are barred, even
in executive session, “meetings of the Oregon Health Sciences University
Board of Directors or its designated committee regarding candidates for
the position of president.”61
A QUESTION OF POWER
Lawmakers reviewing SB 2 also struggled over how much bonding au-
thority to give to OHSU versus the legislature in allowing the university
to become a public corporation. In the Senate Education Committee’s
second session, committee member Sen. Cliff Trow questioned whether
OHSU could sink so deep in debt it would damage the rest of the state’s
bonding capacity. John Woodward, the San Francisco health finance ex-
pert, said OHSU’s capacity for debt would be limited by the market.
Douglas Goe, the Portland attorney who helped Billups address bonds in
SB 2, added that if OHSU were a public corporation, the debt market
“would rely on its own authority to issue debt rather than looking at the
state.” In short, he said, “this is not going to be state debt.” But Goe also
said OHSU would like to have access to some measure of state general
obligation bond authority, which had been its primary capital funding
source in the past. Trow was not satisfied.
“There needs to be some kind of checks and balances,” he said.
Goe responded that without the flexibility to raise money based on its
own revenue as opposed to tax revenue, OHSU would be strapped. Ran-
dall Edwards, executive assistant to the state treasurer who would later
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serve eight years as state treasurer, told the committee that his department
also worried about allowing OHSU too much freedom with state debt. So,
he explained, the treasury department and OHSU agreed to amend the bill
to bar the university from using general obligation bonds backed by state
tax money. The university would have to handle its own debt through the
private market or certificates of participation, state tax-exempt bonds that
the university would have to pay back with its own revenue.62
Kohler told the committee that the university president should be
fired if he or she did not handle the university’s debt properly. “I can assure
you,” he said, “as long as I am president, I do not intend for us to get out
on a limb financially.”63
At the Senate Education Committee’s third and final meeting on March
2, Bill Nestle of the Department of Justice testified that OHSU, the higher
education system, and the state treasurer had agreed that OHSU would not
only have no authority to issue state general obligation bonds, but also would
agree to handle its existing debt of about $110 million and to notify the state
if it ever were unable to make payments on it. The committee approved that
agreement in bill amendments. Senator Ken Baker (Republican from Clacka-
mas) and Trow said the bill should also require OHSU to pay off its existing
debt before incurring more. Baker proposed giving it a deadline. Hartung
agreed to make that suggestion in a note to the Joint Ways and Means Com-
mittee, but no deadline made it into the bill.
The Ways and Means subcommittee on education also looked for
ways to protect legislative control over a more independent OHSU. The
House Republican caucus expressed concern that the legislature was “giv-
ing you this bill and basically not having the authority,” said Representa-
tive Carolyn Oakley, of Albany, chairwoman of the subcommittee. “They
would like to see it in writing. . . . We need some way to feel as if we
still have some control over what you folks are doing, and if we are not
pleased, we would like to know how to pull in the reins.”
Billups assured the committee that “what the Legislature creates, the
Legislature can essentially uncreate.” But explicitly stating in the bill that
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the legislature has authority to revoke OHSU’s public corporation status
would make the conversion appear less stable, which could jeopardize the
university’s ability to borrow money in the private market, Billups ex-
plained. The university must go to the legislature every two years for
money, she noted. “In reality,” she said, “and in fact, you have the authority
over us that you really need to have.”64
She proposed addressing the lawmakers’ concerns in a budget note
that would state the legislature retains authority over OHSU. But another
committee member, Representative Cedric Hayden, a conservative Re-
publican from Lyons, proposed amending the bill by adding the following
statements:65 “The public corporation is the creation of the Legislative As-
sembly and shall be financially and programmatically accountable to the
Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly retains the authority to
amend, alter or change the form and structure of the public corporation.”66
Billups said it would be risky to put that language even in a budget
note. “I fear that it will put at risk the university’s ability to access the
financial market,” she said. Al Kowalski, manager of the Municipal Secu-
rities Group at Pacific Crest Securities in Portland, stepped up in support
of Billups to say even a budget note could spook financial lenders.
“It could easily be read in today’s market as a sign that something’s
amiss, that we’re not going forward as fully supportive and as committed
to this,” he said, “and investors are looking for every opportunity they can
to not invest and not provide the best opportunity for academic health
centers to enter the market.”
Representative Kevin Mannix (Democrat from Salem) then launched
an exchange that sounded like something from Alice’s Adventures in Won-
derland. He observed lawmakers were asked not to speak the plain mean-
ing about their authority because even mentioning it creates greater
meaning than it has.
“So it’s best to follow the Chinese method of negotiation where a wink
or a nod will do,” he said. “The wink or the nod is the record we’ve already
made because of all of this being recorded and videotaped. . . . All we have
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to do is repeal the damn statute and it’s gone, but if we say that, somebody
will think we’re thinking about doing it.”
“Exactly,” replied Kowalski.
Peggy Archer, a legislative staff member, then asked, “If you say this,
aren’t you implying, since you already have this authority, aren’t you im-
plying that you don’t have it elsewhere unless you say it?”67
Hayden withdrew his amendment, but asked Archer to read it aloud
so there was a “historical record of it.” Archer read the amendment. He
proposed adding to the budget note only the second part of his amend-
ment, which said the university would keep records on its spending and
make those available for legislative audits. Representative Gail Shib-
ley, (Democrat from Portland), objected.
“It is unnecessary, restrictive, and the language that’s in paragraph 2
of the proposed budget note is unnecessary,” she said.68
In the end, the committee gave up on an amendment or budget note,
sparing OHSU from entering the private debt market with words defining
the legislative authority looming over it.
OHSU’S GOVERNING BOARD
The composition and size of the new governing board for OHSU as a
public corporation also commanded attention from lawmakers scrutiniz-
ing SB 2. The advisory committee led by Goldschmidt recommended the
board be small enough to act quickly and structured more like a corporate
board with the president as a voting member. In Billups’ original ver-
sion of SB 2, the board would have nine members, including two who
were also members of the State Board of Higher Education, one student
member, the president, and five representatives appointed by the gover-
nor who “have experience in areas related to the university missions.”
Robert Noose, executive director of the Oregon Student Lobby, rep-
resenting students in all of the state’s public universities, proposed a
The Legislative Battle 155
change in that plan in his testimony before the Senate Education Com-
mittee. He argued the board should have two student members serving
staggered terms so every new student member on the board would have a
senior student member to teach them the ropes.
Hartung wasn’t sympathetic to that argument. He said even state
board members have to be quick studies. “It is really incumbent on who-
ever the member is to get up to speed fast,” he said. “We can’t serve as a
training ground.”
Others proposed suggestions for the board’s composition. The Amer-
ican Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Local 328
requested a seat on the board. Timms introduced an amendment to reduce
the state board representation to one member of the OHSU board.
Trow said the chancellor or the state university system should be a non-
voting member of the board “to help with that interconnectedness we
talked about.”
Kohler recommended the board be limited in size and composed
mostly of governor appointees. “If we get too many [positions] that have
to be filled by various categories, I’m just concerned that we’re not going
to be able to move as we will need to in the future with regard to the de-
cisions that are going to be important to this institution,” he said.
The committee also debated whether the president should be on the
board. Trow said the president “should work for the board, not be a mem-
ber of the board.” Kohler said putting the president on the board would
“provide a certain continuity,” but added, “this is not something that I
asked for from the advisory committee at all.”
Legislators were undecided. “You have to think you might make a
CEO with great power and authority if he is on the board as well,” said
Hartung, “and maybe that’s good and maybe it’s not.”
The committee voted down the students’ request to have two mem-
bers on the board, but allowed one.69 It resumed its debate on whether
the president should be on the board at its third meeting. Baker expressed
deep reservations.
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“In deference to Dr. Kohler here,” he said, “if you make the president
of the university a member of this board, you could set up a situation in
which the president of the university could be the chairman of the board,
and you start to collapse an awful lot of power into that individual, and
we’re creating kind of a new animal here. . . . I am more comfortable with
the model in which you don’t have that bizarre position.”
Hartung countered that the advisory committee recommended OHSU
adopt the structure of a private company. “If we are going to make this
public corporation as competitive as it possibly can be, it is well to have
the president and CEO a member of the board,” he said.
Senator Shirley Gold (Democrat from Portland), agreed with Baker. “We
should take a step at a time in this and maybe two years from now, after we see
it all at work, maybe we’ll come to a different conclusion,” she said. “I’m ner-
vous enough about doing this at all much less taking more extreme steps.”
In the end, the committee voted in favor of a seven-member board
comprising a student, a member of the state board, and five governor ap-
pointees. The president would not be on the board.70
The Ways and Means education subcommittee spent little time on
the board composition. Ronda Trotman Reese, the young mother study-
ing to become a dentist and member of the state board, testified in support
of OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation and said she was comfort-
able with having only one student member on the board.71
Buckman, the PacifiCorp CEO, reminded the lawmakers that the
Public Corporation Advisory Committee concluded the OHSU president
should be on its board.72
“That is something that would be expected of a private corporation,”
he said, “and I think that it would be unfair in an environment where we
are asking Oregon Health Sciences University to compete with private en-
terprise for it to be shackled in its ability to compete on an equal basis.”
But the issue did not come up again until the next day when Timms
told the committee that the Senate Committee on Education had recon-
sidered and wanted Kohler on the board.
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“They have re-thought their thinking,” he said. “It was one of those
kind of snap decisions that are made without really thinking it through. It
doesn’t make a lot of sense I think to have the CEO not on the board.”73
Without comment, the committee approved the change and had no
other discussion on the board’s makeup and size. So in its final version,
SB 2 establishes a seven-member board that includes the president, one
student, one state board member, and four members appointed by the
governor.74
WHO CONTROLS THE LAND?
In the Ways and Means education subcommittee’s second session on SB 2,
Representative Hayden, the conservative Republican from Lyons,
dropped a bombshell that could mortally wound the public corporation
by destroying its capacity to raise private money. Hayden said the House
Republican caucus was supportive of allowing OHSU to become a public
corporation provided the legislature would have the option to sell the
state land OHSU was built on.75
“If Oregon Health Sciences University has the opportunity to transfer
or obligate the property then of course that would preempt our ability to
recover the property and sell it in 10 or 20 years if we got in a real fiscal
bind,” Hayden said, “so I would like to have that cleared up before I make
a decision on my vote.”
Kohler and his team saw trouble. OHSU would have to be able to
show potential investors that it had guaranteed unfettered use of the land.
Without exclusive care, custody, and control of the land, it could not
borrow money. And one of the chief reasons for becoming a public cor-
poration was to gain access to capital.
Legislative Counsel Tom Clifford, who had no political or partisan
interests in the bills his office handled, tried to explain this to Hayden and
the committee. The university needed the land to issue bonds, he said.
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Giving the legislature the option of taking the land back to sell “may be to
impair beyond repair the prospect for this Oregon Health Sciences Uni-
versity to proceed.”76
But Hayden insisted there must be a way.
“We’re giving them the property with the debts, and we should be
able to say that we retain the option of retaking the property with the
debts,” he said. “In that case the debts would be covered by the security of
the state, the full faith and credit of the state, and I would think anyone
wouldn’t hesitate to issue bonds with that kind of backing.”77
Billups stepped up to the table and calmly tried to reason with Hay-
den. She said OHSU was seeking a long-term lease.
“The university really has to be in a position of being able to represent
to the financial market that we have the same rights to use this property
for a long period of time as any other lessor has the right to use property,
and in that role we are simply a tenant,” she said. “The state affirming in
the statute that at any time the state could transfer or otherwise dispose of
the property would really impair beyond repair the ability that we might
have to access any type of financial market.”78
But Hayden wouldn’t budge. OHSU’s proposal to become a public cor-
poration was a “grand experiment,” he said, and “not a final culmination
of events.”
“We want it in the bill so there is clear understanding that if at some
future time the state would say we really need a billion dollars, and we
have it in surplus property, and here it is, and we’re going to give you five
years notice, and we’re going to sell it to Legacy, Sisters or Providence
[hospitals], whomever. I would like to see that option, and I think that’s
fiscally prudent to do.”79
Billups assured Hayden that the state does have authority to change the
statute. But, she added, “to put that sort of language in the statute is a differ-
ent matter because it sends a message to the market that we’re not trusted.”
She suggested a compromise. OHSU could negotiate a ground
lease with appropriate state agencies and “set out what the rights and
The Legislative Battle 159
obligations of both parties are with respect to future use, sale or other
transfer of property.” Billups called up the experts, Doug Goe, the
bond lawyer, and Al Kowalski, a higher education financial expert.
Goe assured Hayden OHSU could not sell the land. “It is clear, and it’s
always been the deal that the title to real property and buildings re-
mains with the state,” Goe said. However, he added, OHSU was giving
up its access to state-backed bonds to become independent. So it had
to be able to raise money in the private market, and to do that, it had
to have control of its lands and buildings so it can generate money to
pay back what it borrows. He again made the case that Clifford and
Billups had made.
“So if you put language in the bill that suggests that the state can come
back and take those land and buildings away, those sources generating the
revenues to repay the investors, you’re going to cut off the public corpo-
ration at the knees to start,” he said.80
Kowalski said bond insurers and ratings agencies would have prob-
lems with OHSU not having control of its facilities. Investors were edgy
about lending money to academic health centers because they “are under
the gun all across the country,” Kowalski said.81 Timms explained the uni-
versity was seeking authority to sell revenue bonds, which would be paid
back with OHSU earnings, rather than general obligation bonds, which
are paid off with taxes.
“If we handicap the Oregon Health Sciences University by requiring
certain things that affect their bonding,” he said, “we could hurt what we
are trying to do, and that is to allow them to operate with a little bit more
freedom, and that’s what we’re talking about in the system, to do a better
job for the patients and research and teaching.”
Oakley the committee chair, asked Billups if there was a way to
tighten the language in the bill to appease Hayden. Billups said she could.
She proposed saying that state property under the care and control of
OHSU “shall not be sold by the university and shall only be obligated in
accordance with state law.”
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Hayden accepted the wording. “It is allowing the university to use this
property, to bond this property, but not to sell this property,” he said, “and
future legislators may in fact elect to return control of this property to the
state.”82
Kohler and his leadership team felt like they had narrowly avoided
getting washed over a financial cliff. Billups’ language survived in the final
version of SB 2.
A SOLUTION
In the Ways and Means education subcommittee’s final meeting, Kohler
said that OHSU faced a 16 percent reduction in state support in the com-
ing biennium, which without change would have “devastating conse-
quences” for the university. SB 2, though, would enable the university to
reduce the impact and avoid closing major services and programs.
The Legislature must deal in the realities of the revenues it has be-
fore it today, and so must we. SB 2 represents an opportunity to
reinvent and streamline government, to show we are willing to
do things differently, and to set OHSU on a course to realize its
potential as a world-class academic health sciences center and an
economic engine for the state. When this new approach proves to
be the enormous success story I know it will be, it will represent a
significant point of pride for all of us—the Legislature, the gover-
nor, the state, and OHSU.
This was Kohler’s major selling point. Rather than ask for more
money, he proposed a solution, a way for OHSU to raise money for itself.83
The bill reached the full Joint Ways and Means Committee on April 21,
and the panel devoted most of its short time on the bill to how much money
to give OHSU as a public corporation. Timms introduced the bill to the
committee and noted it would give the university about $100 million plus
The Legislative Battle 161
another $3.8 million in lottery money over the 1995–97 biennium as rec-
ommended by the governor.84 Most of the state money, $62 million, was
allocated to the university’s educational and general services, $28 million to
support the hospital and clinics and $10 million to the Child Development
and Rehabilitation Center. The lottery money was also divided three ways:
$134,000 for the university’s physician assistants program, $1.7 million to
the AHECs, and $2 million to nursing education.85
OHSU would be getting 16 percent, or $19.5 million, less from the state
than it was receiving in its current biennium.86 As Kitzhaber had whispered
to Kohler at the news conference earlier in the year, OHSU would get no
more in the 1997–99 biennium. It would be on its own to grow.
Legislators pored over SB 2 in their committees for about sixteen
hours in total, and probed many other issues. Billups took them through
every section of the thirty-four-page bill. They wanted assurances the
legislation would comply with state and federal requirements for its dis-
abled workers, and that it would continue to press for more minority
representation in its workforce and student body. They looked at how
the conversion to a public corporation might affect research and OHSU’s
commitment to its traditional education and indigent care missions. They
examined OHSU security, student fees, employee rights, audits, retire-
ment plans, the university’s freedom to invest in stocks, its transition
plans, and more. Nearly all of them showed respect, and sometimes ad-
miration, for the university and what it was trying to do—a far cry from
those days in the early 1980s when legislators looked at the university and
its struggling hospital with disdain and even considered shutting it down.
During one session of the Ways and Means education subcommittee,
Representative Larry Wells, a Republican from the small town of Jeffer-
son near Salem, stepped back and asked Fred Buckman, the PacifiCorp
president, “if you could put in a few words, the argument I could use if
I was out with an average constituent, out on someone’s farm or what-
ever, and he asked me why I should support this or why I supported this
bill. . . . In just a few short words, why is this good for the state?”87
162 TRANSFORMED
Buckman used a lot of words in his first attempt. “Oregon Health Sci-
ences University is unique in that it has a public responsibility over and
above the public responsibility that private hospitals have, both from an ed-
ucational perspective and from a perspective of providing services in rural
areas and to the indigent.” He went on to explain its competitive challenges.
“You think the average guy on the street really understands what
you’re saying there?” replied Wells.88
Buckman took another shot.
The average guy on the street understands that Oregon Health
Sciences University provides services in rural areas and St. Vin-
cent’s [hospital] doesn’t have to, and that Oregon Health Sciences
University had a higher percentage of people who cannot pay
their bills than other hospitals do. If you are asking it to do those
extraordinary things, at the same time you can’t make it more
cumbersome for the hospital to deal with the things it needs to
deal with in order to do its business.89
In the final hearing before the full Joint Ways and Means Committee,
Representative Mannix took a turn at explaining the purpose of SB 2.
We need to understand that when we talk about a public corpora-
tion it’s sort of like sending your child off to school. You still main-
tain contact although the child becomes somewhat independent,
and you are still a parent although you get nervous sometimes
about your responsibilities. There is still a link here. . . . Oregon
Health Sciences University is a different kind of creature in gov-
ernment, and we recognize that with this bill . . . We have a one
size fits all Department of Administrative Service system for pay-
roll, for benefits, for salaries, and that size is being stretched way
out of whack sometimes to accommodate some functions. Oregon
Health Sciences University with its grants and its special programs
is a different kind of creature, and we have really stretched the
fabric of the state government trying to cover it in terms of con-
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tracting personnel, purchases, all of that stuff. This bill recognizes
that we are really better off giving it a new suit of clothes rather
than trying to stretch the state suit of clothes.90
Senator Mae Yih, a conservative Democrat from Albany and long-
time critic of OHSU, was the only person on the Joint Ways and Means
Committee, or in all of the public hearings and work sessions of all the
legislative committees, to oppose SB 2 and speak against it.
I just want to say that I am not convinced that state agencies should
become public corporations to avoid some regulations. We all live
under regulations of different state agencies. The farmer must live
under DEQ [state Department of Environmental Quality], LCDC
[state Land Conservation and Development Commission], OSHA
[federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration], and they
would like to get away from regulations too, but there is no way
for them to become a public corporation. I think that we need to
work with agencies to reduce unnecessary regulations, but becom-
ing a public corporation I do not believe is the way to do it. They
are still going away with our land, state buildings, state equipment.
I just don’t think that’s the way to go.91
With only Yih objecting, the Joint Ways and Means Committee on
April 21 referred SB 2 to the Senate floor with a “do pass” recommenda-
tion. That gave Kohler’s team only a matter of days to shore up support
before the Senate voted. Davis counted votes, focusing particularly on
some of the less-than-enthusiastic liberal Democrats. One of those was
Trow, the history professor from Corvallis. Davis had long had a good
working relationship with Trow, but lately he had been dodging her.
When she finally caught up with him in a capitol hallway, she asked him
if he had concerns about SB 2.
“He said, ‘Look, I don’t know if I can vote for it because I’m very wor-
ried that the university won’t continue to carry out its public missions.’”92
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Trow ultimately said he would support the bill, but with reluctance.
Senator Richard Springer (Democrat from Portland), also seemed to
be on the fence, though OHSU was in the district he represented. Davis
had a page deliver a note to him on the Senate floor during session
one day, asking him to come to the lobby between votes to talk to her.
Springer told Davis he would probably vote for the bill, but wasn’t sure.
He didn’t like the idea of an essential public service such as OHSU oper-
ating more like a private business. He worried OHSU would start turning
away poor patients as some private hospitals were rumored to do. He
trusted the current leadership, he said, but was concerned about what
could happen down the road when others were in charge. Davis made the
best case she could for SB 2, but as Springer walked back into the Senate
Chamber, she could count him only as “probably.”93
Davis was confident OHSU had the votes it needed when the bill came
up for a vote on the Senate floor on April 27. Senator Timms carried the bill
to the floor and spoke eloquently on its behalf. No one spoke against the bill.
The Senate then voted, approving the measure 24-3. Three Democrats op-
posed the bill. They were Yih and two liberals from Portland, Senators Bill
McCoy and Randy Leonard. Hartung, a supporter, was away on legislative
business and did not vote. Neither did Republican Senators Randy Miller
and Marylin Shannon, supporters who had been excused from the session
for other reasons.
Davis was not surprised that McCoy opposed the bill. A veteran legisla-
tor and former chair of the Human Resources Committee, he was a staunch
advocate for the poor, and it was predictable he would worry about how the
poor would fare under a corporate model for OHSU. Leonard, a first-term
senator who would later become a member of the Portland City Council,
was a complete surprise. He had at no point expressed any concerns about
the bill. He would later tell Davis that Springer had convinced him to vote
against the measure, even though Springer ended up supporting it. Springer
said he had not explicitly told Leonard to vote “no,” but had been critical of
the bill in a conversation with Leonard.94 In a 2016 interview, Leonard said
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he was not opposed to the public corporation concept, but he didn’t want to
see OHSU or any other government entity so free from government over-
sight. OHSU wanted to retain the benefits of its government status, such as
a cap on tort claims, yet wanted to be free from government accountability,
he said.95
“I don’t regret the vote,” he said. “If they could be a public corporation
while at the same time having some process where the Legislature looks
at their budget, I would support it.”96
The House unanimously approved SB 2 on May 15, with three of the
sixty members excused for other business.97 Gordon Smith, the Senate
president, signed the bill on May 19 as did Speaker of the House Beverly
Clarno (Republican from Redmond). Five days later, Governor Kitzhaber
signed the bill into law.
As Davis’ favorite line in her four-page legislative white paper said,
“OHSU had been unleashed to succeed.”
Kohler spoke at Kitzhaber’s bill signing ceremony on May 24, calling
the legislation “dramatic change”:
SB 2 is a remarkable achievement, one that is already being looked
at with envy by academic medical centers around the country.
While others have made their hospitals independent, we are first
in the nation to spin off the academic and research programs along
with the hospital. There is no question that SB 2 will serve as a
model for others around the country.98
On July 1, OHSU officially became a public corporation.
Two months later, its major employee union went on strike.
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The University of Oregon Medical School’s Class of 1889 poses somewhere in downtown Portland. The
University of Oregon chartered the medical school in 1887 at the request of eight physicians, including
four who broke away from a Willamette University medical school. The original University of Oregon
school occupied two rooms of a former two-story grocery store at NW Twenty-Third Avenue and
Marshall Street in Portland. The school moved in 1919 onto Marquam Hill and into a new medical
school building, Mackenzie Hall, named after Dr. Kenneth A.J. Mackenzie. The men in this photo from
the OHSU Archives are not named and may include some faculty members. Courtesy of OHSU Historical
Collections & Archives.
Photo from 1925 of the University of Oregon Medical School’s Mackenzie Hall on Marquam Hill. The
school’s first building was completed in 1919 and named after its second dean, A. J. Mackenzie, MD,
who persuaded the Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Company to donate 20 acres on the
hill to the school. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Under the leadership of David W. Baird, dean of the University of Oregon Medical School,
and with federal funds secured by US Sen. Mark Hatfield, the university in 1956 constructs a
teaching hospital, today’s OHSU Hospital, on Marquam Hill. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Col-
lections & Archives.
OHSU’s eight-story Basic Science Building, now known as the Richard T. Jones Hall for Ba-
sic Medical Sciences, shown here in 1974, three years after it was completed. The building
was designed by Campbell Yost Partners, an architectural firm known for its exposed con-
crete styles. The building has features of an architectural style called Brutalism with its
angular, heavy cement exterior and windows framed and divided by thick bands of steel.
The Brutalism style expressed strength and functionality and was popular among universi-
ties in the 1960s and 1970s. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. David W. Baird poses for a portrait in 1968 during his final year as dean of the University of Ore-
gon medical school. He became dean in 1943 and led the school through a major expansion, including
construction of University Hospital, and a new building for basic science and administration that is
named after him. During his 25 years as dean, the medical school’s fulltime faculty grew from 26 to 276
and the number of departments doubled to 39. He was a friend and adviser to Oregon’s US Sen. Mark
Hatfield. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
Dr. Lewis William (Bill) Bluemle, a nephrologist, served as the first president of the University of Ore-
gon Health Sciences Center after it was created in 1974. He was tall and distinguished with a charming
demeanor and sharp mind. He helped organize the university as an academic health center independent
of the University of Oregon. But he found Oregon too parochial and left after less than three
years. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
174 TRANSFORMED
Dr. Robert Stone, a pathologist, was hired by Dr. Lewis William (Bill) Bluemle, as dean of the Univer-
sity of Oregon Health Sciences Center medical school. Stone, who served two years as director of the
National Institutes of Health under President Richard Nixon, was an effective and tough dean. But he
developed a reputation for also being mechanical and impersonal and at odds with many of the school’s
leaders, including Bluemle. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. Richard Jones works in his laboratory. He chaired the biochemistry department in 1977 when he
was appointed interim president after the University of Oregon Health Sciences Center’s first president,
Lewis William Bluemle, departed. Jones served as president 14 months until Leonard Laster was hired
as the academic health center’s second president in 1978. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections &
Archives.
Lesley Hallick arrived at OHSU in 1977 as a molecular biology professor and researcher. In her early
years at OHSU, she became a sounding board for President Leonard Laster. She said this photo was
taken about 1987 or 1988. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. Leonard Laster, OHSU’s second president, stands outside the newly completed building for the Vol-
lum Institute for Advanced Biomedical Research in 1987. During his nine years at OHSU, the bright,
charming gastroenterologist launched numerous expansion projects like the Vollum that set the stage
for his successor, President Peter Kohler. Of the Vollum building, he said that what matters is not the
cost and square feet, but rather the people who work inside. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections &
Archives.
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Dr. Donald Kassebaum, hired by President Lewis William Bluemle, served as vice president for OHSU’s
hospital services and director of the University Hospital under President Leonard Laster. Kassebaum
initially liked Laster, but over the years, their relationship grew strained, coming to a head in 1986
when they agreed on a mutual parting. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Timothy Goldfarb, pictured here in the late 1980s, joined OHSU in 1984 as an associate administrator
of University Hospital and eventually became part of President Peter Kohler’s leadership team in charge
of all of the university’s hospitals and clinics. He found OHSU so dysfunctional when he arrived that he
tried to warn newly-hired James Walker, hospital chief finance officer, not to come. Courtesy of OHSU
Historical Collections & Archives.
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The young, good-humored James Walker left a comfortable job as chief financial officer for the Univer-
sity of New Mexico Hospital in 1983 to fill the same position at OHSU Hospital, though others warned
him not to take the job. President Peter Kohler made him part of his core leadership team, and Walker
played a key role in leading OHSU through its transition to a public corporation. Courtesy of OHSU His-
torical Collections & Archives.
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A young Lois Davis, chief of staff for US Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon, dropped by OHSU for
an informational interview with President Leonard Laster in 1986, and the same day he offered her a
job as lobbyist and liaison to the faculty. While he left OHSU eight months later, Davis stayed for 23
years. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. Leonard Laster, left, with friend and Tektronix founder Howard Vollum, who contributed $30 mil-
lion to a building and endowment for the Vollum Institute for Advanced Biomedical Research, a major
leap forward for research at OHSU. Laster called Vollum “one of the most brilliant people I’ve ever
known.” Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
Edward Herbert, a top-notch molecular biologist at the University of Oregon, turned down a job at
Harvard University to become founding director in 1983 of the Vollum Institute for Advanced Biomed-
ical Research, specializing in the study of the molecular basis of the nervous system. President Leonard
Laster said Herbert gave the institute “soul.” Herbert died tragically of pancreatic cancer early in 1987,
months before the institute could move into its new building. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections &
Archives.
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Dr. Julian S. “Dutch” Reinschmidt, joined the University of Oregon Medical School in 1970 as director
of its Regional Medical Program and later of its continuing education program. President Peter Kohler
put Reinschmidt in charge of leading OHSU’s rural programs and Area Health Education Centers,
which Provost Lesley Hallick called a key decision. “Dutch was beloved,” she said. “He immediately had
credibility across the state.” Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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OHSU President Peter Kohler (left) and US Sen. Mark Hatfield applaud as Carol Lindeman, dean of the
School of Nursing, breaks ground in 1990 on a $14 million building for the school. Lindeman led the ef-
fort to complete the building, which received federal support secured by Hatfield. The building was
completed in 1992. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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US Senator Mark Hatfield and OHSU President Peter Kohler stand behind people in wheelchairs as
Barry Bell, director of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center, cuts the ribbon for the 1992 opening of the
660-foot-long bridge connecting OHSU Hospital to the VA Medical Center. Smiling at the far right is
Dr. John W. Kendall, an endocrinologist, researcher and dean of OHSU’s medical school from 1983 to
1992. Hatfield and former OHSU President Leonard Laster initiated the bridge project, but Kendall led
it through to its completion. He also helped the medical school overhaul its curriculum in the early
1990s into a forward-thinking approach that reduced lectures and increased hands-on learning, drawing
top students and national attention. He argued OHSU missed an opportunity to grow when it failed to
go after research money during the rapid expansion of the National Institutes of Health during the
1950s and 1960s. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. John Benson, who graduated from Harvard Medical School in 1946, was OHSU faculty’s first
full-time gastroenterologist and later dean of the medical school from 1991 to 1992, when the
school’s curriculum was overhauled. He joined OHSU as a professor and head of the Division of
Gastroenterology in 1959, joined the board of the American Board of Internal Medicine in 1961
and became its president in 1975. He was one of one of OHSU’s most nationally prominent physi-
cians. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Janet Billups became OHSU’s first attorney when Kohler hired her in 1992, made her part of his leader-
ship team, and gave her the monumental challenge of drafting Senate Bill 2, the legislative and legal
framework for OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation. She continues to head OHSU’s legal depart-
ment. Courtesy of Janet Billups.
US Sen. Mark Hatfield of Oregon (left), Gov. Neil Goldschmidt and OHSU President Peter Kohler talk
at a ground breaking event in 1990 for the Center for Research on Occupational and Environmental
Toxicology (CROET). Hatfield and Goldschmidt proved strong supporters of OHSU’s conversion to a
public corporation and its subsequent expansion. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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President Peter Kohler talks sometime around 1990 with Dr. Kenneth Swan (left), an ophthalmologist
who built OHSU’s Department of Ophthalmology into one of the nation’s best, and Dr. Frederick
Fraunfelder (center), who led efforts to build the privately-funded Casey Eye Institute, which opened in
1991. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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The Casey Eye Institute perches on the east side of the OHSU campus shortly after the building’s com-
pletion. The privately-funded, $23 million building, which opened in 1991, provides a striking, elegant
gateway to the OHSU campus. GBD architects, a Portland firm, designed the five-story building with
clean lateral lines and ever-changing light. The 82,000-square-foot building, with an adjoining 320-car
garage, includes the nation’s largest glass floor designed by New York artist James Carpenter. The insti-
tute was named after contributors James Casey, founder of United Parcel Service, and his brother,
George Casey. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
OHSU President Peter Kohler speaks at the 1991 opening of the Biomedical Information Communica-
tion Center, a high-tech medical library near the hospital on the university’s Marquam Hill
campus. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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The elegant open interior of the $13 million Biomedical Information Communication Center fills with
light. The “library of the 21st Century,” which opened in 1991, allows distance learning and teleconfer-
encing between rural doctors and OHSU specialists and remains one of the most sophisticated
electronic medical libraries in the world. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. Grover Bagby, an expert and researcher on blood disorders, was a top research grant winner for
OHSU, which is one reason President Peter Kohler made him director of OHSU’s Oregon Cancer Cen-
ter. In that role, Bagby recruited Dr. Brian Druker, who became one of the university’s most renowned
researchers for his discovery of a compound that has essentially cured a rare form of leukemia. Image
credit: William Graves.
Mark Dodson, a Portland attorney and president of Northwest Natural Gas, headed the search that led
to the hiring of Peter Kohler as president of OHSU in 1988. At the time of the search, Dodson was chair
of both the State Board of Higher Education and the board’s search committee and pushed hard for the
selection of Kohler over other candidates. He served as the first OHSU board’s unofficial secretary and
remained heavily involved in OHSU’s early years as a public corporation. Image credit: William Graves.
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Dr. Brian Druker works in his laboratory where he discovered the power of a compound that was later
named Gleevec in treating people with chronic myelogenous leukemia. Tens of thousands of CML pa-
tients are alive because they take a simple Gleevec pill daily. Druker epitomized the kind of researcher
OHSU liked to go after—bright, ambitious and on the rising arc of a promising career trajectory.
OHSU’s Lois Davis said Druker’s success “cast a sort of halo over the whole institution.” Courtesy of
OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Paul Bradgon, former longtime president of the private and prestigious Reed College in Portland, was
hired in the early 1990s to head the Oregon Medical Research Foundation, which funded research and
operated the Oregon Regional Primate Center. Bragdon helped organize the merger of the Oregon
Medical Research Foundation with the OHSU Foundation. He also helped with the merger of OHSU
and the Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and Technology. Image credit: William Graves.
OHSU President Peter Kohler gives a distinguished faculty award in 1994 to Richard Goodman, a bio-
chemist and molecular biologist who served as director of the Vollum Institute for Advanced
Biomedical Research from 1990 to 2016. Kohler considered Goodman his first important recruitment.
Goodman lured many nationally prominent scientists to Vollum and helped the institute gain a re-
spected national profile. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Mike Thorne, a plain-speaking Pendleton rancher and former state senator, helped OHSU President
Peter Kohler expand health services in rural Oregon and was a strong supporter of the university’s con-
version to a public corporation. Image credit: William Graves.
Fred Buckman, former president and chief executive officer of PacificCorp, served on the committee
that recommended OHSU become a public corporation and chaired the university’s first board of direc-
tors. The six-foot-four-inch, low-key executive saw OHSU through much of its explosive expansion on
Marquam Hill and Portland’s South Waterfront. Image credit: William Graves.
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US Sen. Mark Hatfield speaks at the February, 1998, opening of the new OHSU research building
named after him, the fourteen-story Mark Hatfield Research Center. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collec-
tions & Archives.
This view of the west face of the $60 million, 266,000-square-foot Mark Hatfield Research Center
shows it attached to OHSU Hospital to the left. The research center was constructed in three phases be-
tween the library and hospital with both private and federal money. It provides space for a variety of
research enterprises and an emergency room. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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The state-of-the-art Doernbecher Children’s Hospital spans a canyon on the Marquam Hill campus.
The $73 million, four-story hospital, opened in 1998. An Oregonian reporter called the hospital, built
with university bonds and $35 million in donations, “the most visible triumph for OHSU since it freed
itself from state control in 1995.” Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
Dr. Brian Druker, now director of OHSU’s Knight Cancer Institute, commands a plate glass corner of-
fice on the fifth floor of the Hildegard Lamfrom Biomedical Research Building with perfect views of the
wilderness he loves: Mount St. Helens to the north and Mount Hood to the east. Image credit: William
Graves.
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Dr. Joseph Bloom served as chairman of the OHSU Department of Psychiatry under OHSU
President Leonard Laster and later became dean of the medical school under Peter Kohler
from 1994 to 2001. He called Laster a bull in a china shop. He was strongly supportive of
keeping the entire OHSU medical center whole under its transformation to a public corpo-
ration. Like Kohler, he feared spinning off just the hospital, as other academic health centers
had done, would create political and financial conflicts between the hospital and the univer-
sity. Bloom, who earned his psychiatrist degree at Harvard Medical School, headed the
Alaska Native Health Service before joining OHSU in 1977. He’s considered an expert on
the legal sanity defense. Courtesy of OHSU Historical Collections & Archives.
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Dr. Joseph (Joe) Robertson Jr., OHSU president since 2006, works in the same Baird Hall office that Pe-
ter Kohler occupied. Robertson, an ophthalmologist, has led OHSU through continuous expansion in
keeping with Kohler’s vision. Image couresty of OHSU.
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Attorney Steve Stadum, a legal expert on real estate, worked for OHSU in various administrative posi-
tions for seventeen years. He helped the university secure a critical lease on its land and later expand on
Portland’s South Waterfront. He was eventually promoted to OHSU’s chief administrative officer and
then executive vice president. He left the university in 2016 to be executive vice president and chief op-
erating officer for the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle. Image credit: William Graves.
Dr. Lynn Loriaux, an endocrinologist and researcher, worked with Dr. Peter Kohler during Loriaux’s
20 years at the National Institutes of Health and later joined Kohler at OHSU in 1990 as head of the Di-
vision of Endocrinology, Diabetes and Clinical Nutrition. In 1994, he became chair of the Department
of Medicine, a post he held until 2013, after which he returned to head the endocrinology division. Un-
der his leadership the department grew from 52 faculty members to 260. Loriaux supported OHSU’s
move to a public corporation, but he’s concerned that more recent flows of big donations into specialty
centers are undercutting the university’s education and research missions. Image credit: William Graves.
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Peter Kohler stands before the OHSU patient care building named after him when it opened in 2006.
Kohler still has an office—and a parking pass—on campus, which he visits every month or two, often in
connection with meetings as a member of the Pacific University Board of Directors. Image credit:
William Graves.
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Peter Kohler poses next to his portrait, which hangs in the lobby of the Peter O. Kohler Pavilion. After
leaving OHSU, Kohler returned to Arkansas, where some of his children live, to serve as vice chancellor
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. He helped establish satellite medical programs in
northwest Arkansas and has led a major effort to reduce obesity and diabetes among a large migrant
population from the Marshall Islands. He moved into semi-retirement in the summer of 2016. Image
credit: William Graves.
Lesley Hallick stands on the campus of Pacific University in Forest Grove, where she has served as pres-
ident since 2009. Prior to that she worked 32 years at OHSU, initially as a molecular biology professor
and researcher and later as President Peter Kohler’s vice president of academic affairs, or provost. She
helped persuade faculty and legislators to support OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation and then
helped lead it through its transformation. Image credit: William Graves.
TRANSFORMED 201
Janet Billups is the only member of former President Peter Kohler’s leadership team still working at
OHSU. She leads the university’s legal office as General Counsel, a post she has held most of the two
decades OHSU has been a public corporation. She oversees seven in-house and multiple outside
lawyers. Image credit: William Graves.
Timothy Goldfarb stands outside his home in Washington County west of Portland in 2015. After
leaving OHSU, where he was in charge of hospitals and clinics, he became in 2001 chief executive offi-
cer of Shands HealthCare, a health care system affiliated with the University of Florida Health Science
Center. He retired in 2015. Image credit: William Graves.
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James Walker finally found retirement after several failed attempts. He left OHSU in 2003, but then two
months later stepped in for two years to help Lewis & Clark College in Portland recover from a finan-
cial scandal. He retired to St. Simons Island, Georgia, but OHSU called him back for nine months in
2009 to help it weather the Great Recession. He settled in 2016 where his career began—in Albu-
querque, New Mexico. Image courtesy of Jim Walker.
Lois Davis left OHSU in 2009 to become chief of staff and vice president for public affairs for Portland
State University. OHSU, where she had worked as vice president for public affairs and marketing, had
reached healthy stability, she said, and she needed a new challenge. Image credit: William Graves.
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Two silver, bullet-shaped tram pods float above the Corbett-Terwilliger-Lair Hill neighborhood along
S.W. Gibbs Street in Southwest Portland on their journeys to and from the Peter O. Kohler Pavilion
and OHSU’s complex campus sprawling over Marquam Hill. Image credit: Mark Graves.
The tram descends toward its docking station next to the Center for Health & Healing on Portland’s
South Waterfront near the Willamette River. The sixteen-story center opened in 2006 and gave the
university another 400,000 square feet of space for surgery, research, clinics, classrooms and a fitness
center with pools, spas, weight rooms, and lab facilities. Image credit: Mark Graves.
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A small city of sleek, thin, glass-and-steel apartment and condominium skyscrapers tower on the south
flank of the OHSU health center along with other apartment buildings, shops, and restaurants, all
served by the Portland Streetcar. This development on Portland’s South Waterfront continues to un-
fold. Image credit: Mark Graves.
OHSU’s $160 million Collaborative Life Sciences Building, a joint venture with Portland State Univer-
sity and Oregon State University, opened in 2014 on a once barren brownfield on the South
Waterfront. The building provides space for biomedical research, for medical, nursing, and pharmacy
school classrooms, and for the OSHU/PSU School of Public Health. Adjoining it is the $135 million Sk-
ourtes Tower for the School of Dentistry. Image credit: Mark Graves.
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Courtesy of OHSU.
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Courtesy of OHSU.
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Chapter Five
Transition: The First Year
With their victorious passage of SB 2, Peter Kohler and his administrative
team were immediately slammed with an array of tasks and deadlines for
transforming their institution. There was no time to savor their win with
a victory lap or party. Billups, Davis, and Hallick have vague memories of
leaving work thirty minutes early, one smoggy June afternoon shortly af-
ter Governor Kitzhaber signed the bill, for a quick celebratory drink on
the outside deck of one of the restaurants along the Willamette River be-
low OHSU.1 Hallick said sentiment among the team could be summed up
as: “Whew, two minute pause! Now we had better get on with the work
in front of us.”2
OHSU’s hard-won new independence came at the cost of new re-
sponsibilities, and that meant work. Even with its new public corporation
authority, the staff of OHSU could have chosen to stay with the more
comfortable status quo or risk only incremental change, said Fred Buck-
man, the PacificCorp leader who would chair OHSU’s first board.
“The willingness of the staff to accept the challenge to be transforma-
tional is what made this a real success,” he said.3
Kohler’s top priority was to get more money to address the univer-
sity’s severe deferred maintenance needs.
“The first thing we looked at was how do we get sufficient funds to
fix the bad problems on the campus and then begin to look at what we can
do to move forward,” he said. “We had a lot of aspirations for building out
the research productivity of the campus.”4
Even before SB 2 passed, Kohler created a transition team headed by
Jim Walker, by then promoted to vice president for finance and adminis-
tration. For Walker, the new task meant only more pressure.
“We knew if this transition failed, it would cast doubt on the whole
management team and its public corporation model,” said Walker. “It
would also be very public and would erode our ability to access debt on
Wall Street.”5
During their long drive to sell SB 2, Kohler’s team had learned
the enormous value of clear communication, both on and off campus.
One big reason the team won so much support for change was that it
kept talking to everyone. So when Kohler and his team turned to the
transition in that summer of 1995, they made sure they communicated
frequently and clearly about what the institution’s transformation to a
public corporation would mean. One way Kohler did that was to launch
a newsletter called Transition News, which was distributed across campus
every two weeks.
“Superior customer service, to our patients and to one another, will
be our hallmark as we move forward,” wrote Kohler in the first issue
of Transition News on May 30, six days after Kitzhaber signed SB 2. “Our
commitment to quality education, cutting edge biomedical research, the
highest standard of patient care as well as a productive work environment
will guide the transition priorities.”6
To operate independently as a public corporation, the academic
health center would have to organize procedures, rules, and staff for seven
members of its new board of directors appointed by the governor. It
would need to lease land from the state, assume new liability risks, cre-
ate new purchasing plans, rethink retirement programs, and establish a
larger legal department, an independent accounting system, a payroll de-
partment, and a human resources office. University officials also would
have to make presentations to rating agencies and bond insurers as the
university independently assumed responsibility for its $109 million in
outstanding debt.
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What’s more, Kohler’s team started hearing that some leaders within
the state higher education system and other state agencies were angry
about OHSU’s success and would cut it no slack. The state vice chancellor
of finance, for example, didn’t want to lose control of OHSU’s budget or
the fees it paid to help support the state university system infrastructure,
Hallick said.
“We thought that we would have two years to put in place all the in-
formation systems, etc., required to be independent of the Oregon State
System of Higher Education, but in the ‘anger’ phase, we suddenly had
only one year,” she said.7
So Kohler led OHSU in a race to transform the university into a
functioning, independent public corporation in one year. In an August 1
editorial titled “OHSU’s Sea Change,” The Oregonian said the success of
OHSU’s bold experiment should be measured by how well it cut costs,
continued quality care for the indigent, produced general practitioners,
upgraded its specialty programs, attracted research money, won patents,
and collaborated with other hospitals.
“The health care seas are rough. This experiment will show whether
OHSU can make it to the top.”8
By these measures, OHSU would make it to the top.
WORKERS STRIKE
But that wasn’t apparent in September, when OHSU administrators faced
the more immediate problem of a full-blown strike by the American Fed-
eration of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Local 328,
the first labor strike in the medical school’s history. The university’s talks
with its other union, the Oregon Nurses Association, also had been stalled
since two days after OHSU became a public corporation. A rival union,
the University Federation of Nurses, was seeking to take control of the
nurses’ bargaining unit, though it would not prevail.
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In the early hours of Thursday, September 21, the first AFSCME
strikers walked off their jobs and were greeted by 250 cheering and chant-
ing union members outside the admitting areas to the north and south
buildings of University Hospital. Picketers carried signs that said “On
strike against OHSU” and chanted “People united will never be defeated.”9
OHSU management was not caught completely off guard by the
strike, Kohler said, “but we were surprised that they would think it was a
good idea.”10 He had every intention of raising staff pay when the public
corporation began increasing revenue, but the university could not do so
immediately. Kohler wanted to go out and talk to the strikers, but Davis
held him back. The university had a good relationship with the union,
Davis said, but striking demonstrators can get worked up.11
The relationship was good, agreed Lovell, the field staff worker for
the union. But OHSU administrators had been distracted by their drive to
pass SB 2 in the legislature, she said, and did not seem to recognize the
implications of a fact-finder’s report on their negotiations, which had ad-
vanced to mediation. The fact-finder sided with the union’s assertion that
its members were underpaid compared to other state workers in similar
jobs because of the state’s payroll classification system. Its report would
reveal to union members how underpaid they were, and they would de-
mand action. But OHSU’s labor relations director didn’t seem to convey
that reality to Kohler and his administrative team, she said.
“Nobody had bargaining on their radar because they were so preoccu-
pied, understandably so, with the public corporation that they didn’t pay
attention to our union,” she said.
What’s more, OHSU had employed a new human resources director
for its transition to a public corporation, and she aggravated the union with
eleventh-hour interference. The director demanded a one-year contract,
contrary to what the union was accustomed to, and she wanted to comb
through the contract for other changes. Lovell said the fact-finder’s report,
poor communication with OHSU administrators, and the new human re-
sources director created a “perfect storm” of discontent that led to the strike.12
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University management rejected the fact-finder’s report and made a
final offer of a 3 percent across-the-board increase in wages for all AF-
SCME, with additional money available to increase pay scales in some
categories that were substantially below market rates. The union rep-
resented 3,200 workers, which included most of those who were not
doctors, researchers, or nurses, such as cooks, nursing assistants, labora-
tory and X-ray technicians, janitors, office workers, and phlebotomists.
The union wanted to see workers, whose salaries had been frozen
for two years or more, get a 4 percent increase in pay and a bigger fund
to help bring jobs up to market pay. In a statement, the hospital said
that it made $18 million in profits in the previous year, but its state fi-
nancing had been cut by $19 million and additional federal cuts could
be coming.13
The workers said OHSU leaders had promised to bring their pay up to
market levels after it became a public corporation. That was the plan, uni-
versity officials agreed, but not in the first two months. And Kohler also
wanted to improve faculty salaries, which were even further behind than
those of the union members. It would take more time for the university to
make the conversion and start reaping sufficient money to boost salaries.
Even so, Kohler told reporters, the university as a public corporation was
offering employees a better deal than it would have offered as a state insti-
tution. State employees represented by AFSCME got only a 2 percent pay
increase, he noted.14
The hospital scaled down its services during the strike, postponing
elective surgeries and diverting some patients to other hospitals. Still, on
Thursday and Friday, the first two days of the strike, surgeons managed
to perform two heart, one liver, and two kidney transplants. Early Friday,
Governor Kitzhaber urged parties to work harder for an agreement.
“This dispute must be settled as expeditiously as possible,” he said,
“even if the parties must move into 24-hour bargaining to do so.”15
By Sunday, the two sides were back at the bargaining table. Union
leaders settled on a 3 percent wage increase plus a larger $740,000 fund
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to push wages toward market pay in thirty-three job categories. That
evening, union members voted to accept the contract.
“We won,” said Lovell. “It wasn’t about getting a lot more money; it
was about a description of how the money was to be spent.”
Kohler and his team’s long, trusting relationship with the union con-
tributed to the strike being short-lived. “If there’s such a thing as a friendly
strike, it sort of was that,” Kohler said.16
However, Doug Hurd, president of AFSCME, said the bargaining
process had not met the union’s expectations and management had not
been clear about it taking several years to bring salaries to market level.
And while workers waited, he noted, management had plans to bring fa-
cilities up to market standards swiftly. Management and the union had
some issues to work through, he said.17
Kohler and his team, though, faced a bigger challenge in keeping their
new public corporation afloat and thriving in the new world of managed
health care. The business was already saturated in the Portland area and dom-
inated by what Oregonian reporter Steve Woodward called the Big Three:
Kaiser Permanente, Legacy Health System, and Providence Health System.18
Portland health leaders said there wasn’t much room for a new player.
OHSU opened some primary care clinics in Portland, but Kohler and
Timothy Goldfarb, his hospitals administrator, recognized that they could
not compete for acute primary care. Instead, they would focus on what the
academic health center could provide better than anyone else—cutting-
edge technology and extremely specialized medicine and surgery such as
pediatric intensive care and transplant operations.
OHSU also had one other advantage: it was now a public corporation.
The academic health center had always exploited the advantages of part-
nerships, such as its joint agreements with the federal Veterans Affairs
Hospital that helped pay salaries for some of its faculty and researchers.
But now, Kohler and his team realized, the flexibility and autonomy the
university gained as a public corporation would make it easier to forge
partner agreements. OHSU could enter joint ventures as a state agency,
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but potential partners, particularly private ones, generally were reluctant
to deal with the university because of state bureaucratic barriers and de-
lays and because they were so exposed under the open records law. Now
free of the state and higher education system, OHSU struck agreements
with other health providers on collaborative ventures that allowed all
players to streamline operations, avoid duplication, and give OHSU more
market share. In one agreement, for example, the university teamed up
with Kaiser Permanente to combine some laboratory functions, saving
millions of dollars on standard laboratory tests. In addition, the university
joined with hospitals and physicians statewide in Health Futures, a con-
sortium to improve care through sharing of experience and resources.
The university also formed partnerships with the Big Three to exploit
its strengths in providing tertiary care. It contracted with Kaiser Perma-
nente, for example, to offer advanced pediatric services and heart and liver
transplants. The Oregonian’s Woodward noted that as a public corpora-
tion, OHSU was having to make some major shifts:19
• A strong-willed independent group of physicians had to learn to col-
laborate more with the business side of OHSU and one another.
• OHSU’s longtime mission of serving indigent patients had to be bal-
anced by its search for paying patients.
• A high concentration of specialists with millions in research grants
had to give ground to training more primary care doctors essential for
managed care systems.
THE BOARD
Kohler also had to report now to OHSU’s new seven-member governing
board. Kitzhaber, on Kohler’s recommendations, filled the board with
prominent leaders, two of whom had served on the public corporation
advisory board. The board included Fred Buckman, CEO for PacifiCorp;
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Neil Goldschmidt, former Portland mayor and Oregon governor; Mike
Thorne, Port of Portland director and former legislator; Ronda Trotman
Reese, the dental student who also had served as a student member of
the state higher education board; Robert “Bob” Bailey, one of the state’s
leading agriculture leaders as president and CEO of Orchard View Farms
in The Dalles and also a member of the state board; and Patricia “Trish”
Smith, a property developer from Bend. Mark Dodson was not on the
board, but the board made him its official secretary. As president, Kohler
also was a board member.
The board had its first meeting as a transition team on June 6, before
OHSU officially became a public corporation. Kitzhaber had recom-
mended Buckman chair the board, and members agreed to have him run
the first meeting.20 In that first unofficial meeting, the board established
some policies on meeting attendance, conflicts of interest, committee
structure, the university’s bonding authority, the proper relationship of
the foundation to the public corporation, retirement issues, and the need
to hire a communications expert with a strong corporate ethos. Kohler
also wanted to be delegated clear authority on what he could act on with-
out board approval. He told the board he would err on the side of bringing
it issues early.
“One of Peter’s gifts is his ‘no-surprises’ approach to business,” said
Goldschmidt. “If he continues that approach, we should be fine. The team
he has put together is the key. Our goal is to make sure the board isn’t an
impediment to acceleration. . . . Velocity is going to be a critical issue at
some point.”21
Buckman added that he wanted “to know things are being ‘managed
well.’” He said, “I am more interested in how, as a board, we can add value.
There are two principle ways we add value. Simply by being here, we have
empowered you to become a public corporation. Second is that we come
from diverse backgrounds and can give advice.”22
Jim Walker told the board that the Paine Webber financial firm had
assured OHSU it has “the strength to issue bonds.” Among other things,
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he said, the university wanted to issue $30 million in bonds for the first
phase of the project to build a new Doernbecher Children’s Hospital, for
which the university had already raised $30 million in donations. He said
the university wanted to break ground within the next two months, de-
pending on how quickly it could find a lender on Wall Street.23
The board agreed to have its first official meeting on July 1, the day
OHSU became a public corporation. The 10:30 a.m. meeting was con-
ducted through a telephone conference call with Buckman, Bailey, and
Goldschmidt absent. It lasted only ten minutes. The board took two ac-
tions: it elected Buckman chair, and it delegated authority to Kohler to act
on the university’s behalf in daily operations.24
Buckman said the board’s initial priority in its early days was to define
“our relationship with the state” as a public corporation.25 The full board
assembled again at 1:00 p.m. July 26 on the OHSU campus for its first full,
official meeting.
“We are off to the start of something very important here,” Kohler
said, “and there is considerable national attention focused on us, and how
this might serve as a model for other academic health centers. We are
breaking new ground, and we want to do it well.”26
For the next two hours, the new board focused on a central issue
for any corporation: money. Kohler noted that at least one bond insurer
had given the university a triple-A bond rating, which would be key to
borrowing money for deferred maintenance, the new Doernbecher Chil-
dren’s Hospital, and other projects he wanted to get underway. After
Hallick gave the board an overview of OHSU’s academic programs, the
discussion quickly turned to tuition and fees. Though tuition increases
would vary among the medical, nursing, and dentistry schools and other
graduate programs, the university was seeking an overall $1.4 million, or
16 percent, increase in tuition revenue for the 1995–96 fiscal year. In sub-
sequent years, just as students feared when OHSU proposed becoming a
public corporation, university leaders could not resist raising tuition to
help ease the financial pressures they were always under. The school’s tu-
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ition already was relatively high and it would soon become one of the
highest among the nation’s public medical schools, but it would not sur-
pass private medical schools.27
In this first year as a public corporation, tuition would help the uni-
versity offset a 17 percent drop in state revenue. The state gave OHSU
$52 million, about $10 million less than the previous year. The university
expected to earn more money and save more with the increased flexibility
and efficiencies that came with its transition to a public corporation.28 But
the change also brought new costs, such as hiring the university’s first hu-
man resources director. And the hospital and clinical operations included
new expenses associated with new outpatient clinics in Portland to help
OHSU compete for managed care patients. Walker told the board he still
expected to see the health services stay in the black, and the university
would sustain sufficient revenue to operate on a half-billion dollar bud-
get. Board members wanted to track finances closely. They agreed to meet
monthly for the first year and would be looking for budget updates at
every meeting.29
“When a budget comes up with increased expenses and reduced rev-
enue, it sends up a big red flag,” Buckman said.30
Never before had OHSU had such focused oversight.
“We knew right from the beginning this would not be a hands-off
board,” said Walker. “They challenged all of us and were not reserved in
their criticism.”31
The board organized to focus on OHSU’s new corporate structure.
On October 5, Buckman formed two subcommittees: one on strategic
planning and another on competition and competitive strategy. At that
meeting, the board also approved a resolution authorizing OHSU to pro-
ceed with the pricing and purchase of bonds. But there was still one
obstacle to getting the bonds, a hurdle that was demanding the time and
patience of Kohler, Walker, and Billups. The university needed control of
the land it stood upon. It needed control of Pill Hill.
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LEASE WAR
To enter the bond market, OHSU had to have possession of its land,
which it aimed to secure through some kind of lease with the state.
But the Department of Justice—led then by Attorney General Ted
Kulongoski, who had opposed OHSU’s conversion to a public corpora-
tion—was arguing the new law created by SB 2 did not require the state
to negotiate the lease. As Billups and others had explained to legislators
during hearings on the bill, without the lease, bond lenders would not
have the necessary assurance that OHSU controlled the land on which
it operated its hospitals and clinics, its primary source of money to pay
back loans.
“No decent investor is going to buy bonds when you don’t own the
land you are building on,” Billups said.32
Walker was edgy. He wanted to move fast to borrow money and start
upgrading OHSU’s buildings, break ground for the children’s hospital, and
launch other projects, but the lack of a land lease stopped him cold. It also
put in doubt whether the university had a positive relationship with the
state, another red flag for lenders, said Walker.33 Without a land lease,
Kohler’s vision, his whole plan for expanding OHSU, would crumble.
OHSU’s new board of directors, though, wasn’t so worried about
the lease, recalled Buckman. The directors knew Kulongoski opposed the
public corporation and saw his dragging his feet as a statement that “I have
no intention of helping you guys out.” But the board was confident he
would relent sooner or later.34
Kulongoski said in a 2016 interview “I had no involvement with the
lease,” though his office debated it with OHSU. He also said that while he
opposed the public corporation, he never publicly campaigned against it at
Governor Kitzhaber’s request. Kitzhaber “sat me down and said he wants
this to happen,” Kulongoski said.35
Billups had hired Doug Goe, the bond attorney at Ater Wynne in
Portland, to help. In the face of the attorney general’s resistance, Goe
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turned to Steve Stadum, a managing partner at Ater Wynne and an expert
on land deals.36
Stadum soon learned the Attorney General’s Office was concerned
about language in SB 2 that stated title to OHSU’s land would remain with
the state, but “the university shall have the exclusive care, custody and
control of such real property and facilities.” Stadum agreed the language
was unusual and unclear. The university’s interest in the real estate was
not stated as a title or leasehold interest or easement.
“I think it was intended to mean everything but legal title, but frankly
I think there may have been a little hostility or resistance to the concept
of Senate Bill 2 and public corporation,” Stadum said. “Kulongoski did not
like it, and I think that trickled down to the AG office, and I think that
they latched onto this as something that was a problem.”37
Stadum concluded that what OHSU was really looking for and should
seek was a perpetual ground lease, a ninety-nine-year automatically re-
newable lease for a dollar. “Then you have an interest in real estate that the
legal counsel for the underwriter can recognize,” he explained. Walker,
Billups, and Goe agreed to Stadum’s proposal. He then met in Salem with
state attorneys, including Suzanne Townsend of the Attorney General’s
Office and Harvey Rogers, the state’s bond lawyer. They responded that
the state had no authority to enter into a ground lease. There were some
more exchanges, but the state was not budging.
As negotiations continued, Stadum commissioned a title search on
all of OHSU’s property to ensure there were no covenants or dis-
putes that could complicate a lease. The search turned up no problems,
though it did reveal some parcels of land were donated to the state
with the stipulation they be used for buildings devoted to health and
research. It also showed that the VA Hospital was on land owned by
the federal government.
At its September meeting, the State Board of Higher Education asked
the university system’s vice chancellor for finance to help OHSU negotiate
a lease with the state Department of Administrative Services (DAS). But
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Kulongski’s office told the vice chancellor that DAS lacked the authority
to enter such a lease.38
OHSU’s negotiations with the state seemed deadlocked. Walker was
restless. Stadum was worried. Rogers then suggested a possible path to an
agreement. If Stadum could get the governor and leadership of the legis-
lature to say a lease was what they intended with the language in SB 2, the
state might be willing to negotiate a deal. “Somebody needs to tell these
guys to sign a ground lease,” Stadum told Kohler.39
Kohler and Davis enlisted the help of Kitzhaber, Senate President Gor-
don Smith and Representative Beverly Clarno, a Republican and Speaker of
the House from Redmond in Central Oregon. Billups composed a letter that
clarified the legislature’s intent to lease the state land to OHSU.
“OHSU has accepted considerable responsibility and liability in return
for this bond authority and exclusive, long-term use of its property,” said
the letter, dated October 3, 1995. It explained that OHSU was assum-
ing responsibility for more than $100 million in debt and $200 million
worth of deferred maintenance on its buildings—unlike four other aca-
demic health centers that spun off their hospitals in Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, and West Virginia. Those states gave their institutions either a
long-term lease or outright transfer of land. The letter also said:
We understand that for OHSU to succeed, it needs to be able to
participate effectively in the bond market as anticipated by SB 2.
The best way to carry out the purpose of SB 2 is to implement the
language that provides OHSU with exclusive use of its property by
a long-term ground lease that can be terminated only if the state
pays the debt through bond sales, appropriations or other financ-
ing strategies.40
The letter was signed by Smith, Clarno, and Kitzhaber, the state’s
three top government leaders. But justice department lawyers said the let-
ter provided no legal reasons for them to change their position, recalled
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Billups. They appeared to be trying to fulfill Kulongoski’s desire to stop
OHSU from becoming a public corporation, though Kulongoski did say
he was not involved with the lease negotiations.41 The Attorney General’s
Office refused to issue the necessary opinions or complete the documen-
tation, she said.
“I didn’t live inside their heads,” said Billups, but they “engaged in the
most difficult, ultra-conservative, protracted negotiations that we had all
ever seen or that Steve [Stadum] had seen.”42
DAS then proposed to the higher education board that the board re-
tain title to the property on behalf of the state, strike a lease with OHSU
and allow DAS to manage it since the department could not by law hold
property that is not occupied by a state agency. Kulongoski reluctantly ac-
cepted this deal, but only under certain conditions. The state board would
have to get consent for the lease from a credit corporation that would al-
low the board to hold the deed in trust. And OHSU, DAS, and the state
board were to write agreements spelling out their various outstanding
obligations in the event of any default by OHSU on its loans.
Even then, Kulongoski implied in comments to the State Board of
Higher Education on November 17 that the land lease posed possible pit-
falls for the board and state:
It doesn’t matter what Oregon Health Sciences University calls
itself; it still has a relationship with the state as a public entity.
People sometimes give things titles and try to imply that they
are something else, but they are still an instrumentality of the
state. . . . What we have tried to do, as I have said, is to draft a lease
that provides the least risk to the state system. . . . Ultimately, from
my perspective, somebody in the State of Oregon is going to be
held responsible if there is a default.43
Townsend of Kulongoski’s office explained that the legislature may
have overstepped its bounds in SB 2 by giving OHSU “exclusive care, cus-
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tody and control” of property owned by the state. She suggested the state
may not have authority to grant the lease and makes that clear in the lease
agreement.44 Despite all the cautions and conditions from the Attorney
General’s Office, the state board adopted a resolution to approve a fifty-
year lease agreement, which was signed in December. Finally, OHSU was
free to go to Wall Street after a loan.
Even after the lease was signed, Stadum was troubled that it wasn’t for
longer. Fifty years was short enough to create borrowing problems. Two or
three decades into the lease, OHSU would face the dilemma of trying to get
long-term loans that extended beyond the life of the lease. Four years later,
Stadum was looking to start his own law practice when Walker invited him
to apply for the general counsel post in OHSU’s legal office. Billups had traded
the job for part-time legal counsel so she could spend time with her new
daughter. The opening drew many applicants, but Stadum won the job. In
that role, he soon persuaded legislators to modify SB 2 to give OHSU a per-
petual ninety-nine-year revolving lease on the land for $99. The amended
lease was signed by Kohler and state officials on August 5, 1999.45 Stadum
later became chief operating officer of the Knight Cancer Institute at OHSU
and left in 2016 to be executive vice president and chief operating officer for
the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle.
BONDS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Long before the lease agreement was struck, Walker, Kohler, and John
Woodward, the San Francisco public debt banker and consultant to
OHSU, had been meeting with Wall Street rating agencies and bond in-
surers. With the lease nailed down, they began making formal pitches
for money. On one trip, Kohler and Walker made three presentations in
one day at 9:00 a.m., 11:00 a.m., and 3:00 p.m. to three rating agencies, in-
cluding Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. Walker and his staff had spent
months preparing hundreds of pages of information.
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“These were big guys,” Walker said. “They wanted answers to ques-
tions on a lot of things. . . . It was very stressful. We knew if we got turned
down by Wall Street or were not able to access debt at reasonable rates,
the public corporation could not happen.”46
In January, just six months after becoming a public corporation,
OHSU successfully issued a $215 million bond package backed solely
by the good faith and credit of the institution. As a state agency, it
would have taken the health center years to win approval for a bond
sale of that magnitude if it could be done at all. Because the bonds
were sold at favorable rates and OHSU had authority to shape the fi-
nancing package to its needs, the deal raised the university’s annual
debt payments only slightly.
The health center also received $30 million from the OHSU Foun-
dation. It applied $59 million of the financing to its old debt. About
$100 million was allocated to replace Doernbecher Children’s Hospital,
upgrade University Hospital’s patient care units and expand adult and pe-
diatric critical care capacities. Another $20 million was used to upgrade
laboratories and classrooms. The public corporation was in business. This
was the largest capital infusion in OHSU’s history, but just the beginning
of the academic health center’s dramatic transformation.47
As the capital began to flow, Kohler looked for a way to bring more
coherence to the university. OHSU’s many institutions and centers, such
as the Casey and Vollum institutes, operated so independently that many
people assumed they were separate organizations clustered near OHSU.
The academic health center has historically “operated as a confederacy,”
Kohler told the board in November of 1995. As a public corporation, it
would be developing clearer linear relationships for accountability and
responsibility, and it would be giving more attention to communication
and marketing.48 He had appointed Davis the university’s corporate com-
munications director, in charge of telling OHSU’s story to the people of
Oregon. This was a priority of the board’s too. It wanted the university to
sharpen its brand and market itself.
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“Prior to the conversion, we had done very little marketing at all, in
part because we weren’t allowed to as a state agency,” Davis said.49
But once Davis became corporate communications director, “I was both
being trotted out to meet with Nike folks [in nearby Beaverton] about their
marketing program and being told that I should go to various conferences
and meet with people that were doing corporate marketing.”50
Davis and her staff concluded they were selling a service, not a com-
modity, and looked for a way to distinguish OHSU from its health care
competitors. One distinction was that in addition to health care, the in-
stitution educated doctors and other health professionals and engaged
heavily in research. How could OHSU turn that into some kind of slogan?
Kohler came back with a suggestion after attending a meeting of the
Association of Academic Health Centers (AAHC), where he and his coun-
terparts were discussing the same idea. The group of AAHC presidents
had concluded that the way they commonly portrayed their institutions as
being built on the three-legged stool of teaching, caring for patients, and
doing research didn’t carry much “marketing buzz,” Kohler said.51
So we were sitting there trying to think of better ways to describe
it. And everybody was throwing out options. And one of the op-
tions our group particularly liked was ‘Why don’t we instead of
patient care call it healing. Instead of calling it teaching, call it
learning. And instead of research, call it discovery. So let’s think of
a slogan that would be something related to healing, discovery and
learning.’52
Kohler brought the idea back to Davis and his executive group. Ad-
ministrators liked the words healing and discovery, but wanted to stick
with teaching instead of learning. So they settled on a slogan that OHSU
continues to use today: “Where health, teaching and discovery come to-
gether.” The university wanted to convey to patients that they “were going
to get the advantage of the best and brightest minds, people on the cutting
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edge of research,” Davis said. That was a truth that she experienced first-
hand when she was treated at OHSU for breast cancer. A whole team of
doctors attended not only to her disease, but to the psychological effects
that come with it, she said. At one point, the medical team faced a ques-
tion about which of several possible medical protocols it should follow.
“My oncologist picked up the phone and called colleagues at eight of
the top cancer institutions in the country and asked, ‘What should I do?’”
she said. “We ended up doing what six of the eight said to do. He had ac-
cess because he was in research and understood it. So that’s what we [her
marketing team] sold.”
By the end of the year, with the completion of the new labor and de-
livery floors in the C-Wing of OHSU Hospital, they could start selling
OHSU as a good place for mothers to deliver their babies.
“We also had to convince people that we were no longer the county
hospital where you delivered your baby in the hallway and shared a bath-
room with four women,” she said. “One of our first ads was this wonderful
television ad about the mother-baby unit.”53
The ad featured a woman rocking her baby in a beautiful, warm mod-
ern suite. “It has all these warm, soft feelings around it that people didn’t
necessarily associate with OHSU,” she said.
OHSU was turning the old iconic image of its struggles with the state, of
its pre-public corporation days, into a symbol of its rebirth as a modern health
care organization with new facilities and top-notch doctors. The run-down
former county hospital labor and delivery unit that the state would not let it
fix, the grim labor and delivery unit described in Susan Stanley’s book, Ma-
ternity Ward, the place where poor mothers with no other choice crowded in
small rooms or even hallways to deliver their babies, had been replaced. Now
mothers would find spacious, private, well-equipped, warmly decorated de-
livery and recovery suites with spa tubs and rocking chairs, and they would be
served by teams of doctors who often not only were familiar with the latest
research but were actually doing it. Davis and her staff played the ad to the
OHSU board’s marketing subcommittee, led by Goldschmidt.
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“Well, I really don’t like it,” he said after watching the ad.
The room, filled mostly with women, was dead silent. Goldschmidt
looked around and could see the women loved the ad.
“Oh yeah,” he said. “I guess I’m not your target audience, am I?”
Davis and her staff went ahead and placed the ad in local media. There
was no way to be sure how effective it was, Davis said, but OHSU began
attracting more women to deliver their babies. Some still were poor, but
a growing number were insured women who paid.54
As Davis worked to polish OHSU’s new image, Kohler wrestled with
a host of other matters he needed to handle during the course of OHSU’s
first year as a public corporation. The Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations was conducting a site visit of University Hos-
pital.55 The new Doernbecher Children’s Hospital design and construction
plan needed to be approved and carried out. After OHSU settled with
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees in
the fall, the Oregon Nurses Association in the spring seriously considered
going on strike over issues related to job security and the scope of their au-
thority within the institution.56 In another development, Senator Hatfield
asked Kohler to testify on April 11, 1996, in OHSU’s Old Library Audi-
torium on the merits of federal investment in biomedical research. He
wanted Kohler to speak in support of the Clinical Research Enhancement
Act of 1996, legislation that would stabilize funding for clinical research.57
Kohler also was getting more attention as OHSU’s national profile
began to rise. The university was drawing interest not only because of
its radical move to become a public corporation, but also because of real
improvements in its health care, hospital finances, research growth, and
overhauled medical school curriculum. US News and World Report, in its
spring 1996 review of medical schools, ranked OHSU medical school third
best among primary care schools and it ranked its Department of Family
Medicine fourth best. The NIH listed OHSU at sixtieth for research fund-
ing among the nation’s 2,000 research institutions, which put it in the top
3 percent.
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These improvements in OHSU’s stature led to accolades for Kohler.
The National Special Events Advisory Board of the Jewish National Fund
of America, for example, offered him its Tree of Life Award for his “con-
tributions to the people of Oregon.”58 He also received the Gold Medallion
for Humanitarianism from the American Lung Association of Oregon.
But what mattered more to Kohler was getting on various corporate
boards where he could learn more about private business since he was
trying to apply corporate practices to OHSU.59 He joined, for example,
the Portland Mayor’s Business Roundtable and Standard Insurance Com-
pany’s board of directors, where he would serve more than two decades.
He also was invited onto the boards of HealthChoice Inc., First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, and the Portland branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco.
Other academic health center leaders across the country were aware
of the university’s conversion to a public corporation and many of them
wanted to know more. In July of 1995, David J. Ramsay, president of the
University of Maryland at Baltimore, with the fifth-oldest medical school
in the nation, asked to visit. Ramsay wrote Kohler that the health center’s
hospital had become independent ten years earlier with positive results.
“It has changed from a disastrous money-losing enterprise with a poor
physical plant into a successful operation, with a new building and healthy
reserves,” he wrote. “I have seen firsthand the advantages of operating
outside the state bureaucracy.”60
Ramsay said he had organized a group to explore whether to privatize
the entire university, including its schools of law, medicine, nursing, phar-
macy, dentistry, and social work. Ramsay visited OHSU on October 12 and
13 and had interviews with Kohler, Billups, Hallick, Walker, Goldfarb,
Davis, and others. He was concerned, Kohler recalled, that while the hos-
pital was prospering, its independent board sometimes was at odds with
the university’s board and its academic and research aspirations. Kohler said
Ramsay was exploring whether he could make the entire academic health
center independent as OHSU had done and bring the university and hospital
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under the oversight of a single board. Whatever Ramsay’s group concluded,
the University of Maryland at Baltimore remains a public university and one
of the nation’s top academic health centers.
A group of four executives from the Medical College of the Virginia
Commonwealth University Medical Center in Richmond visited OHSU
in the spring of 1996. The medical school was getting about 13 percent
of its funding from the state, leaving it heavily dependent on hospital and
clinical revenue. Carl Fischer, associate vice president for health services,
wrote Kohler that OHSU’s “responses to the emerging health care market
are of extreme interest to us.”61 Later in the year, David Blumenthal and
Dr. Paul Griner of the Association of American Medical Colleges asked
to visit OHSU because they were studying changes in structure at acade-
mic health centers that foster “strategic decision making in response to the
many challenges these centers face.”62
But it was early for people to be making a case study out of OHSU. As
visitors arrived to see how the university had transformed itself, Kohler
and his team were still racing to carry out the change.
NEW DUTIES; NEW WORKERS
After the land lease was finally secured, Billups turned to other legal tasks
connected with the conversion. She needed to transfer the liability risk
from the state to the university and establish full legal services for the
medical center since it was no longer a state agency entitled to repre-
sentation by the Attorney General’s Office. She and the DAS Division of
Risk Management drew up an agreement to handle the first task. The
deal would transfer risk management from the state to the university over
a short time, which meant OHSU had to get more insurance coverage.
The university recruited a professional risk manager to build its program.
The agreement also included the transfer of medical malpractice lawsuits
that were being handled by the Department of Justice. Now Billups’ office
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would handle them. The university recruited Rod Norton, a lawyer who
handled medical malpractice suits for the Department of Justice, to help,
and the transition was smooth.
The Attorney General’s Office also gave OHSU all of its files related to
legal work it had done for the university. As the university took full con-
trol of its own legal services, it hired more lawyers to round out its first
legal department. It hired, for example, Jim Mattis, a generalist at the De-
partment of Justice, and Carey Critchlow, a lawyer in private practice, to
handle employment law services. Now with its own lawyers, its own risk
management program and its own legal department, OHSU was fully in-
dependent of the state Department of Justice.63
The academic health center had one year under the public corporation
law to assume full control of various functions that the Oregon State
System of Higher Education had been handling for it, in many cases
through its offices at the University of Oregon in Eugene and Oregon
State University in Corvallis. These functions included the general ledger,
accounting, payroll, purchasing and accounts payable, cash management,
supply logistics, human resources, pensions, and communications. In the
past, OHSU had offices that gathered information for these functions and
sent it to the state system or other state agencies to be processed. The
university, for example, forwarded information from its campus for the
general ledger and sent it to the state system. OHSU had never run checks
for payables or payroll and did not have bank accounts for a cash manage-
ment function. Its human resources office had just gathered information
and sent it to the state university system administration.64
Most workers at OHSU did not notice much change in their jobs after
the university became a public corporation. But managers responsible for
establishing new functions did, and that kept Walker up at night.
To be really honest, when we first started, in the first 90 days,
I was having a hard time sleeping. Here was this thing that we
pushed for two years to get—it became a big issue statewide, and
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we pushed for it with the governor and the State Board of Higher
Ed. If we fall on our face in payroll, finance and general ledger, it’s
going to be really tough. Talk about being on the hot seat—if we
couldn’t get the infrastructure [in place] it was going to fall apart.
If we couldn’t get the debt structure to work, we would have to go
back to [state higher education leaders] hat in hand.65
Walker soon discovered many of his management workers could not
handle the rapid shift from a state to corporate culture. They could sup-
ply information for payroll, purchasing, accounting, and other functions,
but they couldn’t process that information into balance sheets, purchases,
checks, and other practical services that the university would now have to
handle. Walker needed people who could move fast, make decisions on
their own and work sixty to seventy hours a week at times if that’s what
it took to carry out the changes on time. Many of his managers, Walker
realized, would have to go or the public corporation would fail. He had
plenty of experience firing people when they didn’t measure up, but he
had never had to cut smart, hard-working people. He had to demote or
fire nearly all of his management staff because they “couldn’t change fast
enough,” he said.
“This was a radical change in a very short time,” Walker said. “The
transition of replacing many of the management positions in these areas
started by the late summer of [1995]. This was a very difficult period for
all, including myself.”66
If Walker had not had experience working for a private construction
company and an independent university hospital, he would not have been
able to handle the change either, he said. “They would have had to get rid
of me.”67
During OHSU’s first months as a public corporation, Hallick also
was juggling multiple duties. In addition to her jobs as provost, research
overseer, and transition team member, she was interim director of the
Biomedical Information Communication Center, the high-tech library
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initiated by former OHSU President Laster with help from Senator Hat-
field. On top of that, she and Walker had concluded they needed to
integrate the hospital and the university’s financial and computer systems
if the health center was going to be able to handle all of its new functions,
such as payroll and purchasing, and be competitive. They had to create a
single system that everyone could use.68
At the time the hospital and university were using different internet
technologies. The hospital used the Token ring local area network while
the university used Ethernet networking. Hospital and university leaders
resisted the proposal to integrate as a single network. Hospital adminis-
trators were convinced adding the university to their network would drag
them down with inefficiencies they could not afford in their race to be-
come more competitive. University staff, on the other hand, feared that
integrating would mean patients would always get first priority and they
would not be able to meet their needs for research and teaching.
Still, Walker and Hallick proceeded with creating a unified system.
Everyone would have access to parts of the system, such as the library,
but other parts, such as financial or patient information, would be re-
stricted to appropriate groups who would have passwords and security
codes for access. The unified system also would have to accommo-
date Microsoft personal computers and Apple Mac computers, a blend
requiring various kinds of Band-Aids, Hallick said. In addition, the
network had to accommodate two cultures. The hospital operated by
extreme discipline and expected everyone to use its standardized system
and software. University researchers, on the other hand, were explor-
ers, eager to try new things, including building their own networks
for research purposes. Hallick enlisted the help of David Robinson, a
tech-savvy neuroscientist, to bridge the two cultures. He explained to
researchers that IT workers had good reasons for keeping the hos-
pital network standardized, and he explained to the IT leaders that
researchers have bona fide research needs and were not trying to under-
mine their network with their rogue operations.
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“It was just really a challenge, partly because we were right on the edge
of the technology’s ability to be compatible across those different kinds of
systems,” Hallick said, “and yet it was so critical.”69
It would take about four years to fully integrate the hospital and uni-
versity computer networks. But within eighteen months of becoming a
public corporation, OHSU had converted to a single biweekly payroll sys-
tem, moved to an annual budget process, and converted its accounting
system to one that allowed for capitalization and depreciation in long-
term budget planning.
The integration was unusual among academic health centers at that time
and gave OHSU a competitive management advantage, Hallick said. Eventu-
ally, OHSU became capable even of integrating faculty and clinical salaries.
For decades, faculty had collected one salary from the university and another
completely separate paycheck for their medical services. Under the unified
system, they got one paycheck that included money from both sources.
“It was just an amazing run,” said Hallick, “getting everything into one
information system, one financial system, so that we could develop a sys-
tem that would make sure that we paid everybody. We did it, and we
didn’t miss a beat in payroll.”70
OHSU’s freedom from the state brought savings, but it also came at a
price. While the state’s other universities and community colleges were re-
ceiving modest state funding increases, OHSU received no more. The state
gave it about $60 million in its first year as a public corporation, amounting
to about 12 percent of its revenue. The university spent $24 million of that
for uninsured, non-paying patients and for education support in University
Hospital and the Child Development and Rehabilitation Center. Most of the
rest was spent to provide other educational support.
The university was largely able to adjust to its limited state support
through new opportunities and efficiencies, but by the end of its first year
as a public corporation it was facing a $4 million-to-$6 million deficit.
Kohler and his team decided to lay off eighty-two hospital and clinical
workers, including managers and nurses, and freeze 112 positions. Lead-
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ers of OHSU worker and nurses unions said they understood why the
cuts were necessary. “We want [administrators] to succeed,” said Randi L.
Post, representative of the Oregon Nurses Association.71
In its first year as a public corporation, however, OHSU made changes
in the way it conducted business that would produce a growth surge far
outpacing its 1996 job cuts. The academic health center had established
a full-fledged human resources department that consolidated personnel,
benefits, employment, and other functions previously scattered over the
campus and handled through various agencies. It developed an alternative,
less-expensive pension plan designed to fit its employees, who could still
choose to stick with the state’s Public Employees Retirement System. In
addition, OHSU entered a joint project with an insurance company that
allowed it to hold an equity interest, which would not have been permit-
ted were it still a state agency.
Along with these changes, the academic health center also:
• Replaced its state risk management program with its own, lowering
worker compensation costs.
• Simplified labor negotiations and moved more employees’ pay toward
market levels.
• Instituted a state-of-the-art telephone system, expected to save
$500,000 to $800,000 a year.
• Brought faculty pay into line with competitive market rates.
• Negotiated contracts previously administered through the state, in-
cluding a 20 percent reduction in the price of natural gas, saving
$400,000 a year.72
With the university’s new independence, its new board and new systems
in place, and with its bond money rolling in, new buildings began to rise
on campus. One of the first was a fitting symbol of OHSU’s successful
conversion to a new era: the modern, dramatically upgraded labor and
delivery unit on the twelfth and thirteen floors of the OHSU Hospital C-
Wing addition.
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Chapter Six
Research: Path to Prominence
In 1992, Dr. Brian Druker was a young researcher at the Dana-Farber
Cancer Institute in Boston exploring tyrosine kinase, an enzyme that can
function like an on and off switch in cellular functions. He suspected the
enzyme was involved with chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a rare
but deadly disease in which the bone marrow produces too many white
blood cells. He was looking for a way to turn the switch off in CML pa-
tients. He had spent six years at the cancer center as an instructor, which
he described as “indentured servitude between the end of your fellowship
and a real faculty appointment.” So he approached the head of Dana-Faber
to ask for a promotion to assistant professor.
“Oh, you have a lot of publications,” said the director. “Almost as
many as I do.”
Then he started counting the number of publications in which
Druker was first author.
“Well, you only have a couple of first authors here,” the director said.
“I don’t think you’re going to make it. I don’t think you have a future here.”
The director did offer to let Druker run a molecular diagnostic lab-
oratory, but when Druker listed the equipment and funding he would
need, the director balked, saying “we can’t afford that.” Later looking back,
Druker said he probably “did need a kick” to move on with his career.
“I needed somebody to say, ‘Do you believe in yourself? Do you think
you have what it takes to make a difference?’” he said. “I decided at that
point I was going to make a difference.”1
Druker started looking for a place committed to cancer research
where he could interact with medical students and enjoy living.
“Part of it was that I wanted to find an institution where I could teach
students, I could be part of a growing, developing program,” he said. “The
institution had to have a commitment to growing its cancer program.”2
A friend who knew Druker was job searching told him that OHSU
President Peter Kohler had just made a commitment to one of his talented
researchers, Dr. Grover Bagby, to expand cancer research. Bagby, a top
grant winner whom Kohler wanted to keep, was thinking about going back
to Baylor College of Medicine Medical Center in Houston. To keep him,
Kohler asked him to build a new Oregon Cancer Center. Druker had been
collaborating on his CML project with Jim Griffin, who was friends with
Dr. Bagby. Griffin put in a good word to Bagby on Druker’s behalf. Druker
and Bagby met at an American Society of Hematology meeting in Decem-
ber of 1992, and Bagby invited Druker to campus in January of 1993.
“I flew out on one of those glorious winter days where the sun was
out,” Druker recalled. “It must be one of, probably one of the dozen days
where the sun is out in January. And I flew up and saw Mount Hood,
Mount Saint Helens and just immediately fell in love with this place.”3
That evening, Bagby took Druker out to dinner and introduced him
to Senator Hatfield.
“Grover gave him background about who I was, where I was coming
from,” Druker said. “[Hatfield] looked me in the eye and said, ‘You’re ex-
actly the kind of people I want to see moving to Oregon.’”4
That helped seal the deal. And Grover would prove to be the perfect
boss, Druker said.
“Here was somebody who was going to put his arm around my shoul-
der and say, ‘I believe in you. And I’m going to do what it takes to make
you successful. And I’m going to help you. But I’m not going to get in your
way.’”5
Bagby had moved to OHSU in 1985 to work in hematology and oncol-
ogy at the Veterans Affairs Hospital. But he also taught at OHSU. He could
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see in Druker the kind of a professional OHSU liked to go after—bright,
ambitious, on the rising arc of a promising career trajectory—a rising star.
And Bagby knew what Druker was looking for.
“So Brian had a lot of choices about going to different places in the
country,” said Bagby, “but I think part of what brought him here was free-
dom. Nobody was going to get in his way.”6
Druker’s goal upon arriving at OHSU was to find a drug that would
shut down a tyrosine kinase enzyme called Ber-Abl and move that into
clinical trials for human CML patients. He had in the late 1980s helped a
Boston company called Ciba-Geigy, now Novartis, set up a drug discov-
ery program to identify inhibitors of kinases. He contacted Nick Lydon, a
researcher he knew at the company, to see if the company’s scientists had
come up with any compounds that might shut down Ber-Abl, and they
had some candidates. Being so far away, Druker was beginning to miss the
“scientific environment” in Boston.
“It got me to thinking. . . . Was this the best move?” he said. “I began to
wonder, ‘Am I really going to be able to make it here to the level I really want
to get to, despite the fact I established great collaboration with other top-
notch scientists?’ I began to wonder, ‘Was this really going to be the place
that was going to catapult my career and was this a good choice?’ A couple
years later, you look back, and of course, this is the right place for me.”7
Druker arrived at OHSU in July of 1993. By August, he had six com-
pounds from Ciba-Geigy to test. By the end of August, he identified one
that killed CML cells without harming normal cells. He and Lydon be-
gan working together with academia and industry to move the compound
out of the laboratory and into clinical trials. Within his first six weeks at
OHSU, Druker was working on a drug that ultimately was going to revo-
lutionize the way the medical world thinks about fighting cancer.
Because of market size, potential for toxicity, and other complica-
tions, it took five years to get the compound into clinical trials, where
it proved to be remarkably effective. In 1998, the first human patient,
Bud Romine, a retired railroad engineer from Tillamook, Oregon, took
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a pill of Imatinib, the compound that killed CML cells in the laboratory.
The initial doses were so small that they had no effect. But by January
of 1999, Romine and every other patient in the trial had normal blood
counts. Druker and his team were seeing something many thought never
was possible—eradication of cancer with a daily pill.8 No chemotherapy or
radiation therapy or surgery. Just a pill a day. Today, more than fifteen
years later, tens of thousands of CML patients are alive because they take
a daily pill of what was named Gleevec. For this one rare form of blood
cancer, Druker found what looks like a cure. Not only that, he helped put
OHSU on the national map.
“Brian Druker in and of himself was a marketing campaign” for
OHSU, said Davis. “His success was so remarkable, it cast a sort of halo
over the whole institution, certainly in the cancer area, but beyond that.
Frankly, once you get a Brian Druker there, then you can attract other
people like him in terms of leading-edge clinicians, researchers, and it
kind of snowballs.”9
A key step in this dramatic advance was creating the Oregon Cancer
Center and putting Bagby in charge of it. That not only held Bagby, but
also drew Druker.
“One of the key things that really led to our growth was convincing
Grover Bagby to stay here instead of going to Baylor and promising we
would work with him to set up a cancer center,” Kohler said. “Bagby was
our top grant getter, meaning he had abilities scientifically to write pro-
posals and conduct research that was important to sustain funding. He is
an ideal example of the kind of person we could build on. Then, obviously,
he could build a program, which is what he did, and he recruited Druker,
who was clearly a rising star, but I want to give Bagby credit for having
done that.”10
Bagby not only recruited Druker, but a whole team of researchers and
National Cancer Institute support grants. Within three years, the Oregon
Cancer Center was operating on a $4.2 million budget, nearly half going
to provide more space and equipment. One of the center’s recruits, Dr.
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Craig Nichols, had helped cyclist Lance Armstrong overcome testicular
cancer with treatments in 1996 at Indiana University Medical Center in
Indianapolis.11
OHSU’s cancer center grew into the Knight Cancer Institute. Druker
replaced Bagby as director and now commands a plate glass corner office
on the fifth floor of the Hildegard Lamfrom Biomedical Research Building
with perfect views of the wilderness he loves: Mount St. Helens to the
north and Mount Hood to the east. In 2014, the center received a
$500 million fund-raising challenge from Phil Knight, cofounder of Nike,
and his wife Penny. In less than two years, OHSU raised more than
$500 million, including $200 million in bonds from the legislature for two
new buildings, triggering the match. The institute will raise an additional
$200 million and use the $1 billion to recruit researchers and focus on
finding ways to detect cancer in its earliest and most treatable stage, along
with other cures like Gleevec.
BUILD AND THEY WILL COME
Druker is one of the most dramatic examples of how Kohler’s vision, and
that of Laster before him, came to fruition. Kohler essentially adopted his
own version of farmer Ray Kinsella’s dictum in the 1989 film Field of
Dreams: “Build it, and they will come.” Instead of a baseball diamond in an
Iowa cornfield, though, OHSU was building research laboratory space on
Pill Hill. And instead of trying to draw legendary baseball players from the
past, Kohler was going after rising star researchers with promising futures.
He described his rationale for this approach in August of 1993 in re-
marks he prepared for the Congressional Committee on Science, Space
and Technology chaired by Representative George E. Brown Jr. (De-
mocrat from California). He was defending OHSU’s choice to build its
$63-million Ambulatory Research and Education project, which would
become the Hatfield Research Center, in a partnership of federal and
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private money. Brown saw the project as an example of what he called
academic earmarking by Hatfield and other powerful senators and con-
gressmen. Kohler wrote:
An article by Clark Kerr in the May/June 1991 issue of Change
supports the belief that the attraction of research stars is a key
variable in research reputation. It is likewise clear that research
facilities are a key ingredient in the attraction of research stars,
which then allow you to grow your own outstanding scientists
as we are now doing. In this context, I am pleased to report that
Congress’ decision to direct funding to support facilities at Oregon
Health Sciences University has been a pump-priming technique
for Oregon’s economy that has enhanced the university’s competi-
tiveness for peer-reviewed awards.12
Kohler was echoing OHSU’s Thomas G. Fox, vice president for de-
velopment and public affairs, who a year earlier had given Kohler a mem-
orandum that argued the efforts of Kohler and his predecessor, Laster,
to build more space at OHSU with help from Hatfield between 1987
and 1992 had been a “pump-priming technique for Oregon’s economy
by enhancing the university’s competitiveness for peer-reviewed awards.
Furthermore, it has also provided the best means to assure the university’s
survival.”13
During that five-year period, OHSU added 735,000 square feet of new
space for everything from the Vollum and Casey Eye institutes to hospital
renovations and the sky bridge connecting the university and VA hos-
pitals. Between 1986 and 1991, the university’s research volume roughly
doubled from $26 million a year to $50 million.
“Likewise, these data suggest the availability of up-to-date facilities
has enabled the institution to recruit individuals that previously would
not have been attracted to the university,” wrote Fox.14
As OHSU expanded and drew more researchers and research money,
Fox noted, its “ability to attract private gifts has likewise increased dra-
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matically.” Between 1987 and 1992, the OHSU Foundation saw a 300 per-
cent increase in gifts, and the funds under its management climbed from
$52 million to $100 million.15
Kohler also knew that by attracting top faculty and researchers, OHSU
Hospital and clinics could offer the most highly-skilled and trained physi-
cians in Oregon. And they were necessary to generate more revenue to
support the research, about 15 percent of which typically must be subsidized
by the university. Top doctors would attract paying, insured patients, im-
proving the university’s revenue flow. Kohler set out to “help somebody
who hadn’t showed up yet,” said former Governor Goldschmidt.
“He set out to help get people we couldn’t have hired otherwise,” he
said. “He set out to help patients who were never going to show up there
unless we did the job right, and I suppose above all things, he set out to
make live and real this connection between medical research, high quality
medical care and medical education.”16
While they shared aspirations to expand OHSU’s research capacity,
Kohler and Laster had different visions for how to do so, noted Bagby.
Laster understood the importance of building OHSU’s research capacity,
but he concluded the university should focus on building one area of ex-
cellence, a vision he successfully fulfilled in the Vollum Institute and its
focus on neuroscience.
“Peter had a grander view,” Bagby said. “He wanted surgery to be bet-
ter. He wanted internal medicine to be better. He wanted pediatrics to be
better. He wanted Doernbecher [Children’s Hospital] to be better. He had
a very big idea. His goal was to get the university itself lifted up, and he
knew it would take more than one foundation to do that. You can’t just
build up the corner of a building. He did things the right way and gave us
the kind of space that we needed to accomplish our plans.”17
Even without much space, Kohler started going after talent soon after
he arrived at OHSU, though it was rough going without more to offer.
“The first recruitments in the early nineties were hard work,” said Hal-
lick, who as provost oversaw the university’s research enterprise, including
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new hires. “I mean really hard. You sold the mountain over and over.”18
She is talking about Mount Hood, symbol of Oregon’s vast natural
beauty. John Kendall, former dean of the medical school, said in the early
1980s, when Lewis William Bluemle was president, the mountain was
worth about $10,000 in annual salary. Later in Kendall’s tenure, he said, it
was worth $20,000.
“It was true,” he said. “It was worth money. You could sell it on the
Mount Hood Factor. You could sell it on the basis of livability.”19
Kohler put the value of the mountain at $40,000.20 But he knew he
needed to offer more than the mountain to get good researchers and faculty.
“You wanted to be a major biomedical research institution, and to do
that, we had to have capacity,” he said. “We were constrained, particularly
in the area of research space, but also investigators. We need to be able to
do some key recruitment and build-out our research activities. . . . Making
sure we had the faculty, the space and the right people who could interact
with each other in a coordinated way.”21
Kohler also sought out strong department chairs who would appeal
to good research professors, said Hallick. Federal research grants included
money for indirect costs such as maintenance, administration, and other
overhead. But for a time Kohler funneled those federal indirect cost al-
locations into more competitive salaries and what administrators called
“dowries” for department chairs, allowing them to recruit new people to
their programs. That meant that departments didn’t necessarily collect as
much of their indirect costs on research grants, but they drew some key peo-
ple. Using indirect costs in this way is a kind of financial finesse that can
work for a while when an organization is in a growth mode, Hallick said.
The indirect money “isn’t gravy,” she said. “It’s just at the moment
you get it, it’s not embedded, and if the state or some other resources
help you cover those infrastructure costs, then you’re basically liberating
that to invest.”22
So Kohler and Hallick worked with the medical school to recruit
research-oriented chairs with successful track records. They also gave
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them money to recruit good colleagues, Hallick said. The aim was to
use the department chairs as the catalyst for boosting the entire re-
search enterprise.
“It wasn’t about recruiting a single person,” she said. “It was about re-
cruiting a team that was chosen by the new chair.”23
Among the promising new department chairs recruited by the uni-
versity was Magdalene “Maggie” So, hired in 1991 from the private
Scripps health system in San Diego to become chair of the molecular
microbiology and immunology department. With So came a package of
other people. So wanted to bring Jay Nelson, a mid-career virologist and
rising star in understanding virology and herpes simplex, who would later
take charge of a new OHSU Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute. In addi-
tion, So brought another promising researcher named Fred Hebner, who
was her ex-husband. Hebner, in turn, wanted to bring his new wife, a
medical student.
“We had to convince the medical school to accept transfer students,
which they didn’t really do,” Hallick said, “but they finally made an excep-
tion in this case.”24
In the early 1990s, the university also recruited Robb E. Moses, a
promising young geneticist to head the department of molecular and med-
ical genetics. Moses had a special interest in researching Fanconi anemia,
a rare bone marrow disease that increases risks for leukemia. Bagby and
Dr. Markus Grompe, a researcher and pediatrician who joined the genet-
ics department in 1991, also had a special interest in the disease, which
afflicted three of the daughters of David Frohnmayer, former Oregon At-
torney General and University of Oregon president. Frohnmayer and his
wife, Lynn, lost three of their daughters to the disease: Katie died in 1991
at age twelve, Kirsten in 1997 at age twenty-four, and Amy in 2016 at age
twenty-nine, nineteen months after Frohnmayer himself passed away.
In 1994, Kohler hired M. Susan Smith, a professor in the physiology
department at the University of Pittsburgh with a special interest in neuro
endocrinology, to be director of the Oregon primate center. He was plan-
Research: Path to Prominence 247
ning to fully integrate the center into the university after OHSU became
a public corporation. Smith wanted to bring some other researchers with
her, and she wanted a job for her husband, Bill Smith, an English profes-
sor at the University of Pennsylvania.
“It wasn’t exactly our wheelhouse,” Hallick said.25
But she learned that the English professor was computer savvy, so she
made him head of educational communications, in charge of helping other
professors learn to handle technology. He also proved to be an excellent grant
writer. Hallick was fond of saying he was OHSU’s first English professor.
EARLY EXPANSION
Shortly after Kohler arrived, many of the projects launched by
Laster and others came to fruition, giving Kohler a lot more to sell in his
recruiting than the mountain. The Casey Eye Institute opened in 1991
as an independent project led by Dr. Fraunfelder, head of OHSU’s De-
partment of Ophthalmology, and sponsored by an organization called
Research to Prevent Blindness. Casey was the seventh and last regional
eye research institute supported by the organization, which led the
capital campaign to build it. The institute was named after James
Casey, founder of United Parcel Service, and his brother, George Casey.
There were other donors to the privately funded project, too. Shortly af-
ter Kohler arrived at OHSU in 1988, he and Fraunfelder invited donors
for a bid opening to celebrate the project in the OHSU Auditorium. But
upon opening the bids, the two administrators discovered the lowest
was $5 million over the university’s budget.
“We drew all of these people out there expecting to hear who was go-
ing to be the successful bidder,” Kohler said, “and we had to tell them we
needed more money.”26
GBD architects, a Portland firm, designed the white, five-story building
with clean lateral lines and ever-changing light, as though to say that the place
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where some of the top ophthalmologists in the world teach, do research, and
treat eye disease should be pleasing to the eye. The 82,000-square-foot build-
ing, with an adjoining 320-car garage, includes the nation’s largest glass floor
designed by New York artist James Carpenter.27
The $23-million building crouches on the east brow of Marquam Hill
as a striking, elegant gateway to the OHSU campus.28 When the Depart-
ment of Ophthalmology moved into its new quarters, it already had a
good national reputation because of its many accomplished researchers.
Fraunfelder, for example, was a world expert on surface eye cancer and on
clinical ocular toxicology, the adverse side effects of drugs on the visual
system. The additional research laboratories, offices, surgery suites, and
outpatient clinics gave the institute space to flourish. The institute later
expanded in 2006 into an 11,000-squre foot ambulatory care center in the
Center for Health & Healing on the South Waterfront at the bottom of
the tram and into 20,000 square feet of laboratories in the university’s new
Biomedical Research Building. Over the two decades following OHSU’s
conversion to a public corporation, the number of surgery patients at the
institute quadrupled, research tripled, and patient visits and staffing dou-
bled. In 2011, the institute ranked second in the nation in drawing NIH
money for eye research.29
Several projects initially planned by Laster (with help from Hatfield)
were also completed before OHSU became a public corporation. The
$13.4 million library, or Biomedical Information Communication Center,
was completed in 1991. In the following year, the $13.8 million School of
Nursing building and the Center for Research on Occupational and Envi-
ronmental Toxicology building were completed.30
The center, now called the Oregon Institute of Occupational Health
Sciences, gets its own stream of state funding from Oregon’s Worker
Compensation Division. It houses one of the first research centers in the
world to combine the use of molecular and cell biology in the study of ad-
verse effects of chemicals on the nervous system and body31. Oregon is a
fitting place for such a center as its residents place a premium on the envi-
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ronment. Oregon was, for example, the first state to pass a law requiring
bottles and cans to be sold with refundable deposits.32 The state also has
some of the strictest land-use laws in the nation, and its entire coast be-
longs and is open to the public.33
In 1993, more space opened on the OHSU campus with the comple-
tion of the modern outpatient building called Physicians Pavilion. The
development became key in providing the university not only with more
parking, but also more revenue. And as noted earlier, the privately funded
building gave OHSU administrators a glimpse of what was possible when
they had control over raising capital for construction and could enter into
business-like partnerships.34
FREE TO GROW
OHSU’s expansion in the early 1990s gave the university momentum and
a base to build on, but as Kohler argued before lawmakers, the growth and
momentum would have ended without the university’s conversion to a
public corporation. As a more independent institution, OHSU could more
readily raise revenue and donors were more inclined to give, assured their
contributions would go for what they intended and not be absorbed or
supplanted by the state.
That’s become apparent to Druker in recent years since he started
spending more time out of the lab working with donors. Contributors are
accustomed to state university systems with big bureaucracies, Druker said,
but as a public corporation, OHSU had the independence to raise money,
erect buildings, and determine its fate much as a private university could do.
“Donors get that, and it resonates with them,” he said. “When we talk
about putting up a building or doing new things, we actually can execute
on those projects very quickly. They are all on board.”35
OHSU could now go to Wall Street on its own to get money without
long delays. It was free to keep growing. So instead of losing momentum
250 TRANSFORMED
with the completion of all the projects launched during the Laster era,
OHSU embarked on its biggest growth spurt in history.
With the initial $215 million bond package it received in January of
1996, it upgraded its hospitals, clinics, and labs and started a project to
replace Doernbecher Children’s Hospital. Kohler also was working with
Hatfield to build a new federally-funded research center adjacent to the
hospital, the name of which was changed from University Hospital to
OHSU Hospital in 1996.
In February of 1998, the $60 million, 14-story, 266,000-square-foot
research building, constructed in three phases, rose to completion be-
tween the hospital and library. The Mark O. Hatfield Research Center
provided space for a variety of research enterprises scattered across the
campus, including the OHSU Clinical Research Center, Doernbecher Pe-
diatric Research Laboratories, Neurosurgery Research Laboratories, the
Oregon Cancer Center, the Oregon Hearing Research Center, and a new
emergency room.36
Three months after the Hatfield building was completed in 1998,
the new, $73 million state-of-the-art Doernbecher Children’s Hospital
opened. The four-story tower spanned a canyon on the Pill Hill campus.
Oregonian reporter Steve Woodward called the hospital, built with uni-
versity bonds and $35 million in donations, “the most visible triumph for
OHSU since it freed itself from state control in 1995.”37
Randy Gragg, The Oregonian’s architecture and design critic, weighed
in on the hospital and many of the other near forty new and old buildings
on the 116-acre campus. The campus was beginning to look like “a mini-
Hong Kong in the woods,” he said.
From the high idealism of its beginnings to the pragmatic urban
mutation it’s become, the OHSU campus is an 89-year lineage of
architectural highs and lows. . . . Offering a promise of success as a
medical facility, the Doernbecher nevertheless remains strained as
a work of architecture. In much the same way it forces its way into
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the landscape, it uncomfortably exhibits the clash between tech-
nology and nature.38
RESEARCHERS COME
Part of that conflict stemmed from the absence of flat land, forcing
the university to put its buildings on slopes and across canyons and
to connect them with bridges. Still, gleaming new laboratories rose on
Pill Hill, and the researchers arrived—hundreds of them—and some be-
came leaders. The university, for example, hired Dr. Mark A. Richard-
son, from Johns Hopkins University, where he was a professor, to
become chair of OHSU’s Department of Otolaryngology—head and neck
surgery. In five years, he tripled the department’s NIH funding, lifting
it to among the top five otolaryngology departments in the nation. In
2007, he became OHSU’s dean in the School of Medicine, a position
he held until his death on September 2, 2016, after a steep fall while
completing a home repair.39 Dr. John G. Hunter left his post as a gas-
trointestinal surgeon and professor of surgery at Emory University
School of Medicine in Atlanta to be professor and chairman of the
Department of Surgery at OHSU. Hunter is among the pioneers of la-
paroscopic gastrointestinal surgery. OHSU lured Dr. Ron Rosenfeld, an
internationally renowned endocrinologist and authority on the biology
of growth, to be its chairman of pediatrics. He left in 2002 to become
a senior vice president at the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s
Health in Palo Alto, but he is still on the OHSU faculty, still operates a
research laboratory on Pill Hill, and has drawn continuous NIH research
support for three decades.40
Along with researchers came new research initiatives. One, for ex-
ample, was the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute at the Oregon Re-
gional Primate Research Center in Hillsboro. Even before it was operat-
ing, Kohler used it as something to attract good researchers in much the
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same way he used the promise of a new cancer center to retain Bagby. In
1999, Kohler and Jay Nelson, head of the gene therapy institute, invited
another rising star to join OHSU as a senior scientist at the institute and
in the Pathobiology and Immunology Division at the primate center. He
was Dr. Louis Picker, an associate professor of pathology at the University
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas. The institute and pri-
mate center were on the West Campus in Hillsboro, and Kohler had plans
to erect a new building there by 2000 that would house both the Vac-
cine and Gene Therapy Institute and the Neurological Sciences Institute.
The offer to Picker reflected the complexity of the university’s funding. In
the offer letter signed by Kohler and other administrators, Picker was told
he would be tenured in the School of Medicine with a salary of $180,000
plus benefits. The primate center and the gene therapy institute would
contribute $150,000 and another $30,000 would come from the pathol-
ogy department. The letter goes on to explain that half his salary would be
considered an X component funded by the university and the other half a
Y component that will “be obtained from external sources and is to com-
pensate you for special assignments, conditions or services.”41
But Picker wasn’t being offered just a job and salary. He also was given
authority to establish a research program in vaccine development using
monkeys at the primate center. He would “recruit three additional immu-
nologists, each with a package of $650,000, thus bringing the total faculty
recruitment package to $1.95 million.” The money would cover salary,
start-up costs such as equipment and supplies, technical help and reloca-
tion expenses. The new recruits would be expected to establish research
programs within three years that would pay for half their salaries from
NIH research grants and other sources. And Kohler told Picker he ex-
pected him and his team to shoot high.
“The faculty should make this unit one of the premier vaccine insti-
tutes in the world,” he said.42
The offer included more. Picker would be expected to create a “vac-
cine testing facility.” The offer stated “we will provide $182,000 to equip
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this laboratory and a total of $90,000 over three years for supplies. A total
of $5,000 for personnel travel during the set-up of the laboratory will
also be provided.” The Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute would occupy
one wing of a $35 million, 100,000-square-foot building, which would be
built near the primate center with funds from the NIH. Picker’s labora-
tory would have 1,200 square feet of space for biochemistry, another 200
square feet for a biosafety Level 2 space, an office with a secretary, and ad-
ditional office space for postdoctoral fellows.
The offer stated that in order to help Picker outfit his laboratory for
primate research, the university would provide $750,000 in salary support
for technical help, $360,000 for supplies, $260,000 for equipment for the
vaccine testing facility, $260,000 for two cytometers, $40,000 for service
contracts, $240,000 to support two additional core technicians, $200,000
for supplies for the cores, $400,000 for the molecular biology core labo-
ratory, and $39,539 to pay rent for nine months at the VA Hospital while
awaiting the completion of the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute’s new
building.43
The institute also would provide centralized or shared core services
that Picker and his research team could tap. They would have access to
an immunology cell flow core with two cell sorters, two cell analyzers,
computers, and service contracts for instruments; a monoclonal core de-
voted to producing monoclonal antibodies to use in primate studies; an
imaging core, which includes a state-of-the-art confocal microscope and a
technician; and a molecular biology core with sequencing, oligonucleotide
generation, microarray analysis, and chip preparation.44
The letter made it clear that Picker was being offered a chance to help
lead in the creation of an ambitious new research institute.
“We were trying to create something special here,” Kohler said.45
Four months later, Picker and Jay Nelson, the institute’s director, out-
lined an $18.5 million, five-year plan for the institute that envisioned five
investigators and a support staff of another dozen or so research profes-
sors and technicians.
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“The time has come to ‘breathe life’ into the Vaccine and Gene Ther-
apy Institute and set the institute on a course to become a world class
research center,” they wrote Kohler.
During his work in Dallas, Picker had studied the immune system and
had ideas about how disease-causing microorganisms in blood and tissues
trigger memory T cells that stay in the body for years and will remind the
immune system to attack again should the invaders return. The T cells could
be the basis for a vaccine against diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tubercu-
losis, but Picker could not test his ideas on humans. So the OHSU offer
appealed to him because it would put him next door to primates—in partic-
ular, the only pathogen-free colony of macaque monkeys in the nation.46
But he also was drawn by the chance to be part of something bigger
than himself, to join a team that shared his drive to make a difference. He
had an additional attractive offer from Emory University. “But at Emory, I
wouldn’t have had the opportunity to start from scratch to build this new
institution,” he said.47
FREEDOM
Picker may have also sensed another quality at OHSU that often comes
up often in interviews with researchers there—freedom. It both draws and
keeps researchers at the university. Freedom reflects a core value of the in-
stitution that drew its founders to break away from the Willamette Medical
School late in the nineteenth century, that drew the academic medical center
to break away from the University of Oregon in 1976, and, finally, to break
away from the state and the state higher education system in 1995 when it
became a public corporation. Freedom helped draw and hold Druker.
“One of the things I’ve said I like about being here, besides the collab-
orative collegiate environment, is that you can pretty much do whatever
you want,” he said. “There aren’t any people that tell you to ‘do this,” and
there aren’t people that tell you ‘you can’t do that.’ There are lot of other
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institutions where you’ll bump up against either competition for space, for
resources, for ideas, whereas around here, people let you explore and ac-
tually help you explore.”48
Giving researchers that kind of freedom became the centerpiece of
Bagby’s management style. He admired a professor at Harvard’s medical
school named David Nathan, who had trained at least ten of the heads
of pediatrics departments across the country. Nathan told Bagby that he
was so successful because he hired people who were smarter than him and
then he got out of the way.
“So I worked that way,” Bagby said.
OHSU would not be a place where researchers would be told what
they couldn’t do, he said.
My feeling is you should do precisely what makes you the happiest
and what is the biggest challenge you can face. For me, it became
at that period of time personally how leukemia starts. So you have
a normal person and the next day they have something wrong that
leads to leukemia. That’s what I want to understand. Part of that
had to do with personal stories. When I was a resident, I took care
of a woman with acute leukemia who died within 10 days after
coming to the hospital, and that really had an impact on me. I said,
“This is something I really need to figure out.”49
Bagby also became friends with Frohnmayer, who lost his daughters
to Fanconi anemia.
“To understand how they get leukemia I think is leading us to under-
stand how other people without Fanconi get leukemia as well,” he said. “I
am driven now to finish that story, figure it out, and to more importantly
get other people interested in that story.”50
OHSU’s culture of freedom spurs researchers to pursue their own in-
terests and collaborate, Bagby said.
“Those are the two parts of freedom,” he said, “the freedom of some-
body saying, ‘I’m going to get out of your way and be supportive,’ and
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that’s a very personal person-to-person thing, and that has to do with
leadership. And the other thing is sort of a culture. The culture at OHSU
is, ‘Oh, you’re interested in that? Go get a grant and then we’ll talk to you,
and we won’t get in your way.’”51
BUSINESS OF GROWTH
OHSU also aggressively exercised its new freedom as a young, au-
tonomous, entrepreneurial public corporation. Kohler and his team
looked everywhere for opportunities to find profitable partners and en-
terprises, to grow not only through construction and new hires, but also
through partnerships and mergers. The university was operating like a
corporation, looking for ways to stay lean, to compete and to grow.
Because the university was so physically constrained on Pill Hill,
Kohler’s team looked west for opportunities. Once freed from the state,
OHSU fully merged with the Oregon Regional Primate Research Center
so that it was not just an affiliate but an integrated part of the university,
adding 160 acres to the university’s assets and a major source of new re-
search money. For example, the center in 1998 pulled in $17.6 million
in federal research grants, more than the $9.8 million in research money
flowing to the Vollum Institute and second only to the university’s School
of Medicine, which drew $68 million in federal money.52 Adopting the
primate center immediately lifted OHSU’s research ranking among the
nation’s academic health centers. In addition, Jean Bates, a nurse and
alumna, along with her husband, a dentist, had donated to OHSU property
adjacent to the primate center property. So in all, OHSU had 247 acres on
its West Campus by 2000.
In anticipation of OHSU integrating the primate center, another
merger was orchestrated earlier by Paul Bragdon, former longtime pres-
ident of the private, prestigious Reed College in Portland. He had been
hired in the early 1990s to head the Oregon Medical Research Foundation,
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which owned the primate center, managed its research grants and also
provided start-up grants for other Oregon scientists. The foundation
board did little fund-raising, operated independent of OHSU and saw its
primary duty as overseeing the primate center, which had a director “who
did pretty much what he wanted to,” Bragdon said.53
“I really thought it was dangerous that they were in charge of the
primate center,” Bragdon said. “They really had no control of what was
happening there.”54
Because the foundation did little for OHSU and was at times at odds
with the university, Laster, during his presidency, had created a second
foundation for the university called the OHSU Foundation. With Kohler’s
expectation that the primate center would become part of the university,
Bragdon concluded the two foundations should merge. The merger ap-
pealed to Kohler, Bragdon said, with the medical foundation’s endowment
of about $20 million, its acres of land and its handling of primate center
research grants. It made no sense for OHSU to have two foundations,
which created confusion for donors. Merging them into one provided a
useful clarity and efficiency, said Davis, the communication director.55
Bragdon and Kohler worked out the merger over three years, even-
tually sealing a deal in 1994 that left Bragdon without a job. The day after
he left the foundation, however, he stepped in as president of the Oregon
Graduate Institute of Science and Technology, which had financial prob-
lems that would eventually drive it to propose also merging with OHSU.
The graduate institute was a privately funded computer engineering
school established by Howard Vollum, then-Governor Hatfield, and other
business leaders and chartered by the 1963 Oregon Legislature to provide
research and graduate-level training in support of the state’s rapidly ex-
panding high-technology industries such as Intel and Vollum’s Tektronix.
So many companies were expanding nearby in Hillsboro and Washington
County that the region was nicknamed the Silicon Forest. The graduate
institute spread over twenty acres that adjoined OHSU’s West Campus.
By the late 1990s, with a small enrollment of about 350 graduate students,
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the institute was struggling financially. It was heavily invested in research,
which falls about 15 percent short of paying for itself, and it was not get-
ting the philanthropic support it needed to make up the deficit. In 2000,
Kohler visited Ed Cooley, chair of the institute’s board, in OHSU Hospital,
where he was on his death bed. Cooley urged Kohler to save the institute
by merging it with OHSU.56
In August of 2000, Kohler and Edward Thompson, president and
CEO of the institute, signed a memorandum of understanding pledging to
merge. The engineers could collaborate with OHSU medical researchers
on biomedical engineering, biomedical computer science and environ-
mental and biomolecular systems. The merger plan called for a $20 mil-
lion budget that would include the hiring of eight new faculty and for
a five-year, $37 million fund-raising campaign to eventually hire twenty
more faculty. The memorandum described the merger as a win-win plan.
“Activities at the two institutions are largely complementary,” it said,
“and combining the two will produce critical mass that will attract major
new funding and research distinction while enhancing services to their
current constituencies.”57
After the merger was completed in 2001, the university changed its
name from Oregon Health Sciences University to Oregon Health & Sci-
ence University, acknowledging that it was expanding its scope beyond
the health sciences into computer engineering. Again, as with the primate
center, OHSU also was adopting another batch of research money, about
$20 million a year, by merging with the Oregon Graduate Institute. The
additional research awards would help OHSU boost its NIH ranking.58
Yet another research group joined the university during this period,
too. The Neurological Sciences Institute at Legacy Good Samaritan Medical
Center in Portland asked OHSU to adopt it. The institute had been harassed
by animal rights activists for its use of cats in research, and its leaders felt
their research would find a better fit at OHSU. The Vollum Institute, with
its focus on the microbiology of the brain, seemed like the logical place to
put it. But the neurological institute was more involved in clinical research
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with humans as opposed to the pure basic science at Vollum, so OHSU
found a home for it in 1998 on the West Campus as its fifth institute. The
research group got space along with the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Insti-
tute in the new West Campus building when it opened in 2001.59
OHSU brought together the City of Hillsboro and neighboring edu-
cational and research enterprises to craft a twenty-year plan for its West
Campus. The organizations involved included the Capital Center, a
nearby building offering career education through a consortium of public
and private schools and businesses; AmberGlen, a biotech development
park; and the Oregon Graduate Institute. The plan protected the campus
from being bisected by major roads, as Hillsboro at one time envisioned,
and put it right next to the Portland metro area’s light-rail network,
known as MAX.60 Hallick described the expansion:
So by taking advantage of the primate center resources and the
interest in AIDS vaccine testing in primates, you can use those re-
sources to bring in the talent that you eventually want to have in
immunology and genetics to do gene therapy. The time was ripe. I
mean, we had to do it then.61
OHSU’s aggressive and entrepreneurial moves to establish a substan-
tial presence west of Portland in Washington County, home to a major
branch of Intel and world headquarters for Nike Inc., caught the attention
of Portland leaders. OHSU was among the city’s top three employers. In
the five years following its conversion to a public corporation, it added
3,500 jobs, most of them high-paying, and grew to 10,000 employees.
The university had become a powerful economic engine for the city, one
that Portland leaders did not want to see drift elsewhere. But containing
OHSU growth in Portland offered big challenges because Pill Hill was so
crowded and ill-suited to more development with its slopes and canyons.
The university had added thousands of employees without any more park-
ing spaces, a problem it handled by persuading its workers to take buses,
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reducing the share driving single cars to 50 percent, a record unmatched
just about anywhere. After seeing OHSU break ground for its new West
Campus building in Hillsboro, Portland leaders realized they could lose
one of their most valuable businesses, Hallick said. City officials were
ready to start looking for new space on Pill Hill for OHSU’s expansion,
even though the hill already seemed saturated with buildings.
“Literally, almost the first shovelful [on the West Campus] suddenly
induced Portland to be more accommodating to us,” Hallick said, “because
it became obvious that what we’d been saying for years—that if we
couldn’t grow in Portland, we were going to grow out there—suddenly be-
came a reality.”62
ENTERPRISE
OHSU’s new entrepreneurial energy also gave rise to another enterprise
launched by its physicians: one that would have been much more difficult
if the university had not become a public corporation. The doctors created
a 501(c)(3) nonprofit for a physicians’ billing group. The OHSU Medical
Group unified more than thirty-three independent practice groups into
one unit that included the clinical practice plans of OHSU faculty. The
group contracted with the university as a separate entity to provide pa-
tient care. For a time, the participating faculty members would get one
check for their research and teaching duties and another through the med-
ical group for their clinical work.
“It gave us bargaining power, and the ability to contract with insur-
ance entities like Blue Cross and others without having to go through
state contracting [rules] that would slow that process, if not kill it,” said
Dr. Swanson, the skin cancer expert who worked with Kohler and others
in creating the medical group, and who saw Kohler as a patient.
Physicians in the group paid an expense, a sort of tax, to help support
the medical school. The group “basically was funding and running the
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school because of the lack of state support,” said Swanson. He went on
to work in OHSU’s Center for Health & Healing on Portland’s Southwest
Waterfront, a building constructed with more than $105 million in bonds
financed in large part by the physicians group.63
In another enterprise promoted by an Oregon contingent of the na-
tional Campaign for Women’s Health and a group of prominent Portland
women, OHSU in May of 1998 began raising money to build space, possibly
on the South Waterfront, for the Center for Women’s Health, an enterprise
already taking shape with a director and staff. The center embraced a holis-
tic, team-based approach to integrate health care services focused on
women, including outpatient clinical care, clinical research, mental health
care, and consumer education services. The university eventually found
space for the center in the Physician’s Pavilion. More recently, it moved into
OHSU’s newest patient care facility next to the hospital.
Also in 2000, OHSU entered a joint venture with Management of
Medical Innovation (MMI), a company in Cambridge, England, to help
turn its research into spin-off businesses. Profits would be divided among
MMI, OHSU, and the spin-off companies. The venture never got off the
ground, but it revealed OHSU’s rising stature in the medical research
world. British newspapers noted OHSU’s Brian Druker had helped de-
velop the genomic “cancer pill” to cure leukemia. They also mentioned
OHSU researchers recently had cloned a healthy female rhesus monkey
named Tetra, the first cloning of a primate in the world. Researchers at
the primate center had drawn global headlines when they revealed that
they had, on September 7, 1999, delivered a healthy cloned female mon-
key.64 One British newspaper called OHSU “one of the world’s leading
research centers.”65
As if Kohler did not have enough going on as the university ap-
proached the new century, he sent Hallick to talk with Michael Mooney,
president of the private Lewis & Clark College in Portland; and Edward
Thompson, president of the Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and
Technology; about establishing a private research university in Portland
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that could attract at least $1 billion in donor support. That venture, too,
died, but talks among the three schools went on secretly for months with-
out ever leaking into the public or the press. The leaders saw the creation
of a research university as a way of boosting Portland’s economy just as
major research universities were doing in Seattle, San Francisco and San
Diego. But Kohler believed that OHSU could become the institution to
fulfill that role.66
THE PAYOFF
OHSU’s investments into research generally, though not always, reaped
the kind of benefits Kohler and his team envisioned. As the Vollum In-
stitute made plans to add ten more laboratories, many of the university’s
other research ventures also blossomed. A good example is the Vaccine
and Gene Therapy Institute. Less than a year after Picker was hired in the
summer of 1999, Nelson, the institute’s director, hired many more promi-
nent researchers. The institute hired Klaus Frueh, principal scientist and
virology group leader at the R.W. Johnson Pharmaceutical Research In-
stitute in San Diego. Dr. Janko Nikolic-Zugic, a rising star in immunology
at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, also joined the institute.
So did Mark Slifka, a scientist in the Department of Neuropharmacology
at the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California.
In late September 2001, the institute opened with a staff of sixty in a
44,000-square-foot wing of the new building. The wing housed seven re-
search laboratories and four highly secure biosafety rooms for the study of
infectious diseases. The dedication was postponed a year because the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks barred transportation for some scientists from
around the world who would want to attend.67
By the end of 2014, the institute had brought in more than $240 mil-
lion in research grants, nearly twenty times what it spent on its initial
five-year plan. Picker’s team alone, which includes Nelson and Frueh, has
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brought in millions of dollars in research support for its efforts to develop
a vaccine for the HIV virus that causes AIDS. The Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation gave the team $8 million for its research in 2012 and another
$25 million in 2014.
Picker’s team began recruiting volunteers in June of 2016 for human
trials for a potential HIV vaccine and cure for those who already have
AIDS. Picker said it is “quite likely” the vaccine he used to eradicate Simian
Immunodeficiency Virus in half of infected primates would work in hu-
mans. The vaccine also posed a promising technique for fighting other
infectious diseases, such as malaria and hepatitis C. Picker’s work is be-
ing closely watched around the world for its promise in combating AIDS,
which kills 1.5 million people each year.68
The institute’s initial five-year plan worked out just as designed,
Picker said, although he noted that it could have benefited from making
subsequent long-range plans.
“But from the 10,000-foot level, it is all good,” he said. “We have done
what we said we were going to, and the university is proud of that. . . . We
developed a great team here. The team they allowed us to assemble, it is
still here, and we have the freedom to do what we think is right and it has
worked.”69
In its first five years as a public corporation, OHSU expanded its
research space alone by 42 percent, from 243,000 square feet to
345,000 square feet. It spent $77 million on new research buildings,
$16.8 million on renovations of research laboratories, with nearly half the
financing coming from bonds, 27 percent from federal grants and only
3 percent from the state.
Research income climbed during that period by 95 percent to
$168 million in 2000. Kohler created an Office of Technology Manage-
ment to help the public corporation push patent applications, which in-
creased from an average six per year to sixteen per year.70 OHSU’s national
ranking among academic health centers as measured by its research
money had climbed from eighty-seventh in 1986 to sixtieth in 1995, and
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to thirty-third by 2000, which put it within striking distance of Kohler’s
goal of twentieth.71
The university made gains on other fronts in its first five years. It
was now operating the hospital of first choice rather than last resort. In a
survey of 1,031 households, residents ranked OHSU Hospital the best of
five in the Portland metropolitan area for reputation, having the best doc-
tors and being best at caring for those who could not pay.72
The OHSU endowment doubled to about $225 million, its hospital
and university revenue climbed 46 percent to $714 million a year, and
it increased its professional teaching and research staff by 24 percent, or
461 people, to a total of 2,363.73 Kohler created new administrative posi-
tions to oversee the university’s growth: a vice president for research, vice
president for development, and vice president for clinical programs.
An accrediting organization, the Commission on Colleges of the
Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges, in a 2000 interim report
concluded: “Oregon Health Sciences University is a dynamic institution
led by a group of very capable leaders. In many respects it is remarkable
that the institution has not only survived, but has increased its stature in a
time of dwindling state resources.”74
The state gave the university between $53 and $56 million for each
of its first five years. Despite nearly flat state funding, the university was
able through its increased efficiencies and business practices to preserve
programs that would have been cut were it still a state agency. The univer-
sity raised tuition, pushed physicians and basic researchers to pay more of
their own salaries, and saved costs it was no longer paying to the state for
services. Through more revenue and less costs, OHSU was able to cover
its inflationary increases for its first five years as a public corporation de-
spite no significant increases from the state, Hallick said.
“In fact,” she said, “we gave significant salary increases to bring people
to market, and we didn’t eliminate any education programs.”75
Many other academic health centers, however, were not faring so
well. The forces of rising drug costs, reduced Medicare payments, and
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low-paying managed care insurance plans were forcing teaching hospitals,
particularly large ones in inner big cities, to make dramatic cost cuts that
usually meant reducing staff. The Detroit Medical Center lost $160 mil-
lion in 1998 and $93 million in the first half of 1999. Five academic
medical centers in New York City collectively saw their operating income
drop by $100 million in 1999. The University of Pennsylvania Health Sys-
tem in Philadelphia saw its operating revenues drop $288 million over
1997 and 1998.76 In a 1999 survey, 40 to 50 percent of forty-nine academic
health center hospitals were operating with negative margins. Nearly half
of sixty-one hospitals reported reducing staff.77
In an attempt to cope with rising costs and declining revenue, the
University of California at San Francisco Medical Center and Stanford
University Health Services merged their teaching hospitals in 1997,
hoping to gain economies of scale. But the merged health center pro-
duced a new layer of bureaucracy that only drove up costs more. By
1999, when it called in the Hunter Group, a seventy-member man-
agement consulting firm that specialized in helping medical schools
balance their budgets, the two hospital systems were hemorrhaging
$2 million a month in operating losses. The consultants told the trou-
bled UCSF-Stanford merger it would have to lay off 2,000 employees to
be financially viable. The schools made cuts and dissolved the merger.
The Hunter Group became viewed as the slash-and-burn cost-cutter
for ailing academic health centers across the country. Under Hunter’s
guidance, the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center in Philadel-
phia cut 2,800 out of 14,000 health service jobs in 1999 and 2000. The
George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, DC,
sold 80 percent of its hospital to the for-profit Universal Health Ser-
vices in 1997.78
Many of these academic medical centers had prestige and big endow-
ments, price tags, and profits. They were not accustomed to operating
with lean administrations and belt-tightening efficiencies as OHSU was
and were caught off guard by the forces of managed care and lower
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Medicare payments, said Jim Walker, OHSU vice president for finance
and administration.
“The whole world changed in a pretty short period,” he said. “It was
harder for them to come to grips with it. . . . They weren’t used to having
to cut costs.”79
OHSU, by contrast, had trimmed down to a lean operation in its first
years as a public corporation and had entered a growth surge, where it
added rather than cut workers. Its challenge was to avoid hiring too many
workers, Walker said.80
David Hunter, chief executive officer for the Hunter Group, told
the University Health System Consortium, a national organization
serving academic health centers, “One of the most significant factors
leading to deteriorating performances is the attitudes of Academic
Medical Center Leadership.” He said the health center leaders displayed
denial, complacency, inflexibility, lack of urgency, slow consensus
decision-making, and the inability to make tough decisions. These are
all debilitating qualities in a competitive health care market, and they
were all scarce at OHSU.81
MORE MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS
Though OHSU grew and asserted its dominance in the Oregon health
care market, Kohler and his team still had their share of headaches during
the university’s early years as a public corporation. These ranged from
problems integrating its new partners, such as the primate center or the
Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and Technology, to disgruntled
workers, an unfounded Medicare fraud investigation, and animal rights
activists.
In the fall of 1999, Smith, director of the primate center, told Kohler
that the merger was forcing her scientists to slow down; ironically, be-
cause of OHSU bureaucratic obstacles.
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“We are losing efficiency and some of the service provided by OHSU
has been of very little added value,” she wrote. “It can take a very long time
to get anything done at OHSU.”
The OHSU human resources department was “adversarial” and taking
nine months to approve a new hire, a process that previously took a
month, she said. Payroll information was slow, contracts were sloppy, and
the OHSU travel services were “terrible” and “costing more money.” She
said her employees regretted the merger and would prefer to go “back to
the way things were” when the primate center was more independent.
“We need some independence to manage our affairs if we are going
to maintain our current level of services and effectiveness,” she wrote.82
An independent group of researchers who came to review the merger
the following spring reached similar conclusions:
“During our visit, however, it became apparent that interactions with
the Central Campus are far from ideal,” wrote John H. Nilson, chair
of pharmacology at Case Western Reserve University near Cleveland,
Ohio.”83
Kohler winced at what he was seeing.
“I realized that after escaping the bureaucracy of the state, we had cre-
ated one of our own,” he said.84
The merger, he concluded, had created a clash of cultures between the
primate center, where a small group of people were focused on a narrow
research operation, and the larger university with its complexity and mul-
tiple missions. In addition to working to improve communications and
operations between the two organizations, the merger also required that
Kohler learn to live with occasional confrontations with animal rights
protesters. Groups opposed to using live monkeys in research, such as
the Coalition to End Primate Experimentation, staged protests outside the
primate center. Sometimes they would try to break in. In June of 1999,
about thirty protesters gathered outside Kohler’s home.85 And on one late
October day, Kohler recalled, a bus of about thirty animal rights activists
with a national group parked outside his house. He happened to be in his
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basement when several of them came up to his basement windows and
rattled the bars over them as though looking for a way inside.86 Groups
also distributed tracts attacking OHSU, such as one by the Coalition to
Abolish Animal Testing of Portland that questioned the benefits of pri-
mate research. At the primate center, the tract said, “research alone cost
the public about $25 million, yet the center has not produced a single cure
from its animal research in 40-plus years.”87 Activists at times went to the
homes of researchers, put graffiti on their homes or put their addresses
and photos of their children on the Internet, Hallick said.
“Some of those groups were scary,” she said. “It was a very difficult
time for our faculty who used animal research models.”88
One day about eight-to-ten protesters made it to the president’s suite
in Baird Hall and chained themselves to the desks, said Carol Rein-
miller, Kohler’s secretary. The president was gone at the time. The pro-
testers chanted against the primate center until security workers and
Portland police forced them out.
“They had all that chain stuff all over them and tattoos,” Reinmiller
recalled. “Half of them had leather boots, belts.”89
Kohler and his leadership team also contended with some unhappy
employees who in some cases defected, sued the university, or threatened
to strike. While many if not most employees noticed few changes after the
university converted to a public corporation, the shift put more pressure
on some, particularly middle managers, as well as doctors and scientists
who were expected to generate more of their own pay through clinical
practices and research.
In the spring of 1997, a group of twenty doctors, nurse practitioners,
and support staff left the university, pooled their money, leased a building
in southwest Portland, bought some furniture, and opened the Fanno
Creek Clinic. The group objected to the aggressive belt-tightening OHSU
was going through to stay solvent while the university continued to pro-
vide more charity care than any other hospital and to treat some of the
state’s sickest, costliest patients. The university had brought together its
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primary care specialties—internal medicine, family medicine, pediatrics,
and women’s health—to share resources. OHSU Hospital also discharged
patients more quickly and used hospitalists, doctors specializing in hos-
pital care who freed primary care doctors from time-consuming rounds.
The Fanno Creek group did not like these changes.90
Two years later, representatives of the Oregon Nurses Association
at OHSU threatened to strike in the fall of 1999 because the university
nurses’ pay, an average $22.97 per hour, was not as high as that for nurses
in other Portland hospitals. The low pay contributed to a nursing short-
age at OHSU that the union also wanted the university to correct. OHSU
argued the generous 12 percent of pay it was sinking into each nurse’s re-
tirement fund put their compensation on a par with other nurses.91 More
than six months after the negotiations began, the university and union
settled in November of 1999 on a compromise that gave the nurses a
3 percent increase for the current year and a 2.5 percent raise the year af-
ter. They also got some small bonuses to help offset the rising costs of
their health benefits.92
In the summer of 2000, two researchers sued the university after
administrators concluded they were engaged in a conflict of interest
with their private company, Clinical Research Group of Oregon, which
conducted clinical trials for drug and food companies. The researchers,
kidney specialists Dr. David McCarron and Dr. William Bennett, to-
gether ran the university’s division of nephrology, building it from four
faculty members in 1977 to a division with twenty-two faculty mem-
bers and a clinical, research, and support staff of sixty people. Kohler’s
administrators accused the doctors of improperly using employees and
funds to operate their private business. Other researchers also charged
their research was biased because of their sponsors. Based on his find-
ings, for example, McCarron promoted the health features of milk and
Campbell’s Soup as a food that reduced high blood pressure, cholesterol,
and blood sugars. His research was supported by the dairy industry and
Campbell’s Soup.93 While Kohler wanted his staff to be entrepreneurial
270 TRANSFORMED
and foster spin-off companies, he didn’t want them engaging in research
for profit that marred their scientific integrity. He also didn’t like seeing
news about the lawsuits appearing on the front page of The Oregonian
among other places.
“I may be overly sensitive,” he wrote to Davis and other staff mem-
bers, “but I think the stories are doing some harm.”94
There were other potentially harmful stories about OHSU in The Ore-
gonian during the summer of 2000, including three front-page accounts of
federal investigations into Medicare billing fraud allegations at the univer-
sity involving 768 procedures performed by scores of doctors. In addition,
auditors for the state Office of Medical Assistance Programs concluded
doctors in the University Medical Group improperly charged Medicaid
$338,000 in 1995 and 1996, including payments for services physicians
couldn’t prove they delivered.95 The medical group repaid the overcharges
to the state while the federal investigation, which involved the FBI, fizzled
without charges or sanctions. Kohler said the charges were bogus claims
from an employee who had been fired.96
And not everything the public corporation did during those early
years worked. Two institutes adopted by OHSU—the Oregon Graduate
Institute of Science and Technology and the Neurological Sciences Insti-
tute—would ultimately fail to survive. It became clear that the dream of
using the graduate institute as a vehicle to create a sizable bioengineering
program was too expensive and ambitious. The Oregon Graduate Insti-
tute’s merger with OHSU would also prove to be another “clash of cul-
tures,” Davis said. While OHSU researchers raised money for their salaries
through research grants, she said, the Graduate Institute researchers were
accustomed to a guaranteed salary and to working in small, independent
units rather than as part of a large institution.
“They were all part of the Oregon Graduate Institute, but they basi-
cally were a bunch of completely different businesses that did their own
thing,” Davis said.97
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Portland State University and OHSU negotiated a transfer of at least
ten of the institute’s computer science faculty to PSU in 2004, and within
a few years, other Oregon Graduate Institute faculty were absorbed into
other OHSU departments, but the institute was closed and its West Cam-
pus buildings were sold or leased.98
During the same period, the Neurological Sciences Institute also
closed, and its scientists were spread elsewhere in the university, most in
faculty appointments, said Hallick. The institute’s twenty or so investiga-
tors came from Legacy Good Samaritan Medical Center “like orphans,”
placed on the West Campus and never really integrated into the univer-
sity, she said.99 After the neurological institute closed, the thriving and
expanding Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute took over its space in the
West Campus building.
THE BIG ASK
As a result of its aggressive expansion, OHSU had within four years spent
its initial $215 million in bonds and some additional borrowing through
a few smaller bond issues and was just about tapped out for capital. And
one member of the OHSU board, still one of the most influential political
leaders in the state, expressed his concerns about the institution’s health
in a memo to Kohler and board Chair Fred Buckman. Former Gover-
nor Goldschmidt wrote that “after two or more years of conversation,”
the university still was failing to attract many more “clients from the pri-
vate insurance marketplace.”100 He acknowledged the university showed
promise in that it had increased hospital occupancy levels, reduced costs,
won more federal research money, expanded its foundation staff and pri-
vate fund-raising efforts, and pursued partnerships to offer specialty care
for outlying hospitals across Oregon. But he was concerned that the uni-
versity depended so heavily on its hospital and clinical revenues, yet was
not making progress in competing for paying, privately insured patients.
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The university was opening some primary care clinics in Portland, but it
was not aggressively marketing health plans to potentially lucrative cus-
tomers such as Nike Inc. or the City of Portland.101
Kohler wanted to add more laboratories and researchers, but he and
Walker also were sensitive to Goldschmidt’s concerns about university fi-
nances and were cautious about taking on too much debt.
“If things are going well, people are going to lend you more money
than you should have,” Walker said.102
Borrowing to expand research is also risky because research doesn’t
fully pay for itself and actually requires a subsidy from some-
where—hospital and clinical revenue, an endowment, or state support.
But Kohler needed to keep expanding the research enterprise if he was
to reach his top twenty goal. So he and his team looked elsewhere for
money and a way to strike a proper balance between debt and growth.
They soon had their eyes fixed on the massive settlement that forty-six
states made in November, 1998, with the tobacco industry. The indus-
try would give the states annual payments totaling $206 billion over the
next quarter century, $2.2 billion of which would flow to Oregon, to help
cover their Medicaid costs for damage to smokers’ health. The payments
would start in 2000,103 and Kohler and his team thought they could make
a good case for using some of that money to pay for research that could
lead to health improvements. In a move both audacious and ironic, Kohler
proposed to his board that the university ask for money of the state from
which it just five years earlier had declared independence. At the OHSU
board’s annual retreat, the major topic would be how to approach the leg-
islature for $20 million in tobacco settlement money.
The retreat was organized for October 15 and 16, 1999, at Skamania
Lodge, a secluded resort near Stevenson, Washington, about a forty-five-
minute drive northeast of Portland. The lodge spreads over a hillside over-
looking the scenic Columbia River Gorge. The retreat agenda focused first
on guiding the board to reflect on OHSU’s goals, mission, and values and
how best to meet its challenges. Kohler’s team raised questions for the board
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to ponder: Is our goal research growth or financial strength? How do we ad-
dress the financial gaps in the strategic plan? What should we stop doing?
Can our entire strategy be premised on the hospital making money?104
The team reminded the board of OHSU’s vision: “to improve the lives
of Oregonians and others by being a national and international leader
through excellence and innovation in health care delivery, education and
research.”105
It also reminded them of OHSU’s core values: Creation of new knowl-
edge, education of high-quality health professionals, a commitment to
excellence in all we do, integrity and collegiality that makes OHSU a good
place to work, and compassionate care for our patients.
And finally, the team listed the institution’s goals, which included the
following:
• Meet the state’s need for health care professionals.
• Become the regional leader in the care of adult and pediatric patients
with neurological diseases, cancer, cardiovascular, and related ail-
ments.
• Achieve financial stability, including 175 days of cash on hand and an
endowment worth at least $500 million.106
Walker showed the board financial documents and graphs and charts
that projected the university’s revenue would plunge into the red in a
year or two if nothing changed. But, he said, if the university invested
$140 million to expand and upgrade the hospital, $162 million for two
new buildings and an additional 400,000 square feet of research space, and
$112 million to hire 212 renowned researchers, it could put itself on a tra-
jectory to net $10 million or more in annual income by 2006. Walker’s
scenarios, however, included an assumption that the state would increase
its annual support by $20 million, which would normally seem unlikely.107
Board members were skeptical.
“I remember having conversations with board members who said,
‘You guys are out of your mind,’” said Davis. “They’re not giving you
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$20 million. Because at that point the state had not invested in research.
They did not see that as their job. They invested in education.”108
But maybe it was not such a stretch if OHSU aimed for the tobacco
money. As the meeting unfolded, board members began to suggest that
OHSU not only ask for tobacco money, but ask for more than the $20 mil-
lion Kohler had proposed. Kohler had reminded board members that
OHSU was aspiring to be among the top twenty medical schools in NIH
research revenue and already had climbed from a rank of sixtieth in 1995
to thirty-ninth in 1998.109
The board then focused on what Fred Buckman, the chair, would call
the Big Ask. They discussed how to make a case for tobacco money. Not
only would health research directly address the harm caused by smoking,
but it also would bring in researchers whose discoveries would lead to
spin-off biotechnology businesses and more jobs. The investment would
be good for the state’s health and economic development. By the second
day, the Big Ask had climbed to $100 million. OHSU could match that
with a fund-raising campaign, giving it $200 million to expand its re-
search operations. Then, as the retreat was about to wrap up, Goldschmidt
dramatically raised the stakes, recalled Buckman.
“He said, ‘I think it should be $200 million.’ It went from $100 million
to $200 million at the 11th hour and 45th minute, and it was one of the
really good things we did.”110
Hallick, who was sitting across the table from Goldschmidt, remem-
bers the moment.
“It was completely arbitrary,” she said. “It was not based on what we
thought we could get. It was, ‘Why not? We go through all this trouble,
we might as well ask for what we need.’”111
Over the next year, Kohler’s team and the board agreed that if the
legislature would give it $200 million, the university would raise an addi-
tional $300 million from donors. As with its drive to convert OHSU into
a public corporation, Kohler and his team again were raising their sights.
What had begun as a weekend retreat to consider asking lawmakers for
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$20 million had grown into a half-billion dollar proposal for what would
be called the Oregon Opportunity Initiative, all devoted to expanding the
university’s research power, economic health, and national stature.
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Chapter Seven
Reaching for the Top
Kohler opened his campaign for the Big Ask from the legislature in much
the same way he did with his push for the public corporation bill—by float-
ing it in public with a major speech to the Portland Regional Chamber of
Commerce on February 16, 2000. He didn’t mention that the university
planned to ask the legislature for $200 million, but he did describe why
OHSU must continue to expand and how doing so would benefit Oregon. In
an argument he would use across the state, he reminded the audience of how
far OHSU had come since becoming a public corporation and that it was
now well-positioned to take advantage of a new revolution in biotechnol-
ogy emerging with the US Human Genome Project, an international effort
to for the first time identify and map all of a human’s genes. Kohler said the
university now was Portland’s largest employer with ten thousand workers,
and had added $380 million to its annual budget over the previous five years
and nearly two million square feet of space over the last decade.1 OHSU,
he said, had climbed from about sixtieth among the nation’s 125 academic
health centers in NIH research dollars to thirty-third. Kohler noted that Dr.
Druker and his cure for leukemia had been featured the previous Friday on
the national ABC program, 20/20.
“It was a struggle,” he said, “But now in our fifth year as a public cor-
poration, we are hitting our stride.”2
Kohler argued that if OHSU grew to his goal of reaching the top
twenty medical centers in research funding, it would be a powerful eco-
nomic engine for Oregon. It could create jobs and bring $250 million or
more a year in research money to the state. It could also foster spin-off
biotechnology businesses and be the catalyst for Oregon’s biotechnology
industry. OHSU scientists already had spun off 15 businesses and intro-
duced 340 inventions, he said. To reach its full potential, Kohler said,
OHSU needed space.
“Our academic reputation is already good enough right now to recruit
world-class researchers who can bring most of their own money, but we
simply lack the space to house them,” he said. “We want to add 150 more
research scientists over the next seven years. To do that, we will need to
double our laboratory space and space for health care delivery research.”
So without saying how OHSU proposed to get money for more space,
Kohler made the case for why it needed to do so. Soon after, he and others
on his team would talk about their hope to win $200 million in tobacco
settlement money from the legislature.
In the following months, they sharpened their arguments. In May of
2000, the OHSU government relations office put out a three-page paper
titled “The Oregon Medical Research Initiative.” The paper said the uni-
versity wanted to invest $155 million in upgrading its clinical programs
and another $400 million in expanding research space and recruiting sci-
entists over an eight-to-ten-year period. The university could self-finance
the clinical upgrades and raise $200 million more through private fund-
raising. In addition, OHSU would “propose to ask the state to invest the
additional $200 million as a one-time investment.”3
Kohler and his administrators knew they couldn’t win that much
money from the state without putting up a private match, Davis said.
Initially, they looked at a one-to-one match, but soon realized they’d
need more. “What we were really trying to accomplish was bigger than
$400 million,” she said. “It was $500 million.”4
A brief description of the plan surfaced in a short story in May tucked
deep inside The Oregonian. “During the next six years, the university hopes
to raise $500 million, its most ambitious fund-raising goal ever,” the
newspaper said.5
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Over the summer, Kohler’s team refined its campaign, arguments,
and numbers. The team changed the name of the initiative to Oregon Op-
portunity. It persuaded some of the state’s business and political leaders
to serve on a steering committee “to advise our executive team as we
discuss this investment opportunity with the governor and Legislature.”6
The committee was chaired by former Senator Hatfield and included Tom
Imeson, Portland lawyer and former chief of staff to Governor Gold-
schmidt, and other Portland leaders. But most members on the committee
were leaders from other parts of the state such as Steve Forrester, pub-
lisher of The Daily Astorian; Dr. Charles Hofmann, a Baker City physician;
William Thorndyke Jr., president of Medford Fabrications; and Elizabeth
McCool, chair of Western Communications, which published newspa-
pers in Central Oregon including The Bulletin in Bend. Again, Kohler was
employing the strategy that worked so well in selling the public corpora-
tion plan by bringing rural leaders into his camp.
He traveled to small towns across the state such as Lincoln City on
the coast to sell Oregon Opportunity before civic groups, business lead-
ers, and newspaper editorial boards. His core argument was that OHSU
was poised to capture the benefits of the genetic revolution, marked by the
coming map of the human genome, for the entire state. With the Oregon
Opportunity investment, OHSU could seize the moment, claim a stake in
the biotechnology boom, and create jobs through its own expansion and
spin-off businesses.
What’s more, he argued, the university had proved itself worthy of
the investment. In fifteen years, its research awards had climbed sixfold to
$168 million a year,7 putting it among the top 2 percent of the more than
2,000 grant-receiving institutions nationwide. In the next year, 2001, it
would merge with the Oregon Graduate Institute and open its new build-
ing for the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute. OHSU already employed
a critical mass of some of the world’s most accomplished researchers,8 and
the Oregon Opportunity investment could double OHSU’s research fund-
ing over the next decade.
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By fall of 2000, the university was describing Oregon Opportunity in
detail. Of the $300 million private investment it was raising, it planned
to spend $66 million on endowments and scholarships for the schools
of medicine, dentistry, and nursing; $132 million on faculty endowments
and facilities for cancer, heart disease, women’s health, and children’s
health; $25 million to expand the Casey Eye Institute; $20 million for
the Oregon Graduate Institute; $16 million for neurosciences programs;
$10 million for the Center for Healthy Aging; and $5 million for hearing
research programs and facilities. It would also spend $80 million of the
$200 million state investment on building a patient care building and a
biomedical research building, $75 million to recruit scientists, $25 million
on the Oregon Graduate Institute, $10 million for an advanced imaging
center, and $5 million for a statewide education network.
Oregon Opportunity would also reserve $5 million for the creation of
the Oregon Rural Practice-based Research Network. The network would
allow rural doctors and their patients to participate in clinical trials and
other OHSU research, an unusual practice that would “realize the dream
of sharing the benefits of medical research across the entire state,” said
an OHSU discussion paper on the proposal.9 The university had shown
its commitment to a statewide, 98,000-square-mile campus, the paper
said, with its development of Area Health Education Centers, rural ro-
tations for its medical students, and a nursing education program that
was offered on three regional university campuses: Southern Oregon and
Eastern Oregon universities and the Oregon Institute of Technology in
south-central Oregon’s Klamath Falls. The research network would work
with health centers in Oregon’s hinterlands to get research grants and
contracts for research projects that involve rural Oregonians and their is-
sues. It could create jobs that grow out of new technologies and biotech
spin-off companies and bring some of OHSU’s claim on the biotech boom
to the countryside.10 The network would prove successful in making
OHSU a national leader in tapping rural practitioners for relevant, needed
clinical studies on their medical practices.11
286 TRANSFORMED
“It was fundamentally how we went about getting the public corpo-
ration,” Davis said. “We figured out that, yes, the single biggest block of
legislators are in the Portland metro area, . . . but if you can’t get the sup-
port of the other [rural] folks, then you have problems.”12
THE BIOTECH DEBATE
Kohler promoted the potential benefits of investments in bioscience as the
centerpiece of his campaign for Oregon Opportunity. The biotechnology
industry emerged as a force across the nation during the 1990s, mostly as
small companies, many born in the research labs of the nation’s academic
health centers, including OHSU.
For example, two scientists and an officer at OHSU’s Vollum Institute
in 1993 founded Northwest NeuroLogic Inc., which developed
melanocortin receptor and neurotransmitter transporter technologies
that could be used in developing drugs for stroke, head trauma, diabetes,
and many other diseases. The company had grown to six employees five
years later when it was sold to a San Diego company for $4.2 million
in common stock.13 Dr. Richard I. Lowensohn, a nationally prominent
OHSU obstetrician-gynecologist, developed OBLink, an electronic med-
ical records system, for Health Outcome Technologies Inc. The company
was founded in 1991 and merged with MedicalLogic Inc., a larger Hills-
boro, Oregon, company in 1998.14 OHSU had shares in both of these
companies and more.
Even so, OHSU’s nascent biotechnology enterprises were small and
brought in little revenue. But the industry was thriving elsewhere in
the country, and Kohler saw it as a potential new source of support for
OHSU in the years ahead. He was not alone. The Oregon Economic De-
velopment Department focused its efforts on twelve key industries, one
of which was biotechnology. The Portland Development Commission in
1998 had identified bioscience as a key industry for the city, and Portland’s
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then-Mayor Vera Katz had created a biotechnology committee to work on
recruiting bioscience and pharmaceutical companies to the city.15
The biotech industry already was exploding near major universities
elsewhere in the country, including the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology in Cambridge, the University of Washington in Seattle, and the
University of California at San Diego. A 1995 study showed that UC San
Diego had spun out more than 7,000 jobs in the region, largely in biotech-
nology, and a 1997 report said MIT had created 14,000 jobs in Cambridge
alone. An analysis by the Milken Institute in Santa Monica, California,
concluded the high-tech sector could account for 65 percent of economic
growth in metropolitan areas, largely determining which cities succeeded,
and the presence of major research centers and institutions was the most
important factor in creating high-tech companies.16 A New York Times ar-
ticle explained:
The university is an increasingly powerful force in the knowl-
edge economy, both because its brains are greater assets than
ever before and because of a growing trend in which institutions
of higher education see themselves as generators of business,
whether professors’ start-ups or technology licensing deals.
“There’s a great awakening that we’re sitting on top of a gun-
powder keg” of growth, said David Lampe, author of two books
on high-tech locales.17
Kohler took these findings to the leaders and people of Oregon, ar-
guing that OHSU not only should be part of that gunpowder keg, but
that it could be with the Oregon Opportunity investment. He and Edward
Thompson, president of the Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and
Technology, wrote an op-ed column for The Oregonian and were inter-
viewed by Oregon Business magazine, and in both they pressed the case
for how the merger of their two institutions would give the state a com-
petitive edge in the emerging biotech industry.18 As Kohler made that
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argument in talks across the state, the university did the same in its mar-
keting publications.
“The benefits far outweigh the costs,” said a flier, one of many
brochures, papers, Q-&-As, and other publications OHSU churned out in
support of the campaign. “The biotech boom created more than 437,000
new jobs in 1999 alone, on U.S. revenues approaching $47 billion. And
that’s just the tip of the iceberg. Financial analysts project the biotech in-
dustry to grow at a 35 percent annual rate for the foreseeable future. The
genetic revolution is underway.”19
OHSU already was a “national and international leader in biomedical
research” with its potential barely tapped, wrote Davis, now OHSU vice
president for communications, in a memo to Felicia Trader, executive di-
rector of Portland’s development commission.
“Just as the University of North Carolina, North Carolina State Uni-
versity and Duke University spawned the Research Triangle Park and the
University of California at San Francisco gave birth to Genentech and
other biomedical companies, OHSU is poised to serve as the catalyst for
development of the biomedical industry in Oregon,” she wrote.20
Another OHSU paper underscored the urgency of the investment in
OHSU by describing how Oregon lost a major opportunity when Druker’s
cancer drug ended up as Gleevec, a major moneymaker for Novartis Phar-
maceuticals Corporation in New Jersey and Switzerland.
Druker “sought to identify companies that were furthest along in de-
veloping cancer or leukemia inhibitors,” said the flier. “There was no such
company in Oregon, no culture of biotechnology to foster his work and
share in the financial rewards. This opportunity has been lost forever.”21
However, claims by Kohler and other OHSU leaders about the uni-
versity’s potential to still become a biotech powerhouse met some skepti-
cism. Oregon had yet to lure or spawn a major biotech company on the
scale of Glaxo-Wellcome or Genentech, and it was not putting pressure
on its universities to churn out product ideas and companies. Brock Met-
calf, cofounder of Oregon Life Sciences LLC, one of a handful of Oregon
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venture capital firms investing in biotech, said the biotech industry in
Oregon was still struggling. “There has to be a critical mass,” he said.22
Successful small biotech firms created in Oregon found it hard to
stay because of their isolation from larger industry centers. A successful
six-year-old biotechnology venture called Bioject Medical Technologies,
which made devices to shoot medicine under the skin without a needle,
moved from Oregon to New Jersey in 2001 because it wanted to be near
three of the world’s biggest pharmaceutical makers.
“When you are a small company like ours,” said Jim O’Shea, the com-
pany’s president, “there just isn’t anything like New Jersey or the Boston
area for access to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.”23
OHSU was getting into the biotech game too late, said Joe Cortright, an
economist with Impressa Consulting in Portland and lead author of a 2002
economic report on the biotech industry by the Brookings Institution, a
nonprofit research foundation in Washington, DC. More than forty states
were engaged in drives to get into the biotechnology game.
Research centers already well established in Boston, Baltimore, and
seven other cities had the critical mass to draw top scientists and federal
research funding, but Portland wasn’t one of them, Cortright argued.
OHSU could not expect to compete. His study showed that the nine
top-tier biotech communities in the United States—including Seattle, San
Francisco, and San Diego—claimed 88 percent of all venture capital for
biotechnology drug development and 96 percent of the estimated value of
research alliances with drug companies.24
Portland, the study showed, ranked among twenty-eight third-tier
cities. Four second-tier cities competed with those at the top for research
dollars.
“Our studies show not just that the industry is concentrated, but that
it is becoming more concentrated over time,” Cortright said. “The fact that
everybody wants to be the next biotech Mecca says more about the herd
instinct of the economic development fraternity than it does about the
technology of biotech.”25
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Four months before Cortright’s report was published, Portland’s Bu-
reau of Planning and the Battelle Memorial Institute produced an assess-
ment of OHSU’s research prospects and Portland’s bioscience economic
potential titled Building Bioscience in Portland. The report noted OHSU had
developed a thirty-year plan for growth that would require adding 1.2 to
1.5 million square feet of facility space elsewhere than on Pill Hill. The re-
port concluded Kohler’s aspiration to see OHSU become one of the top
twenty NIH-funded bioscience centers in the nation was achievable, pro-
vided it “could move forward quickly” in adding research and support
buildings—more space. The Oregon Opportunity fund was “crucial,” the
report said, in making that happen.26
Kohler argued that even if OHSU captured just a sliver of the bur-
geoning biotech industry, just 1 percent, it could mean another billion
dollars flowing into Oregon. “Presently, Oregon’s biotech industry pales
compared to those in San Diego, San Francisco, or Seattle,” he told a US
Senate subcommittee. “But we need not—nor can we afford to—think of
biotech as the exclusive province of our larger neighbors to the north and
south.”27
In retrospect, the argument by Kohler and other advocates for cre-
ating a biotech hub in Portland were probably overblown, said Daniel
Dorsa, a neuroscientist and OHSU’s senior vice president for research.
“The press got the idea that what was going to happen was that
in September of 2001 this [Oregon Opportunity] money would hit the
ground, and in 2004 Pfizer would announce it’s placing a 10,000 person
facility on the waterfront,” he said. “The point being, it wasn’t driven by
biotech, per se; it was driven by OHSU’s need to expand.”28
The university did need space. But the bioscience industry has also
boomed in Oregon. In 2010, the behemoth drug maker Genentech opened
a $400 million factory and distribution center in Hillsboro, and in May
of 2016, Pinnacle Economics, Inc., reported that biotech research at Ore-
gon universities and hospitals, which occurs primarily at OHSU, produced
$587 million in economic activity, including $356 million in wages and
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4,085 jobs. Pinnacle, which the Oregon Bioscience Association commis-
sioned to do the study, also reported that 793 private bioscience estab-
lishments in Oregon generated $5.6 billion in economic activity in 2014.
So private and university biotech research produced a total $6.2 billion of
economic activity in the state, six times the goal Kohler had set in his cam-
paign for Oregon Opportunity.29
SELLING OREGON OPPORTUNITY
None of this growth was certain when Kohler first focused on the
promise of biotech while pressing his case for Oregon Opportunity to the
legislature. Nevertheless, as the result of OHSU’s statewide advocacy, its
Big Ask emerged in 2001 as Senate Bill 832, also called the Oregon Op-
portunity Act, and like the public corporation bill, it was sponsored by
rural Republicans from north central Oregon: Senators David Nelson of
Pendleton and Mark Simmons of Elgin. The bill would allow the state to
use its tobacco money to finance $200 million in bonds for OHSU’s re-
search expansion.
Kohler made some trips to the legislature, but not near as many as
when he pushed for the public corporation bill. Even so, the legislation
won broad support, and Governor Kitzhaber signed it on August 8, 2001,
with an audience of about one hundred legislators, business leaders, and
university officials. Kitzhaber said the investment would help Oregon take
“advantage of the incredible opportunity for medical advances offered by
the fast-growing world of genetic research.” Kohler said the money would
put OHSU on a platform to help the state “catch the coming biotechnol-
ogy wave.”30
This marked the final victory for the administrative team that had
helped Kohler transform OHSU into a rising star among the nation’s aca-
demic health centers. The team had slowly been losing its cohesion as each
member took on bigger and bigger responsibilities in the rapidly expand-
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ing medical center. The demands of their individual duties left them little
time to meet together on university-wide initiatives such as those for a
public corporation and Oregon Opportunity bonds. Hallick had become
provost and vice president for academic affairs, which included oversee-
ing the university’s rapid research expansion until Dorsa arrived in 2001
to become vice president for research. Billups had assembled a grow-
ing legal team, including medical malpractice, contract, and employment
lawyers. In 1999, after she adopted her daughter, she had reduced her own
hours, and Stadum, the real estate lawyer, was hired to serve as General
Counsel for her office. As vice president for finance and administration,
Walker was putting in sixty-hour weeks overseeing not only the univer-
sity’s finances, but its administrative operations, including finance, risk
management and purchasing. Davis, vice president for public affairs and
marketing, oversaw the university’s promotion and lobbying duties while
serving as its chief spokesperson for news events. Goldfarb orchestrated
the university’s expanding clinics and hospital operations as director of
hospitals and the health care system. Kohler, too, was pulled in other di-
rections. While overseeing the rapidly expanding medical center, he was
gaining more jobs on boards and professional groups. For example, he
served on and chaired the board of the Association of Academic Health
Centers; chaired the Committee on Quality in Long-Term Care for the
Institute of Medicine; and was on the boards of the Alzheimer’s Disease
Center of Oregon and the Portland Chamber of Commerce.
Goldfarb became the first member of Kohler’s leadership team to
leave OHSU. He departed in 2001 as the university sealed its Oregon Op-
portunity plan with the legislature. He moved on to more hospitals—this
time in Gainesville, Florida, where he became chief executive officer of
Shands HealthCare. The health care system is affiliated with the Univer-
sity of Florida Health Science Center. That put Goldfarb in charge of a
primary teaching hospital, two children’s hospitals, a cancer hospital, two
specialty hospitals, two home care agencies, and other outpatient services.
The Florida job was one of three offers that came to Goldfarb in a pe-
Reaching for the Top 293
riod of about sixty days. The two others were from public universities
still affiliated with their state higher education systems—the University of
Washington and the University of Wisconsin. He turned those down be-
cause they were still state agencies, which was what he and Kohler’s team
fought so hard to get away from in making OHSU a public corporation.
He said he had decided to move on because he was no longer happy.31
OHSU was not making enough money, he said. “Peter was unhappy
about that. I was unhappy.”32
Kohler was happy, however, to get his hands on $200 million in
bonds to spend on research expansion. Yet if the state could give, it also
could take away. The legislature allocated OHSU about $96 million for
its 2001–03 budget, down more than $10 million from the previous bien-
nium.33 That meant OHSU would have $10 million less for its academic
and indigent care missions. Kohler broke that news in his Message from
President Kohler newsletter, which came out on campus in late September,
2001, just weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The $10 million
“can only come out of services and programs,” he wrote.34
Among other adjustments, Kohler downsized the OHSU satellite nurs-
ing program at the Oregon Institute of Technology in Klamath Falls, raised
tuition for incoming medical and dentistry students, and trimmed services
at its statewide programs for children with disabilities and special needs in
the Child Development and Rehabilitation Center. By this time, state fund-
ing accounted for only 6 percent of the university’s operating budget.
“Cuts in state support meant that, more than ever, OHSU’s survival
depends on its ability to function efficiently as a business, competing in
the marketplace,” Kohler wrote in the newsletter.35
NURSES STRIKE
Another strain on OHSU’s resources emerged in late fall of 2001 when its
nurses went on strike. Unlike the earlier strike by the American Federation
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of State, County and Municipal Employees, which Kohler characterized as
almost “friendly,” the nurses dug in for a tough, two-month battle that drew
regular newspaper coverage. About 71 percent of OHSU’s 1,500 registered
nurses, members of the statewide Oregon Nurses Association, voted to go
on strike on Monday, December 17, 2001, the first time nurses in any Ore-
gon hospital had gone on strike since 1990. As organizers stacked picket
signs, OHSU management began hiring replacement nurses.
Citing the same concerns as when they had threatened to strike two
years earlier, the nurses complained they were underpaid, earning about
$2 to $3 less per hour than nurses at other Oregon hospitals, and worked
in hospitals and clinics that were understaffed. OHSU argued again that
their lower pay was offset by 12 percent of their pay that OHSU put into
their retirement plans. OHSU management offered to raise wages 14 per-
cent over twenty-seven months; the nurses demanded a 20 percent raise
over twenty-four months.36
The strike began Monday with hundreds of nurses and supporters
picketing in front of OHSU and Doernbecher Children’s hospitals as
OHSU security guards, whose ranks had been increased by fifty temporary
hires, stood sentry at the hospital entrances. OHSU was forced to divert
some emergency cases to other hospitals and to postpone non-urgent
heart procedures.37 One day, as the strike unfolded, Mark Dodson crossed
the nurses’ picket line to meet with Walker. The strikers were shouting,
“Jim Walker is ugly. Jim Walker is ugly,” Dodson recalled. And then
Walker appeared to greet Dodson, and the strikers muffled their voices,
even as they continued to repeat, “Jim Walker is ugly.”38
The strike was in part rooted in OHSU’s remarkable growth. The uni-
versity had added 200 registered nurses over the previous two years, a
17 percent increase. But even that rate of new hires, nurses said, failed to
keep up with the growth in patients. Emergency room traffic had jumped
by 8,500 patients over the previous year to 38,392. The hospital inpatient
count had soared from a daily average of 288 in 1998 to 339, which kept
the hospital humming at 90 percent to 95 percent occupancy.39 Hospital
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administrators say the optimum occupancy is about 85 percent; anything
higher strains the staff.
“It’s gotten to the point where you always seem to be one nurse short,”
said Kristin Kidd, a nurse on the picket line.40
Four days into the strike, The Oregonian’s editorial board weighed in,
faulting both sides for failing to settle. The nurses were loud and unruly
on the picket lines, disturbing patients, and OHSU management was not
taking the nurses seriously, the board said.
“Stirring a deep anger in your workforce is not a sign of effective
management,” the editorial said. “OHSU has had less and less state over-
sight, making it less publicly accountable than even other higher educa-
tion institutions.”41
Pat Southard, a nurse and the interim hospital director replacing
Goldfarb, challenged the editorial in an op-ed article. She said OHSU was
offering the nurses the best deal in the local market.42
The nurses continued to walk the picket line through cold and windy
winter days, including Christmas, into January, then February. Finally, at
6:30 a.m. on February 13, 2002, about 200 nurses walked into the lobby of
OHSU Hospital to report for work. OHSU had agreed to give the nurses
a 20 percent pay increase over three years, rather than two, to improve
working conditions and to seek national hospital accreditation for nursing
excellence. The two-month strike, one of Oregon’s longest labor disputes
in a generation, had cost OHSU at least $6 million, a rift between manage-
ment and nurses, and lingering enmity between nurses who crossed the
picket lines and those who didn’t.43
The strike, slashed state funding, and more patients incapable of pay-
ing for care had suddenly “clouded the future of Oregon Health & Science
University,” said The Oregonian. It explained:
In dollar terms, the recently ended strike by registered nurses
almost fades in comparison to such looming problems as the pro-
posed $9.4 million reduction in state funding for serving the poor,
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a projected 35 percent increase in uninsured patients seeking char-
ity care and a likely $26 million net loss for the schools of medi-
cine, dentistry and nursing. Dr. Peter Kohler, president of OHSU,
remains optimistic about carrying out the institution’s ambitious
strategic plans, which include expanding the hospital by as many as
100 beds, building thousands of square feet of laboratory space and
recruiting dozens of leading scientists to make Portland a hotbed
of biotechnology.44
But before Kohler could begin building new lab space, the university
needed to turn to Oregon voters to settle another issue with its finances.
The state and OHSU wanted the university to use its Oregon Opportunity
money to finance general obligation bonds, which were funded with the
tobacco settlement money, and have lower interest rates than revenue
bonds. The latter are riskier because they depend on revenue from what
they are used to build. If the university, for example, were to use revenue
bonds to build a hospital, it would figure on paying back the bonds with
revenue generated by the new hospital. The state gave OHSU $16 million
a year in tobacco settlement money to finance bonds. That was enough
for OHSU to finance $200 million in general obligation bonds, but only
$165 million in revenue bonds because of their higher interest rate. State
law, however, limited what general obligation bond money could be used
for, and it did not include all of OHSU’s plans to hire new researchers
and build research laboratories and clinics. The state would have to amend
the constitution to allow OHSU’s broader use of general obligation bonds,
which meant putting the proposal up for a vote of the people.
So Kohler’s team persuaded legislators to propose House Joint Res-
olution 46-A, which would go on the ballot the following spring. The
resolution passed and showed up on the May 21, 2002, election ballot as
Measure 11. As with previous OHSU initiatives, Measure 11 won broad
support. The Oregonian editorial board called support of it “a no-brainer.”45
Former Senator Hatfield, a member of the OHSU board, and Governor
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Kitzhaber co-chaired a committee in support of Measure 11. In a guest
opinion column for The Oregonian, Hatfield wrote the measure would re-
duce bonding costs, create jobs, save lives, and improve health care for all
by allowing Oregon Opportunity to go forward with a full $200 million in
bond money. “It’s simply too good to miss,” he wrote.46
Voters solidly approved Measure 11 in May, with 76 percent voting in
favor, 24 percent against. After weathering the election, budget cuts, and
a nurses’ strike, Kohler could finally proceed on a project that he expected
would lift OHSU’s stature. On September 17, 2002, the OHSU board ap-
proved a $321 million contract with Hoffman Construction and Anderson
Construction, both of Portland, to build the Biomedical Research Building
and a fourteen-level patient care center. The financing would come from a
combination of revenue bonds and Oregon Opportunity money.47
On October 10, 2002, a cool, but dry and pleasant day in Portland,
Kohler gathered with university officials; three state legislators, including
Senator David Nelson, who sponsored the Oregon Opportunity bill;
OHSU board members, and other leaders, including Randall Ed-
wards, state treasurer; and Oregon’s Democratic US Congressman David
Wu to break ground on the Biomedical Research Building on the west
side of campus.
“Today is the first step in fulfilling the promise of the Oregon Oppor-
tunity,” Kohler said. “The new research building cannot come too soon.
It will allow us badly needed space to recruit new scientists and expand
existing research projects. . . . Architecturally, the building will promote
functionality by connecting the existing research quadrangle with the out-
patient clinics.”48
Additional Oregon Opportunity money would be used to renovate
two research buildings on the West Campus in Hillsboro, to establish the
rural health research network, and to recruit scores of researchers. By
early 2003, work also was underway on the new patient care facility, a
twelve-story building that would rise like a 100-yard-long, curved glass
cliff facing east and stretching north off OHSU Hospital.
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This was all part of a thirty-year plan that in early 2000 Kohler had
enlisted his staff to work on with City of Portland planners. The two-year
project, called the Marquam Hill Plan, created a blueprint that was to guide
development on Pill Hill through 2032. The plan recognizes the intersection
between “OHSU’s vision and Portland’s economic development priorities,”
said Stadum, OHSU’s general counsel at the time the plan was adopted.49
Marquam Hill had been zoned residential from the time the University of
Oregon Medical School moved onto it in 1919. So every time the university
wanted to build anything—a hospital, research building, a library, a parking
lot—it had to apply to the city for permits and re-zoning. The process was
slow and cumbersome and sometimes ended in denials.
In 2002, the city council adopted the Marquam Hill Plan, which re-
zoned one hundred acres as a “central employment” zone and designated
it a plan district. This allowed OHSU to move forward on construction
projects as needed provided that they conform to the thirty-year plan. The
blueprint organized development into three zones that reflect the uni-
versity’s three missions—research, patient care, and education. The plan
included measures for constructing buildings, new parking structures,
road improvements, parks, and walking paths. It envisioned the need for
an additional 2.2 million square feet of building space by 2032, some of
which would be developed on OHSU’s West Campus in Hillsboro. Some
also would be developed on the South Waterfront along the Willamette
River at the base of Pill Hill.
SOUTH WATERFRONT PROJECT
It was not long after OHSU became a public corporation that Kohler and
his administrative team and board were looking at the possibility of taking
a giant leap off Pill Hill to the vacant industrial land below. OHSU and city
planners had been working for years on development plans for the area long
before Kohler created his thirty-year plan. In fact, Kohler and his leadership
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team were looking to the waterfront even before they retreated to Skama-
nia Lodge to devise the Big Ask. The 130-acre swath of land stretches south
from Portland’s Marquam Bridge about a mile along the Willamette River.
It had served industry from the 1880s, when the Portland Lumber Company
was established there, through most of the twentieth century. The land ap-
pealed to industries that relied on access to the river, roads, and railways.
The Portland Lumber Mill operated on the South Waterfront as did a metal
fabrication plan, chemical manufacturers, an aluminum smelter, a barge-
building operation, and various salvaging operations. Industrial waste from
some of these industries was dumped on the site and into the river. By the
1960s, though, the South Waterfront’s industrial development was on the
decline. The construction of two freeways—Harbor Drive in the 1940s and
Interstate 5 in the 1960s—limited access and isolated the waterfront, con-
tributing to the demise of industry. By the 1970s, the South Waterfront had
become dead space in the city, a barren brownfield. The Portland Devel-
opment Commission acquired seventy-three acres of the South Waterfront
District in 1978, removed Harbor Drive and made plans to redevelop it as
part of the Portland Downtown Urban Renewal Plan. This led to a series
of revitalization plans—the South Waterfront Redevelopment Program of
1979, the Central City Plan of 1988, and the North Macadam Renewal Plan
of 1999, named for Macadam Avenue, which parallels part of the South Wa-
terfront.50
In late 1997, Mayor Katz created a twenty-five-member steering
committee to study the development possibilities of the land, including
use for OHSU expansion. She urged the panel to come up with a more
creative name than the North Macadam District. By its second meeting,
the committee was discussing whether a big gondola or tram might be
the best way to move people between the waterfront and Pill Hill. Former
governor and OHSU board member Neil Goldschmidt had come up with
the tram idea as he and OHSU administrators discussed possibilities for
expansion on the South Waterfront. 51
“He was the first to mention the tram,” said Davis, who served on
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Katz’s South Waterfront steering committee for years. “He mentioned it
to me early on. We began to look at it, and it started to make sense.”52
Goldfarb said he was at the breakfast meeting across from Kohler’s
office in Baird Hall when Goldschmidt proposed the idea. Also at the
meeting was an expert from Bechtel—an international engineering and
construction company and one of Goldschmidt’s clients—who worked on
snow resort trams in Europe. First they talked about a funicular, a tram-
like vehicle that would rise from the South Waterfront to Pill Hill on rails.
“I thought that was a pretty good idea because I was stationed in the
Navy in Italy in Naples, and they had a lot of them there,” Goldfarb said.
“Then we talked about a gondola. Then Walker joined us.”53
Kohler liked the idea of a gondola or tram and appointed Walker to
work with the city on exploring the possibilities.54 They didn’t have to
worry about regulations because there were none: no US city had ever
built an aerial tram, Goldfarb said.55
Before long, city and OHSU leaders were considering a tram. “People
were juiced by it,” Goldfarb said. The Bechtel expert told Goldschmidt
a tram connecting Marquam Hill to the waterfront could be easily built.
“This is nothing as trams go,” he said.56
It made sense because no other option for moving people between the
waterfront and the hilltop campus seemed feasible. Three two-lane roads
led to OHSU from the north, south and west. The one road snaking up
the hill from downtown Portland already was clogged with traffic, and any
South Waterfront traffic—whether cars, buses, or streetcars—would have
to flow through a neighborhood and up the hill, creating unacceptable
congestion and delays. Many involved with the project, including Kohler
and Davis, would later conclude the South Waterfront project could not
have worked without the tram. Yet the tram would be the project’s most
controversial feature, creating friction with neighbors, a common prob-
lem for universities when they expand.
The steering committee brought together the city, developers and
OHSU in a plan for the South Waterfront, which would become part of
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the Marquam Hill Plan. The design, incorporating an earlier vision from
the Central City Plan of 1988, proposed an urban mixed-use neighbor-
hood. It modeled the South Waterfront development after English Bay
in Vancouver, BC, with restaurants, hotels, thin apartment and condo
towers, a river greenway, parks, and a wildlife refuge. OHSU’s future pa-
tient clinics and biotechnology research and classroom buildings would be
mixed with these developments.
“This goes way beyond OHSU,” said Homer Williams, a prominent
Portland developer. “This is about the city itself over the next 30 years.”57
The steering committee incorporated city policy objectives that called
for affordable housing, job growth, new greenways and parks, new trans-
portation options, sustainability, and the smart growth practice of keeping
jobs, restaurants, and living space close. Williams and Dame Develop-
ment, a real estate development consultant to the committee, said OHSU
should serve as an economic development anchor for the waterfront with
more buildings for research labs, clinics, and classrooms. Gerding Edling,
a real estate investment and development firm, recommended that
energy-efficient green practices be part of every building that rose from
the brownfields of the South Waterfront.58
The city and its consultants produced their first draft for the wa-
terfront development in May of 1999. It proposed a 130-acre district
that would support 1,550 to 3,100 housing units and 10,000 jobs in
250,000 square feet of retail space and 1.9 million square feet of space
for business offices and university research labs, clinics, and classrooms.
The plan also called for a fifty-foot-wide greenway along the Willamette
River, eighteen acres of parks and a streetcar connecting its 5,000 resi-
dents to the city, a light-rail station, and a tram connecting OHSU workers
and patients to Pill Hill. The city would invest $150 million in property
taxes in the project. The Portland City Council established the North
Macadam Urban Renewal Area.59
But planners just kept planning for another two years, as environ-
mentalists pushed for a wider greenway along the river and residents in
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the neighborhood adjacent to the waterfront district expressed growing
concerns about how the development and the tram would affect their
quality of life. By the spring of 2001, Kohler and his team were pressing
city officials for a clear commitment to the project. If the development was
going to become bogged down in controversy, the university needed to
consider shifting its focus to its 263-acre West Campus in Hillsboro. That
pivot could ultimately lead to OHSU moving its entire center of gravity to
Hillsboro, Walker said.
“An academic medical center cannot afford to have two full-service
campuses,” he said.60
By moving west, the university could avoid buying more land as it
would have to do on the waterfront, and it would not have to deal with
public controversy over the tram or with parking and congestion issues.
Portland leaders wanted to keep OHSU’s expansion in the city, which
meant finding room for it on the South Waterfront. The district had mul-
tiple owners, the largest being Zidell Marine Corporation, which was still
building barges on some of its thirty acres on the north end of the dis-
trict. The Schnitzer family, who made its fortune in the steel business, also
owned about twenty acres. Planners, consultants, and developers were
bogged down in forging intergovernmental agreements for parks, trans-
portation, zoning codes, greenway guidelines, and other details in the
complicated plan. But in December of 2001, sensing OHSU’s growing
restlessness, the North Macadam Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
recommended the city concentrate its entire budget, staff, and work on
making room for OHSU on the waterfront.
“Do what you need to do for OHSU and let the rest of these fall off
the table,” said Ann Gardner, member of the committee and development
project manager for Schnitzer Investment.
Davis, also a member of the committee, reminded the city that OHSU,
now armed with Oregon Opportunity money, had reached a critical point
where it needed to start building in the coming summer of 2002.61
In the spring of 2002, the Portland Planning Commission organized
Reaching for the Top 303
two public hearings to allow residents to weigh in on the thirty-year Mar-
quam Hill Plan, which was aligned with what was still being called the
North Macadam District. Hallick reminded the commission that OHSU
was making plans to build with its Oregon Opportunity money and
needed to move soon to stay competitive in the rapidly evolving biosci-
ence industry. If city leaders and residents cannot accept an aerial tram,
she said, “we would rather build in the West Campus. We think we are in
an excellent position to compete, but not if we dawdle.”62
Three weeks later the Portland Planning Bureau released proposed
zoning and design guidelines for what it wanted to rename the South
Waterfront development. A group called the North Macadam Investors
led by Homer Williams, the veteran urban developer, had bought ten
acres in the district with plans to buy eighteen more by July. On the
land, they proposed to build a 400,000-square-foot tower of offices, re-
search labs, and classrooms for OHSU. That building would be flanked
by four to eight blocks of additional development that would include
condominiums and apartments. The greenway along the Willamette
River had been extended to 100 feet, and the plan included construction
incentives to encourage 150-foot setbacks. The plan allowed buildings
to rise to 250 feet and also offered incentives for environmentally
friendly building practices.
“This is the most seductive piece of property in the region,” Williams
said. “Four stories up and you’re looking straight into Mount Hood and
[Mount] St. Helens.”63
Randy Gragg, The Oregonian’s architecture critic, had earlier been crit-
ical of the development plan for lacking ambition and vision. But he
changed his tone after seeing the buildings Williams and his partners were
proposing to build.
Sleek, glass “pin” or “blade” towers 240 feet high, surrounded by
five- and six-story bases. Following the city’s new guide-
lines . . . the idea is to create a Pearl District-style64 urbanity of
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active ground floors but topped with Vancouver, B.C.-style sky-
scrapers—tall, thin and clad entirely in glass, maximizing the light
inside and views between them. . . . The first building would be
developed by the team who did the award-winning
Wieden+Kennedy Building, Gerding/Edlen Development and Al-
lied Works Architecture. Together the concept designs and the
developers’ approach hold the promise of the kind of new architec-
tural energy the city needs and that OHSU has occasionally aspired
to with buildings such as the Biomedical Information Communi-
cation Center and Casey Eye Institute. Williams and his Partners
clearly are raising the stakes of the North Macadam game, match-
ing, if not exceeding, the city’s aspirations.65
However, before construction could begin to carry out those aspira-
tions, the city, OHSU and the residents near the waterfront had to come
to an agreement on the tram. Without the tram, there would be no wa-
terfront development, said Buckman.66
THE TRAM BATTLE
Buckman said he probably spent more time on the tram debate than any
other issue during his tenure as chair of the OHSU board from its incep-
tion through 2003. He didn’t work so much with the neighbors opposed
to it, he said, as with members of the city council, Mayor Katz, architects,
and engineers who all were feeling the heat of the opposition.67 The resis-
tance surprised Kohler and other OHSU leaders who thought Portlanders
would love the tram because it would be so much better for the environ-
ment compared to any alternative.
Residents in Corbett-Terwilliger-Lair Hill, a strip neighborhood
eight blocks wide bordering the South Waterfront area, began expressing
alarm about the tram in the fall of 2000. About sixty signed a letter by
Craig Rowland on behalf of their neighborhood association, notifying
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OHSU they were prepared to fight to stop the project. Rowland and many
of them lived on SW Gibbs Street, which ran east–west right under the
route the tram’s cars ride on their climb to Pill Hill. In a letter to Gordon
Davis, OHSU’s planning consultant, Rowland wrote:
We cannot conceive how this tram could be built without severely
impacting our neighborhood. Our concerns include, but are not
limited to, the visual impact of tram and cables and the potential
noise from the operation of the tram. Who can honestly say they
would welcome a bus-sized conveyance sliding over the street that
fronts their house 10, 20, 40 times a day? If there is a positive side
for our neighborhood, we fail to see it. . . . We want to hear from
OHSU regarding why they might need a tram in the first place and
how they intend to address the concerns expressed above.68
The battle over the tram would rage for the next twenty-one months
in public meetings, newspaper editorials and op-ed columns. The more
they studied the idea, the more city and OHSU officials became convinced
that the tram was the best, and probably the only, solution for handling
transportation in connection with waterfront development. Davis told a
Portland planning commission that without the tram, “traffic constraints
on both Marquam Hill and in the North Macadam area would make the
[the waterfront] site impractical and would ultimately limit growth on
Marquam Hill as well.”69
The tram could ferry sixty or more people up the hill in a matter of
two or three minutes whereas buses would take about twenty minutes,
said Gordon Davis, the consultant to OHSU, in a public presentation of
a preliminary engineering study. The university would have to add ten
buses to handle the traffic at the cost of $1.2 million a year compared to
about $480,000 a year for a tram system, he said.70 City officials also ar-
gued that the tram was key to keeping OHSU in Portland. Without it, the
university would expand at its West Campus in Hillsboro. And without
OHSU, the waterfront development would not have the economic en-
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gine it needed to support a thriving community of condos, apartments,
and small businesses. Without the tram, city officials argued, the Corbett-
Terwilliger-Lair Hill neighborhood would continue to live next to an
industrial wasteland and nothing more.
“Having a healthy OHSU is a good thing, and far, far better thing than
having them go to the suburbs,” said City Commissioner Charlie Hales.71
The Oregonian’s editorial board urged the Portland City Council to
use a wider lens in making a decision on the tram, looking beyond one
neighborhood’s objection to the needs of the whole city to keep OHSU
in Portland. Without the tram, the board wrote, OHSU would shift its
expansion to its West Campus and “Hillsboro would reap much of the
biotechnology benefits that could have been Portland’s—a huge economic
blow for Portland.”72
Neighbors were livid.
“What occurs to me is, ‘How dare you?’” said lawyer Mark
Eves, whose office was on Gibbs Street. “How dare you step into our
neighborhood so you can save a bunch of money and damage the value of
our properties?”73
Opponents argued the tram would block views, mar a historical dis-
trict, intrude on their privacy, lower their property values, and offer them
no benefits.
“Design cannot remove the fact that it’s intrusive,” said Sean Bren-
nan, a technical writer and Gibbs Street resident. “They keep talking engi-
neering; they can’t see that it can’t be mitigated. It doesn’t matter whether
you make the towers look like trees.”74
Stephen Leflar, a neighborhood activist and designer, objected to the
way the proposal flouted community guidelines and scenic protections.
“I’m against bankrupting 100 years of planning,” he said. “Also, it
bankrupts my heart to know all the work I’ve done for the city” may be for
nothing. If the tram is built, he added, “I won’t do it anymore.”75
In the spring of 2001 and again in the fall, Gragg, The Oregonian’s ar-
chitect critic, argued the tram could integrate OHSU, “a castaway on an
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island,” with the city. He urged the city to see it as more than a transporta-
tion solution, but as “part of a comprehensive effort to link two important
places—public places—in the city. It means designing the cars, towers and
surrounding plazas as objects and places of beauty.”76
Gragg urged city leaders to seek one of ten $50,000 grants the Na-
tional Endowment of the Arts was offering to cities to fund architectural
design competitions for projects such as the tram.
The tram could be the most important project this city builds in
the next 25 years. It will link Portland’s landlocked largest em-
ployer to 130 acres of prime, largely empty waterfront acreage
where it will seed thousands of jobs and housing units. It will
become a major landmark in one of the city’s verdant vistas, an
instant tourist draw and another chapter in Portland’s 25-year his-
tory of transportation alternatives. If designed, not just well, but
beautifully, the tram’s towers and cars could become an interna-
tional icon for the city. Its landings at OHSU campus and North
Macadam could grow into dynamic civic gathering spaces.77
In the spring, tram supporters created a private nonprofit called Port-
land Aerial Transportation Inc. to design and build the tram. The non-
profit would also oversee other improvements, including a pedestrian
bridge, to reconnect neighborhoods west of Interstate 5 and under the
tram to the Willamette River and restore some cohesion to a community
that had been fragmented by decades of freeway and arterial construction.
The group’s board included representatives from OHSU, South Water-
front property owners, residents of the Corbett-Terwilliger-Lair Hill
neighborhood and a member of the city council. The organization also
created a citizens advisory committee to recommend priorities for the
tram and related projects.
But the battle continued. A consultant on the project, Battelle Memo-
rial Institute, told the Portland Planning Bureau that the tram could serve
as a catalyst for civic development and an aerial icon for “an emerging bio-
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science center.” An opposition group called No Tram countered the tram
would only connect two parts of OHSU.
“A single-purpose transit system with such a limited scope brings no
more benefit to the city’s transit system than would a fleet of carrier pi-
geons,” wrote No Tram.78
In late June of 2002, the city council agreed to hear the debate in a se-
ries of public hearings and then decide whether to build the tram. Gragg
summed up all that was at stake:
For OHSU, the tram is key to a campus expansion its president,
Peter Kohler, hopes will leverage the university into the top 20
medical schools in the country. For a group of developers led by
Homer Williams, OHSU’s expansion is the backbone of ambitious
plans to build a high-density neighborhood on 28 acres of water-
front the developers have acquired south of the Ross Island Bridge.
And for the city, the development could begin transforming the
140-acre Macadam District into what city Planning Director Gil
Kelley envisions as a “Science and Technology Quarter,” support-
ing 10,000 jobs and 5,000 housing units.79
On the eve of the June vote, Mayor Katz said the council would hear
all sides and examine all options. But then it must act.
“We need to make a decision,” she said. “Period. End of conversa-
tion. . . . If Homer [Williams] has a deal and OHSU wants to come down
to North Macadam, we need to begin working on it now, plain and sim-
ple. And the community needs some resolution.”80
That resolution came on July 20 when the four-member city council
unanimously accepted the recommendation from the city’s Office of
Transportation for a tram over Southwest Gibbs Street. The decision set
the Portland Aerial Transportation Inc. to work setting up a design com-
petition for the project. Mayor Katz said the tram could become the city’s
postcard image as the Space Needle is for Seattle or the Gateway Arch is
for St. Louis.81
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Now that the tram finally had a green light, so did development plans
for OHSU and the South Waterfront—just as construction was getting
underway on the Biomedical Research Building and the new patient facil-
ity on Pill Hill.
Designers and engineers went to work over the following months on
forging a complicated agreement that would outline commitments and
plans for the waterfront development over three phases. In the first, de-
velopers would build apartment and condo towers, and OHSU would build
what would become the OHSU Center for Health & Healing, a sixteen-story
building with space for surgery, research, clinics, classrooms, and a fitness
center. The OHSU board voted on July 7, 2003, to agree to the building and
OHSU’s broader role in developing the South Waterfront.
Three days later, the Portland City Council approved a development
agreement among the city, OHSU, and developer Homer Williams and
his partners. Before anyone could build, though, the developers had to
work with state Department of Environmental Quality officials in clean-
ing the property of contaminants. Work also got underway to extend
the Willamette River Greenway from downtown Portland through the
South Waterfront District, with an average 125-foot setback. The plan
also called for a two-acre Elizabeth Caruthers Park and multiple condo-
minium towers on the waterfront.82
The Oregonian’s editorial board urged the Portland City Council in
August to approve $72 million in development aid for the project, which
it did. The board, like most people in Portland, was now looking at the
Oregon Opportunity buildings rising on Pill Hill and OHSU’s construc-
tion on the South Waterfront as all part of one massive expansion.
If OHSU doesn’t expand aggressively, says Dr. Peter Kohler, pres-
ident, it will shrink in a downward spiral because the costs of
training doctors and nurses and serving indigent patients continue
to climb. . . . OHSU has wisely decided to tackle its financial ills
by slugging it out in the wilderness of biotechnology. . . . Kohler
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does not expect Portland to rival Boston, San Francisco or other
biotechnology centers. But it is reasonable to expect Oregon to
claim at least 1 percent of the more than $100 billion that the in-
dustry is expected to produce nationwide over the next decade.
Even if OHSU falls short of its new vision, it will be far healthier
than if it had never tried to fulfill it. So will Portland.83
DEPARTURES
As the university’s most ambitious building project in its history un-
folded on Pill Hill and the waterfront in the summer of 2003, Kohler
was contemplating his retirement. He was sixty-five, old enough to
retire, and his wife, Judy, wanted him to. But the president had not
yet reached all of his goals. The university ranked thirty-one among
US academic health centers in NIH research money, still shy of the
top twenty. Kohler’s research expansion was not yet complete; his
buildings still unfinished. He had had plenty of other opportunities
to leave the university for other jobs, too, but he turned all of those
down so he could complete his agenda at OHSU.84 Kohler struck a
compromise with his wife. He had hoped to retire in Portland, but
Judy wanted to move back to Arkansas where some of their children
and grandchildren lived. So Kohler told Judy he would agree to retire
in Arkansas if she could give him three more years on Pill Hill. She
accepted the deal.
Jim Walker, though, had had enough.
“I had talked with Peter for a number of months about the stress and
strain of 60 hour weeks—week after week, month after month, year after
year,” he said. “It was taking its toll on me. It had become too stressful, and
it just wasn’t fun.”85
Kohler kept urging him to stay, but Walker said he had ended up
with too much responsibility. He was overseeing almost all operations of
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the university, including finance, legal, administration, even contract ne-
gotiations with the unions. One evening while once again negotiating a
contract with the Oregon Nurses Association in a Portland building off
campus, Walker collapsed. An ambulance took him to OHSU Hospital
where he underwent an emergency appendectomy. The next morning
Kohler visited him in his hospital room.
“Pete, this is my wake up call,” Walker said. “I know this is caused by
stress. This is it. I’m going to have to leave.”
So at age fifty-four, early in 2003, Walker retired.
“We were a great team,” he said. “I loved working with the rest of the
team. But at the end of the day, I retired. I could not face going to work,
and I couldn’t face going out and getting a job.”86
But it wasn’t long before Lewis & Clark College in Portland called
up Walker to help it handle a financial and political disaster. Michael
Mooney, president of the small liberal arts college, resigned in June of
2003 after he made an unauthorized loan to an Idaho energy operation
and lost $10.5 million of the college’s money when the company went
bankrupt.87 Paul Bragdon, the former Reed College president and former
head of the OHSU Foundation, stepped in as interim president and
brought Walker on board to help him make repairs.
Walker ended up staying two years as chief financial officer.
“That was 40 hours a week,” he said. “It was the easiest thing in the
world.”88
So with Goldfarb and Walker gone, and with Billups working re-
duced hours to care for her daughter, Kohler pressed on with only Hallick
and Davis from the old team.
Another big break came his way in the summer of 2004 when the
Schnitzer family, represented by Gilbert Schnitzer, donated nearly twenty
acres of the South Waterfront property to OHSU.89 Goldschmidt said he
had urged the Schnitzers, whom he represented as a consulting lawyer,
to make the donation if they were not going to build on the land them-
selves.90 Kohler said the gift, worth about $35 million, was the largest in
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the university’s history and would be used to create a Schnitzer campus for
the dental and medical schools.
By the winter of 2004–05, cranes again dominated the university sky-
line, with construction underway for the Biomedical Research Building,
the sweeping patient care building attached to OHSU Hospital, the Center
for Health & Healing on the waterfront, and the tram that would connect
them. As new buildings rose, so did the precariousness of the university’s
financing and its danger of getting overextended with debt. A drop in the
stock market in 2002–03 discouraged philanthropic donations across the
county. The OHSU Foundation was no exception; its gifts declined by a
third. Donations rebounded by the fall of 2004, but the foundation still
had not raised $67 million of the $90 million it had projected to collect for
furnishing the new Biomedical Research Building and the patient care fa-
cility, both about a year from completion.91
In a memo to the OHSU administration, Lora Cuykendall, the univer-
sity’s new director of media relations and publications, warned that OHSU
was vulnerable and open to challenges on numerous fronts.92 The institu-
tion, she wrote, was under unusual financial pressure because of “its ex-
pansion and increasingly competitive health care environment in Portland”
and more cuts in state funding. It could face public concern over whether it
would fulfill its Oregon Opportunity promises, continue to serve the indi-
gent and other people in need and avoid more cost overruns for the tram.
The university hospitals were serving about the same number of
Medicaid and indigent inpatients in 2005 as ten years earlier, but their
number of commercially insured, that is paying, patients, had climbed by
more than 40 percent. Therefore, their low-income patients had become
a smaller share of their overall mix, shrinking from 42 percent of all inpa-
tients in 1997 to 34 percent in 2005.93
Compared to other Portland hospitals in serving low-income and in-
digent patients, “OHSU is doing more than its ‘fair share,’” wrote Cuyken-
dall. “However, a shift in the payer mix and the hospital’s current bottom
line may be a flashpoint for media interest.”94
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The tram project also was drawing public fire because of cost over-
runs. The initial estimate for the project in 2002 was $15.5 million. But in
2003, Portland Aerial Transportation Inc., the nonprofit created to help
oversee the project, selected through international competition a bolder
design with broader scope and more substantial docking stations at each
end, pushing the cost estimate up to $25.9 million. After a building con-
tractor completed building documents, the price climbed to $39.6 million.
By January of 2006, as construction got underway, the tram was carrying
a $45 million sticker price. Developers, the City of Portland, and OHSU
were sharing in the costs of building the tram. The city was in charge of
managing the project, but OHSU was on the hook for nearly 70 percent of
the costs.95
The cost overruns were the result in part of a poorly calculated,
grossly low early estimate of only $15 million, officials said. An 85 percent
climb in steel prices also contributed to the increase.96 Stadum, who had
moved from general counsel to chief administrative officer at OHSU,
noted in an op-ed column for The Oregonian that OHSU was on budget
and on schedule for the three buildings it had under construction—the
Biomedical Research Building, the new patient care wing adjoining OHSU
Hospital, and the Center for Health & Healing on the South Waterfront.97
Two condominium towers were also rising on the waterfront, just the
first of numerous high-rises planned by developers. Stadum urged critics
to see the big picture.
But we must not lose sight of the long-term vision. Driven by
OHSU’s decision to expand within the city, an unkempt segment
of Portland’s riverfront is being transformed into a vibrant down-
town district. The tram is the catalyst for $2 billion in commercial
and residential investments and—once it is completed—will take
its place as a Portland icon that will add to the city’s already great
appeal.98
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By February, five months into construction, the tram’s price tag had
bumped up another $10 million to $55 million. A small group of angry
residents, including some from the Corbett-Terwilliger-Lair Hill neigh-
borhood, showed for a city meeting March 14 on the tram’s rising costs.
Alan Peterson, who lived in the neighborhood, wore a T-shirt bearing the
words: No Tram to OHSU. “It’s not necessary,” he said. “They could run a
shuttle. It’s just too expensive.”99
To continue the project, the city would have to increase its share
from $3.5 million to $8.5 million, and OHSU would put up an additional
$7.5 million, bringing its total to $40.2 million.100 South Waterfront
property owners also would put up some money. Some city commis-
sioners preferred letting the project die to spending so much more. But
Commissioner Dan Saltzman agreed to back the project, giving it a ma-
jority vote.101 The tram now came in at $57.6 million—a price that would
hold through its completion in December.
Ted Sickinger, a business reporter at The Oregonian, took a hard look
at OHSU’s expansions and ambitions to grow to financial self-suffi-
ciency.102 He acknowledged Kohler had “presided over OHSU’s transfor-
mation from a medical backwater to a behemoth with 11,500 employees,
a $1.2 billion annual budget and an array of clinics, hospitals and research
centers during the past two decades.” 103 He concluded the university’s as-
sumptions for growth were “plausible,” but also implied they were a long
shot. Scott Gibson, a venture capitalist and member of the OHSU board,
told him OHSU was making reasonable assumptions.
“As head of finance and audit committees,” he said, “I would never let
OHSU get out over its skis.”104
But OHSU’s expansion, Sickinger explained, depended on it regularly
turning a 6 percent margin, or profit, on its hospitals and clinics, a historically
high rate that it rarely achieved. OHSU was counting on the hospital, with its
new patient care wing, to increase profits as it made payments on $600 million
in debt. At the same time the state was cutting subsidies for charity care and
federal deficits were pressuring Medicare to reduce reimbursements.105
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The university was also assuming it would see significant increases in
NIH research grants at a time when the NIH funding was not growing and
increasingly difficult to win. One researcher, who left the university to
chair neurobiology at the University of Pittsburgh, said OHSU’s chronic
budget problems and its focus on new buildings rather than existing pro-
grams were sapping the institution’s vitality and faculty’s morale. On the
other hand, the university had attracted some high-profile researchers
such as a team of anesthesiologists from Johns Hopkins, a new chair of
biomedical engineering from Emory University, and a chair of orthope-
dics from Case Western Reserve University.
Federal money that Senator Hatfield once steered to OHSU at the rate
of about $9 million a year had dropped to $1.5 million since he left the
Senate in 1997. The university also was relying on its OHSU Foundation
to gain momentum and build its endowment so it could support OHSU’s
new buildings. But much of the money the foundation was raising was
targeted for specific projects, programs, and academic support that did not
fit the university’s expansion goals, leaving it short of the money it needed
to equip new buildings.106
In short, Sickinger wrote, “the bean counters at OHSU are squeezing
the budget in search of savings. That has meant cutting staff, freezing de-
partmental cash reserves, raising tuition and undertaking a host of new
measures to profitably manage hospital operations.” 107
OHSU THRIVES
For all the concerns with money, the tram, and politics, the OHSU aca-
demic health center bloomed during Kohler’s final year and everything
seemed to fall into place much as he had envisioned.
The university raised $378 million from more than 78,000 donors to
surpass its goal for matching the legislature’s $200 million in bonds for
Oregon Opportunity projects. And as a public corporation, it also raised
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$250 million in its own revenue bonds. So with bonds and a portion of
its donations, the university amassed $513 million for its various Oregon
Opportunity projects, which included constructing two buildings, luring
teams of top researchers, and $44 million to buy land on the South Wa-
terfront.108 The university had also found fortune in buying steel at a good
price for its buildings before prices shot up when the tram construction
got underway.
The $145 million, 274,000-square-foot Biomedical Research Building
was completed in February of 2006. The eleven-level building included
four basement floors, one for a new advanced imaging research center,
and seven more floors above ground, six devoted to research laboratories.
A crane dropped four huge magnets, each weighing from 15 to 30 tons,
onto one basement floor to create one of the most powerful Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) machines in the world. The OHSU Advanced
Imaging Research Center would use the MRI system to create images of
tissues beneath the skin for experimental studies on both people and mice
and rats. The NIH in Maryland was the only other place on Earth with an
MRI machine as strong as that at OHSU.109
The biomedical building rose on the west side of campus, attached
to the Medical Research Building behind the medical school’s Mackenzie
Hall, blocking Kohler’s view of Portland and Mount St. Helens from his
office in Baird Hall. The building also connects with the Multnomah
Pavilion, the former county hospital. It was renamed in 2015 after Hilde-
gard Lamfrom, an influential molecular biologist who guided Brian
Druker early in his career and broke ground in the field of protein synthe-
sis before her death from cancer in 1984. Hallick, the provost, later said
the research building added value to the neighboring research and clinical
buildings.
“We connected the whole hill into integrated research,” Hallick said.
“We connected with the old research labs, and we connected with the
clinical investigations.”110
Druker moved in on the fifth floor next to cell biologist John
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Scott, and they created a new Center for Cancer Cell Signaling. Both stud-
ied kinases—enzymes that change proteins to do work in cells—and some-
times worked together and shared lab space.111 The new labs also helped
OHSU hold onto Dr. Markus Grompe, genetic researcher and professor in
the departments of Pediatrics and Molecular and Medical Genetics, who
was being recruited by Stanford University, said Dorsa, the vice president
for research.
“Stanford was recruiting him because they have a leadership in the
stem cell area,” Dorsa said. “So one of the things we needed to do with
Oregon Opportunity and the space created by it was to give Marcus an op-
portunity for leadership. So we created the Oregon Stem Cell Center and
placed him [in charge of it] in the new building.”112
On other floors of the research building a scientific staff of more than
350 conducted medical research. Pediatric researchers probed the genetic
and molecular causes of childhood diseases, including pediatric cancer and
congenital heart disorders, while others scientists studied the viral and en-
vironmental causes of asthma, inflammatory eye diseases, and treatments
for neurodegenerative diseases such as multiple sclerosis.
The US Green Building Council awarded the research building LEED
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) silver certification for
a design that is a third more energy efficient than Oregon’s code requires.
The design features included smart storm water management, erosion
control, water efficiency, recycled and local materials, and extensive use of
day lighting.
“The design of this building will take this campus to the forefront of
biomedical technology,” said Dorsa.113
Indeed, the building became a magnet for scientific talent. Because the
building could offer a custom cardiovascular imaging laboratory, it was
able to lure Dr. Sanjiv Kaul and his entire research team from the Uni-
versity of Virginia, even before it was complete. Kaul’s team was studying
ways to use imaging technology to diagnose causes of chest pain and to
deliver medicines to specific body sites with pinpoint accuracy.114 Charles
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Springer came to OHSU from Brookhaven National Laboratory to es-
tablish the Advanced Imaging Research Center. The university’s Jungers
Center for Neurosciences Research established an Advanced Light Mi-
croscopy Core Resource in the Biomedical Research Building, which at-
tracted Gary Banker and Fred Robinson, two world-famous neuroscien-
tists, to the OHSU faculty. Stefanie Kaech Petrie, a leader in neuroimag-
ing, also came to direct the new Advanced Light Microscopy Core.115
In June of 2006, the university completed the construction of the
twelve-story patient care wing sweeping north from the hospital and in-
cluding a docking station for the tram on its ninth floor. The $216 million
patient care facility gave OHSU 335,000 square feet of new hospital and
clinical space and a 450-car garage. The gracefully curving, 100-yard-long
wing connected to OHSU Hospital at each floor level. It included room
for twelve operating rooms and 120 hospital beds, including sixty beds for
surgery patients and twenty-four for patients in intensive care. It also in-
cluded clinics for oncology, cardiac, and neurology services and for the
Center for Women’s Health.116
At its meeting three months earlier, the OHSU board gave the build-
ing a name: the Peter O. Kohler Pavilion. The president was caught off
guard. The university had not named a building after a living employee
since the 1940s, when buildings were dedicated to two nurses, Emma
Jones and Katherine Sears. The only other living person to receive that
honor from the board was Senator Hatfield, who was on the board when
it named the pavilion for Kohler.117
“It was a total surprise to me and very humbling,” Kohler said. “I was
hoping we could find a donor we could name the building for. I showed
it to [Nike cofounder] Phil Knight [while it was being built] to try to get
him interested in it.”118
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AUDITING OREGON OPPORTUNITY
In January of 2010, Oregon Secretary of State Kate Brown released an au-
dit on how well OHSU had spent its money on its Oregon Opportunity
projects. “We found that OHSU met or exceeded its specific goals and
measurable targets,” wrote state auditor Gary Blackmer.119
The report noted OHSU not only had built the Biomedical Research
Building, but also expanded research space on its West Campus and cre-
ated the Oregon Rural Practice-based Research Network, which included
157 physicians in thirty-seven rural communities and a rural high-speed
electronic communications network. In addition, the university raised
$378 million from private donors, recruited ninety-four scientific inves-
tigators, added 175 research staff, and, by 2009, received $217 million in
research grants through the investigators it had recruited, more than the
money it had spent.120
While the glowing report confirmed the Oregon Opportunity in-
vestment had produced huge benefits for OHSU and the state, Oregonian
reporter Ted Sickinger noted that Kohler had failed to deliver on produc-
ing a $1 billion biotech industry.
“The biotech industry, the private-sector jobs and the industry activ-
ity on South Waterfront have not materialized in a meaningful ways,” he
said.121
But as Kohler prepared to retire in 2006, plenty was happening on
the South Waterfront. Both the Biomedical Research Building and the
Peter O. Kohler Pavilion were being completed. So also were the
tram—designed by the Los Angeles office of Zurich-based Angélil/Gra-
ham/Pfenninger/Scholl Architecture—and the Center for Health & Heal-
ing on the waterfront. Most residents in Portland saw the overlapping
projects as all part of one big surge in growth at OHSU.
The sixteen-story Center for Health & Healing gave the university an-
other 400,000 square feet of space for surgery, research, clinics, classrooms
and a fitness center with pools, spas, weight rooms, and lab facilities. The
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building rose next to the tram docking station so that people descending
on the tram cars could look through the center’s giant picture windows to
see into its fitness area with basketball and volleyball courts. The university
paid for 25 percent of the $145 million building, while the OHSU Medical
Group, the physicians group, financed the remaining 75 percent. The uni-
versity started moving 937 staff members into the building on October 23,
2006, but the building was not declared officially open until December 3.
Gragg, the architecture critic, described the building as reaching a
“high middle ground between dull and bracing.”122 But he noted some of
its exceptional environmental features such as sun shades on the south
face with integrated photovoltaic panels, and a solar collector on the roof
to heat the building’s air and water. Microturbines in the building use its
recycled heat and a little natural gas to generate electricity.123 The build-
ing, which won LEED platinum rating, also had toilets that flush with
rainwater and staircases ventilated with outdoor air, making it among the
most environmentally friendly buildings in the nation.124
This new front door for OHSU would become “one of the most im-
portant buildings OHSU has ever built,” said Stadum. “It will really be a
place where all of our missions will come together in one space.”125
The building also would enable OHSU to hold on to one of its prized
researchers, Shoukhrat Mitalipov, a Russian immigrant who developed a
new process for creating human stem cells from skin cells. He and other re-
searchers are exploring ways to use stem cells to treat various degenerative
diseases. Cincinnati Children’s Hospital saw Mitalipov as a rising star and
was trying to recruit him, said Dorsa, OHSU’s vice president of research, so
“I had to retain him.” Dorsa made him the director of OHSU’s new Center
for Embryonic Cell and Gene Therapy in the Center for Health & Healing.126
At the new building, the first silver, bullet-shaped pod was attached to
the tram cables on November 9, and the tram was unveiled and began car-
rying passengers on December 9. Almost immediately, all the political and
financial turmoil over the tram evaporated as Portlanders marveled over
the two pods gliding quietly from one gleaming new building to another.
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Two weeks earlier, a streetcar started rolling into a station on the South
Waterfront, creating another connection between downtown Portland,
the South Waterfront, and the tram station. Mary Pitman Kitch, an edi-
torial writer for The Oregonian, took a ride on the tram one rainy day and
declared it a success. The tram’s cars “dematerialize” against the gray sky
exactly as the designers had intended, she wrote. After all the political bat-
tles and cost overruns, Portland ended up with an efficient way to move
people that “collapses distances,” Kitch wrote. “Using the tram will melt
misgivings and turn many Portlanders’ opinions inside out, like their um-
brellas. For all its complications, the tram will soon be known for its
functional simplicity and true trademark—speed.”127
OHSU workers loved the tram. An OHSU shuttle bus trip to the wa-
terfront would take twenty minutes or more each way. The tram took
three minutes, almost like an elevator. Like many people who expressed
opinions on the project, Ian Schnadig, a fellow of hematology and on-
cology, said the tram was well worth the cost and expense.128 In January
of 2007, the twin tram pods were named Walt and Jean after Walt
Reynolds, then eighty-six and the first African-American to graduate
from the OHSU medical school, and Jean Richardson, eighty, the first
woman to graduate with a civil engineering degree in Oregon. The pair
met for a ride on the tram.
“I must say,” said Richardson, as she entered the aerial car and looked
at the city below, “I don’t care for heights.”129
Ten years later, residents of the Corbett-Terwilliger-Lair Hill neigh-
borhoods, all part of what has been named the South Portland Neighbor-
hood Association, have come to accept the tram, said Ken Love, president
of the association. “It is just part of the landscape now,” he said.130
Jim Gardner, seventy, who lives near Gibbs Street, which runs directly
under the tram, said there are “very few hard feelings about it, and it has
benefited us in indirect ways.” The pedestrian bridge over the freeway, built
in conjunction with the tram project, gives residents living under the tram
access to the South Waterfront and its restaurants and parks. Property val-
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ues did not drop as feared in the neighborhoods, said Gardner, but rather
climbed as the housing became prized by people working at OHSU with its
close, convenient access to the tram. In an unusual agreement, the City of
Portland had offered to buy houses at market rates from residents who did
not want to live with the tram, he said, but no one took the city up on the of-
fer. Windows on the tram pods are painted along the bottom so riders can’t
look directly down into residents’ homes as they silently glide over. What
residents notice, he said, is not the pod, but the shadow it casts.131
KOHLER MOVES ON
By the time the tram was sailing, Kohler had retired. On his final day of
work, September 14, 2006, Kohler literally passed the torch, the flickering
flames of a backyard tiki torch, to his successor, Dr. Joseph Robertson Jr.,
an ophthalmologist stepping up from dean of the OHSU School of Med-
icine. OHSU had adopted the torch flame as its logo, so as Kohler ended
his eighteen-year run with a town hall meeting for university staff in the
OHSU Auditorium, the torch seemed a fitting symbol for the transfer of
leadership.
“Think of this as a great flame,” Kohler said. “The flame has become
our new symbol, the flame of knowledge, so before this goes out, I’d like
to give it to Joe.”132
Robertson, who had worked at OHSU for twenty-six years, was selected
from three finalists to succeed Kohler. The other two were Paul Whelton,
senior vice president for health sciences at Tulane University Health Sci-
ences Center in New Orleans, and Jay Gershen, executive vice chancellor of
health sciences at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center.133
Robertson, a Yale graduate skilled in performing microsurgery on the
retina, grew up in rural Indiana, the only child of a flour miller. Like
Kohler, he had an interest in rural health and was committed to reinforc-
ing the rural health network Kohler had built.134 He said he would set
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out to develop a ten-year plan that would include a variety of partner-
ships with other universities and health care organizations to help it train
more doctors and continue its role in providing a safety net for the unin-
sured. Robertson would face a complex set of challenges. It would be up to
him to manage the university’s physical expansion on the waterfront and
hill, absorb scores of new research scientists and clinicians, compete with
other local providers for insured patients, and adjust to eroding govern-
ment support from the state and a decline in federal research funding and
Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements. Representative Mitch Green-
lick, a Democrat from Portland who previously worked as a professor at
OHSU, said Robertson was the kind of leader who could “make sure the
culture of growth that Peter built is stabilized.”135
Three years later, Davis and Hallick would also leave OHSU. Davis
left in mid-August of 2009 to become chief of staff and vice president for
public affairs for Portland State University. She loved OHSU, she said, but
it had arrived, had reached a state of healthy stability, and it was time for
a new challenge.
If you look back over my career, what I always have been most in-
terested in and excited about is working with organizations when
they’re in the messy phase, at the inflexion point with enormous
potential that they have yet to realize. I like being part of helping
them build from there. . . . I went to OHSU at a time when they were
changing over from [Leonard] Laster to Kohler. Kohler had a very
clear vision of where the institution would go, and I was able to play
a small part. . . . It was a great team, and we were really able to help
move the institution along in realizing its potential. I think Portland
State is at the same kind of inflection point. It’s messy, there’s a ton of
work, we’ve got an enormous amount to do, but it’s that time in an
organization’s life that gives me energy. . . . Now I feel like I’m bat-
tling the same battles all over again. . . .
I know we’ve all said this, but the teamwork at [OHSU] was such
an important piece of it, because we came to understand each
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other and what our strengths and weaknesses were, which allowed
us to be much more agile. You didn’t have to worry about “Does
Janet have it? Or does Jim have it?” You knew they had it. Even at
a certain point, you could anticipate what they were going to say.
Fun ride.136
Hallick left OHSU about five months later to become president of Pa-
cific University, a small, private liberal arts university in Forest Grove,
twenty-seven miles west of Portland. She wasn’t looking to leave, she said,
but was intrigued when approached about leading Pacific.137 When she
interviewed for the job, the former president, Phil Creighton, told her the
place “just weaves its way into your heart,” she said. “I felt that from the
moment I stepped on this historic campus.”138
Of the leadership team that led the battle to make OHSU a public
corporation, only Billups remained. She had returned as general counsel,
overseeing seven in-house and multiple outside lawyers.
KOHLER’S LEGACY
As Kohler departed OHSU, he received broad recognition for all that he
had accomplished, but he also drew some criticism for what the institution
had become. The Oregonian summed up the “knock” on OHSU: “While the
university portrays itself as a sort of Florence Nightingale for the state,
outsiders say it has become too big, too insular, even too arrogant for what
is still, in effect, a public agency.”139
The newspaper’s editorial board also said Kohler’s gains came at some
cost to OHSU’s goodwill. “The bruising battle over the tram between
Marquam hill and the new South Waterfront campus is only the latest and
most prominent of the episodes that have damaged OHSU’s standing in
the community.” The paper went on to cite the examples of the university
taking a hard line in paying for care of a patient whose brain was dam-
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aged during a botched procedure in the hospital, warning it might close
the Poison Center for lack of state funding, and threatening to expand on
its West Campus.140
OHSU had its faults, Kohler said, but his administration made earnest
efforts to address them and was never “arrogant.” What’s more, the prob-
lems cited by the Oregonian proved to be fleeting issues, eclipsed by
OHSU’s dramatic transformation. Under Kohler’s watch, OHSU doubled
its building space to more than 6 million square feet, grew its research
awards seven-fold to $294 million, and doubled its employees from 5,800
to 12,000.141 At the same time, its state funding had dropped to $42 mil-
lion or about 3.5 percent of its operating budget. An independent rating
system ranked its hospital among the fifty best in the nation out of 1,263
hospitals that participated in the 2006 survey.142 When Kohler departed,
the university had become a nationally recognized center of research and
teaching with a $1.2 billion annual budget, the largest employer in Port-
land and fourth largest in Oregon. 143
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The university was a central player in the South Waterfront Dis-
trict redevelopment project, the largest urban renewal initiative in
Portland’s history. Three years after Kohler left, ECONorthwest, an
economic think tank in Portland, conducted an analysis of OHSU’s eco-
nomic impact on Portland and Oregon. The study concluded that in
2007, the absence of Oregon’s only academic health center would mean
a loss of $2.4 billion a year in net economic output and the loss of
20,748 jobs and $1.1 billion in net personal income. With OHSU and
Doernbecher hospitals and with more than eighty primary and spe-
cialty care clinics in Portland and throughout the state, the university
provided care for patients with the most complex needs in Oregon.
OHSU drew more than 40 percent of its patients from outside the met-
ropolitan area and also remained the primary provider of health care
for low-income households.144
At Kohler’s retirement town hall meeting, Keith Thompson, an Intel
executive and chair of the OHSU board, named Kohler OHSU’s first
emeritus president. Kohler, who had just been honored with a beautiful
building named after him, was given an honorary degree and a retirement
watch: a gentleman’s model by Seiko. But perhaps the most valuable gift
to the retiring president was a lifetime parking pass on Marquam Hill.145
Kohler described to the town hall gathering what he considered his
four major accomplishments: making OHSU more of a statewide insti-
tution with its rural health network, achieving financial stability, raising
OHSU’s profile as a nationally recognized academic health center, and
converting OHSU to a public corporation, which helped make all those
other achievements possible.146
Seven months after retiring, Kohler took a new job as vice chancellor
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, where he led efforts
to establish satellite medical programs in northwest Arkansas. He worked
with local health care providers to establish a campus with rotations for
students in medicine, pharmacy, and other health professions from the
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University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences in Little Rock. Based in
Fayetteville, Arkansas, he leads a major effort to reduce obesity and dia-
betes among a large migrant population from the Marshall Islands.147 He
moved into semi-retirement in the summer of 2016.
Kohler also continues to keep an office at OHSU. He makes regular
visits there, often in connection with meetings as a member of Hallick’s
board of directors at Pacific University in nearby Forest Grove. He was
scheduled to give the commencement address to the medical school grad-
uates in the spring of 2015, but had to cancel because of an eye injury that
prevented him from traveling.
“Do the right thing” and “learn to adapt,” he was prepared to tell grad-
uates, according to his draft speech. “As long as you are firmly grounded
and adhere to your principles, you can survive all sorts of systems change.”
Kohler left OHSU having accomplished nearly all twelve of the goals
he outlined to the board before he was hired. He had streamlined admin-
istration, upgraded OHSU Hospital and replaced Doernbecher Hospital,
expanded research, strengthened instruction with a curriculum overhaul,
created the Area Health Education Centers, established a focus on gene
therapy research, developed new revenue sources, improved parking, and
expanded facilities. He was not able to win gains in state support, and
though he did increase the university’s share of minority faculty and stu-
dents, he did not make as much headway on that goal as he had hoped.
And what about that driving, overarching quest to lift OHSU’s research
capacity into the ranks of the top twenty academic health centers in the nation?
Hallick, with her penchant for numbers, had predicted that the university
would hit that benchmark when it reached $300 million a year in research
grants, a little more than half of which come from the NIH. In 2006, as Kohler
prepared to depart, OHSU had crept up to the edge of that mark with
$294 million in research grants. And that was close enough. The NIH 2006
rankings for medical schools and their departments put OHSU at twentieth.148
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Chapter Eight
OHSU Inc.
In the months following Kohler’s departure, OHSU continued to expand
with the momentum of a freight train. The medical center had successfully
built a positive cycle of growth so that as it added space, it attracted more
donors, researchers, and patients, who in turn gave it revenue to expand
more and draw even more donors, researchers, and patients. The vision
Kohler and his team had worked for continued to unfold like a flowering
rose on the South Waterfront, beginning with the opening of the Cen-
ter for Health & Healing and the tram that gracefully ferried people up
to the Pill Hill campus through docks in the new Peter O. Kohler Pavil-
ion. An anonymous donor gave the university $40 million, its largest gift
ever, to help it expand its innovative medical school in a new building
on the nineteen acres of the South Waterfront donated to the university
earlier by the Schnitzer family. The 2007 Legislature gave OHSU one of
its first increases for operations in years, a 3.1 percent raise. The hospi-
tal was generating net income of $19 million on revenues of $756 million.
OHSU scientists delivered a breakthrough when they took DNA from Se-
mos, an adult rhesus monkey at the primate center, inserted it into an egg,
and used it to make a line of embryonic stem cells. Time magazine put that
achievement on its list of the top ten scientific discoveries for 2007.1
The new president, Dr. Joseph Robertson, was keeping OHSU on the
course Kohler had charted, and the university seemed to be thriving.2 But
Robertson also saw developments piling up on the road ahead that threatened
to slow the medical center’s momentum. Congress was proposing to reduce
federal payments to medical schools, a pending lawsuit could mean an in-
crease in malpractice insurance premiums, and the medical school was seeing
its annual financial losses climb. After a long string of annual increases in
grant funding, the NIH budget was flat.3 And with all of its construction,
OHSU saw its debt up more than 300 percent since 1995 to about $750 mil-
lion, which was draining cash reserves and jeopardizing its credit rating.
Robertson knew that while the university was thriving for the moment, its
prosperity was precarious. The university had to be financially vigilant.
“It’s no longer sufficient to say a program is exciting,” Robertson said.
“It has to have a sound business plan from the start that doesn’t create a
liability that has to be borne by other programs. . . . There’s no room for
anything but a lean and mean operation.”4
ECONOMIC SETBACKS
By fall of 2007, the university was seeing losses in laboratory research and
the medical school projected to reach $50 million. Another blow came in
December. Though a public corporation, the medical center was still affil-
iated with the state and, as other state agencies, was protected by a liability
cap of $200,000. But the Oregon Supreme Court ruled the cap violated the
constitutional rights of Jordaan Michael Clarke, a nine-year-old who suf-
fered permanent brain damage in 1998 while in intensive care at OHSU
Hospital.5 In addition to driving up the potential payouts on malpractice
and other damage claims, the ruling also drove up OHSU’s cost of mal-
practice insurance by millions.
Robertson began cutting costs. The university sold a parcel of land on
the South Waterfront to a retirement home developer, and it sold the campus
of the former Oregon Graduate Institute to an investment group. It also sold
another parcel on its West Campus. Those sales gave it a one-time wind-
fall of about $30 million.6 OHSU also closed some community primary care
clinics, raised tuition by 20 percent, and laid off 300 employees, containing
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losses for the 2007–08 fiscal year to about $10 million. Plans for a $350 mil-
lion expansion of the Kohler pavilion were put on hold. Despite the losses,
Robertson paid performance bonuses totaling about $1.4 million to about
fifty administrators, drawing critical attention from the press.
Then banks began to fail, the stock market plunged, and the country
fell into the Great Recession. OHSU saw investments drop by $23 million,
its endowment by $100 million. Hospital profits plunged.7 Robertson
scrapped bonuses, ordered more layoffs, froze hiring, restricted overtime,
canceled holiday parties, cut the medical school class size by five students
to 115, reorganized to reduce administrative costs, cut rural clinics, cut
custodial contracts by 40 percent, and vacated space it leased in the VA
Hospital. In all, he had cut about 500 jobs as the economy tanked in late
2008 and early 2009, mostly from central services such as information
technology, human resources, and public safety.8
OHSU, of course, wasn’t alone. Faced with more indigent patients,
fewer paying patients, losses on investments, and tight credit, hospitals
across the country, including those connected to academic health centers,
cut staff and other costs. In 2008, hospitals recorded the highest level of
mass layoffs—defined as cuts of fifty or more people under a single em-
ployer—in a decade, with about half of hospitals reporting layoffs.9
During the first two years of the Great Recession, Robertson, the oph-
thalmologist, had become a fiscal surgeon, wrote Oregonian reporter Ted
Sickinger.10 In February of 2009, he brought back Jim Walker as interim chief
financial officer after Walker’s successor resigned. The administrators were
able to refinance $238 million in debt, reducing interest costs. A variety of
other developments helped them shore up OHSU’s wobbly financial status.
The legislature approved a new tort cap of $2 million, reducing the univer-
sity’s annual malpractice insurance premium by $12.5 million. Lawmakers
also approved $50 million in bonds to help OHSU build a life sciences center,
where it could expand its medical school on its South Waterfront property
in collaboration with other institutions in the Oregon University System.
About $12 million of the federal stimulus issued in the recession to curb the
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nation’s economic crisis flowed to OHSU.11 And it didn’t hurt that the Phil
and Penny Knight Foundation created by the Nike founder pledged in the fall
of 2008 to give the university $100 million over seven years for the cancer in-
stitute, which would help offset the leveling of NIH funding.
By July of 2010, Robertson was still taking measures to cut
costs—such as reducing visits by the Office of Rural Health to rural clinics
and cutting nursing support to the Child Development and Rehabilitation
Center. But there were signs OHSU had survived the Great Recession and
was on the upswing. OHSU Hospital and its clinics were earning more
money and raising OHSU’s net income.
“We have weathered the economic downturn and global recession re-
markably well—better than we might have expected 18 months ago—but
that has not been without incredible sacrifice and hard work,” Robertson
said in the summer of 2010.12
In retrospect, this rough patch would prove to be little more than a “hic-
cup” in the history of OHSU’s financial health, said Robertson. Soon, the
health center fell back into that virtuous cycle. It built space for more hos-
pital beds and added clinics and research laboratories, enabling it to earn
more money and attract more top researchers, who in turn brought more
research money, giving the university resources for further expansion. The
layoffs, handled mostly through attrition, lasted little more than a year. It
was a “painful” time of “great strain,” said Robertson, but it was brief.
“If you compare the activity level, growth, any financial parameter of
OHSU compared to any other major business enterprise in Oregon during
that time,” he said, “we sailed through the recession in comparison. It was
just a very, very mild inflection point in the growth curve. It wasn’t the
Great Recession for us. It was a blip.”13
But the recession brought new discipline to OHSU, pushing it to look
for ways to be even more entrepreneurial. Rather than buying more land and
constructing new businesses alone, Robertson adopted a strategy used often
by Kohler and looked for partners who could help share the cost and increase
the value of OHSU investments. He and Portland State University President
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Wim Wiewel in October of 2010 announced they had struck a strategic al-
liance. They pledged to conduct joint research, share faculty, and create a
collaborative School of Public Health. Some legislators, including Represen-
tative Mitch Greenlick (Democrat from Portland), former OHSU professor,
had long advocated merging the two institutions. Greenlick argued that was
the only way the state could create a major, top-ranked research university
in Portland like the University of Washington in Seattle. But Robertson and
Wiewel said a merger would be expensive and counterproductive. A close
partnership, Robertson said, achieves many of the same benefits “at a fraction
of the costs in a fraction of the time.”14
OHSU BLOOMS
As the health center forged partnerships, it also saw steady growth in
philanthropic support that in some cases enabled it to draw more support
from the state. In September of 2011, Bob and Charlee Moore, who had
amassed a fortune milling stone-ground grains near Oregon City for Bob’s
Red Mill Natural Foods, donated $25 million to OHSU.
“These people are helping so many others,” said Bob Moore, whose
donation established the Bob and Charlee Moore Institute for Nutrition
and Wellness at OHSU.15
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A year later, Nike cofounder Phil Knight and his wife, Penny, stepped
up again with another record donation to OHSU—$125 million to estab-
lish the OHSU Cardiovascular Institute. Two years later, Knight stunned
OHSU leaders and guests gathered in a downtown Portland ballroom of
the Nines Hotel to celebrate and raise money for the university’s Knight
Cancer Institute. Knight promised to give $500 million to the institute if
the university could come up with a match within two years. Dr. Druker,
the institute’s director, had already been recruiting some top cancer re-
searchers to OHSU. Another billion would enable him to expand that
brain trust dramatically.
“There’s no reason that we can’t, and won’t, become the premier can-
cer institute in this country,” he said.16
OHSU not only raised the $500 million, which included $200 million
in bonds from the legislature, it did so in less than two years, drawing
from 10,000 donors. Remarkably, 75 percent of the money came from
donors in Oregon, which is not a wealthy state. The state bond money will
be used to construct two buildings on the South Waterfront with one mil-
lion square feet of research and clinical trial space for the cancer institute.
The institute also plans to raise another $200 million. Phil Knight and
Druker appeared on ABC’s Good Morning America in late June of 2015 to
announce they had met the $1 billion goal. Druker said the institute would
be focusing first on detecting cancer at its earliest stages.
“We want to go after cancer as aggressively as it comes after us,” he said.17
Druker set out to recruit 300 more research scientists, including
twenty-five considered to be among the world’s top. “I can take a congrat-
ulatory lap, but then I have to go back and start a marathon,” he said.
Phil Knight said he had confidence Druker’s team would put a stop to
a disease that touches all people.
“These last 22 months have shown what is possible when people of
vision focus on a single goal,” he said. “We are more convinced than ever
that cancer will meet its match at OHSU, and we are proud to play a role
in this history in the making.”18
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Some OHSU faculty had misgivings about concentrating this infusion
of $1.2 billion on one institute, just as they did with the Vollum Institute,
arguing it would cause OHSU to stray from basic science and education.
Two anonymous faculty members wrote a letter to legislators, urging
them not to give OHSU $200 million in state-backed bonds because
money was being misused to support executive bonuses.
“There has been a lot of angst around the Knight challenge,” said
Bonnie Nagel, a neuropsychologist and president of the OHSU Faculty
Senate.19
Dr. Lynn Loriaux—an endocrinologist, veteran chair of the Depart-
ment of Medicine, and longtime friend of Kohler’s—expressed concern
about big donations flowing into OHSU specialty centers, such as the
heart and cancer institutes, rather than the medical, dentistry, and nursing
schools. He and others feared, he said, that “what we have lost is a sense of
academic excellence.”20
But Lawrence Furnstahl, OHSU’s executive vice president and chief
financial officer, noted that a big gift like Knight’s has a synergistic effect
on the university that helps everybody by raising the medical center’s
stature and attracting more researchers and donors. “These tremendous
gifts allow us to have core facilities” like advanced imaging and gene se-
quencing equipment, he said.21
SOUTH WATERFRONT TAKES SHAPE
As part of its growth, OHSU’s footprint expanded, and its campus began
to spread over the once barren brownfield that the Schnitzers had donated
to the university. In the fall of 2014, OHSU opened its $160 million Col-
laborative Life Sciences Building, a joint venture with Portland State
University and Oregon State University and a symbol of the kind of part-
nerships Robertson would continue seeking to leverage OHSU’s resources
and talent. The building provides space for biomedical research, for med-
OHSU Inc. 343
ical, nursing, and pharmacy school classrooms, and for the new OSHU/
PSU School of Public Health. Adjoining it is the $135 million Skourtes
Tower for the School of Dentistry, and together, with parking, the build-
ing gives the university partners 650,000 square feet of space.22
They rise next to the new Tilikum Crossing, a gracefully arching,
cable-stayed bridge which opened in September 2015, as the only one of
its kind in the nation. It is designed to carry Portland’s newest light-rail
line across the Willamette River to neighboring Milwaukie along with
buses, streetcars, bicyclists, and pedestrians—but no cars. The Life Sci-
ences Building stands at the hub of nearly every form of transportation
Portland offers except the tram, which glides 800 yards to the south from
OHSU’s Center for Health & Healing.23
A small city of sleek, thin, glass-and-steel apartment and condo-
minium skyscrapers tower on the south flank of the OHSU health center
along with other apartment buildings, shops, and restaurants, all served
by the Portland Streetcar. The thin towers allow Portlanders to see Mount
Hood and the Cascade Mountains between slices of buildings on the
South Waterfront.24 The development includes The Ardea, a thirty-story
apartment building; the twin Meriwether Condominiums, double towers
reaching twenty-one and twenty-four stories high; the John Ross Condo-
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miniums, a 325-foot-tall tower with a community garden on its roof; At-
water Place, a twenty-two-story tower for 212 condos; and the Mirabella
Retirement Community, a thirty-story building for a continuing care
retirement community that features apartments for independent living,
assisted care, and rooms for skilled nursing and memory care support. The
South Waterfront development also includes Caruthers Park, urban gar-
dens, and open lawns amid the skyscrapers and an 800-foot greenway on
the banks of the Willamette River that eventually will stretch along the
entire border of the development district into downtown Portland.25
Other projects are still in the works. The Zidell family, which still
owns its barge-building business on the South Waterfront, struck a deal
with the City of Portland in June of 2015 to redevelop another thirty acres
nearby into 1.4 million square feet of new office, residential, and commer-
cial space. The development will include at least two office buildings and
an apartment building. The city agreed to contribute $24 million of pub-
lic money for parks, roads, and other improvements, and the Zidell family
committed to including affordable housing in the ten-year project. And,
of course, OHSU also has plans to put two new buildings for the OHSU
Knight Cancer Institute on the South Waterfront.26
Since it became a public corporation in 1995, OHSU has added
3.8 million square feet of building space, doubling its total to 7.6 million
square feet. That has allowed it to hire more people and increase enroll-
ments in its medical, dental, and nursing schools and graduate programs.
Since becoming a public corporation, its number of employees more than
doubled from 6,600 to 15,100, and its student enrollment climbed from
1,795 to 2,895. It employs about 1,100 principal investigators, each leading
a team of scientists. The university operated on an annual budget of
$2.5 billion in 2016, five times what it was when it became a public cor-
poration. While the US Gross Domestic Product grew since 1995 at an
average 4 percent a year and health care spending climbed at 6 percent
a year, OHSU grew at the rate of 9.5 percent per year.27 It pulled in
$376 million in research awards in 2015, more than four times what it was
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drawing in 1995, and it currently ranks twenty-seventh among academic
health centers in NIH research funds. President Robertson described the
university’s financial health:
If you look at any of our programs, you will see tremendous
growth by any of the conventional numbers. Our financial heft,
status and performance has continued to improve. Our balance
sheet has expanded at double-digit rates, and over the last four or
five years, we’ve gone from a triple B-plus bond rating to double-
A minus. We have launched major new initiatives with partners
in each of the mission areas. . . . Last year [2014–15], we trained
the most students ever, we had the most house staff ever, we did
the most research ever, we had another big increase in clinical ac-
tivity, we had had our best financial performance ever, and I think
we have greater presence out in the community than ever.28
A NATIONAL PLAYER
OHSU has found its place on the national stage in neuroscience, infectious
disease, immunology, cancer, and stem cell research, and it is gaining
strength in cardiovascular disease and stroke, diabetes, metabolism research,
imaging, and aging. Its medical school is nationally recognized for its
patient-centered curriculum and emphasis on rural rotations. The Annals of
Internal Medicine in 2010 ranked OHSU eleventh in the country among the
nation’s medical and osteopathic schools for meeting its social mission to
the state as measured by the percent of graduates who practice primary care,
work in underserved areas, and who are minorities. The university med-
ical school’s primary care and family and rural medicine consistently rank
high as do OHSU’s biological sciences, clinical medicine, nurse midwifery,
and physician assistant programs. For example, US News and World Report
magazine in 2016 rated OHSU’s medical school fifth in the nation in primary
care among the nation’s 130 accredited medical schools and twenty-six ac-
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credited osteopathic schools.29 Times Higher Education in 2016 ranked OHSU
the seventh best small university in the world.30 OHSU Hospital also has dis-
tinguished itself in focusing on patients with the most complex and severe
medical needs. The OHSU case mix index, a measure of the degree and com-
plexity of illness among its patients, ranks among the nation’s highest.
“We are in the top ten of the group of the 130 some hospitals that re-
ceive the sickest patients,” said Robertson. “So with regard to complexity
of care, we are elite in the elite.”31
OHSU is among the top 10 percent of academic health centers in
research funding as a percent of overall funding and in the bottom 10 per-
cent for state funding. In the 2015–16 academic year, OHSU received
about $36 million from the state, which covered less than 2 percent of its
operating budget and is far less than the $53 million it received in 1995.
Because of its small endowment and low state funding, OHSU has had to
be disciplined, entrepreneurial, and innovative, said Robertson.
“We are larger but leaner,” he said. “We are more nimble and responsive
to the marketplace trends and community needs. Being in charge of your own
destiny creates a sense of urgency that has been a big part of our success.”32
MORE PARTNERS
One factor in OHSU’s new responsiveness is its interest in fostering part-
nerships with other organizations. In the fall of 2015, it joined Salem Health,
which includes Salem hospital, to form a $2.5 billion-a-year integrated
health system throughout the northern part of the Willamette Valley, where
most of Oregon’s residents are concentrated. It also signed a similar agree-
ment to bring Tuality Health Alliance in suburban Portland into the net-
work. Robertson outlined the health center’s statewide ambitions:
We are in the process of forming what I believe will ultimately be
a statewide health care system that will be integrally linked with
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key payers as well. A flow of patients, particularly complex pa-
tients, is essential to maintain an academic health center. We can’t
assume in today’s era that patients will automatically arrive on our
doorstep. We have to set up a system that ensures those patients
will continue to have access to OHSU. . . . We see patients cur-
rently being hospitalized at OHSU that could be treated at their
local hospitals, particularly with OHSU backup. . . . We are at ca-
pacity. Most community hospitals are not. It’s really about sharing
responsibility.33
OHSU has also formed partnerships with Intel to help it with
computer-based cancer research, and even has Intel workers and staff
from FEI, an electron microscope company, working part-time at the uni-
versity. Having become a public corporation with little operating support
from the state has both forced and allowed OHSU to be more entrepre-
neurial, Robertson said. The university also would have had difficulty
striking agreements with other private organizations if it were still part
of the state system. Being a public corporation has enabled OHSU to go
to the bond market, chart its own course with its own board, and create
its own infrastructure for contracts, purchasing, payroll, and legal and hu-
man services. That has made it more sophisticated than other academic
health centers in the ways it allocates costs and rewards its staff on the ba-
sis of productivity, said Robertson. OHSU also has been able to draw more
philanthropic support as a public corporation. The university would not
have the stature to draw Knight’s $500 million gift or to raise the money
to match it if it had not grown as a public corporation.
“We needed the public corporation to get to the point that we would
be credible having a $500 million campaign for cancer,” Robertson said.34
The university’s success as a public corporation, ironically, also has en-
abled it to draw more money from the state than it ever received as a state
agency, but for projects rather than operations, such as the $200 million in
bonds for Oregon Opportunity, $200 million for the Knight Challenge and
more than $100 million for the Life Sciences Building on the waterfront.
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“We have a very deep, rich, and strategic relationship with the state,”
Robertson said. “It is also a mutually opportunistic relationship. When there
is something we can do together, where OHSU can leverage that action, the
state has demonstrated it is willing to step forth and work with us.”35
Though the university still doesn’t draw much state money for daily
operations, with the notable exception being stable Medicaid funding,
lawmakers are more willing to give it one-time boosts for projects that
help it build capacity, sustain its missions, and lift the local economy—a
seismic shift from the days when legislators were proposing to close the
university’s hospital.
TRUE TRANSFORMATION
The shift in lawmakers’ views of OHSU is indicative of the transformative
nature of the change that took place during its rebirth as a public cor-
poration. Unlike the incremental change experienced at some institutions,
OHSU’s conversion was truly a transformation, “a clear break with the orga-
nizational structure and functioning of the past,” observes Barbara Archer.36
OHSU went through a culture shift after becoming a public corpo-
ration, Robertson said, that firmly took root over seven years, making it
more nimble and entrepreneurial, which in turn has enabled it to sus-
tain enormous growth with more comprehensive services. Certainly, it
changed. But was it transformed?
Archer began exploring that question one sunny morning on May 24,
1995, when she was headed for work in Hood River, cruising in her car
down Interstate 84 through the scenic Columbia River Gorge. As she
drove, news came on her car radio that Governor Kitzhaber had just
signed a bill allowing OHSU to leave the Oregon University System to be-
come a public corporation. She was stunned.
“I nearly drove off the road,” she said. “How did they do that without
a huge public uproar? It just blew my mind.”37
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At the time, Archer was working as chief executive officer for a
federally-qualified health clinic in Hood River and working on her doc-
torate degree in public administration from the University of Southern
California.
“I have to figure out how this happened,” she told herself.38
It wasn’t long before she was studying OHSU’s conversion to a public
corporation as the topic of her doctoral dissertation. Archer made the case
that OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation was not just an incre-
mental change, but a true transformation. Every one of her professors
challenged her thesis.
“They said, ‘Public organizations don’t transform. They can change.
They can change rapidly. But they don’t transform.’”39
Archer postulated that four forces are necessary for transformational
change in an organization: the organization must have supportive policies,
face economic pressures pushing it to change, be steered by an entrepreneurial
leader, and establish a clean break from its principal overseer, which in
OHSU’s case was the state and system of higher education. Based on inter-
views with OHSU administrators and staff, Archer determined all of these
forces aligned in sufficient force at OHSU to foment transformational change.
There was a general belief that the combination of a good policy
idea at the right time, tightening economic times at the state level
and in the health care marketplace, and the ability of OHSU to
gracefully leave the Oregon State System of Higher Education
were critical to the success of the conversion process. These el-
ements, combined with the internal and external entrepreneurial
activities that created the vision and negotiated the agreements as-
sociated with the conversion process, resulted in the success of the
initiative. It must be also said that respondents believed that luck
also played a part in the process.40
Archer believes that “need, opportunity and action” converged in
sufficient strength at OHSU to “foster organizational transformation.”
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OHSU’s structure and functions, such as personnel, finance, and pro-
curement changed dramatically in a short time, she writes. State funding
dropped. The university’s culture shifted in the face of immediate market-
place competition and the need for capital financing. OHSU’s mission to
serve the indigent remained intact, but the way it carried out that mis-
sion changed. President Kohler and his administrative team were able to
promote the change within and without the university. And all of this oc-
curred in a political climate receptive to innovative change.
“It was a time,” she concludes, “when a series of decision and action
streams converged at the right moment with sufficient strength to create a
climate that fostered and propelled a transformational change in OHSU.”41
TRANSFORMING STRUCTURE, PRESERVING MISSION
Kohler and his team and all of the people interviewed for this book
agree that this radical, relatively sudden transformation was key in making
OHSU a superior institution, lifting it from mediocre status to the upper
tier of the nation’s academic health centers. But not everyone agrees that
this change was all for the best. Michael Warren Redding’s doctoral re-
search compared OHSU’s transformation to changes at the University of
Virginia and the College of William & Mary in Virginia, which each got
more autonomy from the state in exchange for agreeing to meet cer-
tain performance outcomes. Neither, though, made a clean break from
the university system as OHSU did. Redding concluded that after their
changes, the Virginia public universities have been better able to remain
true to their public missions than has OHSU. The Virginia schools were
given more autonomy, he said, but they also were required to comply with
ongoing requirements to meet state public higher education goals.42
OHSU’s more transformative shift away from state oversight, on the
other hand, resulted in greater freedom to “operate unencumbered in the
health care marketplace” with far fewer state accountability requirements
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and performance goals. Further, because of declining state support, it was
under pressure to earn money. As a consequence of their differing cir-
cumstances, OHSU was more focused on market pressures and private
funding, and more distracted from its public missions, than were the Vir-
ginian universities, concludes Redding.
“Due to the increased flexibility granted through the public corpora-
tion legislation, there has been a gradual transition regarding the invest-
ment decisions for capital facilities that have changed the focus and the
client base for OHSU in order to improve the institution’s bottom line,”
he writes.43
Redding said OHSU’s shift to a heavier dependence on the market-
place “has strained” the medical university’s capacity to fulfill its historic
public missions—teaching, research, and health care for the indigent.44 He
recommends states follow the path of Virginia and balance autonomy for
their universities with accountability measures to keep them attentive to
their public missions and with sufficient funding so they are not forced to
turn to the market for money. “Findings from the Oregon case,” he notes,
“illustrate the challenge of a market-based autonomy policy framework,
while the Virginia case offers contrasting evidence of the benefits of poli-
cies that balance the demands of the contemporary environment with the
important societal mission of public higher education.”45
Former Governor John Kitzhaber told Redding that OHSU’s focus on
“high profile construction” had “overshadowed” its community mission.46
In a later interview, Kitzhaber said he supports Knight’s “amazing gift”
of $500 million to the cancer institute, but OHSU is “spending money on
things that to me to some extent is about getting recognition.” Eighty
percent of the forces affecting health are socioeconomic factors such as
lifestyle, diet, housing, and income, said Kitzhaber, so OHSU should be
showing some commitment to “population health,” especially since a large
share of its income is from public dollars through Medicare and Medicaid.
He said OHSU should, for example, put up $50 million for public housing
and challenge developers to do the same.47
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“A little would make a huge difference, and it would say so much,”
he said. “I think they [OHSU leaders] have become more obsessed with
becoming recognized as a world class research center, which I’m all sup-
portive of, but they have sort of lost that community connection. I worry
about that.”48
Contrary to Redding and Kitzhaber’s concerns, Kohler and his team
argue that by winning more autonomy as a public corporation, OHSU was
able to not only sustain its public missions, but enhance them. And like
Virginia’s universities, it also maintains some state performance bench-
marks it is expected to reach. OHSU has increased its number of students
and overhauled its medical school curriculum twice. It has continued to
serve more indigent patients than any other Oregon hospital, though
OHSU, like all hospitals, has seen its share of indigent patients drop pre-
cipitously as a result of the Affordable Care Act, pushed through Congress
by President Obama in 2010. The act expands Medicaid and subsidizes
the costs of health insurance premiums for even middle-class families, ex-
tending insurance to about 400,000 more Oregonians and seventeen mil-
lion more people nationwide. As a result, OHSU’s share of indigent pa-
tients dropped to about 1 percent of the roughly quarter million patients
it serves each year.49
“We did not abandon the public mission, and we carried over the ed-
ucational mission, and we didn’t change the mission at all,” Hallick told
Redding. “Unfortunately, I think there is a perception on the part of one
or two people [that its mission has shifted to the bottom line] and that be-
came a kind of clarion calling card kind of thing.”50
Furnstahl, OHSU’s current chief financial officer, worked for more
than two decades with other academic health centers, including those at
the private University of Chicago and Stanford University and the public
University of California at San Francisco. He found a different culture at
OHSU when he arrived in 2011. What he found most striking, he said,
was how committed everyone was to OHSU’s goal to “improve the health
and well-being of Oregonians.” Whether cleaning rooms in the hospi-
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tal or doing research in the labs, people working at the university would
verbally state that goal, he said. In contrast to Kitzhaber’s view that the
university needed to show more concern for population health, Furn-
stahl found the health center put improving the health and well-being
of Oregonians at the center of its work.51 In July of 2016, OHSU is-
sued $100 million in new bond debt, twice what Kitzhaber suggested, for
population health initiatives, such as Propel Health—collaboration among
OHSU, health systems, and insurers to share data and promote improved
health care use across Oregon.52
In addition, OHSU joined four other major Portland hospitals and a
nonprofit health care plan in taking the kind of action Kitzhaber recom-
mended—they pledged in September, 2016 to donate a combined $21.5
million toward the construction of 400 housing units for the city’s home-
less and low-income population.
OHSU President Joe Robertson said he was excited about the example
the group was setting.
“Most of the story is already written by the time these people show up
in our health system,” he said. “So we have to do something and do it in a
manner that is different than what we’ve done before.”53
EFFECTS ON WORKERS
While there has been considerable attention devoted to the public and ex-
ternal impacts of OHSU’s transformation, the internal impact on staff and
faculty is also important to consider. Dana Director, a third-generation
Oregonian who is now vice president of research operations and student
affairs at OHSU, explored the effect of OHSU’s transformation on staff
and faculty for her 2013 doctorate in public affairs and policy.54 She in-
terviewed Kohler and his leadership team, about twenty faculty members,
and about twenty OHSU employees who were members of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), most
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of whom were there during the university’s transformation to a public
corporation.
A large majority of the AFSCME staff solidly favored the transforma-
tion, saying it made them feel more valued, added worth to their work,
and increased their pay and overall job satisfaction. About half said they
felt more pressure. All said the overall impact of the transformation was
for the better.
Faculty members, though, were more divided over whether the over-
all impact made OHSU better, whether their pay increased, and whether
promotion or tenure improved. Most said shared governance had de-
clined, and more than 70 percent, including all former faculty, said they
felt expectations for their productivity had climbed. Ninety percent said
they felt more pressure.55
Director described her findings:
So what I found with AFSCME employees was that really quite
significantly the people I talked to felt [the transformation to a
public corporation] sort of pushed everyone out of their comfort
zones, like they didn’t know definitely what they were supposed
to do, and there wasn’t a lot of job clarity. But overall people felt
it was a really positive move—that the processes got more effi-
cient, they had more freedom to get things done the way they
wanted to get them done rather than the way the state said you
had to do them. So it was pretty clear that the AFSCME popu-
lation felt pretty good about the public corporation, that it really
improved their quality of life. . . .Faculty were more mixed about
things. . . . In general, the feeling is, particularly with the basic sci-
ence faculty [as opposed to the clinical faculty] that when OHSU
became a public corporation, they lost a large part of what is tra-
ditionally known as the academic culture. It became much more
business oriented. . . . They were very close to unanimous on the
fact that, thankfully, they don’t feel their academic freedom was
impinged upon at all, so that is a good thing.56
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Director quotes anonymous staff and faculty members who say they
experienced a significant entrepreneurial shift in operations when OHSU
became a public corporation. “Everything definitely became streamlined
and more efficient,” said an administrative worker in the school of den-
tistry. “Systems all got a lot better and processes all got a lot better,” said a
classified employee. Another staff member said, “We could have our own
systems; I know we could not have done that as part of the state.”
Many faculty members experienced that change too. “When they de-
cided to get serious about research funding, they decided to pursue a more
professional operation,” said one basic science faculty member. Another
basic scientist said, “Initially, yes, there were some old dusty processes that
were eliminated. And people really thought about what they were doing.”
And yet another faculty member said, “at the outset there seemed to be
a feeling of empowerment—everybody go find ways to be more efficient
and think of better ways to do things.”
But not everyone saw big changes. “It seems that the red tape is about
the same length as it always was,” said one staff member. “There are a lot of
people and a lot of steps. And that’s when I want to ask, ‘Are you sure we’re
not [still] a state institution?’” Unknowingly echoing Kohler’s earlier obser-
vations about the primate center, one faculty member said OHSU replaced
one bureaucracy with another by “recreating a new bureaucracy. It has be-
come as big as what we walked away from at the state, and then some.”57
However, all of the staff and more than half the faculty said OHSU’s
conversion to a public corporation made the university a better place.
“It was a great idea,” said one faculty member. “And it was in fact
probably brilliant, and the best thing that happened since they laid the first
brick up here. In fact, I think it was transformational for the institution,
and I doubt we would be in the position we are today without this step.”58
Just three years after OHSU became a public corporation, J. Peter
Bentley, a researcher in the division of experimental biology, describes
himself as an “entrepreneur” and attributes the rise of OHSU’s national
stature to it becoming a public corporation.
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“You don’t have to say Oregon Health Sciences University anymore,”
he said. “Everybody knows OHSU or what it is. . . . If you go to national
conferences, this place is really recognized as a place where very good re-
search is going on.”
The university is “streamlined,” he said, but its growth has also put
more emphasis on bringing in money and high-powered researchers over
good teaching.
“We’re a big, money-making corporation,” he said, “and people can
get lost in it.”59
Other faculty who lived through OHSU’s transformation agree that it
opened new avenues for the university to expand and prosper. Dr. Joseph
Bloom, dean of the medical school from 1994 to 2001, says that OHSU
was unique in that the entire academic health center, not just the hospi-
tal, broke ties with the state, allowing it to keep its research, teaching, and
health care missions integrated. By doing so, it avoided the money con-
flicts that often emerge between researchers and medical schools on one
hand and privatized hospitals on the other.
“As far as I know, there are no other national models like this [public
corporation],” he said. “What happened nationally is most of these places,
facing the same pressures we were facing and wanting to change, spun the
hospital out. . . . Once a hospital starts thinking how important they are,
and they are free, they start acting like it.”60
Grover Bagby, the researcher who helped Kohler build the Oregon
Cancer Center, said the university prospered after it became a public cor-
poration and probably, at least in part, because it did.
“We developed our campus, we developed our visibility, we increased
our levels of National Institutes of Health support,” he said. “I attribute
that all to the public corporation status.”61
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PILL HILL TODAY
When he became OHSU’s second president, Leonard Laster said he found
the academic health center a “dispirited institution” mired in mediocrity,
without self-confidence, and facing an uncertain future. Today, he would
find a different place, where research thrives and the quality of health
care and education routinely earns high marks. The institution brims with
confidence and busy purpose and has become a place where researchers,
medical students, and patients want to be, and in many ways the place he
hoped it would become.
Today in the research labs, geneticist Dr. Markus Grompe and his
research team savor the fruits of a more corporate institution. Grompe di-
rects OHSU’s Oregon Stem Cell Center and the Pape Family Pediatric Re-
search Institute and works in one of the finest laboratories in the world on
the seventh floor of the Hildegard Lamfrom Biomedical Research Build-
ing. On one spring day in 2014, Grompe gives a quick tour of his busy lab-
oratory, where researchers and graduate students work at long, spacious
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black tables. Stretching above the work benches are shelves crammed with
boxes, bottles, petri dishes, test tubes, pipettes, jars, cell cultures, ma-
chines, and computers. Some dishes hold gels used to sequence DNA and
reveal the precise order of the four nucleobases—adenine, guanine, cyto-
sine, and thymine—that form base pairs for the double-helix of a DNA
molecule. At one table, a graduate student in a blue T-shirt and white rub-
ber gloves carefully releases a pipette of clear liquid into several small test
tubes. The student is adding genes to the genetic code of a virus. Or as
Grompe says, “He’s building a virus.”62
Nearby, in a clean, cold, tissue culture room, another student works
at a long table enclosed by glass and covered by a fume hood that blows
away filtered air to keep everything sterile. She is manipulating cells
growing in gel cultures stored nearby in refrigerated incubators. The
labs on this floor have at least fifteen hooded tables in seven rooms.
The research team has at its fingertips high-powered microscopes, cen-
trifuges, computers capable of doing the billions of calculations required
in DNA analysis, and even more specialized equipment. A black box
with a camera inside can photograph the faint luminescence radiating
from mice tumors genetically altered with glowworm genes. Another
machine slices ultra-thin tissue samples for staining and microscope
analysis. And a flow cytometer sorts and counts cells tagged with flu-
orescence color. Paralleling the labs are specially designed, extra wide
corridors wired with abundant electrical outlets for refrigerators and
liquid nitrogen tanks to preserve cell cultures.
In addition to supporting research, the laboratory has a practical side in
producing monoclonal antibodies that it sells to other researchers for mark-
ing living cells. “This operation,” says Grompe, “is more like a company.”63
On the research front, his team is working on three quests: to convert
gall-bladder cells into insulin producers, to find cells that can help heal dis-
eased or damaged livers, and to discover medicine to cure Fanconi anemia,
the rare and deadly genetic blood disorder that leads to bone marrow fail-
ure and high susceptibility to cancer. These are among more than 4,000
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research projects under way at any given time at OHSU, leading to hun-
dreds of inventions a year, some of which give rise to new businesses.
Now among the top twenty-seven academic health centers in the na-
tion in terms of NIH research grants—and twenty-eight among the 2,450
institutions that receive NIH grants—OHSU has produced a long list of
medical breakthroughs.64 Recently, for example, its scientists conducted
the world’s first clinical trials on gene therapies that may prevent some
types of blindness, discovered a neural stem cell that offers new hope for
thwarting certain fatal brain diseases, and converted human skin cells into
embryonic stem cells.
Every morning at about 5:30 a.m., Robert Searles—research assis-
tant professor in the division of bioinformation and computational
biology, which is to say, DNA analysis—parks at Portland’s South Wa-
terfront and rides the tram to the Kohler pavilion 500 feet above. He
steps into the hospital wing on the ninth floor, a level connected to
a series of hallways and sky bridges that would allow him to reach
most campus buildings without going outside. Searles, though, walks
through OHSU Hospital and out onto SW Sam Jackson Road, past the
Hatfield Research Center and the Biomedical Information Communi-
cation Center on his left. And on his right, he passes Baird Hall, the
administration building, and Mackenzie Hall, the medical school. He
takes a right turn at the OHSU Auditorium, which includes the uni-
versity’s archives. He walks behind the medical school into Richard T.
Jones Hall and rides an elevator up to the fifth floor and his office
in Room 5327A, which is adjacent to his recently remodeled labora-
tory. The lab is stocked with more than $1 million worth of equipment,
including the $700,000 Illumina HiSeq 2000 Sequencing System. The
computerized machine, which looks something like two portable re-
frigerators pushed together, is capable of ordering 180 million base
pairs of DNA an hour, or the entire 3.6 billion base pairs of DNA for
each of four human genomes simultaneously in twelve days. Searles, a
biochemist, directs this operation, which he calls the Massively Parallel
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Sequencing Shared Resource. He also is associate director of the OHSU
Integrated Genomics Laboratory. His lab handles gene sequencing for
other researchers throughout the university as well as for clients else-
where in the country and world.65
DOCTOR AND STUDENT
Not far from Searles’ laboratory, in the emergency room built at street
level on the seventh floor of the Mark Hatfield Research Center, teaching
resident Dr. Jason Oost works with third-year medical student Moon
Yoon one spring afternoon in 2014. Both are in scrubs. The emergency
room serves both the OHSU and Doernbecher Children’s hospitals. The
doctor and medical student discuss a patient in his sixties who has recently
been through chemotherapy for epiglottis cancer and has come to them
with pain in his left leg. Oost, young with a trim beard and short red
hair, examined the patient. Then so did Yoon, whose thick black hair falls
nearly to his bushy eyebrows and black-rimmed glasses. Now they sit at a
row of computers in the heart of the emergency room, each with a stetho-
scope slung over his neck, and discuss how to treat their patient.
“He got a water blister and it popped during chemo,” Yoon says. “It got
infected, first, and it has been difficult to control since then. He developed a
left foot abscess during chemo which is presented here as increased left leg
pain. There’s poor perfusion [flow of blood] to his lower extremities.”
Oost quizzes Yoon. Did the patient have a DVT, deep vein thrombo-
sis, a blood clot in a deep vein of his leg? Did he complain of shortness of
breath? What does Yoon want to do?
The medical student says he’ll get the patient’s pain under control, talk
to vascular and chemo doctors, and order tests, including a chest X-ray
and ultrasound. The medical teacher and student conclude that in addition
to the foot abscess, their patient has constricted blood flow to his legs that
needs to be checked. They probably will admit him to the hospital for a
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variety of tests, primarily an angiogram, which is an X-ray using dyes to
capture images of blood flow.
Yoon is learning under a new curriculum developed by OHSU and
a handful of other top medical schools that marks the biggest change
in physician training in a century. Under the new approach, students
spend less time in the classroom and more on hands-on interaction with
patients. In 2014, a class of 139 students, picked from a record 5,755 appli-
cants, was working with patients within weeks after arriving on campus.
Students learn how to work in teams and to assess the social and eco-
nomic conditions affecting their patients’ health. They learn in the new
Collaborative Life Sciences Building, which includes a 20,000-square-
foot simulation center with twenty clinic rooms and eight mock hospital
stages. Professors can observe and converse with students in each of the
exam rooms from a director’s suite filled with television screens. The stu-
dents confront simulated health care crises with dummy patients or actors
and can view their bedside manner on videotapes. The innovative cur-
riculum is proficiency-based, which allows students to advance at their
own paces and potentially complete their training in three years.66
LABOR AND DELIVERY
Six floors above the emergency room and a little ways north in what is
known as the C-Wing of OHSU Hospital, Tamara and Kevin Wedin of
nearby Vancouver, Washington, relax on a sunny morning in the summer
of 2014 with their baby boy, Daniel, who has not yet completed his first
day on Earth.
The Wedins are in a postpartum suite in the recently expanded
Mother-Baby Unit, where big block letters on the wall say “Welcome
Mothers, Babies & Families.” The spacious suite, with wide windows look-
ing out over OHSU’s Physicians Pavilion, has just about everything mother
and child could want: a large adjustable bed, a clear plastic bassinet cradled
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in a wooden base with drawers and wheels, a television, Wi-Fi, vital sign
monitors—and quiet. Tamara, thirty-nine, a college student, relaxes peace-
fully in her bed with baby in arms as Kevin, forty, a Home Depot manager,
sits in a comfortable chair nearby. They came to the hospital four days ear-
lier, when Tamara thought that her water may have broken, and went into
the maternity triage area where there are small rooms with beds and moni-
tors to determine whether a woman is ready to deliver.
As it turned out, Tamara’s water had not broken. But at more than
thirty-nine weeks, she was about due and her cervix was slightly dilated, so
she and Kevin decided to proceed with an induced delivery. They moved
into one of the hospital’s spacious private suites in the Family Birth Center
on the twelfth floor. The suite includes an attached private bathroom with a
jetted tub, private shower, and a sterile bassinet for the newborn. The room
also is equipped with computers, fetal heart monitors, and ultrasound equip-
ment. If Tamara wanted to deliver her baby in water, the hospital would
bring in a small heated tub. Down the hall on the same floor are surgery
suites should she need a cesarean delivery. Also nearby on the same floor is a
neonatal unit should the baby need specialized care.
A birth team that included a midwife and nurses cared for Tamara
as she was given medicine Thursday evening to induce labor. But little
happened for the next twenty-four hours. Or the twenty-four after that.
By late Saturday, Tamara was still having only occasional mild cramps.
Her medical team suggested it may be time to take the baby by cesarean.
Tamara and Kevin had just begun discussing whether to proceed with
the operation when Tamara was silenced by severe cramps. Baby Daniel
was on his way. He arrived twelve hours later, at 2:00 p.m. Sunday. The
midwife immediately placed the baby on Tamara’s chest, a modern skin-
to-skin practice that stimulates nursing and bonding.
Daniel arrived in Room 12. The Wedins had requested that room be-
cause a year earlier, that is where their baby, Marina, died. Doctors had
been prepared to take Marina by cesarean, too, because she had some
life-threatening congenital disorders. Just as they were about to operate,
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Marina’s heart rate plunged. That and other vital signs made it clear to
doctors and to the Wedins that Marina was not going to make it. So in-
stead of going into surgery, Tamara and Kevin asked their medical team to
turn on the ultrasound machine. The parents laid their hands on Tamara’s
abdomen and watched the ultrasound screen over the next few minutes as
their unborn daughter’s life slipped away.
Then the labor and delivery staff “circled the wagons around us,” says
Tamara. “The nurse, the midwives, everybody down there, circled around
us like family and gave us space and love. . . . Every single nurse did some-
thing over and above her shift duties for us. . . . We were listened to, and
we were respected, and we were honored, and that made it possible for us
to leave the hospital after a trauma feeling loved.”
That level of care brought the Wedins back to OHSU to deliver
Daniel, though as military veterans they had plenty of other choices.
“We got pregnant with this little guy three months after Marina died,
and we said, ‘Well great. We get to go see our people again,’” Tamara
says.67
The Wedins’ experience, once unthinkable at OHSU, is now typical.
The hospital offers a variety of childbirth services and delivers about
2,400 babies a year. It is one of the few providers in Oregon who help
women who have previously undergone cesarean sections deliver their
babies vaginally, and it has the highest success rate in the country for these
mothers. About 30 percent of the hospital’s births are by cesarean section,
which is lower than the national average even though 18 percent of its
mothers have high-risk pregnancies, far above the average 6 percent to
8 percent.68
A similar expansion in scope, quality, and specialty care has unfolded
throughout OHSU’s hospitals and out-patients services on Pill Hill and
in its clinics in rural and medically underserved areas across Oregon,
Southwest Washington and Boise, Idaho. The university offers varying
specialty services—nephrology, radiation oncology, psychiatry via elec-
tronic telemedicine connections, pediatric cardiology, and much more—in
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twenty-nine towns and cities outside Portland. For example, the univer-
sity operates clinics in Bend in Central Oregon, Coos Bay and Lincoln City
on the coast, Hermiston in the Columbia Gorge, Enterprise and LaGrande
in Eastern Oregon and Klamath Falls and Medford in the state’s south.
OHSU’s expansive health care network, its hospital’s spacious labor
and delivery wing, Grompe’s research labs, Searles’ gene sequencing op-
eration, the modern emergency room where Yoon learns medicine by
practicing it, and the Collaborative Life Sciences Building did not exist at
OHSU two decades ago. And they may have never become part of OHSU
had it failed to become a public corporation.
President Joe Robertson told employees in a town hall meeting that
becoming a public corporation gave OHSU the structure, the “relative au-
tonomy cemented in public purpose,” and the “best enabling legislation of
any academic health center in the country,” to become a disruptive force.
“We are not the Ivory Tower of academia of old,” he said. “We are not
your grandfather’s university. We are an agent of change.”69
Mike Thorne, the Pendleton rancher, questions whether OHSU could
have survived without becoming a public corporation. As a state senator,
he saw its financial problems before its transformation when it was a
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health center most people tried to avoid. He eventually served on OHSU’s
first governing board and now sees doctors there himself.
“You feel good about going there,” he says. “It just stands out as such
a success story for all the right reasons. It is gratifying to be around to see
it.”70
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Epilogue
A Model for Transformation?
OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation presents an intriguing, and
even attractive, case study for other stalled—or struggling—public insti-
tutions to consider. The question, as with any case study, is the extent
to which OHSU’s methods and remarkable results can be generalized
to other public colleges, universities, and academic health centers. Did
OHSU’s success stem from the unique mix of people and politics of its time
or does it offer a model that can be followed and replicated?
GAINING INDEPENDENCE FOR OREGON’S PUBLICS
As state funding continued to decline for all of Oregon’s universities, sev-
eral of them began looking at following, at least in some measure, OHSU’s
example by separating from the state bureaucracy—with two different ap-
proaches that yielded very different results.
On November 18, 2009, Dave Frohnmayer, former president of the
University of Oregon, proposed in a paper written at the request of Chan-
cellor George Pernsteiner that Oregon convert its three largest univer-
sities—UO, Oregon State, and Portland State—into public corporations
so they would have their own boards and more freedom to raise money
and manage their operations. Otherwise, he wrote, the university system
would continue to starve financially, which threatens to destroy the state’s
economic future and render it a “stagnant backwater.”1
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Richard Lariviere, a Sanskrit scholar who became president of UO in
2009, agreed. He could see, as Kohler did at OHSU, that the university
could never become great without more freedom and other sources of
money. State support was on the decline.
So he asked the state to back $800 million in bonds for UO in lieu of
state funding. UO would raise another $800 million and build a $1.6 bil-
lion endowment that would allow it to grow without having to keep
raising tuition an average 7 percent a year. The state would have no future
obligation to UO beyond paying off the bonds.2
At the same time, the state board again was exploring the prospects
of making the whole seven-campus university system independent of
the state and its regulations. The board told Lariviere it liked his cre-
ative ideas and would consider them after the legislature passed the OUS
reforms, which would give all the universities more independence. Sell-
ing both plans at the same time could be confusing and scuttle them
both, the board said.3
But Lariviere pushed his plan anyway, even wrote about it in a guest
column for the Wall Street Journal. When the 2011 Legislature convened,
lobbyists for the UO Foundation and for the Oregon University System
battled for separate bills. Neither passed.
Lariviere continued to push his plan for the 2012 Legislature. He also
defied his superiors in other ways. In the difficult economy, Governor
Kitzhaber had asked all seven universities to keep increases under 6 per-
cent. He said Lariviere and the other presidents assured the chancellor
they would. But then Lariviere raised salaries for more than 1,100 UO fac-
ulty and administrators to the tune of nearly $5 million, defying Kitzhaber
and others.4 Lariviere said in an email that he “never agreed to any salary
guidelines before I granted the staff raises,” and state funds were not used
for the increases. The guidelines came after he granted the raises, he
said. The UO faculty had had no salary increase in four years, and under
Kitzhaber’s guidelines, they would have had to endure frozen salaries for
three more years, Lariviere said.5
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While Lariviere had captured the imagination of the UO community,
he had estranged the governor and his boss, the state board. He had pro-
posed to govern UO with an independent board and to build a sustainable
financial plan. He found a way to raise pay for nearly a third of faculty
and administrators. Fall enrollment hit 24,447 students, a record. Incom-
ing freshman were the smartest ever. But on December 3, 2011, the state
board voted to fire him. His brash, forceful style appealed to the UO com-
munity, but it alienated everyone else and doomed his mission.6
“Richard was his own worst enemy,” Kitzhaber said. “He was charis-
matic, and he was interesting. . . . I was totally in support of his vision.
. . . He is a great guy, and I’m really sorry he left.”7
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES FOLLOW OHSU
Undeterred by Lariviere’s failed attempt to win independence for the
University of Oregon, the state’s universities continued to seek OHSU’s
status—and this time, followed more of its approach. The State Board of
Higher Education and Chancellor George Pernsteiner followed Kohler’s
example by patiently, quietly lobbying the legislature for more autonomy.
The university system worked with Kitzhaber’s office and lawmakers in
crafting a thoughtful case for making the universities more independent,
and in 2013 the legislature gave all seven state universities some of the
freedom OHSU has. They now have their own governing boards. They
can issue their own revenue bonds and contract for their own legal, pur-
chasing, and other services.8
But they also have limits on their power that do not apply to OHSU,
said Jay Kenton, an administrator for more than three decades in the Ore-
gon higher education system, most recently as interim president of East-
ern Oregon University.9 Unlike OHSU, they all are under the umbrella of
Oregon’s fourteen-member Higher Education Coordinating Commission,
which replaced the State Board of Higher Education as overseer of the
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state’s community colleges and universities. Many of the universities still
share services for information technology, payroll, financial statements
and other functions. Their staffs receive public retirement and health ben-
efits. Service Employee International Union, which represents all of the
universities’ classified workers, engages in collective bargaining for a sin-
gle labor agreement with all seven campuses.
One big limit on the universities’ powers restricts their authority to
raise tuition. They cannot raise tuition above 3 percent without first noti-
fying the coordinating commission and legislature. The limit reflects fears
expressed by student leaders that if the state gave its universities more in-
dependence, they would be inclined to raise tuition—just as had happened
at OHSU.
It is true that the university on Pill Hill has raised tuition substan-
tially over the two decades since it became a public corporation. Tuition
for a medical student from Oregon during that period climbed from
about $13,400 to $39,196: a 191 percent increase. Add fees, and OHSU’s
sticker price for a first-year resident medical student was $44,809 in
2015, the third-highest among the nation’s public medical schools,
lower only than tuition and fees at the University of Virginia and Oak-
land University William Beaumont School of Medicine in Rochester,
Minnesota.10 But OHSU’s tuition ranked high from the time it became
a public corporation. In the 1996–97 school year, for example, OHSU’s
tuition and fees was sixth highest among public medical schools.11 And
while tuition has grown dramatically since, it has not grown any faster
at OHSU than at other public medical schools and universities. In fact,
public medical schools on average raised their tuition 232 percent over
the last two decades, outpacing OHSU’s 191 percent growth.12 Simi-
larly, tuition and fees climbed an average 221 percent for US public
universities during this period, and by 193 percent at the University
of Oregon. Oregon’s public universities on average saw tuition and
fees rise 171 percent since 1995, only a slightly smaller increase than
OHSU’s. So while tuition and fees are high at OHSU, they have actually
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climbed a little slower than those at most other public universities and
academic health centers across the country.13
Other consequences of the increased autonomy given to Oregon’s
public universities have been mixed, Kenton said. Administering local
boards creates new costs for the universities, but having the boards’ over-
sight brings them more attention, more opportunities for philanthropy,
more advocacy, and more accountability.
Portland State University has seen positive changes as a result of having
its own board and more autonomy, said President Wim Wiewel. More in-
dependence has allowed the universities to lobby the legislature, which they
could not do before, and the presidents of the seven universities concluded
they could do that best by doing it together. They succeeded in winning
$700 million from the state for 2015–16 rather than the $670 million the
legislative leadership had recommended. That translated into $10 million
more a year for PSU, which is “real money,” Wiewel said.
“That alone was worth the price of admission” to becoming more in-
dependent, he said. “The somewhat ironic result is we are collaborating
with the other universities better, and therefore, we have more political
power than we ever had under the umbrella of the state board.”14
PSU also has benefited from a more equitable distribution of state
money among the seven universities. And having its own board has given
the university more clout, Wiewel said.
“It is not about any particular thing a board member says or does that
makes it useful,” he said. “It is just that the political world begins to see
you as an independent organization that has to be listened to and has to be
reckoned with.”15
PSU also proposed for the November 2016 ballot a metro area payroll
tax to raise $25 million to $50 million for student scholarships, something
it could not have done under the old State Board of Higher Education.
PSU later withdrew the proposal after the Portland Business Alliance, op-
posed to the tax, promised that the business community would help raise
$25 million a year for the university by 2019. And the university’s do-
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nations climbed dramatically, from $12 million in 2010 to $48 million in
2015, but Wiewel thinks that has more to do with changes in manage-
ment and strategy than in being more independent.16
Despite these positive developments, PSU still remains under the
oversight of the Higher Education Coordinating Commission, which has
been gaining more authority from the legislature. PSU and the other six
state universities must have their requests for state money and capital
budgets approved by the commission, which also distributes their money.
The commission also must evaluate them against various performance
measures such as graduation rates. PSU still must participate in shared ser-
vices with the other universities including risk management, the Public
Employee Retirement System benefits, joint union bargaining, and use of
the state treasury. PSU does not have the autonomy OHSU enjoys nor
does it have OHSU’s money-making capacity as a health care organization,
Wiewel said.
Robertson agrees Oregon’s universities are not really public corporations
with governance structures comparable to OHSU. “They have more auton-
omy than before,” he said, “but it’s not an apples to apples comparison.”17
Oregon’s universities, which receive the fourth-lowest level of state
support in the nation, are exploring ways to raise more money with
their new freedom. They have recruited out-of-state and international
students, who pay about three times the tuition of resident students.
They have built new dorms to attract students, ramped up campaigns
for donors, and pursued entrepreneurial enterprises such as research
partnerships with private companies or the creation of company spin-
offs. But while Oregon universities are changing, Archer does not see
them transforming. They have not made the clear break from the state
and functions of the past as OHSU did, she said, and are still governed
more by state policies.18
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TRANSFORMATION ACROSS THE COUNTRY
Although Oregon’s large public universities were able to gain only limited
autonomy in that same state in which OHSU claimed its independence,
there is a more successful example across the country that suggests the
move to a public corporation should be possible for any public higher ed-
ucation institution—even a small liberal arts college. One example is St.
Mary’s College of Maryland, which converted from a state to a hybrid
public-private institution, a public honors college.19 As in Oregon, Mary-
land was going through a fiscal crisis in 1991 that led the governor to
challenge the state’s universities and colleges “to explore creative new
strategies for financing higher education.”20 The 1,500-student liberal arts
college in St. Mary’s City, Maryland’s first capitol, had its own governing
board, which decided to accept the challenge.
The college agreed in 1992 to cap its operating budget request to the
state to the amount it received in 1993, and to increase that amount only
by the state’s inflationary price index. In exchange for this fixed lump-
sum support from the state, the college was given more freedom to raise
money from non-state sources and to purchase, hire and conduct other
functions independent of state agency regulations. Unlike OHSU how-
ever, the college at the time was getting half of its money from the state.
That dropped to less than a third by 2014.21
Like Kohler at OHSU, St. Mary’s College President Ted Lewis care-
fully and patiently sold the autonomy plan to his faculty, staff, students,
and alumni and to the legislature.
“St. Mary’s College had been so effective with its relations during the
years leading up to the new status bill that there was remarkably easy
sailing,” writes Robert Berdahl, emeritus professor at the University of
Maryland and an expert on higher education governance and policy.22
The legislation passed with only two opposing votes, one in the Sen-
ate and one in the House of Delegates. The legislation unleashed St. Mary’s
from state regulations, but in exchange the college agreed to maintain its
A Model for Transformation? 377
public mission to serve a diverse population of students and not become
an upper-middle-class white enclave.23
The college thrived under its new structure and freedom. It increased
its faculty size, diversity, and quality, restored faculty tenure and improved
its student–faculty ratio. It doubled its tuition from $2,500 to $5,000, but
used much of its increased income to provide financial aid to students
from low-income families. Both the diversity and the SAT college en-
trance exam scores of its students increased.24 The college made substan-
tial savings by controlling its own purchases. In building forty townhouses
for residential students, the college was able to move quickly, hiring and
beginning construction in six months. That would have been impossible
as a state agency. Its independence allowed it to take advantage of a tight
construction market and lower debt service costs in a favorable bond mar-
ket, saving $2.3 million on a $4.7 million capital construction project.25
An accreditation team in 1995, just three years after its conversion to a
more autonomous institution, concluded: “St. Mary’s has become a pub-
lic liberal arts college of very high quality—and a nationally recognized
model in public higher education.”26 The college has continued to shine. In
2009–10, St. Mary’s had the second highest number of student Fulbright
winners of any public liberal arts college in the nation.27 The college has
a 10:1 student–faculty ratio and 81 percent graduate rate, which is excep-
tionally high for a public institution. U.S. News & World Report in 2016
ranked it ninety-third among the nation’s liberal arts colleges.28
Berdahl notes that President Lewis had an “obvious impact” and “cru-
cial role” in St. Mary’s transformation during his thirteen years in office.
With Lewis at St. Mary’s helm, all four forces that Barbara Archer de-
scribed as necessary for transformational change came to bear on St.
Mary’s College in 1992. The school faced economic pressures to change,
had supportive policies, and had a strong leader who led the institution
through a clear break from its principal authority—the state.
Many Maryland leaders concluded that St. Mary’s was able to make
its remarkable change only because it was so small, Berdahl writes. “The
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St. Mary’s College model in its entirety then, perhaps is not feasible for all
public universities. Yet within this plan, others may find certain pieces to
borrow, a direction to take,” wrote the president.29 Inspired by St. Mary’s
success, eight of the University of Maryland’s eleven campuses created
local boards. The University of Maryland at Baltimore, which includes
the medical school, considered withdrawing from the university system,
Berdahl writes, and creating a not-for-profit corporation as its hospital
had done thirteen years earlier. In making this deliberation, the univer-
sity cited “a precedent from Oregon where a public medical campus had
been privatized.”30 Although David J. Ramsay, president of the University
of Maryland at Baltimore, had brought a team to visit OHSU shortly after
it became a public corporation, the university ultimately chose to remain
part of the state system.
OHSU INC. AS MODEL
Despite the University of Maryland deciding not to follow in its footsteps,
and the limited success of its in-state public peers, OHSU’s move to be-
come a public corporation has impressed academic health centers across
the country with its transformation, Robertson said.
“We are the envy of every public academic health center across the
country with regard to the type of administrative structure we have,” he
said. “There may be a better structure yet to be devised, but I think it is as
good or better than that of any that has been devised to date.”31
Both Kohler and Robertson have written papers for their academic
health center colleagues on how OHSU healed itself by becoming a public
corporation. Yet none so far has followed OHSU’s path in explicitly seek-
ing legislative approval to become a more independent public corpora-
tion. OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation is not even mentioned
in The Transformation of Academic Health Centers, a book published in 2015
with twenty-five chapters written by academic medical center leaders.
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Robertson and others said it may be that none has followed OHSU be-
cause of the enormous political hurtle they must leap to win so much
autonomy. “It takes a legislature that is rather bold to grant the degrees of
freedom that we were given,” Robertson said.32
However, OHSU’s transformation does have implications for acad-
emic health centers, said Dr. Steven A. Wartman, president and chief
executive officer of the Association of Academic Health Centers based in
Washington, DC. The academic medical community views the Oregon
medical center “as a superb institution that has done some creative and in-
teresting things in terms of its reorganization, its structures, its physical
development,” he said.33
Most academic health centers have not felt a compelling need to
change until recently, note some academic health center leaders in The
Transformation of Academic Health Centers.
“And, in the past, there was not a pressing need to rethink the way we
finance and execute our mission; there was little financial incentive to op-
erate differently,” they write. “Today’s economic exigencies are motivating
us to break from tradition and experiment with new ways of delivering
health care, conducting research and educating leaders.”34
So the time may be ripe for other academic health centers to take a
closer look at OHSU’s story, though it is hard to say how its model might
apply as each differs so much in size, structure, and focus. The public cor-
poration model probably makes the most sense for a small number of public
academic health centers that are not attached to undergraduate universities,
such as the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center, said
Lawrence Furnstahl, OHSU’s chief financial officer.35 Today, academic
health centers face forces much like those that drove OHSU to transform.
The federal Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, is again advocating various
forms of managed care, including integrated accountable care organizations,
in which a group of providers receive a bundled payment, rather than fees
for services, to manage the health of a group of enrolled patients. As the
population ages, with Baby Boomers retiring, academic health centers will
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be relying more heavily on patients under Medicaid and Medicare, which
reimburse providers at about 70 percent to 80 percent of the private insur-
ers. That will mean thinner margins in hospital and clinical operations to
subsidize research and education. Research also poses challenges. The NIH
has lost roughly one-fifth of its federal funding in real dollars since its peak
in 2003.36 Academic health centers typically estimate they have to subsidize
about 15 percent of their research funding. But a group of academic health
center administrators launched a study of research costs at thirty-eight med-
ical schools and found they actually subsidize 25 percent to 40 percent of
their research spending.37 The administrators write in their report:
Academic health center leaders remain especially concerned that
the erosion of research funding by the National Institutes of
Health poses a serious threat to the long-term financial viability of
the academic health center model. Not only is direct funding of re-
search under attack, but as the clinical margin shrinks, academic
health centers will be less able to transfer funds from clinical en-
terprises to cover the “hidden costs” of research.38
The long-term trend of declining state support adds to the squeeze
on academic health centers. Withering state funding was the chief driver
for OHSU to transform, not only because it needed more flexibility to
compete in health care, but also because it made no sense to give the
state regulatory authority over an institution it was no longer supporting.
More public academic health centers may be reaching that conclusion.
Less state money combined with declines in Medicare, shifts to bundled
health care fees, a flat NIH budget, and rising costs are driving academic
health centers to consider dramatic change, maybe even transformational
change, says Wartman.
“We are in a disruptive environment,” he said. “Disruptive in terms
of economics, politics, science, technology, the Internet, patient empow-
erment—about 20 forces disrupting business as usual.”39
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RESPONDING TO DISRUPTION
Furnstahl said academic health centers have been wrestling with change and
predicting “the coming collapse” for the last three decades.40 Still, acade-
mic health centers in recent years have explored innovations in every sector
of their operations, most aimed at cutting costs and increasing revenue,
in a race to stay solvent. With downward pressure on federal, state, and
commercial insurance payments, the private Vanderbilt University Medical
Center in Nashville sharpened its administration to adjust to a $200 mil-
lion loss in revenue in 2014 and 2015. The chancellor put a single person in
charge of the medical school and its entire diverse health system, which sees
$3.5 billion in annual revenue. The university aggressively retired debt and
identified $100 million in cost savings through workforce reductions.41
Academic health centers also have looked for more business oppor-
tunities, forging partnerships with biotech companies and launching new
companies. Johns Hopkins University, for example, collaborated with the
private MedImmune, a Maryland firm, in seeking better treatments for
rheumatoid arthritis and prostate cancer. The university’s research also
spawned eight start-up companies in 2014.42
Some medical schools have designed new curriculums that can move
students more swiftly to completion. Among them, OHSU’s new medical
school structure is individualized and proficiency-based to allow some
students to move faster than others, each at his or her own pace. Schools
have also trimmed pre-clinical basic science training, and forty schools of-
fered combined undergraduate-MD programs that reduce total training
time to six or seven years.43
Academic health centers, including OHSU, also have merged with
other health systems in recent years to gain efficiencies through
economies of scale. Many other hospitals and health systems have also
consolidated for the same reason, creating huge health organizations in
competition with academic health centers. Between 2007 and 2012 there
were 432 merger and acquisition deals involving 835 hospitals.
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“The ongoing consolidation within the health marketplace, especially
in the United States, raises serious concerns about the ability of individual
academic health centers to compete with far larger national or interna-
tional health systems,” Wartman writes.44
The Mount Sinai Health System, an academic health center, merged with
the Continuum Health System, producing a Manhattan system of 3,571 li-
censed beds, 138 operating rooms, and 35,000 employees. New York Hospital-
Presbyterian Hospital System includes eleven hospitals in New York’s five
boroughs along with nineteen other hospitals in the tristate area. These two
mergers left the New York University academic health center competing with
two mega-systems in Manhattan. Similarly, OHSU also is trying to leverage its
resources and capacity, more through partnerships than mergers.
“You need more scale to be successful in this business,” Furnstahl
said.45
In a 2014 member survey by the Association of Academic Health
Centers, 41 percent of academic health centers said they were engaged
in major expansions of their hospitals or physician networks, a third
had launched major cost cuts, one in three opened a new health pro-
fessions school or branch campus, and 31 percent changed their gov-
ernance structures.46 Reorganizing, consolidating, merging, cutting jobs,
and streamlining programs are all common and understandable responses
by organizations to financial threats.
But these are changes, not transformation.
TIME TO TRANSFORM?
As their book’s title suggests, the authors of The Transformation of Academic
Health Centers argue more radical change may be necessary to keep the na-
tion’s medical universities healthy.
“We have a dire need to reengineer our organizations—to transform
them in fundamental ways in order preserve our ability to accomplish
A Model for Transformation? 383
our public purpose as organizations leading society toward a healthier fu-
ture,” writes Dr. Daniel Rahn, chancellor of the University of Arkansas for
Medical Sciences. “This is a time of disruptive, transformational change in
every aspect of the academic health center mission.”47
To truly transform, these complex institutions need to look beyond
incremental changes in their business practices and must change their cul-
tures in ways that fit their circumstances and visions. OHSU’s story offers
a vivid example of what this type of transformation looks like. As Barbara
Archer suggests, such transformation may be rare because it requires so
much. It demands the right political climate, the support of state policy-
makers, staff, and the public, and a leadership team willing to make a clear
break with authority and with its past. As Kohler said on the day Gover-
nor Kitzhaber signed Senate Bill 2 to make OHSU a public corporation,
no one should underestimate how hard this is to accomplish.
“It is not the status quo,” he said. “It is not the path of least resistance.
It is dramatic change.”48
And when it happens, it can create a work of wonder like OHSU to-
day, said Mark Dodson, the Portland lawyer and state board chair who led
efforts to hire Kohler.
“When we were looking for the new president, we had big dreams,”
he said. “But I don’t think we had envisioned anything like this, anything
like this at all. I really wanted to think big. I just wasn’t capable of thinking
this big.”49
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Key Players in OHSU’s Transformation
THE PRESIDENT AND HIS TEAM
Janet Billups
Janet Billups became OHSU’s first attorney when Kohler hired her in
1992, made her part of his leadership team, and gave her the monumental
challenge of drafting Senate Bill 2, the legislative and legal framework for
OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation. She had been working since
1987 for the Oregon Attorney General’s Office as the department’s as-
sistant attorney general for OHSU and Portland State University. After
joining Kohler’s team, Billups nearly single-handedly wrote Senate Bill 2,
which would define OHSU’s powers and obligations as a public corpora-
tion, and she helped sell it in the 1995 Legislature.1
Billups was a fourth-generation native Oregonian. Ancestors on her
mother’s side traveled to the state on the Oregon Trail. Her mother died
shortly after she was born on July 12, 1952, in Los Angeles. Her father was
too young to care for her so she was adopted by family friends there. They
later took her to Crescent City, California, and finally to southern Oregon,
where she completed high school. She attended a small Seventh-day Ad-
ventist college in Walla Walla, Washington, and completed law school at
Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland. She passed the Oregon bar exam in
1980, and worked as a law clerk and later as a trial lawyer for Multnomah
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County, which includes Portland, under one of the state’s legendary trial
lawyers, John Leahy. She stayed with the county eight years. Then Leahy
retired, and she decided that was a good time to move on to join the state
Department of Justice as an assistant attorney general.2
After OHSU became a public corporation in 1995, Billups gradually
assembled a legal team for the university, including medical malpractice,
contract, and employment lawyers. In 1999, after she adopted her daughter,
she reduced her own hours, and Steve Stadum, a Portland real estate lawyer,
took over as General Counsel for her office. Billups later moved back into
the General Counsel position. By 2009, she was overseeing seven in-house
and multiple outside lawyers, a position she holds today. She is the only
member of Kohler’s core leadership team still working at OHSU.3
Lois Davis
Lois Davis, former chief of staff for Congressman Ron Wyden (Democrat
from Oregon), served as OHSU’s chief lobbyist in its public and legislative
campaign to convert OHSU to a public corporation. She later served as its
vice president for public affairs and marketing, in charge of telling OHSU’s
story to the people of Oregon.4
Davis was born December 5, 1954, in Caldwell, Idaho, the fifth of
eight children, and grew up on a farm in the small town of Council in
central Idaho, near McCall. She attended Northwest Nazarene University
in Nampa, Idaho, became interested in journalism, and transferred her
junior year to the University of Oregon. There she earned a degree in
journalism and worked as a reporter at the nearby newspaper in Spring-
field. She went on to law school at Willamette University in Salem. While
there, she married Jim Davis in 1978 and became involved in his friend
Ron Wyden’s first campaign for Congress. After Wyden won, she became
his press secretary and later chief of staff.5
Davis and her husband and daughter moved back to Oregon in late
1986 when she joined OHSU as a lobbyist. She gave birth to her son, Matt,
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in OHSU’s cramped, outdated labor and delivery wing in September of
1988. After Kohler arrived that year, he made Davis his chief lobbyist in
Salem and part of his core leadership team. Following the university’s con-
version to a public corporation, Davis became vice president for public
affairs and marketing. She oversaw the university’s promotion and lobby-
ing duties while serving as its chief spokesperson for news events.6
She left OHSU three years after Kohler did, in August of 2009, to become
chief of staff and vice president for public affairs for Portland State University,
where she still works. She loved OHSU, she said, but it had arrived, had
reached a state of healthy stability, and it was time for a new challenge.7
Timothy Goldfarb
Timothy Goldfarb joined OHSU in early 1984 as an associate admin-
istrator of University Hospital and eventually became part of Kohler’s
leadership team in charge of all of the university’s hospitals and clinics.
Goldfarb was comfortable in hospitals because he had grown up in one.
Shortly after he was born in Jerome, Arizona, in 1949, his father came
down with polio and was put into an iron lung to help him breathe. His
father spent sixteen years in the iron lung, mostly in hospitals in Cot-
tonwood, which is near Jerome, and in Prescott and Phoenix, before he
died of pneumonia, and those hospitals are where Goldfarb spent much of
his youth. Since earning his master’s in health services administration in
1978, Goldfarb has continued to live much of his adult life in hospitals.8
In the summer of 1983, Goldfarb and his wife, Laura, left their jobs in
Arizona to work in Oregon, where Goldfarb landed a job as an associate
administrator for OHSU’s hospital and his wife, a midwife, found work in
Woodburn south of Portland. He became friends with Walker, who ar-
rived at OHSU shortly after he did.
Though he expected problems, Goldfarb was shocked by the dysfunc-
tion and disrepair at OHSU, especially in contrast to the new, smooth-
functioning hospital he left behind in Arizona.9
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After joining Kohler’s administrative team, Goldfarb helped campaign
for legislation to make OHSU a public corporation. Kohler later made Gold-
farb director of OHSU hospitals and health care systems, and Goldfarb
orchestrated the university’s expanding clinics and hospital operations.
He became the first member of Kohler’s core leadership team to leave
OHSU. He departed in 2001 and moved on to more hospitals—this time
in Gainesville, Florida, where he became chief executive officer of Shands
HealthCare, a health care system affiliated with the University of Florida
Health Science Center. That put Goldfarb in charge of a primary teach-
ing hospital, two children’s hospitals, a cancer hospital, two specialty
hospitals, two home care agencies, and other outpatient services. He re-
tired in 2015.10But in August of 2016, OHSU President Joseph Robertson
brought him back for five months to fill in at his old job as head of
OHSU hospitals and clinics while the university searched for someone to
take the post permanently. The Goldfarbs’ three daughters all continue
to work at OHSU.
Lesley Hallick
Lesley Hallick joined OHSU in 1977 as a molecular biology professor and
researcher and became Kohler’s vice president of academic affairs, later ti-
tled provost, in 1989. As head of OHSU’s academic affairs, she oversaw
all academic programs at OHSU and took charge of Oregon Regional Pri-
mate Research Center after it merged with OHSU in 1998. She also was
interim director of the Biomedical Information Communication Center
after it opened in 1991. She helped persuade faculty and legislators to sup-
port the bill allowing OHSU to convert to a public corporation. Once the
bill passed, she helped lead an effort to integrate the hospital and the uni-
versity’s financial and computer systems. Kohler’s predecessor, Leonard
Laster, often called on Hallick for advice and to head committees and
campus initiatives. She appealed to him with her insights, charm, and ex-
traordinary interpersonal and diplomatic skills.11
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Hallick was born February 4, 1946, in Springfield, Massachusetts; she
grew up in Orange, California, the daughter of a World War II fighter
pilot, and earned her bachelor’s in biochemistry at Pomona College in
Claremont, becoming the first person in her family to earn a college de-
gree. She earned her doctorate in molecular biology at the University of
Wisconsin, married and had a daughter, and then took a postdoctoral fel-
lowship at the University of California at Berkeley, where she studied the
structures of virus DNA and RNA. Hallick taught and launched research
that would lead her later to explore virology, simian AIDS retroviruses,
and DNA tumor viruses during her twelve years as a faculty member in
microbiology at OHSU.12
Hallick left OHSU in 2009 to become president of Pacific University.
Peter Kohler
Dr. Peter O. Kohler, an endocrinologist, led Oregon Health & Science
University through its conversion to a public corporation in 1995 and its
subsequent rise to a nationally prominent academic health center. OHSU
is the only institution he presided over, but he held leadership positions
through most of his career.
During his eighteen years as president, Kohler led OHSU through a
period of unprecedented growth in quality and in clinical and research ca-
pacity. Under his leadership, OHSU won $200 million in bonds from the
legislature and raised more than $300 million more to expand on Mar-
quam Hill and on Portland’s South Waterfront. That expansion helped
him attract some of the nation’s top researchers and raise the institution’s
national profile. While Kohler was president, OHSU doubled its building
space to more than six million square feet, grew its research awards seven-
fold to $294 million, and doubled its employees from 5,800 to 12,000.13
When he left in 2006, OHSU had reached his goal of ranking twentieth
among the nation’s academic health centers in terms of its National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) research grants.14
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Kohler was born July 18, 1938, in Brooklyn, New York, grew up in
southwestern Virginia, and earned an English degree at the University
of Virginia and his medical degree at Duke University, where he met
his wife, Judy. He served as a clinical associate for two years at the NIH
in Bethesda, Maryland, and stayed at NIH for six more years, eventually
becoming head of endocrine service for his unit. He and his wife had
four children by the time they moved in 1973 to Houston, where Kohler
headed the endocrinology division at Baylor College of Medicine and re-
ceived a prestigious Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator award.
He went on to be chair of medicine at the University of Arkansas and dean
of the medical school at the University of Texas medical center in San An-
tonio before joining OHSU as president in 1988. He was elected in 1994
to the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.15
After leaving OHSU, Kohler returned to Arkansas to serve as vice
chancellor at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, where he
led efforts to establish satellite medical programs in northwest Arkansas.
He worked with local health care providers to establish a campus with ro-
tations for students in medicine, pharmacy and other health professions
from the university’s Little Rock campus. Currently based in Fayetteville,
Arkansas, he leads a major effort to reduce obesity and diabetes among a
large migrant population from the Marshall Islands.
Kohler also continues to keep an office at OHSU. He makes regular
visits there, often in connection with meetings as a member of the board
of directors at Pacific University, a small, private liberal arts university in
nearby Forest Grove.
James Walker
The good-humored Jim Walker was working at the University of New
Mexico Hospital, enjoying his life as one of the nation’s youngest hospital
chief financial officers, when he was invited in the fall of 1983 to join
OHSU as chief financial officer. Though others warned Walker not to
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take the job, he accepted the new position. Walker set out to improve
University Hospital, which was like a county teaching hospital, serving
largely indigent patients. When Kohler arrived at OHSU in 1988, he soon
made Walker part of his core leadership team and vice president for fi-
nance and administration for the entire academic health center. Walker
helped sell Oregon leaders on making OHSU a public corporation. After
the change, he led the university through a difficult transition. Among
other things, he soon discovered many of his management workers could
not handle the rapid shift from a state to corporate culture and was forced
to replace them. The university went through “radical change in a very
short time,” he said.16
Walker was born April 10, 1948, in New York City and grew up on
Long Island, New York, in a hamlet called Wantagh. He attended West-
ern Kentucky University for two years before joining the US Air Force
and marrying his high school sweetheart, Ginny Rowland. After leaving
the military, he enrolled at and graduated from California Polytechnic
University. He and his wife had two daughters by the time he joined
OHSU in February of 1984.17
Walker’s responsibilities widened over his years at OHSU until he
was putting in sixty-hour weeks overseeing not only the university’s fi-
nances, but its administrative operations, including finance, risk manage-
ment, purchasing, and labor negotiations. During labor negotiations with
the Oregon Nurses Association, he collapsed and went through an emer-
gency appendectomy. He told Kohler “this is my wake up call,” and he
retired in 2003.18
But within months, he went to work for Lewis & Clark College in
Portland to help it deal with a financial and political disaster. He stayed for
two years. In 2009, OHSU President Joe Robertson called Walker back for
nine months to help him deal with the forces of the Great Recession. He
helped stabilize OHSU’s shaky finances, and then again retired to St. Si-
mons Island in Georgia. Recently, still retired, he was preparing to move
back to Albuquerque, New Mexico, completing the circle of his adult life.19
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STATE OF OREGON AND OHSU LEADERS
Lewis William (Bill) Bluemle
When the State Board of Higher Education consolidated the University of
Oregon dental and nursing schools with its medical school and hospital
into the academic health center that would become OHSU, it hired Dr.
Lewis William Bluemle Jr. as its first president. The university lured
Bluemle from his job as president of State University of New York’s Up-
state Medical Center in Syracuse.20
He was a tall, distinguished, and innovative nephrologist with a
charming demeanor and sharp mind. He used an electric motor from his
phonograph to develop a blood pump for the first clinically applicable ar-
tificial kidney program at the University of Pennsylvania.
Shortly upon his arrival at OHSU, he dealt with a crisis: the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals withdrew University Hospital’s
accreditation for failing to address shortcomings identified three or four
years earlier. Bluemle helped organize the university as an academic health
center independent of the University of Oregon. But he found Oregon too
parochial and left after less than three years to become president of the pri-
vate Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.21
“He didn’t like the legislature,” recalled Donald Kassebaum, whom
Bluemle hired to head the hospital. “He didn’t like the mindset. He thought
that the faculty was weak and the chairs were weak, and he was right.”22
Fred Buckman
Fred Buckman, former president and chief executive officer of Pacific-
Corp, served on the Public Corporation Advisory Committee that rec-
ommended OHSU become a public corporation. The six-foot-four-inch,
low-key executive testified before legislators in favor of Senate Bill 2, the
legislation that made OHSU a public corporation, and recommended the
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institution’s president be a member of the OHSU board of directors. Gov-
ernor Kitzhaber appointed him to the first OHSU board in 1995, and the
board elected him chairman. He led OHSU through its early years as a
public corporation, including the long and controversial struggle to build
an aerial tram connecting the university’s Marquam Hill campus to its
burgeoning campus on Portland’s South Waterfront. He was on the board
during its 1999 annual retreat when it decided to seek $200 million in
bonds from the Oregon Legislature for its Oregon Opportunity initiative
to expand the academic health center’s research capacity.23
Buckman grew up the oldest of six sons of an insurance adjuster
and homemaker in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He graduated early from high
school and, at sixteen, enrolled in the University of Michigan. He gradu-
ated with a science engineering degree and went on to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology to earn a doctorate in nuclear engineering in 1970
and to Harvard University for a master’s in business administration. He
married Marion Kasey in 1970.
After leaving MIT, he worked as a nuclear reactor engineer for Con-
sumer Power of Jackson, Michigan, the state’s largest electric and gas
utility.24 He was named CEO and president of PacifiCorp in 1994, a po-
sition he held four years. He later worked as an executive for a variety
of energy companies, including president and CEO of Shaw Group Inc.;
managing partner of Brookfield Asset Management Inc.; chairman and
CEO of Trans-Elect Development Inc., which he founded in 1999; and
president and CEO of Powerlink Transmission Company, a position he
still holds. He and his wife live in Vancouver, Washington, and have two
children and three grandsons.25
Mark Dodson
Mark Dodson, a Portland attorney and president of Northwest Natural
Gas, headed the search that led to the hiring of Peter Kohler as president
of OHSU in 1988. At the time of the search, Dodson was chair of both
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the State Board of Higher Education and the board’s search committee
and pushed hard for the selection of Kohler over other candidates. He was
skeptical of the proposal to make OHSU a public corporation. “Do you
know what you are doing here?” he asked Kohler. “Is this really the right
thing?” But he came to see how it freed OHSU to dramatically expand and
improve. He served as the first OHSU board’s unofficial secretary and re-
mained heavily involved in OHSU’s early years as a public corporation.26
Dodson grew up and completed high school in Beaverton, Oregon,
a suburb west of Portland, graduated from Harvard University, and at-
tended a Baptist seminary for a year. But the seminary “didn’t take,” he
said, and Dodson became the first male in three generations in his family
to choose not to become a Baptist minister. Instead, he went to work
doing research on street people in Berkeley, California. While there, he
earned a law degree at the University of California at Berkeley. He mar-
ried in 1968, and moved in 1973 to practice law in Portland, where he and
his wife, Ruth Ann Dodson, raised two children. He served in the general
counsel office of the US Department of Transportation in 1979 and later
as special counsel to the Federal Aviation Administration. He worked for
the Ater Wynne law firm for seventeen years before joining Northwest
Natural Gas Company in 1997 as senior vice president of public affairs and
general counsel. He served as chief executive officer and president of the
company from 2003 to 2008.27
He was active in public life and provided advice and counsel to gov-
ernment and elected officials. He served on the transition committees
for three governors, including his friend Governor Goldschmidt. He has
retired, but continues to be active in several industry and business associ-
ations including the Northwest Natural Gas board of directors.28
Brian Druker
Dr. Brian Druker became one of OHSU’s most renowned researchers
after he discovered the compound that was later named Gleevec, a simple
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life-saving pill for people with chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML). In
1992, Druker was a young researcher at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
in Boston exploring an enzyme involved with CML, a rare but deadly dis-
ease in which the bone marrow produces too many white blood cells.29
After six years at the cancer center as an instructor, he was looking for a
move. Dr. Grover Bagby, a top researcher at OHSU, was launching a new
Oregon Cancer Center and recruited Druker, who arrived in July of 1993.
Within his first six weeks at OHSU, Druker was closing in on a drug that
ultimately was going to revolutionize the way the medical world thinks
about fighting cancer.30
It took five years to get the compound into clinical trials, where it
proved to be remarkably effective. By January of 1999, patients trying
the drug, called Gleevec, were seeing normal blood counts. Druker and
his research team were eradicating cancer with a daily pill and without
chemotherapy or radiation therapy or surgery. Today, tens of thousands
of CML patients are alive because they take Gleevec daily.31 Druker gained
international recognition with his discovery and “cast a halo over the
whole” of OHSU, says Davis, the communications director.32
OHSU’s cancer center grew into the Knight Cancer Institute, and
Druker replaced Bagby as director. In 2014, the center received a
$500 million fund-raising challenge from Phil and Penny Knight. OHSU
met the challenge, collecting $500 million in less than two years, and will
raise an additional $200 million. The money will pay for two buildings
and more researchers, who will focus on finding ways to detect cancer in
its earliest and most treatable stage.33
Druker was born in 1955, and earned a degree in chemistry and his
MD at the University of California at San Diego. He completed his in-
ternship and residency at Washington University School of Medicine in
St. Louis, and then became a fellow, instructor, and researcher at the
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute of Harvard Medical School. After a previous
marriage, he married Alexandra Hardy, a journalist, and they have three
children.34
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In 2002, Druker was selected for the prestigious position as inves-
tigator for the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. He was elected to the
American Association of Physicians in 2006 and the National Academy of
Sciences in 2007. He’s received numerous awards, including the Lasker-
DeBakey Clinical Medical Research Award and the Hamdan Award for
Medical Research Excellence.35
Neil Goldschmidt
Neil Goldschmidt, an energetic, six-foot-one-inch political icon in Ore-
gon, was involved with OHSU from the time he became Portland mayor
in 1973, a job he kept through 1979.36 As one-term governor from 1987
through 1991, he went to bat for OHSU’s University Hospital when it had
money problems.37
After leaving office, he started a law and consulting firm, and in 1994,
chaired the Public Corporation Advisory Committee, created by Kohler
to explore whether OHSU should become a public corporation or pursue
some other change in governance. The committee recommended OHSU
become a public corporation, and Goldschmidt testified in favor of the
change before legislative committees.
He was appointed to OHSU’s first board of directors in 1995 and served
through 1999. During his final board retreat in late 1999, he recommended
OHSU increase its Big Ask to the Legislature for Oregon Opportunity money
from $100 to $200 million, which it did. After leaving the OHSU board, he
continued to be involved in the university. He is credited with coming up
with the idea of the Portland aerial tram to connect the university’s Marquam
Hill campus to the South Waterfront. He also urged the Schnitzer family,
which was his client, to donate nearly twenty acres on the waterfront to
OHSU, and the family did so in 2004. The gift, worth about $35 million, was
the largest to date in the university’s history and would be used to create a
Schnitzer campus for the dental and medical schools. Goldschmidt also rep-
resented other owners and developers involved in the South Waterfront.38
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Goldschmidt, a Democrat, was born in 1940 in Eugene, Oregon. He
graduated from the University of Oregon, where he was student body
president, and earned a law degree from the University of California at
Berkeley in 1967. In 1965, he married Margaret Wood, with whom he had
two children. He and Wood divorced in 1990 and, in 1994, he married
Diana Snowden, a senior vice president at PacifiCorp.39 Two years before
becoming the nation’s youngest mayor in 1973, Goldschmidt was elected
as a Portland city commissioner at age thirty. He served as US Secretary of
Education under President Jimmy Carter from 1979 to 1981.40
Governor Ted Kulongoski appointed him to the State Board of Higher
Education in 2003, but he resigned the following spring after Willamette
Week, an independent newspaper in Portland, revealed that Goldschmidt
had a sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl for an extended pe-
riod during his first term as Portland’s mayor.41 He was not prosecuted for
what constituted third degree rape because the statute of limitations had
expired. Goldschmidt admitted to the relationship, resigned from several
prominent organizations, and dropped out of public life.42
Mark Hatfield
US Senator Mark Hatfield contributed to OHSU’s expansion throughout
a career that made him one of the most influential politicians in Oregon
history. As a representative in the Oregon Legislature, he helped find state
funds to allow the dental school for the University of Oregon in 1956
to move out of its forty-year-old building in Northeast Portland into a
$2.2 million ten-floor building on the OHSU Marquam Hill campus. As
a state senator on the Senate Health Committee in 1955, Hatfield carried
the bill to the Senate floor that would create a teaching hospital, Univer-
sity Hospital, for what was then the University of Oregon Medical School.
Hatfield worked closely with most of OHSU’s leaders, including Dr.
David W. Baird, dean of the medical school;43 President Leonard Laster;
and President Peter Kohler. As chair of the US Senate Appropriations
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Committee from 1981 to 1987, Hatfield was able to funnel more than
$90 million of federal support into construction projects at OHSU such
as the Vollum Institute for Advanced Biomedical Research.44 In 1998, the
university honored Hatfield by opening its fourteen-story Hatfield Re-
search Center.45 After he left the US Senate in 1997, Hatfield served on the
OHSU Board of Directors from February of 2000 to May of 2008.
Hatfield, who died August 7, 2011 at the age of eighty-nine, spent most
of his life as an Oregon political leader. After graduating from Willamette
University in Salem, he served in the US Navy as a landing craft officer in
the World War II battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Through his career, he
opposed arms proliferation and used his influence instead to improve health
care and research. After the war, he earned a master’s degree in political
science at Stanford University and entered politics as a Republican state rep-
resentative for four years and member of the Oregon Senate for three more
years. He went on to serve a term as Oregon Secretary of State, two terms as
governor, and thirty years as a US senator.46
John Kitzhaber
John Kitzhaber, a former emergency physician and former Democratic state
legislator elected to four terms as governor, attended OHSU’s medical
school and supported its transformation to a public corporation. Kitzhaber
was governor when OHSU introduced Senate Bill 2 in the Legislature. He
testified in support of it and signed it into law on May 24, 1995.47
He was chief architect of the Oregon Health Plan, which dramati-
cally expanded Oregon’s Medicaid population and helped push OHSU to
become a public corporation. He also appointed OHSU’s first board of
directors. He stepped in as governor to urge the Attorney General’s Of-
fice to grant OHSU a lease on its property so it would have solid stand-
ing to borrow money on Wall Street. He helped in a campaign to win
voter approval for Measure 11, which allowed OHSU to save money
by issuing general obligation rather than revenue bonds. He signed
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the Oregon Opportunity legislation into law on August 8, 2001, giving
OHSU $200 million in state bonds that was paired with $300 million in
private donations to support the university’s dramatic research expan-
sion. He supported legislation that gave the state’s other seven public
universities some of the independence OHSU achieved in becoming a
public corporation. While supporting OHSU’s dramatic transformation
and growth over the two decades after it became more independent, he
expressed concern that the academic health center was losing its com-
mitment to its public mission of providing health care for the poor.48 In
2003, after serving his second term as governor, he established the Cen-
ter for Evidence Based Policy at OHSU.49
Kitzhaber, who commonly dressed in his signature blue jeans and
cowboy boots, has been one of Oregon’s most influential leaders as a leg-
islator and the state’s longest-serving governor. He was born in Colfax,
Washington, in 1947. He graduated from Dartmouth College before earn-
ing his MD from OHSU, and worked as an emergency physician. He was
elected to the Oregon House in 1978 and to the Oregon Senate in 1980,
where he served three terms and was Senate president from 1985 to 1993.
He was elected governor in 1994, served two terms, and then was elected
again in 2011.50 He led broad and systemic reforms in health and educa-
tion, including an education reform act and the Oregon Health Plan in the
early 1990s and the restructuring of the state’s education governance sys-
tem during his third term.
He married Rosemary Linehan in 1971 and they divorced three years
later. He married Sharon LaCroix in 1995, and they had one son and
divorced in 2003.51 His current fiancée, Cylvia Hayes, started an envi-
ronmental consultancy, and became a central figure in his political life.
Almost immediately after Kitzhaber took office for his fourth term as gov-
ernor in 2015, he became embroiled in a controversy over Hayes’ work
as a consultant for the state and questions about whether she was uneth-
ically or criminally advising him about green energy while consulting on
the issue.52 Under pressure from political leaders, both Democrats and Re-
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publicans, Kitzhaber resigned, though maintained he had “not broken any
laws or taken any actions that were dishonest or dishonorable in their in-
tent or outcomes.”53
He continues to work as a consultant on health care issues and has in-
dicated he would like to return to public life, telling one newspaper, “I’ve
got runway ahead and gas in the tank.”54
Phil Knight
Phil Knight, co-founder of Nike Inc., Oregon’s largest corporation, has
been OHSU’s largest donor as well as a leading philanthropist for other
enterprises and universities in the state. Knight, and his wife, Penny,
pledged in the fall of 2008 to give OHSU $100 million over seven years
for its cancer institute, the largest gift in the institution’s history.55 The
university subsequently named the institute after him. Three years later,
the Knights donated $125 million to establish the OHSU Cardiovascular
Institute.56 Then in 2013, Knight stunned OHSU leaders and guests gath-
ered in the downtown Portland hotel to raise money for the university’s
Knight Cancer Institute. He and his wife promised to give $500 million
to the institute if the university could come up with a match within two
years, which it did. Knight said he had confidence that the institute, led
by the groundbreaking researcher Dr. Brian Druker, would put a stop to
a disease that touches all people. “We are more convinced than ever that
cancer will meet its match at OHSU,” he said, “and we are proud to play a
role in this history in the making.”57
Knight was born February 24, 1938, in Portland, and graduated from
the University of Oregon with a journalism degree and from the Stanford
University Graduate School of Business. He was a middle-distance runner
at UO, capable of running a mile in four minutes and ten seconds. After
a stint in the US Army, he became a US shoe distributer for the Japanese
company Tiger. He became a partner in 1964 with his former UO track
coach, Bill Bowerman, and they later co-founded Nike, which has grown
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into a multinational corporation, employing 44,000 people worldwide.
The company, headquartered in Beaverton, is one of the world’s largest
suppliers of athletic shoes and apparel. Knight met Penelope “Penny”
Parks in Portland, and they married in 1968.58
Knight invested in Will Vinton Studios, an animation company, in
1998 and subsequently purchased the company and renamed it Laika. He
resigned as CEO of Nike in 2004, but retained his position as chair of the
board until June of 2016. Knight has won many honors for his contribu-
tions to businesses, universities, and sports, including his induction into
the Oregon Sports Hall of Fame in 2000 and the Naismith Memorial Bas-
ketball Hall of Fame in 2012. He was also elected to the 2015 American
Academy of Arts and Sciences membership class.59 His memoir, Shoe Dog,
was published by Scribner in 2016 and quickly soared onto the New York
Times bestseller list.60
Ted Kulongoski
Ted Kulongoski—former Oregon attorney general, Supreme Court jus-
tice, and governor—opposed OHSU’s proposal to become a public corpo-
ration. He said he saw the conversion of Oregon’s State Accident Insur-
ance Fund into a public corporation in the 1980s lead to improprieties and
functional problems, and he wasn’t in favor of the model. OHSU proba-
bly could have been as successful over the last two decades as part of the
state and its university system without becoming a public corporation, he
said. At Governor Kitzhaber’s request, Kulongoski did not publicly op-
pose OHSU’s public corporation quest.61
Some OHSU administrators said Kulongoski’s opposition to OHSU’s
public corporation structure appeared to be behind the Attorney General
Office’s reluctance to give the university a lease from the state on its
campus land. But Kulongoski said he was not involved with the lease
negotiations. He implied in comments to the State Board of Higher Educa-
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tion on November 17, 1995, however, that the lease posed dangers for the
board and state. “Ultimately,” he said, “from my perspective, somebody in
the State of Oregon is going to be held responsible if there is a default.”62
Kulongoski, whose full name is Theodore Ralph Kulongoski, was
born November 5, 1940, in St. Louis, Missouri. Following his father's
death when Kulongoski was four, he grew up in a parochial boys’ home.
He served in the US Marines, earned undergraduate and law degrees from
the University of Missouri and, in 1970, went to work as a labor lawyer in
Eugene. He is married to Mary Oberst, an attorney who has edited Ore-
gon historical publications and been active in historical preservation.63
Kulongoski, a Democrat, was elected to the Oregon House in 1974 and
to the Senate in 1978. Governor Goldschmidt appointed him state insurance
commissioner in 1987, and he was elected state attorney general in 1992.
He served on the Oregon Supreme Court from 1997 to 2001 and was then
elected to two terms as governor from 2003 to 2011. He became a mem-
ber of the faculty of the Mark O. Hatfield School of Governance at Portland
State University after his governorship ended, and he was also chosen to
review sentencing guidelines as a member of the Oregon Commission on
Public Safety.64
Leonard Laster
Dr. Leonard Laster, a handsome, confident gastroenterologist from the
East Coast, became OHSU’s second president in 1978. He dragged OHSU
out of its slumber, expanded its research capacity by building the Vollum
Institute, and launched a number of other expansion projects.
He was a brilliant physician and researcher, born and raised in New
York City and admitted to Harvard College in 1944 at age fourteen. He
graduated from medical school in 1950 at age twenty-one. As a young
doctor he joined the Public Health Service and became a researcher at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) when the agency was in its infancy.
He stayed twenty-three years during NIH’s golden age as it ushered in the
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modern era of medicine and later produced nine Nobel laureates.65
He moved on to become dean of the medical school at State Univer-
sity of New York Downstate Medical Center, and then was recruited to
become president of the University of Oregon Health Sciences Center in
1978. His nine-year term at OHSU was marked by both conflict and sig-
nificant growth, especially in research. He soon discovered that OHSU
didn’t find much respect within state government and was “not the fa-
vored child” in the state higher education system.66
He worked with US Senator Mark Hatfield from Oregon to launch
a variety of building projects at OHSU, and Tektronix founder Howard
Vollum helped him build the eight-story Vollum Institute for Ad-
vanced Biomedical Research in 1987, putting Oregon on the national
map for biomedical research. OHSU’s high-tech Biomedical Informa-
tion Communication Center, the School of Nursing building, the Cen-
ter for Research on Occupational and Environmental Toxicology, and
the 660-foot-long bridge from University Hospital to the Veteran’s Af-
fairs Medical Center were all started by Laster with Hatfield’s help.
None was completed, though, before he left in 1987 to take his new job
at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center. He later retired in
Massachusetts.
Laster had conflicts with his administrators and faculty at OHSU, but
he worked long hours, railed against mediocrity, and pushed his staff to
strive for excellence. He was surprised when some faculty opposed the
Vollum Institute as a waste of money. “That was a very, very difficult
time—and a shock,” said Laster. “I thought I was doing something that
would get people starry-eyed.”67
Barbara Roberts
Barbara Roberts, a former Democratic legislator and Oregon Secretary
of State, served one term as Oregon’s first female governor from 1991
through 1994 during a period when OHSU was seeking legislative ap-
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proval to become a public corporation. She was elected governor the
same day voters approved Measure 5, the property tax limitation law that
pushed OHSU to seek a fundamental change in its governance structure.
Roberts initially asked Kohler and his leadership team to back off
pressing for public corporation status because she didn’t want their cam-
paign to overshadow her push for tax reform, which included a proposed
sales tax. After voters rejected her tax plan in 1993, she stepped up to sup-
port OHSU’s public corporation proposal. In her 1995–97 budget plan, she
pledged support for making OHSU a public corporation, though not for a
proposal to give more autonomy to the entire university system. She in-
cluded an influential budget note urging the 1995 Legislature to consider
making OHSU a public corporation. With Roberts’ blessing, Kohler and
his team in early 1994 launched their public campaign for the law.68
Born as Barbara Hughey on December 21, 1936, in Corvallis, Oregon,
Roberts spent a portion of her youth in Los Angeles before her family re-
turned to Oregon. By the time she graduated from Sheridan High School
in 1955, she’d already been married a year to classmate Neal Sanders. The
couple moved to Texas, had two children, and then returned to Oregon.
One of the children was autistic, which would eventually lead Roberts
into political action. After she graduated from Portland State University
in 1964, she began lobbying the legislature for special needs children and
served on the boards of Parkrose School District and Mount Hood Com-
munity College. She and Sanders divorced in 1972, and two years later,
she married Frank Roberts, a state legislator. In 1981, Barbara Roberts,
too, was serving in the legislature as a member of the Oregon House of
Representatives. She went on to be elected Oregon Secretary of State in
1981 and, five years later, governor. She only served one term as gover-
nor, during which her husband died.69
After leaving office, she served as director of the Harvard Program
for Senior Executives in State and Local Government at Harvard Univer-
sity’s School of Governance, associate director of leadership development
at Portland State University’s Hatfield School of Government’s Executive
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Leadership Institute, and from 2011 to 2013 as a member of the council of
Metro, the Portland area’s regional government.70
Joseph Robertson
Dr. Joseph (Joe) Robertson Jr., an ophthalmologist, rose from dean of the
OHSU School of Medicine to replace departing President Kohler in the
fall of 2006. He has presided over the academic health center since.
During his decade as president, Robertson has led OHSU through
continuous expansion in keeping with Kohler’s vision. He steered the uni-
versity through a rough patch during the Great Recession, from which the
institution quickly recovered. He adopted a strategy used often by Kohler
of looking for partners who could help share the cost and increase the
value of OHSU investments.71 He and Portland State University President
Wim Wiewel in October of 2010 struck a strategic alliance, pledging to
conduct joint research, share faculty, and create a collaborative School of
Public Health.72 In the fall of 2015, OHSU joined Salem Health, which in-
cludes Salem hospital, to form a $2.5 billion-a-year integrated health sys-
tem throughout the northern part of the Willamette Valley, where most
of Oregon’s residents are concentrated. It also signed a similar agreement
to bring Tuality Health Alliance in suburban Portland into the network.
Like Kohler, Robertson supports OHSU’s rural health network and has
helped expand medical education in Eugene and Springfield through part-
nerships with the University of Oregon and the PeaceHealth System. He
said the university is building a statewide health care system.73
During his tenure, the university has dramatically expanded its campus
on Portland’s South Waterfront and attracted unprecedented private dona-
tions. In September of 2011, Bob and Charlee Moore, owners of Bob’s Red
Mill Natural Foods, donated $25 million to OHSU to establish the Bob and
Charlee Moore Institute for Nutrition and Wellness at OHSU.
A year later, Nike cofounder Phil Knight and his wife, Penny, donated
$125 million to establish the OHSU Cardiovascular Institute. Two years
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later, they pledged another $500 million for the Knight Cancer Institute if
the university could come up with a match within two years, which it did.
OHSU would not be able to attract such generous donations and would be
half its size today, says Robertson, if it had not become a public corpora-
tion, “a foundational change” instrumental in its success.74
Robertson was born and raised in rural Indiana, the only child of a
flour miller. He earned a degree in neuroscience at Yale University in 1974,
and attended medical school at the Indiana University School of Medicine,
where he met and married Dr. Margaret Hewitt, in 1976. He completed his
residency in ophthalmology at OHSU, and, in 1997, earned a master’s degree
in business administration from the University of Oregon. In 1999, he and
Hewitt, who had two children, divorced. He has remarried.75
The president has spent almost his whole career at OHSU. Robertson,
who is skilled in performing micro-surgery on the retina, also served as chair-
man of the Department of Ophthalmology, director of the Casey Eye Insti-
tute, and dean of the School of Medicine. He currently serves on the Oregon
Health Policy Board, which oversees the Oregon Health Authority.76
Steve Stadum
Steve Stadum, an attorney and legal expert on real estate, worked for
OHSU in various administrative positions for seventeen years. He was a
managing partner at Portland’s Ater Wynne law firm when he agreed to
help OHSU’s Chief Counsel Janet Billups negotiate with the state in 1995
for a lease of OHSU campus property. Stadum commissioned a title search
on all of OHSU’s property to ensure there were no covenants or disputes
that could complicate a lease. After several months of negotiations with
the Attorney General’s Office and the State Board of Higher Education,
OHSU finally secured a fifty-year lease, allowing it to borrow money on
Wall Street. Four years later, Stadum joined OHSU as general counsel and
in 1999 persuaded legislators to give OHSU a perpetual ninety-nine-year
revolving lease on the land.77
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Stadum helped execute OHSU’s expansion on Portland’s South Wa-
terfront. In 2004, he was named OHSU’s chief administrative officer,
overseeing all central administrative functions other than finance.78 He
was later promoted to OHSU executive vice president.
In 2010, Stadum announced he was going to leave OHSU, but Presi-
dent Joe Robertson enticed him to stay with the position of chief operat-
ing officer of the OHSU Knight Cancer Institute. In the summer of 2016,
Stadum finally left to be executive vice president and chief operating offi-
cer for the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle.79
Stadum credited OHSU’s conversion to a public corporation for its
extraordinary expansion during the years he worked there. Without that
change, he said, “we would have never had a board, we would have never
been able to issue debt, and we would not have ever been able to take risks,
be entrepreneurial and opportunistic.”80
Mike Thorne
Mike Thorne, a Pendleton rancher, had left the Oregon Senate by the time
President Kohler and his team pushed to make OHSU a public corpora-
tion in the Oregon Legislature. But he remained a strong ally, and when
he was in the Senate, he helped Kohler move the Office of Rural Health
from the State Department of Human Resources to OHSU’s control and
establish Area Health Education Centers across Oregon. In fact, even
before Kohler was hired, Thorne promised to help him expand OHSU
services into rural Oregon.81 The plain-speaking rancher said he admired
Kohler’s efforts to use the public corporation model to let OHSU work out
its own problems rather than turn to the state for money. OHSU showed,
he said, that “if people get focused and are willing to commit themselves,
you can solve things.”82 Over the years, Kohler sometimes visited Thorne
in Pendleton. In 1995, Thorne served on the public corporation advisory
board that recommended OHSU convert to a public corporation.
Michael Thorne was born September 25, 1940, in Pendleton, where
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he “grew up in the saddle on his family’s wheat and cattle ranch.” He grad-
uated in 1961 from Washington State University, where on a blind date
he met his wife, Jill, who was from Olympia, Washington. He worked as a
wheat farmer, rancher, and real estate broker. He served as a Democratic
state senator from 1973 to 1991, and chaired the Legislature’s Ways and
Means Committee. Jill organized his campaigns, served as an aide to Gov-
ernor Goldschmidt, and was chair of the Oregon Trail Sesquicentennial.83
In 1991 Thorne became director of the Port of Portland for ten years,
followed by three years in Seattle as CEO of the Washington State Fer-
ries. He said he wished he had tried to convert the bureaucratic-laden
ferry system into a public corporation.84 In addition, Thorne is a former
member for Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association and
Willamette Industries, and a former chairman of a state task force that re-
viewed Oregon’s land-use system.85
In 2009, the Thornes returned to their ranch in Pendleton.
Eugene Timms
Senator Eugene (Gene) Timms, a friendly Republican from the eastern
Oregon town of Burns, was chief sponsor of Senate Bill 2, the legislation
that enabled OHSU to become a public corporation. No one did more
to influence the bill’s success. As cochair of the Joint Ways and Means
Committee, Timms played a key role in ushering the bill through the
Oregon Legislature in 1995. The avuncular legislator, well liked by his
community and by both Republicans and Democrats, made sure the bill
got on the Senate Education Committee’s agenda and to a vote by the
full Senate. He testified in favor of the bill in committee and on the Sen-
ate floor.86
He also was concerned about the chronic shortage of health providers
in rural Oregon and saw OHSU as an ally in addressing the problem. He
worked with Kohler, almost from the day the OHSU president arrived,
to move the Office of Rural Health from the State Department of Human
412 TRANSFORMED
Resources to OHSU’s control and to establish Area Health Education Cen-
ters across Oregon.87
Timms was born May 16, 1932 in Burns and raised there. He grad-
uated from Burns Union High in 1950, earned a bachelor’s degree in
business at Willamette University, and married Edna Evans in 1953. He
served a stint in the military before returning to Burns and his family’s
business, Alpine Creamery. Timms was active in his community and
served in the state Senate twenty-two years. He died in 2014 at the age of
eighty-one.88
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Timeline
1867
Less than a quarter century after the opening of the Oregon Trail and
eight years after Oregon joined the union, Willamette University in Salem
welcomes its first medical students to its campus.1
1877
Willamette University’s medical program relocates to Portland.
1880
The Oregon–Washington Railroad and Navigation Company buys 360
acres of land, sight unseen, with plans to build a railroad depot and termi-
nal, unaware the land is atop Marquam Hill, too steep for trains.
1887
The University of Oregon charters a state medical school in Portland
at the request of eight physicians, including four who broke away from
the Willamette University program—Simeon E. Josephi, Kenneth A.J.
Mackenzie, H.C. Wilson, and George M. Welles. The University of Ore-
gon Medical School enrolls its first class of seven students in the fall. The
417
school occupies two rooms of a former two-story grocery store at NW
Twenty-Third Avenue and Marshall Street in Portland.
1898
The Oregon College of Dentistry is founded in Portland.
1899
The Tacoma College of Dental Surgery moves to Portland. The following
year it merges with the Oregon College of Dentistry to become the North
Pacific Dental College, later renamed the North Pacific College of Oregon.
1913
Willamette University and the University of Oregon merge programs to
form the University of Oregon Medical School.
1914
The present 116-acre Marquam Hill campus gets its start with a 20-acre
tract donated by the Oregon–Washington Railroad and Navigation Com-
pany, and an 88-acre tract donated by the family of C.S. Jackson, former
publisher of the Oregon Journal.
The statewide Child Development Rehabilitation Center Service Pro-
gram is established, initially in the School of Medicine to provide diagnos-
tic, treatment, and rehabilitation services for children with disabilities.
1919
The University of Oregon Medical School moves from downtown Port-
land into a new building at its present location on Marquam Hill in
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southwest Portland. The medical school’s first building, Mackenzie Hall,
was named after Kenneth A.J. Mackenzie MD, the school’s second dean,
who was also the railroad’s surgeon.
The University of Oregon in Eugene begins offering courses in nursing.
1920
The Portland School of Social Work begins offering courses in public
health nursing.
1923
Multnomah County Hospital opens on the Marquam Hill campus and
contracts with the medical school to provide services to indigent patients.
1926
The University of Oregon establishes a five-year program leading to a
degree in nursing. The following year a nursing dormitory is built on
campus, named Emma Jones Hall after the nursing pioneer and superin-
tendent of Multnomah County Hospital until 1944.
Doernbecher Memorial Hospital for Children is built on the Mar-
quam Hill campus and becomes the first full-service children’s hospital in
the Pacific Northwest. The hospital was financed primarily by a donation
from a charitable trust managed by the heirs of Frank Silas Doernbecher, a
prominent Portland businessman who established Portland’s leading fur-
niture factory.
1928
The University of Oregon Medical School takes over operation of Doern-
becher Children’s Hospital.
Timeline 419
1931
The outpatient clinic building is constructed and opens on Marquam Hill,
allowing medical and nursing students and residents to gain practical ex-
perience.
1932
The Department of Nursing begins.
1938
The medical school adds a library and auditorium building, a three-story
laboratory wing to Mackenzie Hall and an eighty-bed University State Tu-
berculosis Hospital, later converted to the Campus Services Building.
1943
Dr. David W. Baird is named dean of the University of Oregon Medical
School.
1945
The University of Oregon Dental School begins.
1949
A new building opens for a basic science department and administrative
offices, later named after David W. Baird, former dean of the medical
school.
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1952
A four-story east wing is added to Emma Jones Hall.
1954
The Child Development and Rehabilitation Center facility is built on
Marquam Hill.
1956
The Medical School Hospital is built on Marquam Hill. The University of
Oregon Dental School moves from Northeast Oregon Street to its present
location on Marquam Hill.
1958
Dr. Albert Starr launches an open-heart surgery program at OHSU and
produces the world’s first successful heart valve replacement.
1960
The Department of Nursing Education becomes the University of Oregon
School of Nursing in Portland and part of the Oregon State System of
Higher Education.
1971
A new, eight-story, Basic Science Building, later named Richard T. Jones
Hall for Basic Medical Sciences, opens as OHSU’s example of Brutalism ar-
chitecture.
Timeline 421
1973
University Hospital is created through the merger of Multnomah County
Hospital, Medical School Hospital and the outpatient clinics.
1974
University of Oregon Health Sciences Center is formed as an independent
institution under the direction of the Oregon State System of Higher Ed-
ucation. The schools, hospitals, and all of the university’s programs are
brought together under one umbrella to create this new center, which be-
comes Oregon’s only academic health center and one of 125 in the nation.
The Oregon State Board of Higher Education hires Dr. Lewis William
(Bill) Bluemle, president of State University of New York’s Upstate Med-
ical Center in Syracuse, to be the Oregon medical center’s first president.
1977
Lesley Hallick arrives at OHSU to be a professor and researcher, leaving
the University of California at Berkeley, where she studied the structures
of virus DNA and RNA.
1978
Leonard Laster, a gastroenterologist and dean of the medical school at
State University of New York Downstate Medical Center, is hired to be-
come OHSU’s second president.
1981
The institution is renamed Oregon Health Sciences University.
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1983
A $20 million Shriners Hospital for Children opens on Marquam Hill with
thirty-nine beds and 80,610 square feet.
1984
Timothy Goldfarb leaves his job as senior associate administrator of the
new hospital at the University of Arizona’s medical center in Tucson to
join OHSU as associate director of the University Hospital.
James Walker leaves the University of New Mexico Hospital to work
as OHSU’s chief financial officer.
1985
Legislators propose House Bill 2596, calling for a task force to study clos-
ing OHSU’s hospital and, thereby, threatening the entire academic health
center. The bill does not survive.
1986
Lois Davis leaves post as chief of staff for US Representative Ron Wyden, a
Democrat from Oregon, to become government relations director for OHSU.
1987
Construction is completed on the Vollum Institute for Advanced Biomed-
ical Research building. The institute is dedicated to the study of the brain
and nervous system at the molecular level.
OHSU is designated one of two Level 1 trauma care centers in Oregon.
Leonard Laster leaves to become president of the University of Mass-
achusetts Medical Center.
Timeline 423
Janet Billups arrives as the Oregon Attorney General’s Office repre-
sentative at OHSU.
1988
Dr. Peter O. Kohler, an endocrinologist, leaves his post as dean of the
medical school at the University of Texas medical center in San Antonio
to become OHSU’s third president.
New Veterans Affairs Medical Center opens on Marquam Hill.
1989
The Center for Ethics in Health Care is created to promote interdiscipli-
nary study of ethical issues in health care.
The State Office of Rural Health becomes part of OHSU to help rural
areas better address their unique health care needs.
The Area Health Education Centers program is established to pro-
mote better access to adequate health care and to facilitate medical student
primary care clerkships.
1990
Dotter Interventional Institute is established at OHSU to carry on the
work of the pioneer of interventional radiology.
Oregon voters approve Measure 5, a property tax limitation law that
puts a squeeze on state funding for higher education.
1991
Casey Eye Institute opens on Marquam Hill.
Construction is completed for the Biomedical Information Commu-
nication Center, which provides library, audiovisual, and teleconferencing
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services; public computer services; and health informatics.
President Peter Kohler appoints a task force of business leaders, leg-
islators, and representatives from OHSU to consider reorganizational op-
tions, including merging with the Oregon Health Division, becoming fully
private, or transforming into a public corporation. The task force recom-
mends it become a public corporation.
1992
The Center for Research on Occupational and Environmental Toxicology
building opens. CROET is one of the first facilities in the world to com-
bine the use of molecular and cell biology to study the adverse effects of
chemicals on the body and, in particular, the nervous system.
The Veterans Affairs Medical Center bridge opens. The 660-foot-long
suspended pedestrian enclosed skybridge is the longest in North America.
The Oregon Cancer Center is established with a grant from the Na-
tional Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health, and Dr. Grover
Bagby is appointed as its director.
The School of Nursing building opens.
1993
The School of Nursing begins coordinating a statewide integrated nursing
education system that includes programs at OHSU, Eastern Oregon Uni-
versity, Southern Oregon University and the Oregon Institute of Tech-
nology.
Oregon Health Policy Institute, an interdisciplinary center of OHSU,
Portland State University, and Oregon State University is created as a re-
source center for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating health policy
information.
Physicians Pavilion opens on Marquam Hill to provide modern out-
patient services.
Timeline 425
Dr. Brian Druker, researcher who discovered the compound that be-
came Gleevec, a virtual cure for chronic myelogenous leukemia, is hired
by OHSU.
1994
The Oregon Regional Primate Research Center joins OHSU as an affiliate
research institute.
OHSU Foundation and the Oregon Medical Research Foundation,
owner of the Oregon Regional Primate Center, merge.
President Peter Kohler creates the Public Corporation Advisory
Committee, chaired by former Governor Neil Goldschmidt, which urges
state leaders to allow OHSU to become a public corporation.
Oregon Health Plan, led by Senate President John Kitzhaber, receives
funding for implementation.
Governor Barbara Roberts endorses OHSU’s public corporation pro-
posal and gives President Peter Kohler and his team a green light to
campaign for it.
1995
OHSU becomes a public corporation and independent of the Oregon State
System of Higher Education and of state government regulations. Gover-
nance of OHSU changes from the State Board of Higher Education to the
OHSU Board of Directors, whose members are nominated by the gover-
nor and approved by the Oregon Senate. The new board begins meeting
in July.
Two floors for labor and delivery are added to the C-Wing of Uni-
versity Hospital, nine years after the project began.
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
Local 328 go on strike for four days, the first labor strike in the medical
school’s history.
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After more than four months of tense negotiations with the Attorney
General’s Office and the State Board of Higher Education, OHSU secures
a fifty-year lease of its campus property. Four years later the lease is ex-
tended to ninety-nine years.
1996
OHSU issues a $215 million bond package backed solely by its good faith
and credit as a public corporation.
University Hospital is renamed OHSU Hospital.
The first of OHSU’s primary care neighborhood clinics opens in
southwest Portland.
1997
Planning begins for the Center for Women’s Health, and an interim di-
rector is named. The center offers a place where women’s concerns can be
addressed in a comprehensive, comforting, and supportive manner. The
center uses a collaborative model that encourages women to actively par-
ticipate in their care.
Portland Mayor Vera Katz appoints a twenty-five-member steering
committee to study development of land on the city’s South Waterfront.
1998
The Mark O. Hatfield Research Center is dedicated. The center houses a
variety of basic and clinical research programs that have the potential to
spark new therapies. It includes such programs as the Clinical Research
Center, the Oregon Hearing Research Center, Doernbecher Children’s
Hospital Pediatric Research Laboratories, the Bone and Mineral Unit’s
osteoporosis studies, the Oregon Stroke Center, and the Oregon Cancer
Center.
Timeline 427
Doernbecher Children’s Hospital’s new state-of-the-art pediatric
medical complex is opened. Built with private funding and bond revenues,
Doernbecher provides the widest range of health care services for children
in the region.
The Neurological Sciences Institute leaves Legacy Good Samaritan
Medical Center in Portland and joins the university as its fifth research
unit. NSI researchers conduct research to advance understanding of the
brain and neurological disorders.
The Oregon Regional Primate Research Center becomes an OHSU
research unit.
1999
During its annual retreat at Skamania Lodge in the Columbia Gorge,
OHSU board agrees to pursue its Big Ask. The board will ask the legisla-
ture for $200 million in bond money financed by tobacco lawsuit settle-
ment money.
Portland city staff and consultants produce the first draft of a devel-
opment plan on Portland’s South Waterfront.
2000
President Peter Kohler and his leadership team launch a campaign for
$200 million in bonds from the legislature, arguing that it will help Ore-
gon get a foothold in the burgeoning biotechnology business. OHSU
board officially supports the plan, which is named Oregon Opportunity
and also calls for raising $300 million in donations.
2001
The Oregon Legislature approves Senate Bill 832, also called the Oregon
Opportunity Act, allowing the state to use its tobacco settlement money
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to finance $200 million in bonds for OHSU’s research expansion. Gover-
nor Kitzhaber signs the bill on August 8, 2001.
The Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute and Neurological Sciences
Institute buildings open on OHSU’s West Campus in Hillsboro.
OHSU’s name changes to Oregon Health & Science University as
Governor Kitzhaber signs legislation expanding OHSU’s mission and
paving the way for merger with Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and
Technology. The merger took place July 1, 2001.
OHSU Board of Directors expands from seven to ten members.
Oregon Cancer Center changes its name to OHSU Cancer Institute.
Oregon Nurses Association union at OHSU goes on strike, which lasts
nearly two months before a settlement.
Timothy Goldfarb, director of OHSU hospitals and the health care
system, departs to work as chief executive officer of Shands HealthCare in
Gainesville, Florida.
2002
Oregon Regional Primate Research Center changes its name to Oregon
National Primate Research Center.
President Kohler’s staff completes a thirty-year Marquam Hill Plan,
guiding development on the hill and on the South Waterfront. Marquam
Hill is designated a “plan district” by the Portland City council. Portland
Planning Bureau releases proposed zoning and design guidelines for South
Waterfront.
Portland City Council approves construction of a tram from South
Waterfront to OHSU.
OHSU uses Oregon Opportunity money to create the Oregon Rural
Practice-based Research Network.
Timeline 429
2003
OHSU breaks ground for its first building in the South Waterfront District.
OHSU breaks ground for a new research building on Marquam Hill
campus.
James Walker, vice president for finance and administration, retires
from OHSU, and shortly thereafter goes to work as finance director for
Lewis & Clark College.
2004
The Schnitzer Investment Corporation donates nearly twenty acres of
riverfront property in South Waterfront to OHSU.
2006
Hildegard Lamfrom Biomedical Research Building opens on Marquam
Hill.
Peter O. Kohler Pavilion opens as a state-of-the-art patient care facil-
ity on Marquam Hill.
The Center for Health & Healing, one of Oregon’s greenest buildings
and winner of the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental De-
sign) Platinum award, opens on the South Waterfront by the Willamette
River.
The Portland Aerial Tram begins operating between OHSU’s Mar-
quam Hill Campus and South Waterfront.
Oregon Graduate Institute School of Science and Engineering and the
Neurological Sciences Institute are dismantled. Some of their researchers
join other OHSU departments, others leave.
OHSU ranks twentieth among nation’s academic health centers in
terms of research money from National Institutes of Health, reaching
President Peter Kohler’s central longtime goal.
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Peter Kohler retires from OHSU, passing the torch on September 14
to OHSU’s fourth president, Dr. Joseph Robertson Jr. Kohler goes to
Arkansas to serve as vice chancellor at the University of Arkansas for
Medical Sciences.
2008
A gift of $100 million from Nike cofounder Phil Knight and his wife,
Penny, helps evolve the OHSU Cancer Institute to the OHSU Knight Can-
cer Institute.
2009
Lois Davis, vice president for public affairs and marketing, leaves OHSU
to become vice president for public affairs for Portland State University.
Lesley Hallick, OHSU provost and vice president for academic affairs,
leaves to become president of Pacific University in Forest Grove, Oregon.
2010
OHSU and Portland State University agree to a strategic alliance that in-
cludes joint research, shared faculty and a collaborative School of Public
Health.
2011
The OHSU/OUS Collaborative Life Sciences Building and Skourtes
Tower groundbreaking takes place on the Schnitzer Campus.
A gift of $25 million establishes the Bob and Charlee Moore Institute
for Nutrition and Wellness at OHSU.
Timeline 431
2012
A gift of $125 million from Phil and Penny Knight creates the OHSU
Knight Cardiovascular Institute.
OHSU celebrates its 125th anniversary.
2013
Legislature approves bill giving Oregon’s seven state universities more in-
dependence and authority to have their own governing boards.
2014
The OHSU/OUS Collaborative Life Sciences Building and Skourtes Tower
opens on the Schnitzer Campus in Portland’s South Waterfront District.
2015
OHSU sets fundraising record by meeting the challenge of Phil and Penny
Knight and matching their pledge of $500 million.
OHSU joins Salem Health and Tuality Health Alliance to form a
$2.5 billion-a-year integrated health system throughout Oregon’s north-
ern Willamette Valley.
2016
OHSU breaks ground on Portland’s South Waterfront for the
320,000-square-foot Knight Cancer Institute research building, which
will house up to 600 researchers and administrators.
OHSU also starts construction on the South Waterfront for the Cen-
ter for Health & Healing South, a twenty-four-story building that includes
a health care center, a guest house, and other mixed uses.
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Notes
1 This timeline includes information from a historical timeline on the OHSU web-
site: “History,” About OHSU, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/about/facts/history.cfm.
Timeline 433
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